Perhaps the best way to understand early-Twenty-First Century state and federal cannabis law in the United States is to examine the relevant history. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s statement is apropos: "[A] page of history is worth a volume of logic." This article begins by discussing the early history of cannabis and its uses. Next, the article examines the first state and federal marijuana laws. After a brief comparison of alcohol prohibition to cannabis prohibition, this article addresses cannabis laws from the 1920s to the early 1950s. Then, the article takes up the reorganization of the federal drug regulatory bureaucracy since its inception. Addressing the current era of cannabis laws and regulations, this article recounts how marijuana became a Schedule I drug. The discussion then turns to changing social attitudes towards cannabis as reflected in presidential politics and popular culture. Starting with the late-1990s, this article describes the development of state and federal cannabis laws and policies up to the present day.
{"title":"A History of United States Cannabis Law.","authors":"David V Patton","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Perhaps the best way to understand early-Twenty-First Century state and federal cannabis law in the United States is to examine the relevant history. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s statement is apropos: \"[A] page of history is worth a volume of logic.\" This article begins by discussing the early history of cannabis and its uses. Next, the article examines the first state and federal marijuana laws. After a brief comparison of alcohol prohibition to cannabis prohibition, this article addresses cannabis laws from the 1920s to the early 1950s. Then, the article takes up the reorganization of the federal drug regulatory bureaucracy since its inception. Addressing the current era of cannabis laws and regulations, this article recounts how marijuana became a Schedule I drug. The discussion then turns to changing social attitudes towards cannabis as reflected in presidential politics and popular culture. Starting with the late-1990s, this article describes the development of state and federal cannabis laws and policies up to the present day.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38756624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On July 24, 2019, the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed an act that included an amendment requiring Northern Ireland to implement recommendations from the Committee on the Elimination on Discrimination Against Women. The amendment required Northern Ireland to repeal the 1861 abortion act and requires the decriminalization of abortion. The law went into effect on October 22, 2019, since the Northern Ireland power-sharing government (Stormont) did not reconvene before October 21, 2019. Since the law did go into effect, it gave women the right to obtain abortions under the CEDAW recommendations; however, when the Northern Irish government (Stormont) reconvenes, it can recriminalize abortion. They made this attempt when Stormont under DUP leadership reconvened briefly on January 11, 2020 before the official Brexit the next day. This Note argues that abortion should be legal in Northern Ireland regardless of whether the new legislation from British Parliament ever went into effect or gets overturned by the Stormont legislature because of several treaties and domestic decisions from the Supreme Court in Belfast and the new regulations made in accordance with the amendment need to meet the standards of the CEDAW recommendations.
{"title":"International Law and the Legalization of Abortion in Northern Ireland.","authors":"Emily Uterhark","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>On July 24, 2019, the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed an act that included an amendment requiring Northern Ireland to implement recommendations from the Committee on the Elimination on Discrimination Against Women. The amendment required Northern Ireland to repeal the 1861 abortion act and requires the decriminalization of abortion. The law went into effect on October 22, 2019, since the Northern Ireland power-sharing government (Stormont) did not reconvene before October 21, 2019. Since the law did go into effect, it gave women the right to obtain abortions under the CEDAW recommendations; however, when the Northern Irish government (Stormont) reconvenes, it can recriminalize abortion. They made this attempt when Stormont under DUP leadership reconvened briefly on January 11, 2020 before the official Brexit the next day. This Note argues that abortion should be legal in Northern Ireland regardless of whether the new legislation from British Parliament ever went into effect or gets overturned by the Stormont legislature because of several treaties and domestic decisions from the Supreme Court in Belfast and the new regulations made in accordance with the amendment need to meet the standards of the CEDAW recommendations.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38822548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2019, the United States saw the single largest outbreak of measles in recent history. The measles crisis has prompted state legislative bodies to face a seemingly impossible dilemma: eliminate both religious and philosophical exemptions to mandatory school vaccination statutes or sit by idly and allow measles to continue to run its course. As of June 2019, five states have neither religious nor philosophical exemptions to their mandatory vaccination statutes. This Note argues that states should remove all religious and philosophical exemptions to compulsory vaccination statutes. The 2019 measles outbreak demonstrates that the anti-vaccination movement poses a legitimate risk to the health of the masses, especially to the most vulnerable members of our communities. If individuals continue to opt out of compulsory vaccination requirements, diseases that were eradicated decades ago will undoubtably return to the absolute detriment of those unable to protect themselves.
{"title":"The Public Health Demand for Revoking Non-Medical Exemptions to Compulsory Vaccination Statutes.","authors":"Emma Tomsick","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In 2019, the United States saw the single largest outbreak of measles in recent history. The measles crisis has prompted state legislative bodies to face a seemingly impossible dilemma: eliminate both religious and philosophical exemptions to mandatory school vaccination statutes or sit by idly and allow measles to continue to run its course. As of June 2019, five states have neither religious nor philosophical exemptions to their mandatory vaccination statutes. This Note argues that states should remove all religious and philosophical exemptions to compulsory vaccination statutes. The 2019 measles outbreak demonstrates that the anti-vaccination movement poses a legitimate risk to the health of the masses, especially to the most vulnerable members of our communities. If individuals continue to opt out of compulsory vaccination requirements, diseases that were eradicated decades ago will undoubtably return to the absolute detriment of those unable to protect themselves.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38822547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In light of the confusion invited by applying the label "de-identified" to information that can be used to identify patients, it is paramount that regulators, compliance professionals, patient advocates and the general public understand the significant differences between the standards applied by HIPAA and those applied by permissive "de-identification guidelines." This Article discusses those differences in detail. The discussion proceeds in four Parts. Part II (HIPAA's Heartbeat: Why HIPAA Protects Identifiable Patient Information) examines Congress's motivations for defining individually identifiable health information broadly, which included to stop the harms patients endured prior to 1996 arising from the commercial sale of their medical records. Part III (Taking the "I" Out of Identifiable Information: HIPAA's Requirements for De-Identified Health Information) discusses HIPAA's requirements for de-identification that were never intended to create a loophole for identifiable patient information to escape HIPAA's protections. Part IV (Anatomy of a Hack: Methods for Labeling Identifiable information "De-Identified") examines the goals, methods, and results of permissive "de-identification guidelines" and compares them to HIPAA's requirements. Part V (Protecting Un-Protected Health Information) evaluates the suitability of permissive "de-identification guidelines," concluding that the vulnerabilities inherent in their current articulation render them ineffective as a data protection standard. It also discusses ways in which compliance professionals, regulators, and advocates can foster accountability and transparency in the utilization of health information that can be used to identify patients.
{"title":"Hacking HIPAA: \"Best Practices\" for Avoiding Oversight in the Sale of Your Identifiable Medical Information.","authors":"Riyad A Omar","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In light of the confusion invited by applying the label \"de-identified\" to information that can be used to identify patients, it is paramount that regulators, compliance professionals, patient advocates and the general public understand the significant differences between the standards applied by HIPAA and those applied by permissive \"de-identification guidelines.\" This Article discusses those differences in detail. The discussion proceeds in four Parts. Part II (HIPAA's Heartbeat: Why HIPAA Protects Identifiable Patient Information) examines Congress's motivations for defining individually identifiable health information broadly, which included to stop the harms patients endured prior to 1996 arising from the commercial sale of their medical records. Part III (Taking the \"I\" Out of Identifiable Information: HIPAA's Requirements for De-Identified Health Information) discusses HIPAA's requirements for de-identification that were never intended to create a loophole for identifiable patient information to escape HIPAA's protections. Part IV (Anatomy of a Hack: Methods for Labeling Identifiable information \"De-Identified\") examines the goals, methods, and results of permissive \"de-identification guidelines\" and compares them to HIPAA's requirements. Part V (Protecting Un-Protected Health Information) evaluates the suitability of permissive \"de-identification guidelines,\" concluding that the vulnerabilities inherent in their current articulation render them ineffective as a data protection standard. It also discusses ways in which compliance professionals, regulators, and advocates can foster accountability and transparency in the utilization of health information that can be used to identify patients.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38756625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The United States has failed its citizens who suffer from severe and persistent mental illness (SPMI). Homelessness is one of the most obvious manifestations of this failure. The combination of a lack of effective treatment, inadequate entitlement programs such as Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), and subpar housing options form systemic barriers that prevent people suffering from mental illness from being able to obtain adequate housing. Cultural beliefs within the United States regarding who is homeless and what homelessness means also play a significant role in the development of positively impactful social welfare programs. Part II of this Note reviews the history of treatment for persons with SPMI--specifically how that treatment has evolved, the history of federal policies regarding SSI, SSDI and housing, and societal beliefs regarding homelessness and mental illness that have impacted policymaking decisions. Part III looks at these same areas from a current perspective and addresses the current issues and some possible solutions. Part IV discusses how lack of effective treatment, poor disability programs, and the need for better housing options work together to form systemic barriers for people with SPMI. Part IV also address how the cultural beliefs in the United States regarding people who have SPMI and are homeless serve as an independent barrier to policy change. Ultimately, this Note argues that homelessness is a product of system failures rather than individual factors.
{"title":"Homeless and Helpless: How the United States has Failed Those With Severe and Persistent Mental Illness.","authors":"Ashley Gorfido","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The United States has failed its citizens who suffer from severe and persistent mental illness (SPMI). Homelessness is one of the most obvious manifestations of this failure. The combination of a lack of effective treatment, inadequate entitlement programs such as Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), and subpar housing options form systemic barriers that prevent people suffering from mental illness from being able to obtain adequate housing. Cultural beliefs within the United States regarding who is homeless and what homelessness means also play a significant role in the development of positively impactful social welfare programs. Part II of this Note reviews the history of treatment for persons with SPMI--specifically how that treatment has evolved, the history of federal policies regarding SSI, SSDI and housing, and societal beliefs regarding homelessness and mental illness that have impacted policymaking decisions. Part III looks at these same areas from a current perspective and addresses the current issues and some possible solutions. Part IV discusses how lack of effective treatment, poor disability programs, and the need for better housing options work together to form systemic barriers for people with SPMI. Part IV also address how the cultural beliefs in the United States regarding people who have SPMI and are homeless serve as an independent barrier to policy change. Ultimately, this Note argues that homelessness is a product of system failures rather than individual factors.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38822546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The United States government, until recently, did not require the labeling of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). On July 29, 2016, President Barack Obama signed into law the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard (NBFDS). This law directs the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to create regulations that require manufacturers to disclose certain bioengineered products on food labels. On December 20, 2018, the USDA released the final regulations for the NBFDS, which requires food manufactures, importers, and certain retailers to ensure bioengineered foods are appropriately disclosed. The final regulations include provisions that will leave the majority of GMO derived foods unlabeled. The final regulations also restrict approximately 100 million Americans from accessing GMO information by allowing QR codes to replace clear and transparent labeling, an issue that will be discussed in further detail later in this Note. This Note explores why you, as a consumer, may want to know whether your food contains GM products, and furthermore, why you as a consumer have a moral and legal right to know.
{"title":"A New Age of Evolution: Protecting the Consumer's Moral and Legal Right to Know through the Clear and Transparent Labeling of All Genetically Modified Foods.","authors":"Halie M Evans","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The United States government, until recently, did not require the labeling of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). On July 29, 2016, President Barack Obama signed into law the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard (NBFDS). This law directs the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to create regulations that require manufacturers to disclose certain bioengineered products on food labels. On December 20, 2018, the USDA released the final regulations for the NBFDS, which requires food manufactures, importers, and certain retailers to ensure bioengineered foods are appropriately disclosed. The final regulations include provisions that will leave the majority of GMO derived foods unlabeled. The final regulations also restrict approximately 100 million Americans from accessing GMO information by allowing QR codes to replace clear and transparent labeling, an issue that will be discussed in further detail later in this Note. This Note explores why you, as a consumer, may want to know whether your food contains GM products, and furthermore, why you as a consumer have a moral and legal right to know.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37460988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Note examines the NCAA's unwillingness to enforce the requirement that all NCAA institutions must implement a concussion management plan; the NCAA's refusal to apply its appropriate enforcement mechanism when member institutions violate their concussion management plans, which are instituted in order to protect student-athletes from concussions; how both of these failures result in more concussions and a higher probability of debilitating long-term effects; and solutions to remedy this grave injustice. Part II describes what a concussion is, the long-term effects of concussions, the NCAA's management of concussions, and lawsuits challenging the NCAA in relation to concussions. Part III analyzes the inefficiencies of the NCAA in its management of concussions, the previous and current lawsuits' failure to stimulate change within the NCAA, and the proposed solutions that will help create a safe environment for student-athletes.
{"title":"The Bell Has Rung: Answering the Door for Student-Athlete Concussion Issues in the National Collegiate Athletic Association.","authors":"Aaron Caputo","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This Note examines the NCAA's unwillingness to enforce the requirement that all NCAA institutions must implement a concussion management plan; the NCAA's refusal to apply its appropriate enforcement mechanism when member institutions violate their concussion management plans, which are instituted in order to protect student-athletes from concussions; how both of these failures result in more concussions and a higher probability of debilitating long-term effects; and solutions to remedy this grave injustice. Part II describes what a concussion is, the long-term effects of concussions, the NCAA's management of concussions, and lawsuits challenging the NCAA in relation to concussions. Part III analyzes the inefficiencies of the NCAA in its management of concussions, the previous and current lawsuits' failure to stimulate change within the NCAA, and the proposed solutions that will help create a safe environment for student-athletes.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37237240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On May 31, 2017, Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine took a step in fighting Ohio's opioid epidemic, bringing the first of many lawsuits against five top pharmaceutical companies. However, under Federal and State law, there is an exception called the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, which can absolve drug manufacturers of liability from any misconduct that might be found and transfer that liability to a treating physician. This exception is the way many drug manufacturers were able to avoid being held responsible in the past. This Note proposes that with the current pending lawsuit in the State of Ohio, an exception to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine should be introduced. This Note begins with a discussion of opioids and how these drugs have become such an aggressive problem in a very short amount of time in Ohio. Part II talks about the role the government can play and the drug manufacturers have played and continue to play in the availability of opioids. It discusses the effect these pharmaceutical companies have had on this problem and in increasing this problem. Part II also discusses why this is a problem and why this problem matters. Further, it talks about the steps that have already been taken by the Ohio Legislature to combat the opioid problems. Finally, it delves into a discussion of what this current lawsuit means for fighting and decreasing the opioid problem and how it will directly affect the heroin epidemic in Ohio.
{"title":"Solving the Opioid Epidemic in Ohio.","authors":"Lacy Leduc","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>On May 31, 2017, Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine took a step in fighting Ohio's opioid epidemic, bringing the first of many lawsuits against five top pharmaceutical companies. However, under Federal and State law, there is an exception called the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, which can absolve drug manufacturers of liability from any misconduct that might be found and transfer that liability to a treating physician. This exception is the way many drug manufacturers were able to avoid being held responsible in the past. This Note proposes that with the current pending lawsuit in the State of Ohio, an exception to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine should be introduced. This Note begins with a discussion of opioids and how these drugs have become such an aggressive problem in a very short amount of time in Ohio. Part II talks about the role the government can play and the drug manufacturers have played and continue to play in the availability of opioids. It discusses the effect these pharmaceutical companies have had on this problem and in increasing this problem. Part II also discusses why this is a problem and why this problem matters. Further, it talks about the steps that have already been taken by the Ohio Legislature to combat the opioid problems. Finally, it delves into a discussion of what this current lawsuit means for fighting and decreasing the opioid problem and how it will directly affect the heroin epidemic in Ohio.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37237664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The steps taken thus far to protect children in public areas, custody cases, and in vehicles show the legislature's awareness of the chemical harms of secondhand smoke for children. This article will analyze those steps and discuss what they mean for both parents' and children's constitutional rights. This article proposes that the legislature take a vital fourth step by including secondhand smoke exposure in child abuse laws. Section II of this article provides the history of smoking tobacco and its transition from a trendy social status to an unpopular, harmful habit. Section II also introduces the steps that have been taken so far to protect children from secondhand smoke. Section III, Part A discusses how and why there has never been a successful constitutional argument against smoking bans. Section III, Part B looks further into the three steps that courts and legislators have already taken to protect children from secondhand smoke and how those steps are constitutionally permissible. Section III, Part C discusses whether courts and legislators can apply the same constitutional basis of existing statutes to take the next step and interpret child abuse statutes to include secondhand smoke exposure.
{"title":"Puffing Away Parental Rights: A Survey and Analysis of Whether Secondhand Smoke Exposure is Child Abuse.","authors":"Karly Huml","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The steps taken thus far to protect children in public areas, custody cases, and in vehicles show the legislature's awareness of the chemical harms of secondhand smoke for children. This article will analyze those steps and discuss what they mean for both parents' and children's constitutional rights. This article proposes that the legislature take a vital fourth step by including secondhand smoke exposure in child abuse laws. Section II of this article provides the history of smoking tobacco and its transition from a trendy social status to an unpopular, harmful habit. Section II also introduces the steps that have been taken so far to protect children from secondhand smoke. Section III, Part A discusses how and why there has never been a successful constitutional argument against smoking bans. Section III, Part B looks further into the three steps that courts and legislators have already taken to protect children from secondhand smoke and how those steps are constitutionally permissible. Section III, Part C discusses whether courts and legislators can apply the same constitutional basis of existing statutes to take the next step and interpret child abuse statutes to include secondhand smoke exposure.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37237663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Say what you want about the tort-reform debate, but it has staying power. Over the last half-century, legislators and commentators have extensively debated every aspect of tort reform and the litigation "crisis" arguably giving rise to it, without resolving much of anything. Despite this ideological stalemate, tort-reform proponents have managed to push measures through every state legislature. With fifty tries come fifty results, and for the most part, fifty failures. But have all these efforts been in vain? As of yet, no. Although the healthcare system does not appear to be improving, the numerous tort-reform measures states have adopted provide valuable insight into the litigation crisis, even (perhaps especially) when those measures have no effect. But Congress is impatient, one of its many child-like qualities. In June 2017, the United States House of Representatives passed H.R. 1215--The Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017 (PACA). If enacted, PACA would impose comprehensive tort reform on states and, in many cases, preempt similar state laws currently in effect. For many legislators, regardless of political affiliation, this understandably raises federalism concerns. To appease these concerns, PACA's drafters included provisions that appear deferential to similar state laws. However, when considered in context with the rest of the bill, PACA would likely preempt many state tort-reform provisions. This Article focuses on two PACA sections--the affidavit-of-merit section and the expert-witness-qualifications section. PACA adopts both sections from existing state statutes that have proven controversial and resulted in arguably absurd results. By analyzing state approaches in both areas, this Article concludes that these sections of PACA would preempt all similar state laws, setting a uniform federal standard. This uniformity, however, would come at a high price--an unprecedented encroachment on states' rights in an area of traditional state regulation. Further, the inequitable and absurd results occurring in these states would occur nationwide if PACA is enacted.
{"title":"Congress Prescribes Preemption of State Tort-Reform Laws to Remedy Healthcare \"Crisis\": An Improper Prognosis?","authors":"Jason C Sheffield","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Say what you want about the tort-reform debate, but it has staying power. Over the last half-century, legislators and commentators have extensively debated every aspect of tort reform and the litigation \"crisis\" arguably giving rise to it, without resolving much of anything. Despite this ideological stalemate, tort-reform proponents have managed to push measures through every state legislature. With fifty tries come fifty results, and for the most part, fifty failures. But have all these efforts been in vain? As of yet, no. Although the healthcare system does not appear to be improving, the numerous tort-reform measures states have adopted provide valuable insight into the litigation crisis, even (perhaps especially) when those measures have no effect. But Congress is impatient, one of its many child-like qualities. In June 2017, the United States House of Representatives passed H.R. 1215--The Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017 (PACA). If enacted, PACA would impose comprehensive tort reform on states and, in many cases, preempt similar state laws currently in effect. For many legislators, regardless of political affiliation, this understandably raises federalism concerns. To appease these concerns, PACA's drafters included provisions that appear deferential to similar state laws. However, when considered in context with the rest of the bill, PACA would likely preempt many state tort-reform provisions. This Article focuses on two PACA sections--the affidavit-of-merit section and the expert-witness-qualifications section. PACA adopts both sections from existing state statutes that have proven controversial and resulted in arguably absurd results. By analyzing state approaches in both areas, this Article concludes that these sections of PACA would preempt all similar state laws, setting a uniform federal standard. This uniformity, however, would come at a high price--an unprecedented encroachment on states' rights in an area of traditional state regulation. Further, the inequitable and absurd results occurring in these states would occur nationwide if PACA is enacted.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37237239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}