Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania最新文献
Forward and futures rates are frequently used as measures of market expectations. In this paper we apply standard forecast efficiency tests, and some newer exact sign and rank tests, to a wide range of forward and futures rates, and in this way test whether these are in fact rational expectations of future actual prices. The forward and futures rates that we study under a common methodology include foreign exchange forward rates, U.S. and foreign interest rate futures and forward rates, oil futures and natural gas futures. For most, but not all, of these instruments, we find that we can reject the hypothesis that the forward or futures rates are rational expectations of actual future prices. It is well known that foreign exchange forward rates give less accurate forecasts than a random walk, but we show that this is also true for some interest rate futures and forward rates. We conclude that forward and futures prices are not generally pure measures of market expectations: they are also heavily affected by the market price of risk.
{"title":"The Information Content of Forward and Futures Prices: Market Expectations and the Price of Risk","authors":"S. Chernenko, Krista Schwarz, Jonathan H. Wright","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.560386","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.560386","url":null,"abstract":"Forward and futures rates are frequently used as measures of market expectations. In this paper we apply standard forecast efficiency tests, and some newer exact sign and rank tests, to a wide range of forward and futures rates, and in this way test whether these are in fact rational expectations of future actual prices. The forward and futures rates that we study under a common methodology include foreign exchange forward rates, U.S. and foreign interest rate futures and forward rates, oil futures and natural gas futures. For most, but not all, of these instruments, we find that we can reject the hypothesis that the forward or futures rates are rational expectations of actual future prices. It is well known that foreign exchange forward rates give less accurate forecasts than a random walk, but we show that this is also true for some interest rate futures and forward rates. We conclude that forward and futures prices are not generally pure measures of market expectations: they are also heavily affected by the market price of risk.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82936762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-11-01DOI: 10.1287/orsc.14.6.640.24874
G. Cattani, J. Pennings, F. Wezel
A growing body of literature suggests that populations of organizations are not homogeneous, but instead comprise distinct subentities. Firms are highly dependent on their immediate institutional and competitive environments. The present paper further explores this issue by focusing on the spatial and temporal sources of industry heterogeneity. Our goal is threefold. First, we explore founding rates as a function of spatial density, arguing that density-dependent processes occur along a geographic gradient ranging from proximate, to neighboring, to more distant contexts. Second, we show how multiple, local evolutionary clocks shape such entrepreneurial activity. Third, we provide evidence on how diffusion processes are directly affected by social contagion, with new organizational forms spreading through movements of individuals. Results from data on the Dutch accounting industry corroborate these patterns of heterogeneity.
{"title":"Spatial and Temporal Heterogeneity in Founding Patterns","authors":"G. Cattani, J. Pennings, F. Wezel","doi":"10.1287/orsc.14.6.640.24874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.14.6.640.24874","url":null,"abstract":"A growing body of literature suggests that populations of organizations are not homogeneous, but instead comprise distinct subentities. Firms are highly dependent on their immediate institutional and competitive environments. The present paper further explores this issue by focusing on the spatial and temporal sources of industry heterogeneity. Our goal is threefold. First, we explore founding rates as a function of spatial density, arguing that density-dependent processes occur along a geographic gradient ranging from proximate, to neighboring, to more distant contexts. Second, we show how multiple, local evolutionary clocks shape such entrepreneurial activity. Third, we provide evidence on how diffusion processes are directly affected by social contagion, with new organizational forms spreading through movements of individuals. Results from data on the Dutch accounting industry corroborate these patterns of heterogeneity.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"56 Suppl 1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82765774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper extends our earlier analysis of interdependent security issues to a general class of problems involving discrete interdependent risks with heterogeneous agents. There is a threat of an event that can only happen once, and the risk depends on actions taken by others. Any agent's incentive to invest in managing the risk depends on the actions of others. Security problems at airlines and in computer networks come into this category, as do problems of risk management in organizations facing the possibility of bankruptcy, and individuals' choices about whether to be vaccinated against an infectious disease. Surprisingly the framework also covers certain aspects of investment in R&D. Here we characterize Nash equilibria with heterogeneous agents and give conditions for tipping and cascading of equilibria.
{"title":"You Only Die Once: Managing Discrete Interdependent Risks","authors":"G. Heal, H. Kunreuther","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.419240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.419240","url":null,"abstract":"This paper extends our earlier analysis of interdependent security issues to a general class of problems involving discrete interdependent risks with heterogeneous agents. There is a threat of an event that can only happen once, and the risk depends on actions taken by others. Any agent's incentive to invest in managing the risk depends on the actions of others. Security problems at airlines and in computer networks come into this category, as do problems of risk management in organizations facing the possibility of bankruptcy, and individuals' choices about whether to be vaccinated against an infectious disease. Surprisingly the framework also covers certain aspects of investment in R&D. Here we characterize Nash equilibria with heterogeneous agents and give conditions for tipping and cascading of equilibria.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"76 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79965800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze financial market data in order to produce an ex-ante assessment of the economic consequences of war with Iraq. The novel feature of our analysis derives from the existence of a market for Saddam Securities,' a new future traded on an online betting exchange that pays only if Saddam Hussein is ousted. A variety of tests suggest that this future's price provides a plausible estimate of the probability of war. The spot oil price has moved closely with the Saddam Security, suggesting that war raises oil prices by around $10 per barrel. Futures prices imply that markets expect these large immediate disruptions to dissipate quickly, with prices returning to pre-war levels within about a year and a half. Evidence on the long-run effects is fragile, and while prices are probably expected to fall a little as a result of war, any oil dividend' will be minimal. We find large effects in equity markets: and war lowers the value of U.S. equities by around 15 percent. This effect is concentrated in the consumer discretionary sector, airlines and IT; the prospect of war bolsters the gold and energy sectors. Analyzing option prices, we find that the large estimated average effects of war reflect the market pricing in a range of different scenarios - a 70 percent probability that it will lead to market declines of 0 to 15 percent, a 20 percent chance of 15 to 30 percent declines, and a 10 percent risk of a fall in excess of 30 percent. Across countries, the most extreme effects are on the stock markets of Turkey, Israel, and several European nations. Countries that are highly enmeshed in the world economy, or net oil importers, are most likely to experience adverse effects from war.
{"title":"What Do Financial Markets Think of War in Iraq?","authors":"A. Leigh, J. Wolfers, Eric Zitzewitz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.388762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.388762","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze financial market data in order to produce an ex-ante assessment of the economic consequences of war with Iraq. The novel feature of our analysis derives from the existence of a market for Saddam Securities,' a new future traded on an online betting exchange that pays only if Saddam Hussein is ousted. A variety of tests suggest that this future's price provides a plausible estimate of the probability of war. The spot oil price has moved closely with the Saddam Security, suggesting that war raises oil prices by around $10 per barrel. Futures prices imply that markets expect these large immediate disruptions to dissipate quickly, with prices returning to pre-war levels within about a year and a half. Evidence on the long-run effects is fragile, and while prices are probably expected to fall a little as a result of war, any oil dividend' will be minimal. We find large effects in equity markets: and war lowers the value of U.S. equities by around 15 percent. This effect is concentrated in the consumer discretionary sector, airlines and IT; the prospect of war bolsters the gold and energy sectors. Analyzing option prices, we find that the large estimated average effects of war reflect the market pricing in a range of different scenarios - a 70 percent probability that it will lead to market declines of 0 to 15 percent, a 20 percent chance of 15 to 30 percent declines, and a 10 percent risk of a fall in excess of 30 percent. Across countries, the most extreme effects are on the stock markets of Turkey, Israel, and several European nations. Countries that are highly enmeshed in the world economy, or net oil importers, are most likely to experience adverse effects from war.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87055210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Irina Barakova, Raphael W. Bostic, P. Calem, Susan M. Wachter
While there has been considerable research empirically quantifying and simulating the roleof borrowing constraints on homeownership rates, the primary focus of this work has been onmeasuring the relative importance of income and wealth constraints with respect to ownershipoutcomes. An important gap in the literature – the role of credit quality – has largely goneuninvestigated. Also missing from the literature is an assessment of recent trends; that is, of thedegree to which the effects of borrowing constraints on homeownership may have changed overthe past decade.
{"title":"Does Credit Quality Matter for Homeownership?","authors":"Irina Barakova, Raphael W. Bostic, P. Calem, Susan M. Wachter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.478603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.478603","url":null,"abstract":"While there has been considerable research empirically quantifying and simulating the roleof borrowing constraints on homeownership rates, the primary focus of this work has been onmeasuring the relative importance of income and wealth constraints with respect to ownershipoutcomes. An important gap in the literature – the role of credit quality – has largely goneuninvestigated. Also missing from the literature is an assessment of recent trends; that is, of thedegree to which the effects of borrowing constraints on homeownership may have changed overthe past decade.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85504551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we show that profitable market manipulation via trade is possible if prices perform an allocational role. If market prices affect the real value of an asset (e.g. because they contain information relevant to a firm's investment decisions), a potentially informed speculator may wish to trade even in the absence of information. A source of profits will then be the effect that his trade has on the real value of the traded asset. We show that the problem is exacerbated if, in the real sector, there are multiple firms with positive investment spillovers. In this case, firm managers who have perfect private information may ignore it and follow the price signal, knowing that other managers are also looking at this signal. Shutting down a financial market may improve investment efficiency in this case. We discuss the implications of our argument to foreign exchange markets.
{"title":"Manipulation, the Allocational Role of Prices and Production Externalities","authors":"Itay Goldstein, A. Guembel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.302207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.302207","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we show that profitable market manipulation via trade is possible if prices perform an allocational role. If market prices affect the real value of an asset (e.g. because they contain information relevant to a firm's investment decisions), a potentially informed speculator may wish to trade even in the absence of information. A source of profits will then be the effect that his trade has on the real value of the traded asset. We show that the problem is exacerbated if, in the real sector, there are multiple firms with positive investment spillovers. In this case, firm managers who have perfect private information may ignore it and follow the price signal, knowing that other managers are also looking at this signal. Shutting down a financial market may improve investment efficiency in this case. We discuss the implications of our argument to foreign exchange markets.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90964336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jennifer L. Blouin, J. Raedy, Douglas A. Shackelford
This paper provides evidence consistent with shareholders' personal tax incentives affecting stock prices and trading volume. On June 24, 1998, the marginal tax rate on capital gains was reduced from 28 percent to 20 percent for individual investors holding shares between 12 and 18 months. This study compares firms whose initial public shareholders immediately benefited from the reduction to other IPO firms. The sample of immediately affected firms recorded mean, incremental, one‐day stock price declines of −1.3 percent amid heavy trading. The results are consistent with capital gains tax planning constraining investment portfolio management. When the constraint was lifted, enough shareholders sold that prices moved. The results imply that despite increasingly liquid capital markets, transaction costs remain large enough to prevent investors from entering the market immediately and fully offsetting downward price pressure from individual capital gains tax management.
{"title":"Equity Price Pressure from the 1998 Reduction in the Capital Gains Holding Period","authors":"Jennifer L. Blouin, J. Raedy, Douglas A. Shackelford","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.369341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.369341","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides evidence consistent with shareholders' personal tax incentives affecting stock prices and trading volume. On June 24, 1998, the marginal tax rate on capital gains was reduced from 28 percent to 20 percent for individual investors holding shares between 12 and 18 months. This study compares firms whose initial public shareholders immediately benefited from the reduction to other IPO firms. The sample of immediately affected firms recorded mean, incremental, one‐day stock price declines of −1.3 percent amid heavy trading. The results are consistent with capital gains tax planning constraining investment portfolio management. When the constraint was lifted, enough shareholders sold that prices moved. The results imply that despite increasingly liquid capital markets, transaction costs remain large enough to prevent investors from entering the market immediately and fully offsetting downward price pressure from individual capital gains tax management.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"361 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76493863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the risks and benefits of holding company stock in employer-sponsored defined contribution (DC) retirement plans. We address three questions: (1) What is the role and function of company stock in such plans? (2) Who might be affected by enhanced portfolio diversification in such plans? and (3) What mechanisms exist, or might be developed, to enhance portfolio diversification if more diversification were deemed useful? Firms offer company stock within DC plans in an effort to enhance economic performance, though evidence is mixed on productivity gains from stock ownership. We demonstrate that concentrated stock positions arise most often in larger firms' DC plans where sponsors direct employer contributions and restrict diversification. Stock concentration also arises because participants systematically underestimate the risk of employer stock and over-rely on its past performance in making investment decisions. In a retirement system with concentrated stock positions, there will always be some participants who forfeit DC plan savings to firm bankruptcy. Encouraging plan diversification mitigates this risk, but it could also induce some companies to redirect plan contributions to other forms of stock compensation or to replace stock contributions with cash compensation. We conclude by describing policy tools that might be used to encourage diversification and discuss conditions for their effective implementation.
{"title":"Company Stock and Retirement Plan Diversification","authors":"O. Mitchell, Stephen Utkus","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.304461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.304461","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the risks and benefits of holding company stock in employer-sponsored defined contribution (DC) retirement plans. We address three questions: (1) What is the role and function of company stock in such plans? (2) Who might be affected by enhanced portfolio diversification in such plans? and (3) What mechanisms exist, or might be developed, to enhance portfolio diversification if more diversification were deemed useful? Firms offer company stock within DC plans in an effort to enhance economic performance, though evidence is mixed on productivity gains from stock ownership. We demonstrate that concentrated stock positions arise most often in larger firms' DC plans where sponsors direct employer contributions and restrict diversification. Stock concentration also arises because participants systematically underestimate the risk of employer stock and over-rely on its past performance in making investment decisions. In a retirement system with concentrated stock positions, there will always be some participants who forfeit DC plan savings to firm bankruptcy. Encouraging plan diversification mitigates this risk, but it could also induce some companies to redirect plan contributions to other forms of stock compensation or to replace stock contributions with cash compensation. We conclude by describing policy tools that might be used to encourage diversification and discuss conditions for their effective implementation.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84815772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper proposes a habit formation model that explains the failure of the expectations hypothesis documented by Campbell and Shiller (1991) and Fama and Bliss (1987). The model also produces positive excess returns on long-term bonds, an upward sloping average yield curve, and allows for realistic levels of time-variation in the mean of consumption growth. The model generates a novel empirical prediction: Long lags of consumption growth predict the short-term interest rate with a negative sign. This prediction is shown to be strongly supported by the data.
本文提出了一个习惯形成模型来解释Campbell and Shiller(1991)和Fama and Bliss(1987)的预期假设的失败。该模型还产生了长期债券的正超额回报，即一条向上倾斜的平均收益率曲线，并允许消费增长平均值的实际时间变化水平。该模型产生了一种新的经验预测:消费增长的长滞后对短期利率的预测为负号。这一预测得到了数据的有力支持。
{"title":"Habit Formation and Returns on Bonds and Stocks","authors":"Jessica A. Wachter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.263031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.263031","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes a habit formation model that explains the failure of the expectations hypothesis documented by Campbell and Shiller (1991) and Fama and Bliss (1987). The model also produces positive excess returns on long-term bonds, an upward sloping average yield curve, and allows for realistic levels of time-variation in the mean of consumption growth. The model generates a novel empirical prediction: Long lags of consumption growth predict the short-term interest rate with a negative sign. This prediction is shown to be strongly supported by the data.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"336 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75931141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We present an econometric procedure for calibrating no-arbitrage term structure models in a way that is time-consistent and robust to measurement errors. Typical no-arbitrage models are time-inconsistent because their parameters are assumed constant for pricing purposes despite the fact that the parameters change whenever the model is recalibrated. No-arbitrage models are also sensitive to measurement errors because they fit exactly each potentially contaminated bond price in the cross-section. We overcome both problems by evaluating bond prices using the joint dynamics of the factors and calibrated parameters and by locally averaging out the measurement errors. Our empirical application illustrates the trade-off between fitting as well as possible and overfitting the cross-section of bond prices due to measurement errors. After optimizing this trade-off, our approach fits almost exactly the cross-section of bond prices at each date and produces out-of-sample forecast errors that beat a random walk benchmark and are comparable to the results in the affine term structure literature. We find that non-linearities in the pricing kernel are important, lending support to quadratic term structure models.
{"title":"Time-Consistent No-Arbitrage Models of the Term Structure","authors":"A. Yaron, Michael W. Brandt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.261644","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.261644","url":null,"abstract":"We present an econometric procedure for calibrating no-arbitrage term structure models in a way that is time-consistent and robust to measurement errors. Typical no-arbitrage models are time-inconsistent because their parameters are assumed constant for pricing purposes despite the fact that the parameters change whenever the model is recalibrated. No-arbitrage models are also sensitive to measurement errors because they fit exactly each potentially contaminated bond price in the cross-section. We overcome both problems by evaluating bond prices using the joint dynamics of the factors and calibrated parameters and by locally averaging out the measurement errors. Our empirical application illustrates the trade-off between fitting as well as possible and overfitting the cross-section of bond prices due to measurement errors. After optimizing this trade-off, our approach fits almost exactly the cross-section of bond prices at each date and produces out-of-sample forecast errors that beat a random walk benchmark and are comparable to the results in the affine term structure literature. We find that non-linearities in the pricing kernel are important, lending support to quadratic term structure models.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90166127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania
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