Attorney-client privilege was held by the Supreme Court to extend beyond death in 1996, albeit only ratifying centuries of accepted practice in the lower courts and England before them. But with the lawyer's client dead, the natural outcome of such a rule is that privilege--the legal enforcement of secrecy--will persist forever, for only the dead client could ever have waived and thus end it. Perpetuity is not traditionally favored by the law for good reason, and yet a long and broad line of precedent endorses its application to privilege. The recent emergence of a novel species of privilege for psychotherapy, however, affords an opportunity to take a fresh look at the long-tolerated enigma of eternity and the imprudence of thoughtlessly importing it to the newest addition to the family of privileges. Frankly, humanity has always deserved better than legalisms arrogating to the inscrutability of the infinite.
{"title":"Secrets Clutched in a Dead Hand: Rethinking Posthumous Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Light of Reason and Experience with Other Evidentiary Privileges.","authors":"Jason S Sunshine","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Attorney-client privilege was held by the Supreme Court to extend beyond death in 1996, albeit only ratifying centuries of accepted practice in the lower courts and England before them. But with the lawyer's client dead, the natural outcome of such a rule is that privilege--the legal enforcement of secrecy--will persist forever, for only the dead client could ever have waived and thus end it. Perpetuity is not traditionally favored by the law for good reason, and yet a long and broad line of precedent endorses its application to privilege. The recent emergence of a novel species of privilege for psychotherapy, however, affords an opportunity to take a fresh look at the long-tolerated enigma of eternity and the imprudence of thoughtlessly importing it to the newest addition to the family of privileges. Frankly, humanity has always deserved better than legalisms arrogating to the inscrutability of the infinite.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":"37 3","pages":"249-363"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141249132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Concern about individual rights and the desire to protect them has been part of our nation since its founding, and continues to be so today. The Ninth Amendment was created to assuage the Framers' concerns that enumerating some rights in the Bill of Rights would leave unenumerated rights unrecognized and unprotected, affirming that those rights are not disparaged or denied by their lack of textual support. The Ninth Amendment has appeared infrequently in our jurisprudence, and Courts initially construed it rather narrowly. But starting in the 1960s, the Ninth Amendment emerged as a powerful tool not just for recognizing unanticipated rights, but for protecting or expanding even enumerated rights. The right to privacy--encompassing the right to contraception and abortion--the right to preserve the integrity of your family, the right to vote, the right to own a firearm as an individual--all these rights have been asserted under and found to be supported by the Ninth Amendment. In its Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health decision overturning Roe, the Supreme Court found that there is no right to abortion because it is not in the Constitution. But the potential of the Ninth Amendment is such that reproductive choice need not be mentioned in the Constitution to be protected. Reproductive choice may rightfully be considered as part of a right to privacy, an unenumerated right that nevertheless has abundant precedent behind it. The Ninth Amendment, and its counterparts found in many state constitutions, has the power to protect not just reproductive choice, but all of our fundamental rights.
自建国以来,对个人权利的关注和保护个人权利的愿望一直是我们国家的一部分,时至今日依然如此。权利法案》中列举的某些权利会使未列举的权利得不到承认和保护,第九修正案的制定就是为了消除制宪者的这种担忧,确认这些权利不会因为缺乏文本支持而被贬低或剥夺。第九修正案在我们的判例中出现的次数不多,法院最初对它的解释也相当狭隘。但从 20 世纪 60 年代开始,第九修正案成为一种强有力的工具,它不仅可以承认未曾预料到的权利,还可以保护或扩大甚至已列举的权利。隐私权--包括避孕和堕胎的权利--维护家庭完整的权利、投票权、作为个人拥有枪支的权利--所有这些权利都是根据第九修正案提出的,并得到了第九修正案的支持。最高法院在 "多布斯诉杰克逊妇女健康案"(Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health)中推翻了 "罗伊案"(Roe),认定不存在堕胎权,因为《宪法》中没有这项权利。但第九修正案的潜力在于,生殖选择无需在《宪法》中提及即可受到保护。生育选择权可以理所当然地被视为隐私权的一部分,这是一项未列举的权利,但却有丰富的先例可循。第九修正案以及许多州宪法中的对应修正案不仅有权保护生育选择权,而且有权保护我们所有的基本权利。
{"title":"The Ninth Amendment: An Underutilized Protection for Reproductive Choice.","authors":"Layne Huff","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Concern about individual rights and the desire to protect them has been part of our nation since its founding, and continues to be so today. The Ninth Amendment was created to assuage the Framers' concerns that enumerating some rights in the Bill of Rights would leave unenumerated rights unrecognized and unprotected, affirming that those rights are not disparaged or denied by their lack of textual support. The Ninth Amendment has appeared infrequently in our jurisprudence, and Courts initially construed it rather narrowly. But starting in the 1960s, the Ninth Amendment emerged as a powerful tool not just for recognizing unanticipated rights, but for protecting or expanding even enumerated rights. The right to privacy--encompassing the right to contraception and abortion--the right to preserve the integrity of your family, the right to vote, the right to own a firearm as an individual--all these rights have been asserted under and found to be supported by the Ninth Amendment. In its Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health decision overturning Roe, the Supreme Court found that there is no right to abortion because it is not in the Constitution. But the potential of the Ninth Amendment is such that reproductive choice need not be mentioned in the Constitution to be protected. Reproductive choice may rightfully be considered as part of a right to privacy, an unenumerated right that nevertheless has abundant precedent behind it. The Ninth Amendment, and its counterparts found in many state constitutions, has the power to protect not just reproductive choice, but all of our fundamental rights.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":"37 2","pages":"105-126"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141249076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Montana, Alaska, and Wyoming lead the United States in a category coveted by no one: the suicide rate. Firearm ownership drives the rate to the disproportionate level it reaches year after year and the states are left with little recourse. This article argues the usefulness and constitutionality of narrowly tailored red-flag laws aimed exclusively at reducing the rate of suicide in these mountain states. The article follows Supreme Court jurisprudence leading up to New York Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen and offers an analysis that complies with the hyper textualist history and tradition test laid out by Scalia in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago. The analysis demonstrates that narrowly tailored red flag laws are a constitutional means of reducing the suicide rate in these at-risk states and references statutory and cultural avenues for the implementation of the legislation.
{"title":"A Trigger Warning: Red Flag Laws are Still Constitutionally Permissible and Could Reduce the Suicide Rates in the Country's Most Vulnerable States.","authors":"Joseph C Campbell","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Montana, Alaska, and Wyoming lead the United States in a category coveted by no one: the suicide rate. Firearm ownership drives the rate to the disproportionate level it reaches year after year and the states are left with little recourse. This article argues the usefulness and constitutionality of narrowly tailored red-flag laws aimed exclusively at reducing the rate of suicide in these mountain states. The article follows Supreme Court jurisprudence leading up to New York Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen and offers an analysis that complies with the hyper textualist history and tradition test laid out by Scalia in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago. The analysis demonstrates that narrowly tailored red flag laws are a constitutional means of reducing the suicide rate in these at-risk states and references statutory and cultural avenues for the implementation of the legislation.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":"37 3","pages":"364-386"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141249121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Humans have been a communal species since inception and continue to be so to this day. Because of this, if even a small scale of a measured population becomes severely ill, the entire remaining population and surrounding area is thrown into absolute chaos. In fact, we have seen these circumstances throughout history and in the recent COVID-19 pandemic yet, some of us have forgotten that the only way this chaos can be curbed, is by enacting a mandatory vaccination policy. Since COVID-19 however, vaccination mandates have become an uneasy topic of conversation in the United States for essentially one main reason, some U.S citizens do not like to be told what to do with their body and what to place inside it, further believing their bodily autonomy to be absolute. Data shows that this ideology recently became more widespread from an increase of mistrust of government and pharmaceutical companies, and from political beliefs and affiliations. Nevertheless, what the data also shows is that these same individuals were asserting their right to bodily autonomy against a vaccination mandate in an unduly aggressive manner, and on a very erroneous understanding of the governing jurisprudence, policies and modern scientific data surrounding said vaccination mandates and large scale disease outbreaks. This article therefore aims to provide a clear and extensive understanding of the proposition that, while bodily autonomy is favored in other aspects of life, this right can fail with respect to deadly disease outbreaks and mandatory vaccinations as there is presently no other practical or feasible alternative. Specifically, this article introduces and/or reminds the U.S. public of well-established governing case law, relevant historical and scientific information and the pertinent legislative authority surrounding vaccines, bodily autonomy, and vaccination mandates.
{"title":"How Bodily Autonomy Can Fail Against Vaccination Mandates: The Few vs. the Many.","authors":"Jason Yadhram","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Humans have been a communal species since inception and continue to be so to this day. Because of this, if even a small scale of a measured population becomes severely ill, the entire remaining population and surrounding area is thrown into absolute chaos. In fact, we have seen these circumstances throughout history and in the recent COVID-19 pandemic yet, some of us have forgotten that the only way this chaos can be curbed, is by enacting a mandatory vaccination policy. Since COVID-19 however, vaccination mandates have become an uneasy topic of conversation in the United States for essentially one main reason, some U.S citizens do not like to be told what to do with their body and what to place inside it, further believing their bodily autonomy to be absolute. Data shows that this ideology recently became more widespread from an increase of mistrust of government and pharmaceutical companies, and from political beliefs and affiliations. Nevertheless, what the data also shows is that these same individuals were asserting their right to bodily autonomy against a vaccination mandate in an unduly aggressive manner, and on a very erroneous understanding of the governing jurisprudence, policies and modern scientific data surrounding said vaccination mandates and large scale disease outbreaks. This article therefore aims to provide a clear and extensive understanding of the proposition that, while bodily autonomy is favored in other aspects of life, this right can fail with respect to deadly disease outbreaks and mandatory vaccinations as there is presently no other practical or feasible alternative. Specifically, this article introduces and/or reminds the U.S. public of well-established governing case law, relevant historical and scientific information and the pertinent legislative authority surrounding vaccines, bodily autonomy, and vaccination mandates.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":"37 2","pages":"127-161"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141249106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Eczema is a common yet serious inflammatory skin condition affecting millions of children in the United States. Dark skin and/or African-American ethnicity are risk factors for increased eczema severity, most likely due to systemic racism expressed as lower socioeconomic status, increased environmental toxin exposure, decreased access to adequate medical care, and infrequent implementation of early intervention practices. Skin-directed management of eczema for caregivers is critically important for improving clinical outcomes of children with eczema. Skin-directed management of eczema includes avoidance of allergens and appropriate moisturization of skin, which warrants evaluation of cosmetic products like lotions, creams and oils essential for effective home management of the condition. The Federal Drug Administration (FDA) oversees the regulation of cosmetic products under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Some over-the-counter (OTC) cosmetic products labeled as eczema treatments may be considered a nonprescribed drug and/or a cosmetic product by the FDA, and allergens generally considered harmful to eczematous skin may be found in both categories of skincare products. OTC products labeled as treating eczema make a concrete medical claim and should be further scrutinized to assess their credibility. The negative ramifications of inadequate skincare for dark-skinned and Black children with eczema can result in significant medical consequences, increased negative clinical and social outcomes and literally thickened skin.
湿疹是一种常见但严重的皮肤炎症,影响着美国数百万儿童。深色皮肤和/或非裔美国人是导致湿疹严重程度增加的风险因素,这很可能是由于系统性种族主义造成的,表现为社会经济地位较低、接触环境毒素的机会增加、获得适当医疗护理的机会减少以及早期干预措施实施不频繁。护理人员对湿疹进行皮肤指导管理对于改善湿疹患儿的临床治疗效果至关重要。以皮肤为导向的湿疹管理包括避免过敏原和适当的皮肤保湿,这就需要对乳液、面霜和精油等化妆品进行评估,这些产品对有效的家庭湿疹管理至关重要。美国联邦药品管理局(FDA)根据《食品、药品和化妆品法》(FDCA)对化妆品进行监管。一些标注为治疗湿疹的非处方(OTC)化妆品可能会被 FDA 视为非处方药和/或化妆品,而通常被认为对湿疹皮肤有害的过敏原可能会出现在这两类护肤品中。贴有治疗湿疹标签的非处方药产品是一种具体的医疗声明,应进一步审查以评估其可信度。对患有湿疹的黑皮肤和黑人儿童来说,护肤不当的负面影响可能会导致严重的医疗后果、更多的负面临床和社会后果以及皮肤增厚。
{"title":"Developing Thick Skin: Pediatric Eczema in Vulnerable Communities and FDA Regulation of Cosmetic Products.","authors":"Abayomi Jones","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Eczema is a common yet serious inflammatory skin condition affecting millions of children in the United States. Dark skin and/or African-American ethnicity are risk factors for increased eczema severity, most likely due to systemic racism expressed as lower socioeconomic status, increased environmental toxin exposure, decreased access to adequate medical care, and infrequent implementation of early intervention practices. Skin-directed management of eczema for caregivers is critically important for improving clinical outcomes of children with eczema. Skin-directed management of eczema includes avoidance of allergens and appropriate moisturization of skin, which warrants evaluation of cosmetic products like lotions, creams and oils essential for effective home management of the condition. The Federal Drug Administration (FDA) oversees the regulation of cosmetic products under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Some over-the-counter (OTC) cosmetic products labeled as eczema treatments may be considered a nonprescribed drug and/or a cosmetic product by the FDA, and allergens generally considered harmful to eczematous skin may be found in both categories of skincare products. OTC products labeled as treating eczema make a concrete medical claim and should be further scrutinized to assess their credibility. The negative ramifications of inadequate skincare for dark-skinned and Black children with eczema can result in significant medical consequences, increased negative clinical and social outcomes and literally thickened skin.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":"38 1","pages":"174-195"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142677974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Note explores the intricate relationship between emerging adulthood, defined as the transitional phase between youth and adulthood (ages 18-25), and the legal implications of capital punishment. Contrary to a fixed age determining adulthood, research highlights the prolonged nature of the maturation process, especially for individuals impacted by Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs). The Note challenges the current legal framework that deems individuals aged 18 to 25 who experienced ACEs as eligible for capital punishment, highlighting the cognitive impact of ACEs on developmental trajectories. Examining cases like Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and Billy Joe Wardlow, this Note argues that courts often bypass mitigating evidence related to ACEs, thereby perpetuating judicial errors. The mismatched burdens of proof for aggravating and mitigating factors further compound the problem, contributing to a flawed system that disproportionately affects emerging adults. In response to these issues, some states are reevaluating their approach to emerging adult justice, considering initiatives such as "raise the age" campaigns and specialized courts. The Note promotes an approach that aligns with cognitive age appropriateness, tailoring interventions to encompass restorative justice, rehabilitative measures, and a comprehensive legal framework to address the distinct needs of the emerging adult population. Recognizing the potential for cognitive development and rehabilitation during this transitional phase, this Note contends that alternative methods can provide opportunities for ACE-impacted individuals to age out of criminal behaviors, potentially altering life trajectories and mitigating the imposition of capital punishment.
{"title":"Distorted Burden Shifting and Barred Mitigation: Being a Stubborn 234 Years Old Ironically Hasn't Helped the Supreme Court Mature.","authors":"Noah Seabrook","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This Note explores the intricate relationship between emerging adulthood, defined as the transitional phase between youth and adulthood (ages 18-25), and the legal implications of capital punishment. Contrary to a fixed age determining adulthood, research highlights the prolonged nature of the maturation process, especially for individuals impacted by Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs). The Note challenges the current legal framework that deems individuals aged 18 to 25 who experienced ACEs as eligible for capital punishment, highlighting the cognitive impact of ACEs on developmental trajectories. Examining cases like Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and Billy Joe Wardlow, this Note argues that courts often bypass mitigating evidence related to ACEs, thereby perpetuating judicial errors. The mismatched burdens of proof for aggravating and mitigating factors further compound the problem, contributing to a flawed system that disproportionately affects emerging adults. In response to these issues, some states are reevaluating their approach to emerging adult justice, considering initiatives such as \"raise the age\" campaigns and specialized courts. The Note promotes an approach that aligns with cognitive age appropriateness, tailoring interventions to encompass restorative justice, rehabilitative measures, and a comprehensive legal framework to address the distinct needs of the emerging adult population. Recognizing the potential for cognitive development and rehabilitation during this transitional phase, this Note contends that alternative methods can provide opportunities for ACE-impacted individuals to age out of criminal behaviors, potentially altering life trajectories and mitigating the imposition of capital punishment.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":"37 2","pages":"162-186"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141249105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Medical research plays a vital role in advancing human knowledge, developing new therapies and procedures, and reducing human suffering. Following the atrocities committed in the name of medical research by German physicians during the Nazi era, the Nuremberg trials were held, and an ethical code was created to establish the limits within which medical research can operate. Consequently, legal regimes built upon this ethical foundation to develop laws that ensure the integrity of medical research and the safety of human subjects. These laws sought to protect human subjects by minimizing conflicts of interest that may arise during the process. Furthermore, conflicts of interest may be financial such as monetary gain, or nonfinancial such as promotion and career advancement. However, with a $1.1 billion median cost of developing a new drug, the focus of these laws was directed towards financial conflicts of interest. But should we expand these laws to include nonfinancial conflicts of interest? This Article highlights prominent arguments in favor of and against the regulation of nonfinancial conflicts of interest in medical research. It further concludes that adequate institutional policies--not additional regulations--strike the right balance between the need to safeguard against the harmful effects of nonfinancial conflicts of interest on the one hand and avoiding the drawbacks of overregulation on the other.
{"title":"Nonfinancial Conflict of Interest in Medical Research: Is Regulation the Right Answer.","authors":"Nehad Mikhael","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Medical research plays a vital role in advancing human knowledge, developing new therapies and procedures, and reducing human suffering. Following the atrocities committed in the name of medical research by German physicians during the Nazi era, the Nuremberg trials were held, and an ethical code was created to establish the limits within which medical research can operate. Consequently, legal regimes built upon this ethical foundation to develop laws that ensure the integrity of medical research and the safety of human subjects. These laws sought to protect human subjects by minimizing conflicts of interest that may arise during the process. Furthermore, conflicts of interest may be financial such as monetary gain, or nonfinancial such as promotion and career advancement. However, with a $1.1 billion median cost of developing a new drug, the focus of these laws was directed towards financial conflicts of interest. But should we expand these laws to include nonfinancial conflicts of interest? This Article highlights prominent arguments in favor of and against the regulation of nonfinancial conflicts of interest in medical research. It further concludes that adequate institutional policies--not additional regulations--strike the right balance between the need to safeguard against the harmful effects of nonfinancial conflicts of interest on the one hand and avoiding the drawbacks of overregulation on the other.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":"37 3","pages":"225-248"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141249126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the overturning of prior abortion precedents in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, there has been a question on the minds of many women in this country: how will this decision affect me and my rights? As we have seen in the aftermath of Dobbs, many states have pushed for stringent anti-abortion measures seeking to undermine the foundation on which women's reproductive freedom had been grounded on for decades. This includes right here in Ohio, where Republican lawmakers have advocated on numerous occasions for implementing laws seeking to limit abortion rights, including a 6-week abortion ban advocated for and passed by the Ohio Republican legislature and signed into law by Ohio Governor Mike DeWine. Despite this particular ban being successfully challenged and stayed, significant problems persist regarding due process rights for women in Ohio, particularly in the aftermath of Justice Thomas's concurrence in Dobbs advising the Court to revisit prior precedents, such as Griswold v. Connecticut providing for the right to contraception. If the Court were to revisit and strike down Griswold, it would further undermine privacy and due process rights that have been granted to women across this country, including here in Ohio, for decades. Justice Thomas's concurrence, while merely dicta, encapsulates a Court that has become increasingly hostile to treasured fundamental rights for women, a hostility mirrored in numerous Republican legislatures, including right here in Ohio.
{"title":"Without Due Process of Law: The Dobbs Decision and Its Cataclysmic Impact on the Substantive Due Process and Privacy Rights of Ohio Women.","authors":"Jacob Wenner","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Since the overturning of prior abortion precedents in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, there has been a question on the minds of many women in this country: how will this decision affect me and my rights? As we have seen in the aftermath of Dobbs, many states have pushed for stringent anti-abortion measures seeking to undermine the foundation on which women's reproductive freedom had been grounded on for decades. This includes right here in Ohio, where Republican lawmakers have advocated on numerous occasions for implementing laws seeking to limit abortion rights, including a 6-week abortion ban advocated for and passed by the Ohio Republican legislature and signed into law by Ohio Governor Mike DeWine. Despite this particular ban being successfully challenged and stayed, significant problems persist regarding due process rights for women in Ohio, particularly in the aftermath of Justice Thomas's concurrence in Dobbs advising the Court to revisit prior precedents, such as Griswold v. Connecticut providing for the right to contraception. If the Court were to revisit and strike down Griswold, it would further undermine privacy and due process rights that have been granted to women across this country, including here in Ohio, for decades. Justice Thomas's concurrence, while merely dicta, encapsulates a Court that has become increasingly hostile to treasured fundamental rights for women, a hostility mirrored in numerous Republican legislatures, including right here in Ohio.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":"37 2","pages":"187-213"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141249119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over half the states have enacted laws diminishing or curtailing the rights of the executive branch (legislatures or governors) to enact laws to preserve, protect, or safeguard public health in the wake of the COVID-19 emergency. Governor DeSantis, of Florida, for example, effectively banned mask mandates in schools during the high point of the epidemic--based on flawed science and erroneous data--and now wants to make that response permanent. The rules effectuating this Executive Order were enacted under an emergency order finding a threat to public health. Nevertheless, the response promulgated by the Florida Department of Health was to prevent public health measures, favoring individual liberties, parental rights (which have previously been held not to apply in the context of the spread of contagious disease epidemics) at the expense of public health and safety. This article explores alternative means to compel state governments, heretofore vested with the police power to protect public health, to comply with this obligation, using the Florida situation as a case study.
{"title":"When Governors Prioritize Individual Freedom over Public Health: Tort Liability for Government Failures.","authors":"Barbara Pfeffer Billauer","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Over half the states have enacted laws diminishing or curtailing the rights of the executive branch (legislatures or governors) to enact laws to preserve, protect, or safeguard public health in the wake of the COVID-19 emergency. Governor DeSantis, of Florida, for example, effectively banned mask mandates in schools during the high point of the epidemic--based on flawed science and erroneous data--and now wants to make that response permanent. The rules effectuating this Executive Order were enacted under an emergency order finding a threat to public health. Nevertheless, the response promulgated by the Florida Department of Health was to prevent public health measures, favoring individual liberties, parental rights (which have previously been held not to apply in the context of the spread of contagious disease epidemics) at the expense of public health and safety. This article explores alternative means to compel state governments, heretofore vested with the police power to protect public health, to comply with this obligation, using the Florida situation as a case study.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":"37 2","pages":"52-104"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141249117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Affordable Care Act ("ACA") contains a section titled "Requirement to Maintain Essential Minimum Coverage." Colloquially known as the Individual Mandate, this section of the Act initially established a monetary penalty for anyone who did not maintain health insurance in a given tax year. But with the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the monetary penalty was reset to zero, inducing opponents of the ACA to mount a legal challenge over the Individual Mandate's constitutionality. As the third major legal challenge to the ACA, California v. Texas saw the Supreme Court punt on the merits and instead decide the case on grounds of Article III standing. But how would the ACA have fared if the Court had in fact reached the merits? Did resetting the Individual Mandate penalty to zero uncloak the provision from the saving construction of Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius? This Note posits that, had the Court reached the merits, it would have found the Individual Mandate no longer met the requirements for classification as a tax under the rule relied on in NFIB. Moreover, it argues that the Court would have found the unconstitutional provision to be inseverable from the ACA insofar as it was integral to funding both the novel structure of the reformed healthcare system and the prohibition against insurance carriers denying coverage due to a pre-existing condition. This examination ultimately reveals that an outright repeal of the ACA would have been antidemocratic in the face of current consensus opinion that favors the reform and highlights the impact its abrogation would have had.
平价医疗法案》("ACA")中有一节名为 "保持基本最低保险的要求"。俗称 "个人强制要求",该法案的这一部分最初规定对在特定纳税年度未投保医疗保险的人处以罚款。但随着《减税与就业法案》(Tax Cuts and Jobs Act)的通过,罚款额度被重设为零,导致《美国医疗保险法案》的反对者对 "个人强制要求 "的合宪性提出了法律挑战。加利福尼亚州诉得克萨斯州案是对《反垄断法》的第三大法律挑战,最高法院在此案中放弃了对案情的审理,而是以第三条规定的诉讼资格为由对此案做出了判决。但是,如果法院真的对案情进行了审理,ACA 的情况又会如何呢?将 "个人任务 "的罚金重置为零是否使该条款摆脱了 "全国独立商业联合会诉西贝利厄斯 "案的保护性解释?本说明认为,如果法院审理了案情实质,就会发现 "个人授权 "不再符合 NFIB 案中所依据的规则将其归类为税收的要求。此外,该报告还认为,法院会认为该违宪条款与《反垄断法》密不可分,因为它是改革后医疗保健系统的新结构和禁止保险公司因既存病症拒绝承保的规定所不可或缺的资金来源。这一研究最终揭示出,在当前支持改革的共识面前,彻底废除《反垄断法》是反民主的,并强调了废除该法将产生的影响。
{"title":"California v. Texas: Avoiding an Antidemocratic Outcome.","authors":"Jon Lucas","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The Affordable Care Act (\"ACA\") contains a section titled \"Requirement to Maintain Essential Minimum Coverage.\" Colloquially known as the Individual Mandate, this section of the Act initially established a monetary penalty for anyone who did not maintain health insurance in a given tax year. But with the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the monetary penalty was reset to zero, inducing opponents of the ACA to mount a legal challenge over the Individual Mandate's constitutionality. As the third major legal challenge to the ACA, California v. Texas saw the Supreme Court punt on the merits and instead decide the case on grounds of Article III standing. But how would the ACA have fared if the Court had in fact reached the merits? Did resetting the Individual Mandate penalty to zero uncloak the provision from the saving construction of Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius? This Note posits that, had the Court reached the merits, it would have found the Individual Mandate no longer met the requirements for classification as a tax under the rule relied on in NFIB. Moreover, it argues that the Court would have found the unconstitutional provision to be inseverable from the ACA insofar as it was integral to funding both the novel structure of the reformed healthcare system and the prohibition against insurance carriers denying coverage due to a pre-existing condition. This examination ultimately reveals that an outright repeal of the ACA would have been antidemocratic in the face of current consensus opinion that favors the reform and highlights the impact its abrogation would have had.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":"37 3","pages":"387-410"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141249123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}