How do the labor market values of executives’ personal traits evolve over time? We propose and estimate an interactive fixed effects model, which allows for time-variant valuation of unobserved manager attributes. We find that managerial talent is the most important unobserved trait determining compensation. The pay premium based on each talent decile has significant time variation that co-moves with the stock market. Such pay premium is concentrated among top talented managers, with executives at the median level of talent earning $241,000 total pay premium and those at the top talent decile earning $1,136,000. We also identify a second economically important executive trait, and this trait is related to managerial cautiousness or risk aversion. The pay premium of this trait is linked to the time variation in the equity market risk premium, with cautiousness being discounted (compensated) during the low (high) risk premium period.
{"title":"How do the Labor Market Values of Managerial Traits Evolve?","authors":"Si Li, M. F. Perez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2547738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2547738","url":null,"abstract":"How do the labor market values of executives’ personal traits evolve over time? We propose and estimate an interactive fixed effects model, which allows for time-variant valuation of unobserved manager attributes. We find that managerial talent is the most important unobserved trait determining compensation. The pay premium based on each talent decile has significant time variation that co-moves with the stock market. Such pay premium is concentrated among top talented managers, with executives at the median level of talent earning $241,000 total pay premium and those at the top talent decile earning $1,136,000. We also identify a second economically important executive trait, and this trait is related to managerial cautiousness or risk aversion. The pay premium of this trait is linked to the time variation in the equity market risk premium, with cautiousness being discounted (compensated) during the low (high) risk premium period.","PeriodicalId":76903,"journal":{"name":"Employee benefits journal","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80366809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The motivation behind labor union and public pension fund activism is widely debated. We posit that activism motivated by private benefits primarily arises when there is a firm-specific conflict of interest, such as when a union activist also represents workers in collective bargaining negotiations. We provide evidence that the labor market for directorships mitigates the negative effect of “special interest” activism on other shareholders. Specifically, directors who cater to self-serving requests are punished with a loss in directorships and damage to their reputation as corporate monitors. Moreover, we provide insight into when boards are most vulnerable to “special interest” pressure.
{"title":"Can Strong Corporate Governance Selectively Mitigate the Negative Influence of 'Special Interest' Shareholder Activists? Evidence from the Labor Market for Directors","authors":"Diane Del Guercio, Tracie Woidtke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2448920","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2448920","url":null,"abstract":"The motivation behind labor union and public pension fund activism is widely debated. We posit that activism motivated by private benefits primarily arises when there is a firm-specific conflict of interest, such as when a union activist also represents workers in collective bargaining negotiations. We provide evidence that the labor market for directorships mitigates the negative effect of “special interest” activism on other shareholders. Specifically, directors who cater to self-serving requests are punished with a loss in directorships and damage to their reputation as corporate monitors. Moreover, we provide insight into when boards are most vulnerable to “special interest” pressure.","PeriodicalId":76903,"journal":{"name":"Employee benefits journal","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76912662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Charles A. Jeszeck, D. Lehrer, Margaret Weber, L. Beedon, Charles J Ford, Jessica Moscovitch, Layla Moughari, Joseph Silvestri, Anjali Tekchandani, F. Todisco, Adam Wendel
The Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund (CSPF) was established in 1955 to provide pension benefits to trucking industry workers and is one of the largest multiemployer plans. According to its regulatory filings, CSPF had less than half the estimated funds needed to cover plan liabilities in 1982 at the time it entered into a court-enforceable consent decree that provides for oversight of certain plan activities. Since then, CSPF has made some progress toward achieving its targeted level of funding; however, CSPF has never been more than 75 percent funded and its funding level has weakened since 2002. Stakeholders GAO interviewed identified numerous factors that contributed to CSPF's financial condition. For example, stakeholders stated that changes within the trucking industry, as well as a decline in union membership, contributed to CSPF's inability to maintain a healthy contribution base. CSPF's active participants made up about 69 percent of all participants in 1982, but accounted for only 16 percent in 2016. The most dramatic change in active participants occurred in 2007 when the United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) withdrew from the plan. At that time, UPS accounted for about 30 percent of the plan's active participants (i.e. workers). In addition, the market declines of 2001 to 2002 and 2008 had a significant negative impact on the plan's long-term investment performance. Stakeholders noted that, while each individual factor contributed to CSPF's critical financial condition, the interrelated nature of the factors also had a cumulative effect on the plan's financial condition. The 1982 consent decree between the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) and CSPF came about as a result of an investigation of alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and mismanagement of plan assets, and is intended to prevent their reoccurrence. In addition to reiterating the requirement that the plan comply with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)—the primary law governing the treatment of private-sector pensions in the United States—the consent decree further outlines requirements for the plan to help ensure fiduciary controls and plan management, including seeking court approvals for the appointment of new trustees and changes to the plan's investment policy. The consent decree also delineates roles for DOL and other stakeholders. For example, it allows DOL to object to or comment on certain proposed plan actions, but does not require the agency to do so. GAO's review of plan documents found that the agency provided oversight and technical assistance in the areas specifically identified for its involvement under the consent decree, such as vetting proposed trustees prior to the court's approval. DOL is primarily responsible for enforcing the reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary provisions of ERISA for all tax-qualified pension plans, including CSPF. ERISA sets forth a “prudent man standard of care” in the execution of fiducia
中央邦、东南和西南地区养老基金(CSPF)成立于1955年，为卡车运输业工人提供养老金福利，是最大的多雇主计划之一。根据其提交给监管机构的文件，1982年，当公积金基金与法院达成一项可强制执行的同意令，规定对某些计划活动进行监督时，它所拥有的估计资金还不到覆盖计划负债所需资金的一半。从那时起，公积金基金在实现其目标资金水平方面取得了一些进展;然而，公积金基金的资助从未超过75%，其资助水平自2002年以来有所下降。政府问责局采访的利益相关者确定了影响公积金财务状况的许多因素。例如，利益攸关方指出，卡车运输业内部的变化以及工会会员的减少，导致社保基金无法维持健康的缴费基础。1982年，CSPF的活跃参与者约占所有参与者的69%，但2016年仅占16%。最引人注目的变化发生在2007年，当时联合包裹服务公司(UPS)退出了该计划。当时，UPS约占该计划积极参与者(即工人)的30%。此外，2001年至2002年和2008年的市场下跌对该计划的长期投资业绩产生了显著的负面影响。利益攸关方指出，虽然每个单独的因素都对公积金计划的关键财务状况有所贡献，但这些因素的相互关联性质也对计划的财务状况产生累积影响。1982年美国劳工部(DOL)和CSPF之间的同意法令是对涉嫌违反信托义务和计划资产管理不善的调查的结果，旨在防止此类事件再次发生。除了重申该计划必须遵守1974年《雇员退休收入保障法》(ERISA)——美国管理私营部门养老金待遇的主要法律——的要求外，同意令还进一步概述了该计划的要求，以帮助确保信托控制和计划管理，包括寻求法院批准任命新的受托人和改变计划的投资政策。同意令还描述了DOL和其他利益相关者的角色。例如，它允许劳工部反对或评论某些拟议的计划行动，但不要求该机构这样做。政府问责局对计划文件的审查发现，该机构在同意令明确规定其参与的领域提供了监督和技术援助，例如在法院批准之前审查拟议的受托人。美国劳工部主要负责执行ERISA的报告、披露和信托条款，适用于所有符合税收条件的养老金计划，包括CSPF。根据DOL的规定，ERISA规定了在执行信托责任时的“谨慎人标准”，该标准侧重于做出适当信托决定的过程。计划受托人负责选择和监督投资经理，但通常不对这些经理的个人投资决策负责。为执行该条例，劳工处会进行检查和调查。自同意令成立以来，DOL官员报告说，该机构已经完成了对CSPF的两次调查。这两项调查分别于1998年和2004年完成，没有发现反对该计划的不利结果。除了这些机构的监督作用之外，劳工部还与CSPF和其他机构合作，采取措施改善该计划的财务状况，包括参与拟议立法的讨论，并与CSPF合作，根据2014年《多雇主养老金改革法案》(multi - employer Pension Reform Act of 2014)减少福利。该申请没有得到美国财政部的批准。
{"title":"Central States Pension Fund: Department of Labor Activities Under the Consent Decree and Federal Law","authors":"Charles A. Jeszeck, D. Lehrer, Margaret Weber, L. Beedon, Charles J Ford, Jessica Moscovitch, Layla Moughari, Joseph Silvestri, Anjali Tekchandani, F. Todisco, Adam Wendel","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3191291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3191291","url":null,"abstract":"The Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund (CSPF) was established in 1955 to provide pension benefits to trucking industry workers and is one of the largest multiemployer plans. According to its regulatory filings, CSPF had less than half the estimated funds needed to cover plan liabilities in 1982 at the time it entered into a court-enforceable consent decree that provides for oversight of certain plan activities. Since then, CSPF has made some progress toward achieving its targeted level of funding; however, CSPF has never been more than 75 percent funded and its funding level has weakened since 2002. \u0000Stakeholders GAO interviewed identified numerous factors that contributed to CSPF's financial condition. For example, stakeholders stated that changes within the trucking industry, as well as a decline in union membership, contributed to CSPF's inability to maintain a healthy contribution base. CSPF's active participants made up about 69 percent of all participants in 1982, but accounted for only 16 percent in 2016. The most dramatic change in active participants occurred in 2007 when the United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) withdrew from the plan. At that time, UPS accounted for about 30 percent of the plan's active participants (i.e. workers). In addition, the market declines of 2001 to 2002 and 2008 had a significant negative impact on the plan's long-term investment performance. Stakeholders noted that, while each individual factor contributed to CSPF's critical financial condition, the interrelated nature of the factors also had a cumulative effect on the plan's financial condition. \u0000The 1982 consent decree between the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) and CSPF came about as a result of an investigation of alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and mismanagement of plan assets, and is intended to prevent their reoccurrence. In addition to reiterating the requirement that the plan comply with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)—the primary law governing the treatment of private-sector pensions in the United States—the consent decree further outlines requirements for the plan to help ensure fiduciary controls and plan management, including seeking court approvals for the appointment of new trustees and changes to the plan's investment policy. The consent decree also delineates roles for DOL and other stakeholders. For example, it allows DOL to object to or comment on certain proposed plan actions, but does not require the agency to do so. GAO's review of plan documents found that the agency provided oversight and technical assistance in the areas specifically identified for its involvement under the consent decree, such as vetting proposed trustees prior to the court's approval. \u0000DOL is primarily responsible for enforcing the reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary provisions of ERISA for all tax-qualified pension plans, including CSPF. ERISA sets forth a “prudent man standard of care” in the execution of fiducia","PeriodicalId":76903,"journal":{"name":"Employee benefits journal","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78092409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-03-26DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190634100.013.3
Robert H. Sitkoff
This chapter canvasses the fiduciary principles applicable to a trustee of a donative, irrevocable private trust. The focus is on American law. The chapter examines: (1) the trigger for finding a trust fiduciary relationship and the scope of that relationship; (2) the duty of loyalty; (3) the duty of prudence across the distribution, investment, custodial, and administrative functions of trusteeship; (4) other fiduciary duties in trust law, including the prominent duty of impartiality and the increasingly salient duty to give information to the beneficiaries; (5) the extent to which fiduciary principles in trust law are mandatory or may be waived by the settlor or by a beneficiary; and (6) the remedies available for a breach of duty by a trustee.
{"title":"Fiduciary Principles in Trust Law","authors":"Robert H. Sitkoff","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190634100.013.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190634100.013.3","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter canvasses the fiduciary principles applicable to a trustee of a donative, irrevocable private trust. The focus is on American law. The chapter examines: (1) the trigger for finding a trust fiduciary relationship and the scope of that relationship; (2) the duty of loyalty; (3) the duty of prudence across the distribution, investment, custodial, and administrative functions of trusteeship; (4) other fiduciary duties in trust law, including the prominent duty of impartiality and the increasingly salient duty to give information to the beneficiaries; (5) the extent to which fiduciary principles in trust law are mandatory or may be waived by the settlor or by a beneficiary; and (6) the remedies available for a breach of duty by a trustee.","PeriodicalId":76903,"journal":{"name":"Employee benefits journal","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75471372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-22DOI: 10.11575/SPPP.V11I0.43034
N. Nielson
Canadians are not fond of hearing news about people losing their hard-earned pensions because their employer misused the money. The thought of some Working Joe or Jane being deprived of a pension, after a lifetime of working for a company, is naturally repugnant. That is why regulations around defined-benefit pension plans are designed to force employers to keep their pension funds sufficiently solvent. But there are many ways to achieve that end and, while the rules that Canadian companies must follow might serve to help preserve pension savings, they also be very expensive — to employers and regulators — compared to other policies that can do the same thing. In fact, more flexibility in the rules might even make it easier for companies to offer richer pension benefits to employees than they already do. Some of Canada’s outdated pension-funding rules have created the opposite problem: There are now pension plans that are actually overfunded if one assumes the company and the plan will continue. That means money the sponsoring companies could be using to hire more workers, to offer employees better pay and benefits, or to invest, is tied up in pension coffers. The problem lies in the divergence between a “going-concern” valuation — which assumes that the plan continues indefinitely — with the more prescriptive “solvency” valuation that is central to Canadian regulations. It examines funding adequaciy if one assumes the employer is going to go out of business (even if the vast majority of large employers are at any given time at no risk of that). In the days when fixed-income returns were lucrative, companies relied on pension fund investments to top up the funds, reducing sponsor contributions to unsafe levels. The solvency rules required plans that were reaping higher returns in the stock market to continue making some contributions to their plans. Back then, the gap between a going-concern valuation and a solvency valuation was small, and so the rules were not an unacceptable burden. Those rich returns are gone. Now, that gap between valuations has grown dramatically. In B.C., for example, a recent analysis found that when using a going-concern evaluation, 75 per cent of 143 defined-benefit plans registered in the province in 2015 had at least 100-per-cent funding, while the median funding ratio was 124 per cent. Using a solvency model, the median funding ratio was instead estimated to be a much lower 85 per cent. Closing that gap would require onerous pension contributions. More importantly, the contributions it triggers might never be needed to cover benefits. Quebec is the first province to recognize that pension-funding rules need to be revisited and made more responsive, with new rules coming in that will reduce the unnecessary burden on employers while also adapting to changes in the economic environment. Ontario is showing signs that it will take steps in the same direction. Regulators everywhere should be revisiting pension rules to: re
{"title":"The Time Has Come to Revisit Solvency Funding Rules","authors":"N. Nielson","doi":"10.11575/SPPP.V11I0.43034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11575/SPPP.V11I0.43034","url":null,"abstract":"Canadians are not fond of hearing news about people losing their hard-earned pensions because their employer misused the money. The thought of some Working Joe or Jane being deprived of a pension, after a lifetime of working for a company, is naturally repugnant. That is why regulations around defined-benefit pension plans are designed to force employers to keep their pension funds sufficiently solvent. But there are many ways to achieve that end and, while the rules that Canadian companies must follow might serve to help preserve pension savings, they also be very expensive — to employers and regulators — compared to other policies that can do the same thing. In fact, more flexibility in the rules might even make it easier for companies to offer richer pension benefits to employees than they already do. Some of Canada’s outdated pension-funding rules have created the opposite problem: There are now pension plans that are actually overfunded if one assumes the company and the plan will continue. That means money the sponsoring companies could be using to hire more workers, to offer employees better pay and benefits, or to invest, is tied up in pension coffers. The problem lies in the divergence between a “going-concern” valuation — which assumes that the plan continues indefinitely — with the more prescriptive “solvency” valuation that is central to Canadian regulations. It examines funding adequaciy if one assumes the employer is going to go out of business (even if the vast majority of large employers are at any given time at no risk of that). In the days when fixed-income returns were lucrative, companies relied on pension fund investments to top up the funds, reducing sponsor contributions to unsafe levels. The solvency rules required plans that were reaping higher returns in the stock market to continue making some contributions to their plans. Back then, the gap between a going-concern valuation and a solvency valuation was small, and so the rules were not an unacceptable burden. Those rich returns are gone. Now, that gap between valuations has grown dramatically. In B.C., for example, a recent analysis found that when using a going-concern evaluation, 75 per cent of 143 defined-benefit plans registered in the province in 2015 had at least 100-per-cent funding, while the median funding ratio was 124 per cent. Using a solvency model, the median funding ratio was instead estimated to be a much lower 85 per cent. Closing that gap would require onerous pension contributions. More importantly, the contributions it triggers might never be needed to cover benefits. Quebec is the first province to recognize that pension-funding rules need to be revisited and made more responsive, with new rules coming in that will reduce the unnecessary burden on employers while also adapting to changes in the economic environment. Ontario is showing signs that it will take steps in the same direction. Regulators everywhere should be revisiting pension rules to: re","PeriodicalId":76903,"journal":{"name":"Employee benefits journal","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89619474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Both Collective Defined Contribution (CDC) and Collective Individual Defined Contribution (CIDC) schemes place any risks on pension scheme members instead of an external risk-bearer. In CDC schemes, assets are pooled collectively, allowing for risks to be shared between pension scheme members. In Individual DC schemes (IDC), the scheme members bear such risks individually. But CDC’s collective nature leaves little room for individual risk management and the pension assets are allocated to scheme members via rules that are often complex and ambiguous. CIDC schemes strive to retain the desirable aspects of CDC and IDC schemes, while improving on some of the drawbacks. The drawbacks of a CDC scheme are mitigated by the introduction of 1) individually quantifiable pension pots through individual accounts, 2) individual risk management and 3) a simplified scheme. The drawbacks of an IDC scheme are mitigated by 1) mandatory participation, 2) collective management of assets, and 3) sharing of risks. It therefore seems that CIDC schemes have a number of important advantages over CDC schemes. CIDC scheme members should be clearly informed of their legal position vis-a-vis their employer and pension provider, and the contract should clearly define the risks. Scheme members appear to benefit from individual risk management and individually identifiable pension pots, while employers and/or pension providers seem relieved from risks and enjoy the security of fixed pension contributions. The possibility to take out a lump sum seems contrary to the collective sharing of risks in both CIDC and CDC schemes.
{"title":"The Legal Differences between CIDC and CDC","authors":"H. V. Meerten, E. Schmidt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3121141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3121141","url":null,"abstract":"Both Collective Defined Contribution (CDC) and Collective Individual Defined Contribution (CIDC) schemes place any risks on pension scheme members instead of an external risk-bearer. In CDC schemes, assets are pooled collectively, allowing for risks to be shared between pension scheme members. In Individual DC schemes (IDC), the scheme members bear such risks individually. But CDC’s collective nature leaves little room for individual risk management and the pension assets are allocated to scheme members via rules that are often complex and ambiguous. \u0000CIDC schemes strive to retain the desirable aspects of CDC and IDC schemes, while improving on some of the drawbacks. The drawbacks of a CDC scheme are mitigated by the introduction of 1) individually quantifiable pension pots through individual accounts, 2) individual risk management and 3) a simplified scheme. The drawbacks of an IDC scheme are mitigated by 1) mandatory participation, 2) collective management of assets, and 3) sharing of risks. It therefore seems that CIDC schemes have a number of important advantages over CDC schemes. CIDC scheme members should be clearly informed of their legal position vis-a-vis their employer and pension provider, and the contract should clearly define the risks. Scheme members appear to benefit from individual risk management and individually identifiable pension pots, while employers and/or pension providers seem relieved from risks and enjoy the security of fixed pension contributions. The possibility to take out a lump sum seems contrary to the collective sharing of risks in both CIDC and CDC schemes.","PeriodicalId":76903,"journal":{"name":"Employee benefits journal","volume":"151 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79286581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Health status and health costs a major longevity risk in retirement. Health state important in retirement planning (Ameriks et al., 2011; Yogo, 2009). Large component of wealth in illiquid home equity (Home-ownership rate: 80% for 65 ). Housing and LTC are complementary ways of financing or insuring health costs (Davido, 2010). LTC costs are increasing and the increase is projected to continue (Congressional Budget Office, 2004; Shi and Zhang, 2013). Australia: government requires co payment for LTC costs, potential use of home equity to fund costs. U.S.: Medicaid and Medicare private insurance personal payment. The private LTC insurance market is an important supplement (Glendinning et al., 2004; Colombo et al., 2011).
健康状况和健康费用是退休后长寿的主要风险因素。健康状况在退休计划中很重要(美国人等，2011年;优格,2009)。财富的很大一部分是不流动的房屋净值(65岁的房屋拥有率:80%)。住房和长期贷款是医疗费用融资或保险的互补方式(Davido, 2010年)。长期服务成本正在增加，预计将继续增加(国会预算办公室，2004年;Shi and Zhang, 2013)。澳大利亚:政府要求共同支付LTC成本，可能使用房屋净值来资助成本。美国:医疗补助和医疗保险个人支付。私人LTC保险市场是一个重要的补充(Glendinning et al.， 2004;Colombo et al.， 2011)。
{"title":"To Borrow or Insure? Long Term Care Costs and the Impact of Housing","authors":"Adam W. Shao, Hua Chen, M. Sherris","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2707350","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2707350","url":null,"abstract":"Health status and health costs a major longevity risk in retirement. Health state important in retirement planning (Ameriks et al., 2011; Yogo, 2009). Large component of wealth in illiquid home equity (Home-ownership rate: 80% for 65 ). Housing and LTC are complementary ways of financing or insuring health costs (Davido, 2010). LTC costs are increasing and the increase is projected to continue (Congressional Budget Office, 2004; Shi and Zhang, 2013). Australia: government requires co payment for LTC costs, potential use of home equity to fund costs. U.S.: Medicaid and Medicare private insurance personal payment. The private LTC insurance market is an important supplement (Glendinning et al., 2004; Colombo et al., 2011).","PeriodicalId":76903,"journal":{"name":"Employee benefits journal","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87851957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
During the last 10 years, many OECD countries introduced reforms which included automatic enrolment or mandatory participation in privately managed pension schemes. The current article aims to reveal the benefits and costs of privately managed pension schemes. The article uses a study of pension schemes’ bylaws in Israel to study the degree to which the shift to privately operated DC schemes results in the transfer of risk from capital to labour and in the entrenchment of gender and income inequalities. The article shows that the shift of pension provision from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) entails a significant shift of risk from capital to labour. Moreover, separately from the DB to DC shift, moving from public management to private management increases employees’ pension risks. Lastly, the paper shows that the combination of the shifts from DB to DC and from public to private management involves a shift in governance, which exposes pension scheme members to a high likelihood of lower returns as well as to gender and income inequalities.
{"title":"Pension Privatisation: Benefits and Costs","authors":"Lilach Lurie","doi":"10.1093/INDLAW/DWX021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/INDLAW/DWX021","url":null,"abstract":"During the last 10 years, many OECD countries introduced reforms which included automatic enrolment or mandatory participation in privately managed pension schemes. The current article aims to reveal the benefits and costs of privately managed pension schemes. The article uses a study of pension schemes’ bylaws in Israel to study the degree to which the shift to privately operated DC schemes results in the transfer of risk from capital to labour and in the entrenchment of gender and income inequalities. The article shows that the shift of pension provision from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) entails a significant shift of risk from capital to labour. Moreover, separately from the DB to DC shift, moving from public management to private management increases employees’ pension risks. Lastly, the paper shows that the combination of the shifts from DB to DC and from public to private management involves a shift in governance, which exposes pension scheme members to a high likelihood of lower returns as well as to gender and income inequalities.","PeriodicalId":76903,"journal":{"name":"Employee benefits journal","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73390930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-09-29DOI: 10.5278/OJS.NJCL.V0I1.1980
Alexandra Andhov, R. Feldthusen, Vibe Ulfbeck
The European Union encourages individuals to save in private and occupational pension funds to complement their state saving-plans. Throughout their lives, employers directly sponsor occupational retirement saving plans, so individual employees may top up their future pensions. While the European Union clearly supports the formation and cross-border participation in these financial vehicles by adopting EU regulatory framework, the EU has also decided to determine a common investment decision standard to be used in all Member States, called the Prudent Person Principle. According to this principle, the fund - the future retirement for many - shall be managed with care, the skill of an expert, prudence and due diligence. Under this principle, the pension fund’s governing body is given a broad authority to invest the pension assets in a prudent fashion in light of the particular investment plan of a fund. At the same time, the EU is also moving towards more Responsible Investment and inclusion of the ESG-principles (Environment, Social and Governance). The question we aim to answer in this paper is how these two principles co-exist and whether, due to the new Directive adopted by the occupational pension funds in 2016, all funds are obliged to make only responsible, environmentally and socially beneficial investments.
{"title":"Occupational Pension Funds (IORPs) & Sustainability: What Does the Prudent Person Principle Say?","authors":"Alexandra Andhov, R. Feldthusen, Vibe Ulfbeck","doi":"10.5278/OJS.NJCL.V0I1.1980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5278/OJS.NJCL.V0I1.1980","url":null,"abstract":"The European Union encourages individuals to save in private and occupational pension funds to complement their state saving-plans. Throughout their lives, employers directly sponsor occupational retirement saving plans, so individual employees may top up their future pensions. While the European Union clearly supports the formation and cross-border participation in these financial vehicles by adopting EU regulatory framework, the EU has also decided to determine a common investment decision standard to be used in all Member States, called the Prudent Person Principle. According to this principle, the fund - the future retirement for many - shall be managed with care, the skill of an expert, prudence and due diligence. Under this principle, the pension fund’s governing body is given a broad authority to invest the pension assets in a prudent fashion in light of the particular investment plan of a fund. At the same time, the EU is also moving towards more Responsible Investment and inclusion of the ESG-principles (Environment, Social and Governance). The question we aim to answer in this paper is how these two principles co-exist and whether, due to the new Directive adopted by the occupational pension funds in 2016, all funds are obliged to make only responsible, environmentally and socially beneficial investments.","PeriodicalId":76903,"journal":{"name":"Employee benefits journal","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72614171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Will advances in robotics, artificial intelligence, and machine learning put vast swaths of the labor force out of work or into fierce competition for the jobs that remain? Or, as in the past, will new jobs absorb workers displaced by automation? These hotly debated questions have profound implications for the fortress of rights and benefits that the law of work has constructed on the foundation of the employment relationship. This Article charts a path for reforming the law of work in the face of both justified anxiety and uncertainty about the future impact of automation on jobs. Automation is driven largely by the same forces that drive firms’ decisions about “fissuring,” or replacing employees with outside contractors. Fissuring has already transformed the landscape of work and contributed to weaker labor standards and growing inequality. A sensible response to automation should have in mind the adjacent problem of fissuring, and vice versa. Unfortunately, the dominant legal responses to fissuring—which aim to extend firms’ legal responsibility for the workers whose labor they rely on—do not meet the distinctive challenge of automation, and even modestly exacerbate it. Automation offers the ultimate exit from the costs and risks associated with human labor. As technology becomes an ever-more-capable and cost-effective substitute for human workers, it enables firms to circumvent prevailing legal strategies for protecting workers and shoring up the fortress of employment. The question is how to protect workers’ rights and entitlements while reducing firms’ incentive both to replace employees with contractors and to replace human workers with machines. The answer, I argue, lies in separating the issue of what workers’ entitlements should be from the issue of where their economic burdens should fall. Some worker rights and entitlements necessarily entail employer duties and burdens. But for those that do not, we should look for ways to shift their costs beyond employer payrolls, or to extend the entitlements themselves beyond employment. The existing fortress of employment-based rights and benefits is under assault from fissuring and automation; it is failing to protect those who remain outside its walls, and erecting barriers to some who seek to enter. We need to dismantle some of its fortifications and construct a broader foundation of economic security for all, including those who cannot or do not make their living through steady employment.
{"title":"What Should We Do After Work? Automation and Employment Law","authors":"C. Estlund","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3007972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3007972","url":null,"abstract":"Will advances in robotics, artificial intelligence, and machine learning put vast swaths of the labor force out of work or into fierce competition for the jobs that remain? Or, as in the past, will new jobs absorb workers displaced by automation? These hotly debated questions have profound implications for the fortress of rights and benefits that the law of work has constructed on the foundation of the employment relationship. This Article charts a path for reforming the law of work in the face of both justified anxiety and uncertainty about the future impact of automation on jobs. \u0000Automation is driven largely by the same forces that drive firms’ decisions about “fissuring,” or replacing employees with outside contractors. Fissuring has already transformed the landscape of work and contributed to weaker labor standards and growing inequality. A sensible response to automation should have in mind the adjacent problem of fissuring, and vice versa. Unfortunately, the dominant legal responses to fissuring—which aim to extend firms’ legal responsibility for the workers whose labor they rely on—do not meet the distinctive challenge of automation, and even modestly exacerbate it. Automation offers the ultimate exit from the costs and risks associated with human labor. As technology becomes an ever-more-capable and cost-effective substitute for human workers, it enables firms to circumvent prevailing legal strategies for protecting workers and shoring up the fortress of employment. \u0000The question is how to protect workers’ rights and entitlements while reducing firms’ incentive both to replace employees with contractors and to replace human workers with machines. The answer, I argue, lies in separating the issue of what workers’ entitlements should be from the issue of where their economic burdens should fall. Some worker rights and entitlements necessarily entail employer duties and burdens. But for those that do not, we should look for ways to shift their costs beyond employer payrolls, or to extend the entitlements themselves beyond employment. The existing fortress of employment-based rights and benefits is under assault from fissuring and automation; it is failing to protect those who remain outside its walls, and erecting barriers to some who seek to enter. We need to dismantle some of its fortifications and construct a broader foundation of economic security for all, including those who cannot or do not make their living through steady employment.","PeriodicalId":76903,"journal":{"name":"Employee benefits journal","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82242189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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