In 2015, 193 United Nations member states adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Goals (SDGs). The Agenda, although imperfect, opens important space to discuss, analyze and invest in the ways in which different aspects of social, political and economic life influence one another. The Agenda takes specific challenges—organized crime, climate change, gender inequality, etc.—and provides an integrated framework that is both universal (applicable to all countries) and inclusive (applicable to all people). Those working on organized crime would do well to better use the power of Agenda 2030 and the SDGs to advance balanced approaches that can both reduce violence associated with crime in the near term and the dynamics enabling organized criminal behavior in the long term.
{"title":"Threading the Needle of Violence: Pursuing Overlapping Dynamics to Support Urban Peace","authors":"R. Locke","doi":"10.31389/JIED.58","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31389/JIED.58","url":null,"abstract":"In 2015, 193 United Nations member states adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Goals (SDGs). The Agenda, although imperfect, opens important space to discuss, analyze and invest in the ways in which different aspects of social, political and economic life influence one another. The Agenda takes specific challenges—organized crime, climate change, gender inequality, etc.—and provides an integrated framework that is both universal (applicable to all countries) and inclusive (applicable to all people). Those working on organized crime would do well to better use the power of Agenda 2030 and the SDGs to advance balanced approaches that can both reduce violence associated with crime in the near term and the dynamics enabling organized criminal behavior in the long term.","PeriodicalId":73784,"journal":{"name":"Journal of illicit economies and development","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45016125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The physical and political geography of the deserts of southwest Afghanistan have gone through dramatic change over the last two decades. Located on the periphery of irrigated lands settled by the Afghan state in the 1950s and 1960s, this area has been at the forefront of technical change in Afghan agricultural production since 2003. Initially settled by small numbers of households escaping drought in the 1990s, tracts of these former desert lands were captured by local elites and communities from the adjacent irrigated lands. Access to improved technologies, including deep wells and diesel pumps, and a buoyant opium price, led to dry rocky soils being transformed into agricultural land. Further encroachment of these former desert lands came in 2008 with the drive to curb opium production in those accessible irrigated areas where the Afghan state, and foreign military forces, coerced the rural population to abandon opium. These counternarcotics efforts evicted the land-poor from the centrally irrigated valleys of the provinces of Helmand, Farah and Kandahar, leaving them few options but to seek new lives in the former desert areas. For those that owned land in the former desert areas, this supply of relatively cheap labour, skilled in opium production, encouraged a further expansion in opium poppy cultivation. Even in the wake of repeated low yields between 2010 and 2014, and fluctuating opium prices, farmers in these former desert areas adapted and innovated, exploiting herbicides and solar-powered technology to reduce the costs of opium production, and further increased the amount of land under agriculture. As this paper argues, these former desert areas should not be seen as marginal and remote, far from the reaches of the development programs of the Afghan state and its donors, but understood as engines of growth integrated into the global economic system; these are areas that have been transformed by improved access to modern technologies and an entrepreneurial local population that has fully exploited the opportunities illegal opium production offers.
{"title":"On the Frontiers of Development: Illicit Poppy and the Transformation of the Deserts of Southwest Afghanistan","authors":"D. Mansfield","doi":"10.31389/jied.46","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31389/jied.46","url":null,"abstract":"The physical and political geography of the deserts of southwest Afghanistan have gone through dramatic change over the last two decades. Located on the periphery of irrigated lands settled by the Afghan state in the 1950s and 1960s, this area has been at the forefront of technical change in Afghan agricultural production since 2003. Initially settled by small numbers of households escaping drought in the 1990s, tracts of these former desert lands were captured by local elites and communities from the adjacent irrigated lands. Access to improved technologies, including deep wells and diesel pumps, and a buoyant opium price, led to dry rocky soils being transformed into agricultural land. Further encroachment of these former desert lands came in 2008 with the drive to curb opium production in those accessible irrigated areas where the Afghan state, and foreign military forces, coerced the rural population to abandon opium. These counternarcotics efforts evicted the land-poor from the centrally irrigated valleys of the provinces of Helmand, Farah and Kandahar, leaving them few options but to seek new lives in the former desert areas. For those that owned land in the former desert areas, this supply of relatively cheap labour, skilled in opium production, encouraged a further expansion in opium poppy cultivation. Even in the wake of repeated low yields between 2010 and 2014, and fluctuating opium prices, farmers in these former desert areas adapted and innovated, exploiting herbicides and solar-powered technology to reduce the costs of opium production, and further increased the amount of land under agriculture. As this paper argues, these former desert areas should not be seen as marginal and remote, far from the reaches of the development programs of the Afghan state and its donors, but understood as engines of growth integrated into the global economic system; these are areas that have been transformed by improved access to modern technologies and an entrepreneurial local population that has fully exploited the opportunities illegal opium production offers.","PeriodicalId":73784,"journal":{"name":"Journal of illicit economies and development","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46724670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The debate about the prohibition of drugs has taken a fundamental turn with the publication of ‘Regulation: The Responsible Control of Drugs’ by the Global Commission on Drug Policy. This edition of the journal publishes papers addressing how to regulate drugs, which informed the Global Commission report. These papers shift the discussion from what must be done, i.e. end prohibition, to how regulation can be implemented. These papers shift the discourse from a ‘drugs are the problem’ paradigm to ‘management of drugs is the problem’. Implications of regulation means: accepting that people should have controlled access, within a public health framework, to a range of psychoactive substances for non-medical use purposes highlighting of the incoherence of substance use management policy and regulation between legal and illegal substances blurring the dichotomy concept of medical and non-medical use supporting rigorous monitoring, evaluation, and research Consideration of implementing public interest–based regulated drug markets is gaining traction. This will not be without challenges, including pressure from profit-driven interests to weaken the public health orientation. Governments can be capable and competent when provided with technical support to regulate risky products, so should move from rigid adherence to the failed drug prohibition policy to regulation based on public health and human rights principles. This will help refocus on achieving the fundamental aim of the UN drug treaties – promotion of the health and welfare of humankind.
{"title":"Regulation of Illegal Drugs – No Longer “What”?, but “How”?","authors":"Brian Emerson","doi":"10.31389/jied.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31389/jied.19","url":null,"abstract":"The debate about the prohibition of drugs has taken a fundamental turn with the publication of ‘Regulation: The Responsible Control of Drugs’ by the Global Commission on Drug Policy. This edition of the journal publishes papers addressing how to regulate drugs, which informed the Global Commission report. These papers shift the discussion from what must be done, i.e. end prohibition, to how regulation can be implemented. These papers shift the discourse from a ‘drugs are the problem’ paradigm to ‘management of drugs is the problem’. Implications of regulation means: accepting that people should have controlled access, within a public health framework, to a range of psychoactive substances for non-medical use purposes highlighting of the incoherence of substance use management policy and regulation between legal and illegal substances blurring the dichotomy concept of medical and non-medical use supporting rigorous monitoring, evaluation, and research Consideration of implementing public interest–based regulated drug markets is gaining traction. This will not be without challenges, including pressure from profit-driven interests to weaken the public health orientation. Governments can be capable and competent when provided with technical support to regulate risky products, so should move from rigid adherence to the failed drug prohibition policy to regulation based on public health and human rights principles. This will help refocus on achieving the fundamental aim of the UN drug treaties – promotion of the health and welfare of humankind.","PeriodicalId":73784,"journal":{"name":"Journal of illicit economies and development","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41404846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Various jurisdictions are legalising not just cannabis possession and use, but also large-scale commercial production, distribution and sale. Potential problems with that form of legalization raise questions about how best to implement a legalisation. This paper analyses the interests of the suppliers and regulators to help lawmakers and voters decide what over-arching architecture for legalisation might be prudent. In particular, it suggests banning for-profit companies and/or vesting regulatory authority in an agency that views its mission as protecting heavy users from suppliers’ excesses, rather than serving the interests of the cannabis industry.
{"title":"Legalising Drugs Prudently: The Importance of Incentives and Values","authors":"J. Caulkins","doi":"10.31389/jied.44","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31389/jied.44","url":null,"abstract":"Various jurisdictions are legalising not just cannabis possession and use, but also large-scale commercial production, distribution and sale. Potential problems with that form of legalization raise questions about how best to implement a legalisation. This paper analyses the interests of the suppliers and regulators to help lawmakers and voters decide what over-arching architecture for legalisation might be prudent. In particular, it suggests banning for-profit companies and/or vesting regulatory authority in an agency that views its mission as protecting heavy users from suppliers’ excesses, rather than serving the interests of the cannabis industry.","PeriodicalId":73784,"journal":{"name":"Journal of illicit economies and development","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48211918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Zara Snapp, Khalid Tinasti, Jorge Herrera Valderrábano
This policy comment analyzes the risks and issues that might arise from the legal regulation of illegal narcotic and psychotropic products or substances with risks to the health or safety of citizens. We focus on reducing these risks by providing existing examples through existing state-based control mechanisms, with a focus on developing economies with fragile or corruption-sensitive institutions. We discuss the need to implement regulatory models that minimize the risk of diversion and corruption from the legal to the illegal market within a regulated framework. The primary concern is to establish legal and regulatory frameworks and policies with sufficient resilience to mitigate and reduce the risks, and that are inclusive of broad regulation stakeholders and the influence of their interactions on regulation outcomes. Importantly, we look at the integration of current players of the illegal market into the legal one in order to enhance the social, economic and legal benefits of regulation towards the most vulnerable, while at the same time undermining the illegal market. We find that state institutions, including those of LMICs, have varying institutional capacity to regulate currently prohibited drugs, with the existence of regulation frameworks of legal drugs or hazardous and controlled goods. While the technical health and judiciary mechanisms exist to allow for more effective controls of drugs through legal regulation, political will is still lacking. We reviewed regulation models using a social justice focus, thereby allowing countries to establish frameworks for the inclusion of the populations most-affected by prohibition and depriving criminal organizations of local networks of trafficking
{"title":"Regulation of Illegal Drugs: State Control and Fragile Institutional Capacity","authors":"Zara Snapp, Khalid Tinasti, Jorge Herrera Valderrábano","doi":"10.31389/jied.22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31389/jied.22","url":null,"abstract":"This policy comment analyzes the risks and issues that might arise from the legal regulation of illegal narcotic and psychotropic products or substances with risks to the health or safety of citizens. We focus on reducing these risks by providing existing examples through existing state-based control mechanisms, with a focus on developing economies with fragile or corruption-sensitive institutions. We discuss the need to implement regulatory models that minimize the risk of diversion and corruption from the legal to the illegal market within a regulated framework. The primary concern is to establish legal and regulatory frameworks and policies with sufficient resilience to mitigate and reduce the risks, and that are inclusive of broad regulation stakeholders and the influence of their interactions on regulation outcomes. Importantly, we look at the integration of current players of the illegal market into the legal one in order to enhance the social, economic and legal benefits of regulation towards the most vulnerable, while at the same time undermining the illegal market. We find that state institutions, including those of LMICs, have varying institutional capacity to regulate currently prohibited drugs, with the existence of regulation frameworks of legal drugs or hazardous and controlled goods. While the technical health and judiciary mechanisms exist to allow for more effective controls of drugs through legal regulation, political will is still lacking. We reviewed regulation models using a social justice focus, thereby allowing countries to establish frameworks for the inclusion of the populations most-affected by prohibition and depriving criminal organizations of local networks of trafficking","PeriodicalId":73784,"journal":{"name":"Journal of illicit economies and development","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45027476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There are good reasons to legally regulate drugs markets, rather than persist with efforts to ban all non-medical uses of psychoactive substances. Regulated cannabis and coca markets are already a reality in several countries, with more likely to follow. But ignoring or denying that such policy shifts contravene certain obligations under the UN drug control treaties is untenable and risks undermining basic principles of international law. States enacting cannabis regulation must find a way to align their reforms with their international obligations. Reaching a new global consensus to amend the UN drug control conventions so as to accommodate cannabis regulation is not feasible for the foreseeable future, and the options that do not require consensus are limited. For countries choosing to regulate cannabis, notwithstanding the drug treaty provisions intended to disallow such a step, a proactive way forward would combine: (1) providing evidence of the ineffectiveness and negative consequences of the prohibitionist approach; (2) underscoring the inconsistencies and historical errors embedded in the treaty regime, and the political and procedural obstacles to its modernization; (3) explaining the shift to regulation with arguments of citizens’ health and safety, and justifying it with an appeal to human rights obligations; (4) acknowledging that regulation contravenes certain drug treaty provisions and arguing that a limited period of ‘respectful non-compliance’ is unavoidable; and 5) preparing to resolve the legal conflict by submitting new reservations or by elaborating a new agreement among like-minded countries on the basis of the inter se procedure for treaty modification, as provided by Article 41 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
{"title":"Regulating Drugs: Resolving Conflicts with the UN Drug Control Treaty System","authors":"J. Walsh, M. Jelsma","doi":"10.31389/jied.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31389/jied.23","url":null,"abstract":"There are good reasons to legally regulate drugs markets, rather than persist with efforts to ban all non-medical uses of psychoactive substances. Regulated cannabis and coca markets are already a reality in several countries, with more likely to follow. But ignoring or denying that such policy shifts contravene certain obligations under the UN drug control treaties is untenable and risks undermining basic principles of international law. States enacting cannabis regulation must find a way to align their reforms with their international obligations. Reaching a new global consensus to amend the UN drug control conventions so as to accommodate cannabis regulation is not feasible for the foreseeable future, and the options that do not require consensus are limited. For countries choosing to regulate cannabis, notwithstanding the drug treaty provisions intended to disallow such a step, a proactive way forward would combine: (1) providing evidence of the ineffectiveness and negative consequences of the prohibitionist approach; (2) underscoring the inconsistencies and historical errors embedded in the treaty regime, and the political and procedural obstacles to its modernization; (3) explaining the shift to regulation with arguments of citizens’ health and safety, and justifying it with an appeal to human rights obligations; (4) acknowledging that regulation contravenes certain drug treaty provisions and arguing that a limited period of ‘respectful non-compliance’ is unavoidable; and 5) preparing to resolve the legal conflict by submitting new reservations or by elaborating a new agreement among like-minded countries on the basis of the inter se procedure for treaty modification, as provided by Article 41 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.","PeriodicalId":73784,"journal":{"name":"Journal of illicit economies and development","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42968679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scholarly and policy literature has yet to provide a systematic analysis on how criminal organizations launder money beyond descriptions of who conducts this illegal activity and the existing types and practices for laundering the proceeds of crime. This article seeks to bridge the divide of two scant perspectives within illicit economies literature: one related to the structure of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and the other related to theoretical conceptualizations of money laundering. It provides a working hypothesis on how DTOs choose to launder money contingent on the risk appetite each structure has as a result of the investment in human capital they conduct at the managerial levels. Using Mexican DTOs as case studies (Arellano Felix, Sinaloa, La Familia Michoacana, and Zetas) and data collected during fieldwork with US and Mexican officials involved with anti-money laundering measures, I show hierarchical structures—understood as structures that process information and acquire knowledge—prefer risk-averse methods, whereas wheel networks tend to use risk-tolerant procedures for laundering money. These findings have important implications for theory development and policy design.
学术和政策文献还没有对犯罪组织如何洗钱进行系统的分析，除了描述谁进行这种非法活动和现有的犯罪收益洗钱的类型和做法之外。本文试图弥合非法经济文献中两种缺乏视角的分歧:一种与贩毒组织(dto)的结构有关，另一种与洗钱的理论概念化有关。它提供了一个关于dto如何选择洗钱的工作假设，这取决于每个结构的风险偏好，这是他们在管理层面进行人力资本投资的结果。我使用墨西哥dto作为案例研究(Arellano Felix、Sinaloa、La Familia Michoacana和Zetas)，以及在与参与反洗钱措施的美国和墨西哥官员进行实地调查时收集的数据，展示了分层结构——被理解为处理信息和获取知识的结构——倾向于规避风险的方法，而轮毂网络倾向于使用风险容忍程序来洗钱。这些发现对理论发展和政策设计具有重要意义。
{"title":"The Structure of Drug Trafficking Organizations and Money Laundering Practices: A Risk Appetite Hypothesis","authors":"Cecilia Farfán-Méndez","doi":"10.31389/jied.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31389/jied.1","url":null,"abstract":"Scholarly and policy literature has yet to provide a systematic analysis on how criminal organizations launder money beyond descriptions of who conducts this illegal activity and the existing types and practices for laundering the proceeds of crime. This article seeks to bridge the divide of two scant perspectives within illicit economies literature: one related to the structure of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and the other related to theoretical conceptualizations of money laundering. It provides a working hypothesis on how DTOs choose to launder money contingent on the risk appetite each structure has as a result of the investment in human capital they conduct at the managerial levels. Using Mexican DTOs as case studies (Arellano Felix, Sinaloa, La Familia Michoacana, and Zetas) and data collected during fieldwork with US and Mexican officials involved with anti-money laundering measures, I show hierarchical structures—understood as structures that process information and acquire knowledge—prefer risk-averse methods, whereas wheel networks tend to use risk-tolerant procedures for laundering money. These findings have important implications for theory development and policy design.","PeriodicalId":73784,"journal":{"name":"Journal of illicit economies and development","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44307354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
"Legalisation" does not specify a policy. Cannabis could be made available for use by adults under a wide variety of conditions: cheap or expensive, offered by for-profit enterprises, by not-for-profits (including consumer co-operatives), as a state monopoly (for production or sales or both), or even on a "grow-your-own" basis. It could be cheap (as it would be in a free market) or expensive (due to taxes or minimum pricing). Marketing efforts could be free or restrained. Users could be "nudged" toward temperate use - for example, through a system of user-set but enforceable periodic purchase limits - or left to their own devices. Policy-makers should keep in mind Pareto's Law, which applies to cannabis consumption: about four-fifths of consumption is accounted for by about one-fifth of consumers. That fact will drive the commercial strategies of for-profit producers and sellers, and should focus the attention of public agencies on the risks and harms to the heavy-using minority. Uncertainties abound, and consequently policies should be designed to allow the system to learn from experience. But it is possible to try to predict and evaluate – albeit imperfectly – the likely consequences of proposed policy changes and to use those predictions to choose systems of legal availability that would result in better, rather than worse, combinations of gain and loss from the change.
{"title":"Lawful Access to Cannabis: Gains, Losses and Design Criteria","authors":"M. Kleiman, Jeremy Ziskind","doi":"10.31389/jied.41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31389/jied.41","url":null,"abstract":"\"Legalisation\" does not specify a policy. Cannabis could be made available for use by adults under a wide variety of conditions: cheap or expensive, offered by for-profit enterprises, by not-for-profits (including consumer co-operatives), as a state monopoly (for production or sales or both), or even on a \"grow-your-own\" basis. It could be cheap (as it would be in a free market) or expensive (due to taxes or minimum pricing). Marketing efforts could be free or restrained. Users could be \"nudged\" toward temperate use - for example, through a system of user-set but enforceable periodic purchase limits - or left to their own devices. Policy-makers should keep in mind Pareto's Law, which applies to cannabis consumption: about four-fifths of consumption is accounted for by about one-fifth of consumers. That fact will drive the commercial strategies of for-profit producers and sellers, and should focus the attention of public agencies on the risks and harms to the heavy-using minority. Uncertainties abound, and consequently policies should be designed to allow the system to learn from experience. But it is possible to try to predict and evaluate – albeit imperfectly – the likely consequences of proposed policy changes and to use those predictions to choose systems of legal availability that would result in better, rather than worse, combinations of gain and loss from the change.","PeriodicalId":73784,"journal":{"name":"Journal of illicit economies and development","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41397662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Literature on the economic-sociology of illegal markets is progressing convincingly, as scholars identify the need to investigate illegality through the perspective of the market, as well as through the perspective of the actor. In this book review essay, two recent publications are reflected upon: The Architecture of Illegal Markets: Towards an Economic Sociology of Illegality in the Economy (Beckert and Dewey, 2017) and Illegal Markets, Violence, and Inequality: Evidence from a Brazilian Metropolis (Daudelin and Ratton, 2018). While the books undertake a different journey through the field of illegal markets, they reach the same theoretical destination, concluding that illegal markets are not homogenous and cannot be boxed into preconceived generalisations.
{"title":"Heterogeneity of Illegal Markets: A Book Review Essay","authors":"H. Richardson","doi":"10.31389/jied.40","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31389/jied.40","url":null,"abstract":"Literature on the economic-sociology of illegal markets is progressing convincingly, as scholars identify the need to investigate illegality through the perspective of the market, as well as through the perspective of the actor. In this book review essay, two recent publications are reflected upon: The Architecture of Illegal Markets: Towards an Economic Sociology of Illegality in the Economy (Beckert and Dewey, 2017) and Illegal Markets, Violence, and Inequality: Evidence from a Brazilian Metropolis (Daudelin and Ratton, 2018). While the books undertake a different journey through the field of illegal markets, they reach the same theoretical destination, concluding that illegal markets are not homogenous and cannot be boxed into preconceived generalisations.","PeriodicalId":73784,"journal":{"name":"Journal of illicit economies and development","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44942692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Few expect illegal drug markets to completely disappear in a world of legally regulated psychoactive substances, but it is likely that the regulation of currently illicit drugs would significantly challenge the business model of today’s drug trafficking organizations. This article examines if and to what extent governments can expect to profit from regulating illicit drugs in terms of their control over organized criminal activity. It argues that, especially among proponents of drug market regulation, expectations about the impact of regulation on organized crime control might be too high. Regulation might create opportunities to better fight organized crime, but policy-makers are likely to be confronted with a range of sometimes uncomfortable choices in dealing with this new situation. If drug market regulation will result in better control of organized crime is likely to depend on what decisions policy-makers will take.
{"title":"Will Regulating Drug Markets Help Governments to Better Control Organized Crime?","authors":"Christian Schneider","doi":"10.31389/jied.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31389/jied.24","url":null,"abstract":"Few expect illegal drug markets to completely disappear in a world of legally regulated psychoactive substances, but it is likely that the regulation of currently illicit drugs would significantly challenge the business model of today’s drug trafficking organizations. This article examines if and to what extent governments can expect to profit from regulating illicit drugs in terms of their control over organized criminal activity. It argues that, especially among proponents of drug market regulation, expectations about the impact of regulation on organized crime control might be too high. Regulation might create opportunities to better fight organized crime, but policy-makers are likely to be confronted with a range of sometimes uncomfortable choices in dealing with this new situation. If drug market regulation will result in better control of organized crime is likely to depend on what decisions policy-makers will take.","PeriodicalId":73784,"journal":{"name":"Journal of illicit economies and development","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42660905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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