Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania最新文献
Julie Novak, E. M. Feit, Shane T. Jensen, Eric T. Bradlow
Targeting individual consumers has become a hallmark of direct and digital marketing, particularly as it has become easier to identify customers as they interact repeatedly with a company. However, across a wide variety of contexts and tracking technologies, companies find that customers can not be consistently identified which leads to a substantial fraction of anonymous visits in any CRM database. We develop a Bayesian imputation approach that allows us to probabilistically assign anonymous sessions to users, while ac- counting for a customer’s demographic information, frequency of interaction with the firm, and activities the customer engages in. Our approach simultaneously estimates a hierarchical model of customer behavior while probabilistically imputing which customers made the anonymous visits. We present both synthetic and real data studies that demonstrate our approach makes more accurate inference about individual customers’ preferences and responsiveness to marketing, relative to common approaches to anonymous visits: nearest- neighbor matching or ignoring the anonymous visits. We show how companies who use the proposed method will be better able to target individual customers, as well as infer how many of the anonymous visits are made by new customers.
{"title":"Bayesian Imputation for Anonymous Visits in CRM Data","authors":"Julie Novak, E. M. Feit, Shane T. Jensen, Eric T. Bradlow","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2700347","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2700347","url":null,"abstract":"Targeting individual consumers has become a hallmark of direct and digital marketing, particularly as it has become easier to identify customers as they interact repeatedly with a company. However, across a wide variety of contexts and tracking technologies, companies find that customers can not be consistently identified which leads to a substantial fraction of anonymous visits in any CRM database. We develop a Bayesian imputation approach that allows us to probabilistically assign anonymous sessions to users, while ac- counting for a customer’s demographic information, frequency of interaction with the firm, and activities the customer engages in. Our approach simultaneously estimates a hierarchical model of customer behavior while probabilistically imputing which customers made the anonymous visits. We present both synthetic and real data studies that demonstrate our approach makes more accurate inference about individual customers’ preferences and responsiveness to marketing, relative to common approaches to anonymous visits: nearest- neighbor matching or ignoring the anonymous visits. We show how companies who use the proposed method will be better able to target individual customers, as well as infer how many of the anonymous visits are made by new customers.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86008794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Our research as well as that by other authors has found scale economies at all sizes of banks and the largest scale economies at the largest banks – that is, larger banks are able to provide products at lower average cost than smaller banks. While the earlier literature found that scale economies are exhausted beyond a modest size – no larger than $100 billion and usually much smaller – a number of recent studies have found scale economies beyond this point, in fact, economies that increase with size. Based on a model that appropriately accounts for endogenous risk-taking and controls for any cost-of-funding advantages conferred on large banks, we find that technological factors, not advantages in funding costs, account for their scale economies. The literature does not indicate whether these benefits of larger size outweigh the potential costs in terms of systemic risk that large scale may impose on the financial system. However, if public policy considerations imply that society would be better off with smaller financial institutions, restrictions that limit the size of financial institutions, if effective, may put large banks at a competitive disadvantage in global markets where competitors are not similarly constrained. Moreover, size restrictions may not be effective since they work against market forces and create incentives for firms to avoid them. Avoiding the restrictions could thereby push risk-taking outside of the more regulated financial sector without necessarily reducing systemic risk. If such limits were imposed, intensive monitoring for such risks would be required. These factors need to be considered when evaluating policies concerning financial institution scale.
{"title":"The Future of Large, Internationally Active Banks: Does Scale Define the Winners?","authors":"Joseph P. Hughes, Loretta J. Mester","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2800306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2800306","url":null,"abstract":"Our research as well as that by other authors has found scale economies at all sizes of banks and the largest scale economies at the largest banks – that is, larger banks are able to provide products at lower average cost than smaller banks. While the earlier literature found that scale economies are exhausted beyond a modest size – no larger than $100 billion and usually much smaller – a number of recent studies have found scale economies beyond this point, in fact, economies that increase with size. Based on a model that appropriately accounts for endogenous risk-taking and controls for any cost-of-funding advantages conferred on large banks, we find that technological factors, not advantages in funding costs, account for their scale economies. The literature does not indicate whether these benefits of larger size outweigh the potential costs in terms of systemic risk that large scale may impose on the financial system. However, if public policy considerations imply that society would be better off with smaller financial institutions, restrictions that limit the size of financial institutions, if effective, may put large banks at a competitive disadvantage in global markets where competitors are not similarly constrained. Moreover, size restrictions may not be effective since they work against market forces and create incentives for firms to avoid them. Avoiding the restrictions could thereby push risk-taking outside of the more regulated financial sector without necessarily reducing systemic risk. If such limits were imposed, intensive monitoring for such risks would be required. These factors need to be considered when evaluating policies concerning financial institution scale.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"61 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88479121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Golden Rule of Forecasting is a general rule that applies to all forecasting problems. The Rule was developed using logic and was tested against evidence from previously published comparison studies. The evidence suggests that a single violation of the Golden Rule is likely to increase forecast error by 44%. Some commentators argue that the Rule is not generally applicable, but do not challenge the logic or evidence provided. While further research might provide useful findings, available evidence justifies adopting the Rule now. People with no prior training in forecasting can obtain the substantial benefits of following the Golden Rule by using the Checklist to identify biased and unscientific forecasts at little cost.
{"title":"Golden Rule of Forecasting Rearticulated: Forecast Unto Others as You Would Have Them Forecast Unto You","authors":"K. Green, J. Armstrong, A. Graefe","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2644005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2644005","url":null,"abstract":"The Golden Rule of Forecasting is a general rule that applies to all forecasting problems. The Rule was developed using logic and was tested against evidence from previously published comparison studies. The evidence suggests that a single violation of the Golden Rule is likely to increase forecast error by 44%. Some commentators argue that the Rule is not generally applicable, but do not challenge the logic or evidence provided. While further research might provide useful findings, available evidence justifies adopting the Rule now. People with no prior training in forecasting can obtain the substantial benefits of following the Golden Rule by using the Checklist to identify biased and unscientific forecasts at little cost.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"88 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81254663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines how characteristics of a firm’s labor-flow network affect firm productivity. Using employee job histories, we construct inter-firm labor-flow networks for both IT-labor and non-IT labor and analyze how a firm’s network structure for the two types of labor affects firm performance. We find that hiring IT workers from a structurally-diverse network of firms can substantially improve firm productivity, which is likely due to the novel and non-redundant information provided in such networks. Interestingly, we find the opposite effects for hiring non-IT labor, which is likely due to a structurally- cohesive network enabling frequent and repeated exposure to a common knowledge base that is beneficial for implementing complementary organizational practices especially when they are often complex and tacit. Together, these results demonstrate the importance of incorporating a network perspective in understanding the full impact of spillover effects from organizational hiring activities.
{"title":"Are All Spillovers Created Equal? A Network Perspective on IT Labor Movements","authors":"Lynn Wu, Fujie Jin, L. Hitt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2528762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2528762","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines how characteristics of a firm’s labor-flow network affect firm productivity. Using employee job histories, we construct inter-firm labor-flow networks for both IT-labor and non-IT labor and analyze how a firm’s network structure for the two types of labor affects firm performance. We find that hiring IT workers from a structurally-diverse network of firms can substantially improve firm productivity, which is likely due to the novel and non-redundant information provided in such networks. Interestingly, we find the opposite effects for hiring non-IT labor, which is likely due to a structurally- cohesive network enabling frequent and repeated exposure to a common knowledge base that is beneficial for implementing complementary organizational practices especially when they are often complex and tacit. Together, these results demonstrate the importance of incorporating a network perspective in understanding the full impact of spillover effects from organizational hiring activities.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88072459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study a principal–agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection. Risk‐neutral agents with limited liability have arbitrary private information about the distribution of outputs and the cost of effort. We show that under a multiplicative separability condition, the optimal mechanism offers a single contract. This condition holds, for example, when output is binary. If the principal's payoff must also satisfy free disposal and the distribution of outputs has the monotone likelihood ratio property, the mechanism offers a single debt contract. Our results generalize if the output distribution is “close” to multiplicatively separable. Our model suggests that offering a single contract may be optimal in environments with adverse selection and moral hazard when agents are risk‐neutral and have limited liability.
{"title":"Simple Contracts with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard","authors":"D. Gottlieb, Humberto Moreira","doi":"10.3982/te2992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te2992","url":null,"abstract":"We study a principal–agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection. Risk‐neutral agents with limited liability have arbitrary private information about the distribution of outputs and the cost of effort. We show that under a multiplicative separability condition, the optimal mechanism offers a single contract. This condition holds, for example, when output is binary. If the principal's payoff must also satisfy free disposal and the distribution of outputs has the monotone likelihood ratio property, the mechanism offers a single debt contract. Our results generalize if the output distribution is “close” to multiplicatively separable. Our model suggests that offering a single contract may be optimal in environments with adverse selection and moral hazard when agents are risk‐neutral and have limited liability.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88550991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study how long-lived rational agents learn from repeatedly observing a private signal and each others’ actions. With normal signals, a group of any size learns more slowly than just four agents who directly observe each others’ private signals in each period. Similar results apply to general signal structures. We identify rational groupthink—in which agents ignore their private signals and choose the same action for long periods of time—as the cause of this failure of information aggregation.
{"title":"Rational Groupthink","authors":"Matan Harel, Elchanan Mossel, P. Strack, O. Tamuz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2541707","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2541707","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We study how long-lived rational agents learn from repeatedly observing a private signal and each others’ actions. With normal signals, a group of any size learns more slowly than just four agents who directly observe each others’ private signals in each period. Similar results apply to general signal structures. We identify rational groupthink—in which agents ignore their private signals and choose the same action for long periods of time—as the cause of this failure of information aggregation.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"114 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75027675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
R. Maurer, O. Mitchell, Ralph Rogalla, Tatjana Schimetschek
This paper investigates whether exchanging the Social Security delayed retirement credit, currently paid as an increase in lifetime annuity benefits, for a lump sum would induce later claiming and additional work. We show that people would voluntarily claim about half a year later if the lump sum were paid for claiming any time after the Early Retirement Age, and about two-thirds of a year later if the lump sum were paid only for those claiming after their Full Retirement Age. Overall, people will work one-third to one-half of the additional months, compared to the status quo. Those who would currently claim at the youngest ages are likely to be most responsive to the offer of a lump sum benefit.
{"title":"Will They Take the Money and Work? An Empirical Analysis of People's Willingness to Delay Claiming Social Security Benefits for a Lump Sum","authors":"R. Maurer, O. Mitchell, Ralph Rogalla, Tatjana Schimetschek","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2567341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2567341","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates whether exchanging the Social Security delayed retirement credit, currently paid as an increase in lifetime annuity benefits, for a lump sum would induce later claiming and additional work. We show that people would voluntarily claim about half a year later if the lump sum were paid for claiming any time after the Early Retirement Age, and about two-thirds of a year later if the lump sum were paid only for those claiming after their Full Retirement Age. Overall, people will work one-third to one-half of the additional months, compared to the status quo. Those who would currently claim at the youngest ages are likely to be most responsive to the offer of a lump sum benefit.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74505869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jennifer L. Blouin, Linda K. Krull, Casey M Schwab
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 created a tax holiday allowing firms to repatriate foreign earnings at a reduced tax rate and a domestic production activities deduction (DPAD) to encourage domestic investment. We investigate whether the DPAD affects firms’ decisions to use repatriated earnings to increase investment versus shareholder payout. We find that firms receiving an incremental benefit from the DPAD decrease payout by approximately $7.2 billion whereas firms receiving no incremental benefit from the DPAD increase payout by approximately $18.3 billion. This suggests that, under certain conditions, firms retain repatriated funds which may lead to increased domestic investment.
2004年的《美国创造就业法案》(American Jobs Creation Act)设立了免税期，允许企业以较低的税率将海外收入汇回国内，并实行国内生产活动扣减(DPAD)，以鼓励国内投资。我们调查了DPAD是否会影响公司使用汇回收益来增加投资与股东支付的决定。我们发现，从DPAD中获得增量收益的公司减少了约72亿美元的支出，而没有从DPAD中获得增量收益的公司增加了约183亿美元的支出。这表明，在某些条件下，公司保留汇回的资金，这可能导致国内投资增加。
{"title":"The Effect of the Domestic Production Activities Deduction on Corporate Payout Behavior","authors":"Jennifer L. Blouin, Linda K. Krull, Casey M Schwab","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1092222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1092222","url":null,"abstract":"The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 created a tax holiday allowing firms to repatriate foreign earnings at a reduced tax rate and a domestic production activities deduction (DPAD) to encourage domestic investment. We investigate whether the DPAD affects firms’ decisions to use repatriated earnings to increase investment versus shareholder payout. We find that firms receiving an incremental benefit from the DPAD decrease payout by approximately $7.2 billion whereas firms receiving no incremental benefit from the DPAD increase payout by approximately $18.3 billion. This suggests that, under certain conditions, firms retain repatriated funds which may lead to increased domestic investment.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81468850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The century low, near-zero short-term interest rates in the USA, Euro Area, the UK and Japan after the Great Recession of 2008/2009 and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis of 2010-2013 make the non-normality and non-lognormality of short-term interest rates quite clear. To uncover the changing implicit state prices and risk-neutral densities for future short-term interest rates, we use the prices of interest rate caps and floors with various strike rates and maturities from 2 to 10 years. We show that butterfly spreads of time spreads of cap and floor prices give sensible implied risk-neutral densities and state prices that reflect key moves made by the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England. The state prices and risk-neutral densities computed are largely distribution-free, preference-free and model-free results, building from the arbitrage-based computations of state prices from option prices that were presented in Breeden and Litzenberger (1978).
{"title":"Central Bank Policy Impacts on the Distribution of Future Interest Rates","authors":"Douglas T. Breeden, R. Litzenberger","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2642363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2642363","url":null,"abstract":"The century low, near-zero short-term interest rates in the USA, Euro Area, the UK and Japan after the Great Recession of 2008/2009 and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis of 2010-2013 make the non-normality and non-lognormality of short-term interest rates quite clear. To uncover the changing implicit state prices and risk-neutral densities for future short-term interest rates, we use the prices of interest rate caps and floors with various strike rates and maturities from 2 to 10 years. We show that butterfly spreads of time spreads of cap and floor prices give sensible implied risk-neutral densities and state prices that reflect key moves made by the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England. The state prices and risk-neutral densities computed are largely distribution-free, preference-free and model-free results, building from the arbitrage-based computations of state prices from option prices that were presented in Breeden and Litzenberger (1978).","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87410196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The equity premium, namely the expected return on the aggregate stock market less the government bill rate, is of central importance to the portfolio allocation of individuals, to the investment decisions of firms, and to model calibration and testing. This quantity is usually estimated from the sample average excess return. We propose an alternative estimator, based on maximum likelihood, that takes into account information contained in dividends and prices. Applied to the postwar sample, our method leads to an economically significant reduction from 6.4% to 5.1%. Simulation results show that our method produces tighter estimates under a range of specifications.
{"title":"Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Equity Premium","authors":"Efstathios Avdis, Jessica A. Wachter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2443529","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2443529","url":null,"abstract":"The equity premium, namely the expected return on the aggregate stock market less the government bill rate, is of central importance to the portfolio allocation of individuals, to the investment decisions of firms, and to model calibration and testing. This quantity is usually estimated from the sample average excess return. We propose an alternative estimator, based on maximum likelihood, that takes into account information contained in dividends and prices. Applied to the postwar sample, our method leads to an economically significant reduction from 6.4% to 5.1%. Simulation results show that our method produces tighter estimates under a range of specifications.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75663248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania
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