Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1109/SP40001.2021.00022
Benjamin Eriksson, Giancarlo Pellegrino, A. Sabelfeld
Modern web applications are an integral part of our digital lives. As we put more trust in web applications, the need for security increases. At the same time, detecting vulnerabilities in web applications has become increasingly hard, due to the complexity, dynamism, and reliance on third-party components. Blackbox vulnerability scanning is especially challenging because (i) for deep penetration of web applications scanners need to exercise such browsing behavior as user interaction and asynchrony, and (ii) for detection of nontrivial injection attacks, such as stored cross-site scripting (XSS), scanners need to discover inter-page data dependencies.This paper illuminates key challenges for crawling and scanning the modern web. Based on these challenges we identify three core pillars for deep crawling and scanning: navigation modeling, traversing, and tracking inter-state dependencies. While prior efforts are largely limited to the separate pillars, we suggest an approach that leverages all three. We develop Black Widow, a blackbox data-driven approach to web crawling and scanning. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the crawling by code coverage improvements ranging from 63% to 280% compared to other crawlers across all applications. Further, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the web vulnerability scanning by featuring no false positives and finding more cross-site scripting vulnerabilities than previous methods. In older applications, used in previous research, we find vulnerabilities that the other methods miss. We also find new vulnerabili-ties in production software, including HotCRP, osCommerce, PrestaShop and WordPress.
{"title":"Black Widow: Blackbox Data-driven Web Scanning","authors":"Benjamin Eriksson, Giancarlo Pellegrino, A. Sabelfeld","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00022","url":null,"abstract":"Modern web applications are an integral part of our digital lives. As we put more trust in web applications, the need for security increases. At the same time, detecting vulnerabilities in web applications has become increasingly hard, due to the complexity, dynamism, and reliance on third-party components. Blackbox vulnerability scanning is especially challenging because (i) for deep penetration of web applications scanners need to exercise such browsing behavior as user interaction and asynchrony, and (ii) for detection of nontrivial injection attacks, such as stored cross-site scripting (XSS), scanners need to discover inter-page data dependencies.This paper illuminates key challenges for crawling and scanning the modern web. Based on these challenges we identify three core pillars for deep crawling and scanning: navigation modeling, traversing, and tracking inter-state dependencies. While prior efforts are largely limited to the separate pillars, we suggest an approach that leverages all three. We develop Black Widow, a blackbox data-driven approach to web crawling and scanning. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the crawling by code coverage improvements ranging from 63% to 280% compared to other crawlers across all applications. Further, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the web vulnerability scanning by featuring no false positives and finding more cross-site scripting vulnerabilities than previous methods. In older applications, used in previous research, we find vulnerabilities that the other methods miss. We also find new vulnerabili-ties in production software, including HotCRP, osCommerce, PrestaShop and WordPress.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"36 1","pages":"1125-1142"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78743107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1109/SP40001.2021.00046
G. Barthe, S. Cauligi, B. Grégoire, Adrien Koutsos, Kevin Liao, Tiago Oliveira, Swarn Priya, Tamara Rezk, P. Schwabe
High-assurance cryptography leverages methods from program verification and cryptography engineering to deliver efficient cryptographic software with machine-checked proofs of memory safety, functional correctness, provable security, and absence of timing leaks. Traditionally, these guarantees are established under a sequential execution semantics. However, this semantics is not aligned with the behavior of modern processors that make use of speculative execution to improve performance. This mismatch, combined with the high-profile Spectre-style attacks that exploit speculative execution, naturally casts doubts on the robustness of high-assurance cryptography guarantees. In this paper, we dispel these doubts by showing that the benefits of high-assurance cryptography extend to speculative execution, costing only a modest performance overhead. We build atop the Jasmin verification framework an end-to-end approach for proving properties of cryptographic software under speculative execution, and validate our approach experimentally with efficient, functionally correct assembly implementations of ChaCha20 and Poly1305, which are secure against both traditional timing and speculative execution attacks.
{"title":"High-Assurance Cryptography in the Spectre Era","authors":"G. Barthe, S. Cauligi, B. Grégoire, Adrien Koutsos, Kevin Liao, Tiago Oliveira, Swarn Priya, Tamara Rezk, P. Schwabe","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00046","url":null,"abstract":"High-assurance cryptography leverages methods from program verification and cryptography engineering to deliver efficient cryptographic software with machine-checked proofs of memory safety, functional correctness, provable security, and absence of timing leaks. Traditionally, these guarantees are established under a sequential execution semantics. However, this semantics is not aligned with the behavior of modern processors that make use of speculative execution to improve performance. This mismatch, combined with the high-profile Spectre-style attacks that exploit speculative execution, naturally casts doubts on the robustness of high-assurance cryptography guarantees. In this paper, we dispel these doubts by showing that the benefits of high-assurance cryptography extend to speculative execution, costing only a modest performance overhead. We build atop the Jasmin verification framework an end-to-end approach for proving properties of cryptographic software under speculative execution, and validate our approach experimentally with efficient, functionally correct assembly implementations of ChaCha20 and Poly1305, which are secure against both traditional timing and speculative execution attacks.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"7 1","pages":"1884-1901"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73006134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1109/SP40001.2021.00074
Andrea Possemato, Simone Aonzo, D. Balzarotti, Y. Fratantonio
Nowadays, more than two billions of mobile devices run Android OS. At the core of this success are the open source nature of the Android Open Source Project and vendors’ ability to customize the code base and ship it on their own devices. While the possibility of customizations is beneficial to vendors, they can potentially lead to compatibility and security problems. To prevent these problems, Google developed a set of requirements that must be satisfied for a vendor to brand its devices as "Android," and recently introduced Project Treble as an effort to partition vendor customizations. These requirements are encoded as part of a textual document (called Compatibility Definition Document, or CDD) and various automated tests. This paper performs the first longitudinal study on Android OEM customizations. We first built a dataset of 2,907 ROMs, spanning across 42 different vendors, and covering Android versions from 1.6 to 9.0 (years 2009–2020). We then developed an analysis framework and pipeline to extract each ROM’s customization layers and evaluate it across several metrics. For example, we analyze ROMs to determine whether they are compliant with respect to the various requirements and whether their customizations negatively affect the security posture of the overall device. In the process, we focus on various aspects, ranging from security hardening of binaries, SELinux policies, Android init scripts, and kernel security hardening techniques. Our results are worrisome. We found 579 over 2,907 (~20%) of the ROMs have at least one violation for the CDD related to their Android version — incredibly, 11 of them are branded by Google itself. Some of our findings suggest that vendors often go out of their way to bypass or "comment out" safety nets added by the Android security team. In other cases, we found ROMs that modify init scripts to launch at boot outdated versions (with known CVEs and public POCs) of programs as root and reachable from a remote attacker (e.g., tcpdump ). This paper shows that Google’s efforts are not enough, and we offer several recommendations on how to improve the compliance check pipelines.
{"title":"Trust, But Verify: A Longitudinal Analysis Of Android OEM Compliance and Customization","authors":"Andrea Possemato, Simone Aonzo, D. Balzarotti, Y. Fratantonio","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00074","url":null,"abstract":"Nowadays, more than two billions of mobile devices run Android OS. At the core of this success are the open source nature of the Android Open Source Project and vendors’ ability to customize the code base and ship it on their own devices. While the possibility of customizations is beneficial to vendors, they can potentially lead to compatibility and security problems. To prevent these problems, Google developed a set of requirements that must be satisfied for a vendor to brand its devices as \"Android,\" and recently introduced Project Treble as an effort to partition vendor customizations. These requirements are encoded as part of a textual document (called Compatibility Definition Document, or CDD) and various automated tests. This paper performs the first longitudinal study on Android OEM customizations. We first built a dataset of 2,907 ROMs, spanning across 42 different vendors, and covering Android versions from 1.6 to 9.0 (years 2009–2020). We then developed an analysis framework and pipeline to extract each ROM’s customization layers and evaluate it across several metrics. For example, we analyze ROMs to determine whether they are compliant with respect to the various requirements and whether their customizations negatively affect the security posture of the overall device. In the process, we focus on various aspects, ranging from security hardening of binaries, SELinux policies, Android init scripts, and kernel security hardening techniques. Our results are worrisome. We found 579 over 2,907 (~20%) of the ROMs have at least one violation for the CDD related to their Android version — incredibly, 11 of them are branded by Google itself. Some of our findings suggest that vendors often go out of their way to bypass or \"comment out\" safety nets added by the Android security team. In other cases, we found ROMs that modify init scripts to launch at boot outdated versions (with known CVEs and public POCs) of programs as root and reachable from a remote attacker (e.g., tcpdump ). This paper shows that Google’s efforts are not enough, and we offer several recommendations on how to improve the compliance check pipelines.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"18 1","pages":"87-102"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73240800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1109/SP40001.2021.00008
M. Barbosa, G. Barthe, K. Bhargavan, B. Blanchet, C. Cremers, Kevin Liao, Bryan Parno
Computer-aided cryptography is an active area of research that develops and applies formal, machine-checkable approaches to the design, analysis, and implementation of cryptography. We present a cross-cutting systematization of the computer-aided cryptography literature, focusing on three main areas: (i) design-level security (both symbolic security and computational security), (ii) functional correctness and efficiency, and (iii) implementation-level security (with a focus on digital side-channel resistance). In each area, we first clarify the role of computer-aided cryptography—how it can help and what the caveats are—in addressing current challenges. We next present a taxonomy of state-of-the-art tools, comparing their accuracy, scope, trustworthiness, and usability. Then, we highlight their main achievements, trade-offs, and research challenges. After covering the three main areas, we present two case studies. First, we study efforts in combining tools focused on different areas to consolidate the guarantees they can provide. Second, we distill the lessons learned from the computer-aided cryptography community’s involvement in the TLS 1.3 standardization effort. Finally, we conclude with recommendations to paper authors, tool developers, and standardization bodies moving forward.
{"title":"SoK: Computer-Aided Cryptography","authors":"M. Barbosa, G. Barthe, K. Bhargavan, B. Blanchet, C. Cremers, Kevin Liao, Bryan Parno","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00008","url":null,"abstract":"Computer-aided cryptography is an active area of research that develops and applies formal, machine-checkable approaches to the design, analysis, and implementation of cryptography. We present a cross-cutting systematization of the computer-aided cryptography literature, focusing on three main areas: (i) design-level security (both symbolic security and computational security), (ii) functional correctness and efficiency, and (iii) implementation-level security (with a focus on digital side-channel resistance). In each area, we first clarify the role of computer-aided cryptography—how it can help and what the caveats are—in addressing current challenges. We next present a taxonomy of state-of-the-art tools, comparing their accuracy, scope, trustworthiness, and usability. Then, we highlight their main achievements, trade-offs, and research challenges. After covering the three main areas, we present two case studies. First, we study efforts in combining tools focused on different areas to consolidate the guarantees they can provide. Second, we distill the lessons learned from the computer-aided cryptography community’s involvement in the TLS 1.3 standardization effort. Finally, we conclude with recommendations to paper authors, tool developers, and standardization bodies moving forward.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"7 1","pages":"777-795"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82305467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1109/SP40001.2021.00088
Yuncong Hu, Kian Hooshmand, Harika Kalidhindi, Seung Jin Yang, R. A. Popa
Transparency logs are designed to help users audit untrusted servers. For example, Certificate Transparency (CT) enables users to detect when a compromised Certificate Authority (CA) has issued a fake certificate. Practical state-of-the-art transparency log systems, however, suffer from high monitoring costs when used for low-latency applications. To reduce monitoring costs, such systems often require users to wait an hour or more for their updates to take effect, inhibiting low-latency applications. We propose Merkle2, a transparency log system that supports both efficient monitoring and low-latency updates. To achieve this goal, we construct a new multi-dimensional, authenticated data structure that nests two types of Merkle trees, hence the name of our system, Merkle2. Using this data structure, we then design a transparency log system with efficient monitoring and lookup protocols that enables low-latency updates. In particular, all the operations in Merkle2 are independent of update intervals and are (poly)logarithmic to the number of entries in the log. Merkle2 not only has excellent asymptotics when compared to prior work, but is also efficient in practice. Our evaluation shows that Merkle2 propagates updates in as little as 1 second and can support 100× more users than state-of-the-art transparency logs.
{"title":"Merkle2: A Low-Latency Transparency Log System","authors":"Yuncong Hu, Kian Hooshmand, Harika Kalidhindi, Seung Jin Yang, R. A. Popa","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00088","url":null,"abstract":"Transparency logs are designed to help users audit untrusted servers. For example, Certificate Transparency (CT) enables users to detect when a compromised Certificate Authority (CA) has issued a fake certificate. Practical state-of-the-art transparency log systems, however, suffer from high monitoring costs when used for low-latency applications. To reduce monitoring costs, such systems often require users to wait an hour or more for their updates to take effect, inhibiting low-latency applications. We propose Merkle2, a transparency log system that supports both efficient monitoring and low-latency updates. To achieve this goal, we construct a new multi-dimensional, authenticated data structure that nests two types of Merkle trees, hence the name of our system, Merkle2. Using this data structure, we then design a transparency log system with efficient monitoring and lookup protocols that enables low-latency updates. In particular, all the operations in Merkle2 are independent of update intervals and are (poly)logarithmic to the number of entries in the log. Merkle2 not only has excellent asymptotics when compared to prior work, but is also efficient in practice. Our evaluation shows that Merkle2 propagates updates in as little as 1 second and can support 100× more users than state-of-the-art transparency logs.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"10 1","pages":"285-303"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88653714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1109/SP40001.2021.00023
Xiuhua Wang, Sherman S. M. Chow
Access control is a fundamental keystone in security. Damgard, Haagh, and Orlandi (TCC 2016) introduced access˚ control encryption (ACE) that enforces no-read and no-write rules without revealing the senders, receivers, or the content of the encrypted traffic. Existing designs of ACE for arbitrary policy (covering all possibilities of read/write relationship) rely on indistinguishability obfuscation or lattice-based assumptions, with either exponential-size ciphertexts or circuit realization of policy. Also, their designs mandate a private sanitizer key to remain perpetually online for sanitization. The only existing scheme that can afford a public sanitizer key supports only simple policies. To summarize, state-of-the-art ACE schemes only feature at most two of the following desirable properties: arbitrarypolicy, constant-size (ciphertext), and efficient (sanitization). This paper introduces an ACE scheme for arbitrary policy without sanitizer key, which solves the open question posed by Kim and Wu (Asiacrypt 2017). We also put forth the notion of cross-domain ACE, separating the key generator into the sender-authority and receiver-authority. Our scheme requires structure-preserving signatures, non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, and sanitizable identity-based broadcast encryption as the building blocks. It can be instantiated directly from pairing-based assumptions and features constant ciphertext size. We also prototyped our scheme and demonstrated its practical efficiency.
访问控制是安全的基石。Damgard, Haagh, and Orlandi (TCC 2016)引入了访问控制加密(ACE)，该加密在不泄露发送方，接收方或加密流量内容的情况下强制执行无读和无写规则。针对任意策略(涵盖所有读/写关系的可能性)的现有ACE设计依赖于不可区分混淆或基于格的假设，使用指数大小的密文或策略的电路实现。此外，他们的设计要求一个私人消毒密钥，以保持永久在线进行消毒。唯一能够提供公共杀毒程序密钥的现有方案只支持简单的策略。总而言之，最先进的ACE方案最多只具有以下两个理想的特性:任意策略、恒定大小(密文)和高效(消毒)。本文介绍了一种不带消毒密钥的任意策略的ACE方案，解决了Kim和Wu (Asiacrypt 2017)提出的开放性问题。我们还提出了跨域ACE的概念，将密钥生成器分为发送方-授权方和接收方-授权方。我们的方案需要结构保持签名、非交互式零知识证明和基于身份的广播加密作为构建块。它可以直接从基于配对的假设中实例化，并且具有恒定的密文大小。我们还对我们的方案进行了原型设计，并证明了它的实际效率。
{"title":"Cross-Domain Access Control Encryption: Arbitrary-policy, Constant-size, Efficient","authors":"Xiuhua Wang, Sherman S. M. Chow","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00023","url":null,"abstract":"Access control is a fundamental keystone in security. Damgard, Haagh, and Orlandi (TCC 2016) introduced access˚ control encryption (ACE) that enforces no-read and no-write rules without revealing the senders, receivers, or the content of the encrypted traffic. Existing designs of ACE for arbitrary policy (covering all possibilities of read/write relationship) rely on indistinguishability obfuscation or lattice-based assumptions, with either exponential-size ciphertexts or circuit realization of policy. Also, their designs mandate a private sanitizer key to remain perpetually online for sanitization. The only existing scheme that can afford a public sanitizer key supports only simple policies. To summarize, state-of-the-art ACE schemes only feature at most two of the following desirable properties: arbitrarypolicy, constant-size (ciphertext), and efficient (sanitization). This paper introduces an ACE scheme for arbitrary policy without sanitizer key, which solves the open question posed by Kim and Wu (Asiacrypt 2017). We also put forth the notion of cross-domain ACE, separating the key generator into the sender-authority and receiver-authority. Our scheme requires structure-preserving signatures, non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, and sanitizable identity-based broadcast encryption as the building blocks. It can be instantiated directly from pairing-based assumptions and features constant ciphertext size. We also prototyped our scheme and demonstrated its practical efficiency.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"27 1","pages":"748-761"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88729521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1109/SP40001.2021.00103
Jaewon Hur, Suhwan Song, Dongup Kwon, Eun-Tae Baek, Jangwoo Kim, Byoungyoung Lee
Security bugs in CPUs have critical security impacts to all the computation related hardware and software components as it is the core of the computation. In spite of the fact that architecture and security communities have explored a vast number of static or dynamic analysis techniques to automatically identify such bugs, the problem remains unsolved and challenging largely due to the complex nature of CPU RTL designs.This paper proposes DIFUZZRTL, an RTL fuzzer to automatically discover unknown bugs in CPU RTLs. DIFUZZRTL develops a register-coverage guided fuzzing technique, which efficiently yet correctly identifies a state transition in the finite state machine of RTL designs. DIFUZZRTL also develops several new techniques in consideration of unique RTL design characteristics, including cycle-sensitive register coverage guiding, asynchronous interrupt events handling, a unified CPU input format with Tilelink protocols, and drop-in-replacement designs to support various CPU RTLs. We implemented DIFUZZRTL, and performed the evaluation with three real-world open source CPU RTLs: OpenRISC Mor1kx Cappuccino, RISC-V Rocket Core, and RISC-V Boom Core. During the evaluation, DIFUZZRTL identified 16 new bugs from these CPU RTLs, all of which were confirmed by the respective development communities and vendors. Six of those are assigned with CVE numbers, and to the best of our knowledge, we reported the first and the only CVE of RISC-V cores, demonstrating its strong practical impacts to the security community.
{"title":"DifuzzRTL: Differential Fuzz Testing to Find CPU Bugs","authors":"Jaewon Hur, Suhwan Song, Dongup Kwon, Eun-Tae Baek, Jangwoo Kim, Byoungyoung Lee","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00103","url":null,"abstract":"Security bugs in CPUs have critical security impacts to all the computation related hardware and software components as it is the core of the computation. In spite of the fact that architecture and security communities have explored a vast number of static or dynamic analysis techniques to automatically identify such bugs, the problem remains unsolved and challenging largely due to the complex nature of CPU RTL designs.This paper proposes DIFUZZRTL, an RTL fuzzer to automatically discover unknown bugs in CPU RTLs. DIFUZZRTL develops a register-coverage guided fuzzing technique, which efficiently yet correctly identifies a state transition in the finite state machine of RTL designs. DIFUZZRTL also develops several new techniques in consideration of unique RTL design characteristics, including cycle-sensitive register coverage guiding, asynchronous interrupt events handling, a unified CPU input format with Tilelink protocols, and drop-in-replacement designs to support various CPU RTLs. We implemented DIFUZZRTL, and performed the evaluation with three real-world open source CPU RTLs: OpenRISC Mor1kx Cappuccino, RISC-V Rocket Core, and RISC-V Boom Core. During the evaluation, DIFUZZRTL identified 16 new bugs from these CPU RTLs, all of which were confirmed by the respective development communities and vendors. Six of those are assigned with CVE numbers, and to the best of our knowledge, we reported the first and the only CVE of RISC-V cores, demonstrating its strong practical impacts to the security community.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"19 1","pages":"1286-1303"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79524775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1109/SP40001.2021.00030
Andreas Hülsing, Kai-Chun Ning, P. Schwabe, F. Weber, Philip Zimmermann
In this paper we present PQ-WireGuard, a post-quantum variant of the handshake in the WireGuard VPN protocol (NDSS 2017). Unlike most previous work on post-quantum security for real-world protocols, this variant does not only consider post-quantum confidentiality (or forward secrecy) but also post-quantum authentication. To achieve this, we replace the Diffie-Hellman-based handshake by a more generic approach only using key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). We establish security of PQ-WireGuard, adapting the security proofs for WireGuard in the symbolic model and in the standard model to our construction. We then instantiate this generic construction with concrete post-quantum secure KEMs, which we carefully select to achieve high security and speed. We demonstrate competitiveness of PQ-WireGuard presenting extensive bench-marking results comparing to widely deployed VPN solutions.
{"title":"Post-quantum WireGuard","authors":"Andreas Hülsing, Kai-Chun Ning, P. Schwabe, F. Weber, Philip Zimmermann","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00030","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we present PQ-WireGuard, a post-quantum variant of the handshake in the WireGuard VPN protocol (NDSS 2017). Unlike most previous work on post-quantum security for real-world protocols, this variant does not only consider post-quantum confidentiality (or forward secrecy) but also post-quantum authentication. To achieve this, we replace the Diffie-Hellman-based handshake by a more generic approach only using key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). We establish security of PQ-WireGuard, adapting the security proofs for WireGuard in the symbolic model and in the standard model to our construction. We then instantiate this generic construction with concrete post-quantum secure KEMs, which we carefully select to achieve high security and speed. We demonstrate competitiveness of PQ-WireGuard presenting extensive bench-marking results comparing to widely deployed VPN solutions.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"12 1","pages":"304-321"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82758785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1109/SP40001.2021.00021
Penghui Zhang, Adam Oest, Haehyun Cho, Zhibo Sun, RC Johnson, Brad Wardman, Shaown Sarker, A. Kapravelos, Tiffany Bao, Ruoyu Wang, Yan Shoshitaishvili, Adam Doupé, Gail-Joon Ahn
Phishing is a critical threat to Internet users. Although an extensive ecosystem serves to protect users, phishing websites are growing in sophistication, and they can slip past the ecosystem’s detection systems—and subsequently cause real-world damage—with the help of evasion techniques. Sophisticated client-side evasion techniques, known as cloaking, leverage JavaScript to enable complex interactions between potential victims and the phishing website, and can thus be particularly effective in slowing or entirely preventing automated mitigations. Yet, neither the prevalence nor the impact of client-side cloaking has been studied.In this paper, we present CrawlPhish, a framework for automatically detecting and categorizing client-side cloaking used by known phishing websites. We deploy CrawlPhish over 14 months between 2018 and 2019 to collect and thoroughly analyze a dataset of 112,005 phishing websites in the wild. By adapting state-of-the-art static and dynamic code analysis, we find that 35,067 of these websites have 1,128 distinct implementations of client-side cloaking techniques. Moreover, we find that attackers’ use of cloaking grew from 23.32% initially to 33.70% by the end of our data collection period. Detection of cloaking by our framework exhibited low false-positive and false-negative rates of 1.45% and 1.75%, respectively. We analyze the semantics of the techniques we detected and propose a taxonomy of eight types of evasion across three high-level categories: User Interaction, Fingerprinting, and Bot Behavior.Using 150 artificial phishing websites, we empirically show that each category of evasion technique is effective in avoiding browser-based phishing detection (a key ecosystem defense). Additionally, through a user study, we verify that the techniques generally do not discourage victim visits. Therefore, we propose ways in which our methodology can be used to not only improve the ecosystem’s ability to mitigate phishing websites with client-side cloaking, but also continuously identify emerging cloaking techniques as they are launched by attackers.
{"title":"CrawlPhish: Large-scale Analysis of Client-side Cloaking Techniques in Phishing","authors":"Penghui Zhang, Adam Oest, Haehyun Cho, Zhibo Sun, RC Johnson, Brad Wardman, Shaown Sarker, A. Kapravelos, Tiffany Bao, Ruoyu Wang, Yan Shoshitaishvili, Adam Doupé, Gail-Joon Ahn","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00021","url":null,"abstract":"Phishing is a critical threat to Internet users. Although an extensive ecosystem serves to protect users, phishing websites are growing in sophistication, and they can slip past the ecosystem’s detection systems—and subsequently cause real-world damage—with the help of evasion techniques. Sophisticated client-side evasion techniques, known as cloaking, leverage JavaScript to enable complex interactions between potential victims and the phishing website, and can thus be particularly effective in slowing or entirely preventing automated mitigations. Yet, neither the prevalence nor the impact of client-side cloaking has been studied.In this paper, we present CrawlPhish, a framework for automatically detecting and categorizing client-side cloaking used by known phishing websites. We deploy CrawlPhish over 14 months between 2018 and 2019 to collect and thoroughly analyze a dataset of 112,005 phishing websites in the wild. By adapting state-of-the-art static and dynamic code analysis, we find that 35,067 of these websites have 1,128 distinct implementations of client-side cloaking techniques. Moreover, we find that attackers’ use of cloaking grew from 23.32% initially to 33.70% by the end of our data collection period. Detection of cloaking by our framework exhibited low false-positive and false-negative rates of 1.45% and 1.75%, respectively. We analyze the semantics of the techniques we detected and propose a taxonomy of eight types of evasion across three high-level categories: User Interaction, Fingerprinting, and Bot Behavior.Using 150 artificial phishing websites, we empirically show that each category of evasion technique is effective in avoiding browser-based phishing detection (a key ecosystem defense). Additionally, through a user study, we verify that the techniques generally do not discourage victim visits. Therefore, we propose ways in which our methodology can be used to not only improve the ecosystem’s ability to mitigate phishing websites with client-side cloaking, but also continuously identify emerging cloaking techniques as they are launched by attackers.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"23 1","pages":"1109-1124"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78875922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1109/SP40001.2021.00082
Tapti Palit, Jarin Firose Moon, F. Monrose, M. Polychronakis
As control flow hijacking attacks become more challenging due to the deployment of various exploit mitigation technologies, the leakage of sensitive process data through the exploitation of memory disclosure vulnerabilities is becoming an increasingly important threat. To make matters worse, recently introduced transient execution attacks provide a new avenue for leaking confidential process data. As a response, various approaches for selectively protecting subsets of critical in-memory data have been proposed, which though either require a significant code refactoring effort, or do not scale for large applications.In this paper we present DynPTA, a selective data protection approach that combines static analysis with scoped dynamic data flow tracking (DFT) to keep a subset of manually annotated sensitive data always encrypted in memory. DynPTA ameliorates the inherent overapproximation of pointer analysis—a significant challenge that has prevented previous approaches from supporting large applications—by relying on lightweight label lookups to determine if potentially sensitive data is actually sensitive. Labeled objects are tracked only within the subset of value flows that may carry potentially sensitive data, requiring only a fraction of the program’s code to be instrumented for DFT. We experimentally evaluated DynPTA with real-world applications and demonstrate that it can prevent memory disclosure (Heartbleed) and transient execution (Spectre) attacks from leaking the protected data, while incurring a modest runtime overhead of up to 19.2% when protecting the private TLS key of Nginx with OpenSSL.
{"title":"DynPTA: Combining Static and Dynamic Analysis for Practical Selective Data Protection","authors":"Tapti Palit, Jarin Firose Moon, F. Monrose, M. Polychronakis","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00082","url":null,"abstract":"As control flow hijacking attacks become more challenging due to the deployment of various exploit mitigation technologies, the leakage of sensitive process data through the exploitation of memory disclosure vulnerabilities is becoming an increasingly important threat. To make matters worse, recently introduced transient execution attacks provide a new avenue for leaking confidential process data. As a response, various approaches for selectively protecting subsets of critical in-memory data have been proposed, which though either require a significant code refactoring effort, or do not scale for large applications.In this paper we present DynPTA, a selective data protection approach that combines static analysis with scoped dynamic data flow tracking (DFT) to keep a subset of manually annotated sensitive data always encrypted in memory. DynPTA ameliorates the inherent overapproximation of pointer analysis—a significant challenge that has prevented previous approaches from supporting large applications—by relying on lightweight label lookups to determine if potentially sensitive data is actually sensitive. Labeled objects are tracked only within the subset of value flows that may carry potentially sensitive data, requiring only a fraction of the program’s code to be instrumented for DFT. We experimentally evaluated DynPTA with real-world applications and demonstrate that it can prevent memory disclosure (Heartbleed) and transient execution (Spectre) attacks from leaking the protected data, while incurring a modest runtime overhead of up to 19.2% when protecting the private TLS key of Nginx with OpenSSL.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"1 1","pages":"1919-1937"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89619818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：