Pub Date : 2018-08-30DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-60073-1_9
Kyron Huigens
{"title":"On Aristotelian Criminal Law: A Reply to Duff","authors":"Kyron Huigens","doi":"10.1007/978-1-349-60073-1_9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-60073-1_9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"8 4","pages":"465"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50923068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-03-14DOI: 10.4324/9781315243375-10
J. Finnis
I During the past thirty years there has emerged a standard form of legal regulation of sexual conduct. This "standard modern position" has two limbs. On the one hand, the state is not authorised to, and does not, make it a punishable offence for adult consenting persons to engage, in private, in immoral sexual acts (for example, homosexual acts). On the other hand, states do have the authority to discourage, say, homosexual conduct and "orientation" (i.e. overtly manifested active willingness to engage in homosexual conduct). And typically, though not universally, they do so. That is to say, they maintain various criminal and administrative laws and policies which have as part of their purpose the discouraging of such conduct. Many of these laws, regulations, and policies discriminate (i.e. distinguish) between heterosexual and homosexual conduct adversely to the latter. The concern of the standard modern position itself is not with inclinations but entirely with certain decisions to express or manifest deliberate promotion of, or readiness to engage in, homosexual activity/conduct, including promotion of forms of life (e.g. purportedly marital cohabitation) which both encourage such activity and present it as a valid or acceptable alternative to the committed heterosexual union which the state recognises as marriage. Subject only to the written or unwritten constitutional requirement of freedom of discussion of ideas, the state laws and state policies which I have outlined are intended to discourage decisions which are thus deliberately oriented towards homosexual conduct and are manifested in public ways. The standard modern position considers that the state's proper responsibility for upholding true worth (morality) is a responsibility subsidiary (auxiliary) to the primary responsibility of parents and non-political voluntary associations. This conception of the proper role of government has been taken to exclude the state from assuming a directly parental disciplinary role in relation to consenting adults. That role was one
{"title":"Law, Morality, and \"Sexual Orientation\"","authors":"J. Finnis","doi":"10.4324/9781315243375-10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315243375-10","url":null,"abstract":"I During the past thirty years there has emerged a standard form of legal regulation of sexual conduct. This \"standard modern position\" has two limbs. On the one hand, the state is not authorised to, and does not, make it a punishable offence for adult consenting persons to engage, in private, in immoral sexual acts (for example, homosexual acts). On the other hand, states do have the authority to discourage, say, homosexual conduct and \"orientation\" (i.e. overtly manifested active willingness to engage in homosexual conduct). And typically, though not universally, they do so. That is to say, they maintain various criminal and administrative laws and policies which have as part of their purpose the discouraging of such conduct. Many of these laws, regulations, and policies discriminate (i.e. distinguish) between heterosexual and homosexual conduct adversely to the latter. The concern of the standard modern position itself is not with inclinations but entirely with certain decisions to express or manifest deliberate promotion of, or readiness to engage in, homosexual activity/conduct, including promotion of forms of life (e.g. purportedly marital cohabitation) which both encourage such activity and present it as a valid or acceptable alternative to the committed heterosexual union which the state recognises as marriage. Subject only to the written or unwritten constitutional requirement of freedom of discussion of ideas, the state laws and state policies which I have outlined are intended to discourage decisions which are thus deliberately oriented towards homosexual conduct and are manifested in public ways. The standard modern position considers that the state's proper responsibility for upholding true worth (morality) is a responsibility subsidiary (auxiliary) to the primary responsibility of parents and non-political voluntary associations. This conception of the proper role of government has been taken to exclude the state from assuming a directly parental disciplinary role in relation to consenting adults. That role was one","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"9 1","pages":"11"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70638989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-01-01DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-48907-0_6
T. Machan
{"title":"Jobs in a Free Country","authors":"T. Machan","doi":"10.1007/978-0-387-48907-0_6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-48907-0_6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"20 1","pages":"835"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"51681571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A View from the Farm","authors":"G. Jameson","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv172nk.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv172nk.11","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"3 1","pages":"51"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68782248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The concept of human rights reacts to a world that is adikia (“unjust”), as the ancient Greeks put it, or out of joint. However, like the sound made by the tree that falls in the forest when no one is around to hear it, the disjointedness of the world remains invisible unless someone notices it as adikia, as unjust. “What the eye doesn’t see the heart doesn’t grieve over” (Wittgenstein). The ultimate ground of human rights is therefore ethical. The ethical intentionality of noticing and caring about the very real sufferings of others, not just representing them in words, constitutes the living origin of human rights. Only when concrete suffering is noticed can the abstract concepts and pragmatic maneuvers associated with human rights discourse be brought to bear on it. But there is a paradox here: since the concepts expressing the true do not and cannot express the totality of the real, intentionality’s aim is never completely on target. Although an excess of unsaid haunts every event of saying, the ignoble desire to forge a unanimous interpretation tempts us to ignore this excess. This essay claims that the role of ethics in connection with the justice of human rights is to defy the world’s course, whatever that course may be. Only by means of a relentless critique that always attends to the particular can the many abstractions of human rights discourse be prevented from becoming a farce, or worse.
{"title":"The Ethics of the Unsaid in the Sphere of Human Rights","authors":"Louis E. Wolcher","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1929584","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1929584","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of human rights reacts to a world that is adikia (“unjust”), as the ancient Greeks put it, or out of joint. However, like the sound made by the tree that falls in the forest when no one is around to hear it, the disjointedness of the world remains invisible unless someone notices it as adikia, as unjust. “What the eye doesn’t see the heart doesn’t grieve over” (Wittgenstein). The ultimate ground of human rights is therefore ethical. The ethical intentionality of noticing and caring about the very real sufferings of others, not just representing them in words, constitutes the living origin of human rights. Only when concrete suffering is noticed can the abstract concepts and pragmatic maneuvers associated with human rights discourse be brought to bear on it. But there is a paradox here: since the concepts expressing the true do not and cannot express the totality of the real, intentionality’s aim is never completely on target. Although an excess of unsaid haunts every event of saying, the ignoble desire to forge a unanimous interpretation tempts us to ignore this excess. This essay claims that the role of ethics in connection with the justice of human rights is to defy the world’s course, whatever that course may be. Only by means of a relentless critique that always attends to the particular can the many abstractions of human rights discourse be prevented from becoming a farce, or worse.","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"26 1","pages":"533"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67796737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-01-01DOI: 10.1515/9781618116567-015
Samuel J. Levine
A discussion of American legal practice through a perspective of Jewish law, ethics, and tradition may be considered under at least two distinct but interrelated approaches. A historical approach might look to attitudes toward lawyers found in sources relating to courts that have functioned under the Jewish legal system. Levine explains that, because Jewish courts classically operated under an inquisitorial system of justice, relatively few primary sources of Jewish law include material addressing the role of lawyers. Accordingly, references to lawyers in Jewish law and tradition may remain of little relevance to the practice of law in the contemporary United States, as any normative conclusions derived from these sources likely depend upon underlying assumptions inapplicable to the American adversary legal system. Levine suggests that an alternative approach might instead focus more generally upon areas of Jewish law and ethics that, although perhaps not always directly related to the substance of legal practice, may in fact offer a more accurate indication of the attitudes of Jewish tradition toward the work of American lawyers. Toward that end, he presents a three-tiered conceptual framework suitable for an analysis of the implications for Jewish law and ethics of a broad range of human activities, including various aspects of the practice of law. Finally, branching out from Jewish tradition, Levine concludes with a broader reference to the effectiveness of the religious lawyering movement in providing a means for improving exploration of and attitudes toward the work and ethics of lawyers.
{"title":"13. A Look at American Legal Practice through a Perspective of Jewish Law, Ethics, and Tradition: A Conceptual Overview","authors":"Samuel J. Levine","doi":"10.1515/9781618116567-015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781618116567-015","url":null,"abstract":"A discussion of American legal practice through a perspective of Jewish law, ethics, and tradition may be considered under at least two distinct but interrelated approaches. A historical approach might look to attitudes toward lawyers found in sources relating to courts that have functioned under the Jewish legal system. Levine explains that, because Jewish courts classically operated under an inquisitorial system of justice, relatively few primary sources of Jewish law include material addressing the role of lawyers. Accordingly, references to lawyers in Jewish law and tradition may remain of little relevance to the practice of law in the contemporary United States, as any normative conclusions derived from these sources likely depend upon underlying assumptions inapplicable to the American adversary legal system. Levine suggests that an alternative approach might instead focus more generally upon areas of Jewish law and ethics that, although perhaps not always directly related to the substance of legal practice, may in fact offer a more accurate indication of the attitudes of Jewish tradition toward the work of American lawyers. Toward that end, he presents a three-tiered conceptual framework suitable for an analysis of the implications for Jewish law and ethics of a broad range of human activities, including various aspects of the practice of law. Finally, branching out from Jewish tradition, Levine concludes with a broader reference to the effectiveness of the religious lawyering movement in providing a means for improving exploration of and attitudes toward the work and ethics of lawyers.","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"20 1","pages":"11"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66850969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In his book, After Virtue, the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre issued a stinging indictment of modern society. In the famous last sentence of After Virtue, MacIntyre stated that [w]e, our society, are waiting . . . for another - doubtless very different - St. Benedict. I want to propose that Christian law professors should see themselves and their role in accord with MacIntyre's call. In this Article I will try to explain why. First, I will review St. Benedict's life and argue that he created the institution, the form of community - Western monasticism - that preserved much of classical civilization and which was instrumental in synthesizing a new, Christian civilization. Second, I will discuss the state of American culture as diagnosed by MacIntyre. I will then propose how Christian legal scholars should respond: what our role is in American society. I will argue that Christian law professors have three analytically distinct possible roles: building Christian law schools, rebuilding Christian law schools, and what I will label engaging in the debate. Scholars may assume different roles over their careers and aspects of more than one role concurrently. Then I will briefly discuss how one can know what role(s) one should assume, as a Christian legal scholar. Lastly, I will return to St. Benedict and how his legacy of preserving and creating offers a model for Christian law professors fifteen hundred years later.
{"title":"The Role of the Christian Legal Scholar: The Call for a Modern Saint Benedict","authors":"Lee J. Strang","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.843787","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.843787","url":null,"abstract":"In his book, After Virtue, the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre issued a stinging indictment of modern society. In the famous last sentence of After Virtue, MacIntyre stated that [w]e, our society, are waiting . . . for another - doubtless very different - St. Benedict. I want to propose that Christian law professors should see themselves and their role in accord with MacIntyre's call. In this Article I will try to explain why. First, I will review St. Benedict's life and argue that he created the institution, the form of community - Western monasticism - that preserved much of classical civilization and which was instrumental in synthesizing a new, Christian civilization. Second, I will discuss the state of American culture as diagnosed by MacIntyre. I will then propose how Christian legal scholars should respond: what our role is in American society. I will argue that Christian law professors have three analytically distinct possible roles: building Christian law schools, rebuilding Christian law schools, and what I will label engaging in the debate. Scholars may assume different roles over their careers and aspects of more than one role concurrently. Then I will briefly discuss how one can know what role(s) one should assume, as a Christian legal scholar. Lastly, I will return to St. Benedict and how his legacy of preserving and creating offers a model for Christian law professors fifteen hundred years later.","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"20 1","pages":"59"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67841792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Physician-assisted suicide and federalism.","authors":"Brian H Bix","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"17 1","pages":"53-69"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24413258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A comprehensive national policy to stop human cloning: an analysis of the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001 with recommendations for federal and state legislatures.","authors":"Shawn E Peterson","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"17 1","pages":"217-68"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24413266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bioethics today, bioethics tomorrow: stem cell research and the \"dignitarian alliance\".","authors":"Roger Brownsword","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"17 1","pages":"15-51"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24413256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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