{"title":"Adverse impact of predisposition testing on major life activities: lessons from BRCA1/2 testing.","authors":"K A Schneider","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":73765,"journal":{"name":"Journal of health care law & policy","volume":"3 2","pages":"365-81"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40837043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bragdon v. Abbott, asymptomatic genetic conditions, and antidiscrimination law: a conservative perspective.","authors":"R Clegg","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":73765,"journal":{"name":"Journal of health care law & policy","volume":"3 2","pages":"409-29"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40837046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Genetic discrimination: why Bragdon does not ensure protection.","authors":"L F Rothstein","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":73765,"journal":{"name":"Journal of health care law & policy","volume":"3 2","pages":"330-51"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40837041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Discrimination based on HIV/AIDS and other health conditions: \"disability\" as defined under federal and state law.","authors":"D W Webber, L O Gostin","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":73765,"journal":{"name":"Journal of health care law & policy","volume":"3 2","pages":"266-329"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40837040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bragdon v. Abbott: extending the Americans with Disability Act to asymptomatic individuals.","authors":"E Liu","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":73765,"journal":{"name":"Journal of health care law & policy","volume":"3 2","pages":"382-408"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40837045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is there a pink slip in my gene? Genetic discrimination in the workplace.","authors":"P S Miller","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":73765,"journal":{"name":"Journal of health care law & policy","volume":"3 2","pages":"225-65"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40837039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The nation is ill-prepared to finance the quantum jump in long-term care spending that is on its way as the baby boom ages. By default rather than by design, Medicaid has become the main source of funds for long-term care. But reliance on Medicaid has fostered the institutionalization of the disabled elderly, has given rise to a two-tier care system, and has yielded the bizarre outcome of use of limited welfare funds by middle- and even high-income Americans who have succeeded in sheltering assets from Medicaid's spend-down requirements. Insurance would be a greatly better answer to the nation's long-term care needs. But the market will remain small and underdeveloped as long as Americans can make easy claim on Medicaid. The paper puts forth a plan for universal long-term care insurance, supported by income-scaled tax credits, to replace Medicaid in its current role. That would make for "honest government"--one that not only does not fund inheritance protection but also genuinely protects those with greatest need.
{"title":"Financing Long-Term Care: Options for Policy","authors":"Walter M. Cadette","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.193515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.193515","url":null,"abstract":"The nation is ill-prepared to finance the quantum jump in long-term care spending that is on its way as the baby boom ages. By default rather than by design, Medicaid has become the main source of funds for long-term care. But reliance on Medicaid has fostered the institutionalization of the disabled elderly, has given rise to a two-tier care system, and has yielded the bizarre outcome of use of limited welfare funds by middle- and even high-income Americans who have succeeded in sheltering assets from Medicaid's spend-down requirements. Insurance would be a greatly better answer to the nation's long-term care needs. But the market will remain small and underdeveloped as long as Americans can make easy claim on Medicaid. The paper puts forth a plan for universal long-term care insurance, supported by income-scaled tax credits, to replace Medicaid in its current role. That would make for \"honest government\"--one that not only does not fund inheritance protection but also genuinely protects those with greatest need.","PeriodicalId":73765,"journal":{"name":"Journal of health care law & policy","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84489689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we develop a framework for analyzing the behavior of hospitals under selective contracting. We use a unique data set on hospitals in the Southern California region from 1990?1993 to estimate the factors affecting the actual negotiated prices paid to hospitals by two major HMOs. We find that a hospital?s bargaining power, and hence its price, decreases in the ability of the HMO to construct alternative networks that exclude the hospital. Our findings also indicate that hospitals should not be given free reign to merge as some hospital mergers, even in urban areas, can lead to anti-competitive price increases for inpatient services. Beyond hospitals, our methodology can also be applied to other industries where firms contract with multiple suppliers.
{"title":"Competition in Networks: An Analysis of Hospital Pricing Behavior","authors":"R. Town, G. Vistnes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.181608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.181608","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we develop a framework for analyzing the behavior of hospitals under selective contracting. We use a unique data set on hospitals in the Southern California region from 1990?1993 to estimate the factors affecting the actual negotiated prices paid to hospitals by two major HMOs. We find that a hospital?s bargaining power, and hence its price, decreases in the ability of the HMO to construct alternative networks that exclude the hospital. Our findings also indicate that hospitals should not be given free reign to merge as some hospital mergers, even in urban areas, can lead to anti-competitive price increases for inpatient services. Beyond hospitals, our methodology can also be applied to other industries where firms contract with multiple suppliers.","PeriodicalId":73765,"journal":{"name":"Journal of health care law & policy","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87250916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is a great deal of geographic variation in Medicare spending. For example, while the average Medicare cost per beneficiary was around $5200 in 1996, Medicare spending, adjusted for diffences in regional prices and demographic composition, was about $8000 per person in Miami, but only $3500 in Minneapolis. In this paper, we explore the source of this variation. We find that a substantial amount can be explained by differences across areas in the health of the elderly population. This finding suggests that some of the geographic variation in Medicare spending is efficient. But even accounting for differences in the health of the population, significant variation remains. We have been able to explain some of the remaining variation. The strongest factors are supply variables: for-profit hospitals and specialist physicians both increase Medicare spending. If these factors are exogenous, public policy may want to consider the supply of medical services more than it currently does. We do not find that expensive places spend a disproportionate amount on those near death.
{"title":"The Geography of Medicare","authors":"Louise M. Sheiner, D. Cutler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.165508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.165508","url":null,"abstract":"There is a great deal of geographic variation in Medicare spending. For example, while the average Medicare cost per beneficiary was around $5200 in 1996, Medicare spending, adjusted for diffences in regional prices and demographic composition, was about $8000 per person in Miami, but only $3500 in Minneapolis. In this paper, we explore the source of this variation. We find that a substantial amount can be explained by differences across areas in the health of the elderly population. This finding suggests that some of the geographic variation in Medicare spending is efficient. But even accounting for differences in the health of the population, significant variation remains. We have been able to explain some of the remaining variation. The strongest factors are supply variables: for-profit hospitals and specialist physicians both increase Medicare spending. If these factors are exogenous, public policy may want to consider the supply of medical services more than it currently does. We do not find that expensive places spend a disproportionate amount on those near death.","PeriodicalId":73765,"journal":{"name":"Journal of health care law & policy","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74576566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An issue that must be resolved under any health insurance policy is the locus of decisions on treatment. There will be times when a patient may want some treatment that the insurance company (HMO) will not want to provide. There may be other situations when a decision must be made about the amount to spend on care; two issues that come to mind are treatment at the end of life and amount of treatment for premature newborns. There are essentially two ways of making such decisions. They can be made ex ante through contract, or ex post through tort law. That is, it is possible to specify in advance what sort of payments will be provided through a contract between the patient and the HMO, or it is possible to wait until after some illness occurs and some treatment decision is made and then use tort law (or its variant, malpractice law) to decide if the treatment offered was adequate.
{"title":"Treatment Decisions: Tort or Contract","authors":"Paul H. Rubin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.157358","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.157358","url":null,"abstract":"An issue that must be resolved under any health insurance policy is the locus of decisions on treatment. There will be times when a patient may want some treatment that the insurance company (HMO) will not want to provide. There may be other situations when a decision must be made about the amount to spend on care; two issues that come to mind are treatment at the end of life and amount of treatment for premature newborns. There are essentially two ways of making such decisions. They can be made ex ante through contract, or ex post through tort law. That is, it is possible to specify in advance what sort of payments will be provided through a contract between the patient and the HMO, or it is possible to wait until after some illness occurs and some treatment decision is made and then use tort law (or its variant, malpractice law) to decide if the treatment offered was adequate.","PeriodicalId":73765,"journal":{"name":"Journal of health care law & policy","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77846144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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