Annals of Science最新文献

Sounds are heard, sometimes even felt, but in most cases they remain unseen. This ephemeral and invisible nature of sound was already considered a problem when the science of acoustics took form in the seventeenth century. The fact that sound could not be seen was described as a significant hindrance to its understanding. But it was precisely during this time that a wide variety of sounds attracted broad scientific attention across Europe. Scholars, natural philosophers, and mathematicians investigated and experimented with sound and musical instruments and developed theories of hearing. This article looks at the role of images, diagrams, and visualization techniques in late seventeenth-century acoustics, bringing together the history of sound and the history of scientific images. Focusing on water and light as the dominant analogies for sound, the article demonstrates that visualization was an important tool for thinking about sound and allowed for the circulation of theories and experiments. At the same time, the epistemic status of these images remained contested, as there was no single model that could explain the different ways sound behaves as it moves through space and that could be visualized.

This article investigates Haast's claim that in March 1862 he independently reached the same controversial conclusion as Ramsay, that lake basins in previously glaciated regions were formed by ancient glaciers. Both men's views fuelled a passionate debate in British scientific societies. However, science historians largely ignore Haast's contribution or imply he knew about Ramsay's 'theory' before coming to a conclusion about Southern Alps lakes.To assess whether Haast independently reached that conclusion in March 1862, field records, correspondence, reports, newspaper articles, and scientific publications are examined. Of significance are communications with geologists Hochstetter, Hector, and Ramsay, botanist Hooker, and physicist Tyndall. Consideration of what Haast observed in March 1862 is also critical.However, Haast's 1862 conclusion differs from Ramsay's. While Ramsay was convinced ancient glaciers scooped out rock basins, resulting in deep lakes, Haast believed ancient retreating glaciers left moraines that dammed valleys, resulting in shallow lakes. Regardless of their differences, after Haast read Ramsay's paper in 1864, he applied Ramsay's 'theory' to New Zealand's alpine lakes and proposed an excavation process.The essence of both Ramsay's and Haast's conclusions has been confirmed by research in formerly glaciated regions worldwide. However, Haast's contribution to glaciology is overlooked or underemphasized, and warrants being more widely acknowledged.

This article sheds new light on Alexander von Humboldt's political position in the revolutionary decade between 1789 and 1799. The young naturalist interacted with both supporters and opponents of the revolution. In July 1790, he even participated in the preparations for the Festival of the Federation in Paris together with Georg Forster. However, Humboldt remained detached from Europe's polarized politics. He avoided taking a firm stance and distanced himself from revolutionary violence. Continuous emotional and physical crises, in addition to his immersion into scientific studies, fuelled this retreat. While steeped in Enlightenment ideas and committed to a cosmopolitan understanding of liberty, Humboldt absorbed the critique of the French Revolution and the skeptical take on rationalism that the philosophers Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi and Wilhelm von Humboldt, Alexander's brother, articulated.By recognizing these influences and reexamining autobiographical sources, we can identify the various intellectual and political contexts in which Alexander von Humboldt operated during the 1790s. This polycentric approach leads to a nuanced understanding of Humboldt's political thinking in revolutionary Europe. It explains his caution in political matters and revises the conventional image of Humboldt as a fervent supporter of the French Revolution.

This essay proposes that the only publication of the Accademia del Cimento, referred to as Saggi,¹1 Accademia del Cimento, Saggi di naturali esperienze fatte nell' Accademia del Cimento sotto la protezione del serenissimo principe Leopoldo di Toscana e descritte dal segretario di essa Accademia (Firenze: Per Giuseppe Cocchini, 1667). had as one of its main goals the celebration of the House of Medici's paternity of cutting-edge experiments and instruments during the reign of Grand Duke Ferdinando II. These included Ferdinando II's thermometers and hygrometers, Torricelli's experiment and barometer, and Galileo's pendulum as a clock-regulator. It seems that this agenda went unnoticed, not at the time of its initial circulation, but rather in modern historiography. Christiaan Huygens's challenged invention of the pendulum clock provides a case study to explore the agenda of this publication and the problem of defining an invention in seventeenth-century Europe. This paper presents for the first time the document that attests to when the first specimen of Huygens's clock arrived in Florence, disproving the previously believed date of September 1657. The paper argues that over the last two centuries, this error has made the Medici narratives of this dispute appear inconsistent and marginalized them. In light of this new find, they must be reconsidered.

In 1614, the German astronomer Simon Mayr published his claim about the discovery of Jupiter's satellites. In his treatise Mundus Jovialis, Mayr made his assertion in a convoluted but unequivocal manner, earning resentment from Galileo Galilei, who published his harsh protest in 1623 in Il Saggiatore. Though Galileo's objections were fallacious in some respects, and though numerous scholars took to the field to prove Mayr's claim, none ever really succeeded, and the historical evidence remains to Mayr's detriment. On the basis of such historical evidence, including comparisons between Mundus Jovialis and Mayr's earlier works, Mayr's independent discovery of the satellites can be ruled out. Indeed, it is very likely that he never observed them before 30 December 1610, nearly a year after Galileo. The lack of a corpus of Mayr's observations and the inaccuracy of his tables are also puzzling.

As a style of writing and a form of communication, the modern scientific report enables the creation, sharing and continuous updating of natural knowledge in such a manner that the idiosyncrasies of ordinary language are reduced to a minimum. This article examines how the standards for scientific reporting were 'born' in the seventeenth century and their legacy. The first part of the article reviews the existing literature on this topic. The second part outlines the key features of the scientific report and the common standards for scientific reporting. The third part presents detailed historical evidence to trace the emergence of these standards in seventeenth-century England. The final part discusses why the scientific report means so much for the progress of science, for understanding the history of science and science popularization, and even for the development of academia more generally.

This paper utilizes the concept of the agency of material objects, proposed as a tenet by several historians of science in the late twentieth century. It argues that scientific instruments have agency in the field due to their value and fragility, both of which attributes served to dictate a social hierarchy of activity. Furthermore, the resulting numerical outputs served to discriminate between various groups. The principal focus is the role of instruments used by travellers sponsored by the Royal Geographical Society, London, but it also looks at the role of instruments on a larger triangulation; the project to survey the African part of the arc of the 30th meridian east of Greenwich. Seeing the instruments as material objects allows insights into the social arrangements and interactions taking place. It is argued that instruments, and the results of instrument use, entrenched existing power hierarchies, imparting greater prestige to those who were previously endowed with privilege. It is argued the instruments contributed to 'othering' both in the field and in the publications resulting from the expeditions.

Alsatian engineer Gustave-Adolphe Hirn is best known to historians of science for his experimental determination of the mechanical equivalent of heat, first published in 1855. Since the 1840s, that equivalent has been closely associated with the conservation of energy, indeed often conflated with it. Hirn was one of Thomas Kuhn's twelve 'pioneers' whose work he deemed relevant to the ostensible 'simultaneous discovery' of energy conservation. Yet Hirn never wholeheartedly embraced energy conservation. After reviewing his experimental work, his philosophical reflections, and his response to developments in heat theory, this article identifies three factors as having played central roles in this regard: Hirn's deepest concerns were ontological, not energetic; none of the concepts basic to his natural philosophy were appropriate stand-ins for a quantitatively conserved energy; and, accurately reflecting the most common interpretation of the principle of the conservation of energy from the 1860s on - as exemplified already by Helmholtz in 1847 - Hirn associated its corpuscular-mechanical underpinning with the despiritualizing materialism he saw as dominating contemporary science. Hence although Hirn's natural philosophy embraced sentiments quite in the spirit of the conservation of energy, he never explicitly subscribed to that principle.