{"title":"Conflict + interest: financial incentives and informed consent in human subject research.","authors":"Shannon Benbow","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"17 1","pages":"181-215"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24413265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Creating clones, kids & chimera: liberal democratic compromise at the crossroads.","authors":"Nathan A Adams","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"17 1","pages":"71-149"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24413259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Five foot two with eyes of blue: physical profiling and the prospect of a genetics-based criminal justice system.","authors":"Lindsy A Elkins","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"17 1","pages":"269-305"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24413267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The new culture of life: promoting responsible and appropriate medical research.","authors":"Rick Santorum","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"17 1","pages":"151-6"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24413260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The appropriate limits of science in the formation of public policy.","authors":"Maureen L Condic, Samuel B Condic","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"17 1","pages":"157-79"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24413263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bioethics at the beginning, middle, and end of life.","authors":"Elizabeth M Anderson","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"17 1","pages":"1-13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24413931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since 1990, nearly every state has enacted new laws to expand the transfer adolescent offenders from juvenile to criminal courts for sentencing and punishment. What happens to adolescents once placed in the criminal justice system, the returns to crime control from these policies, and the potential violations of human rights that ensue, are the focus of this essay. The quick pace of change, the broad reach of the new laws, the potential for unintended negative outcomes, and the harsh conditions of adult punishment for juvenile offenders add new urgency to these questions. The first section discusses the tension between new laws and both jurisprudential theory and social science evidence on the culpability of adolescent offenders. Although waiver of juveniles to criminal court legally may signal the "end of childhood" for that offender, theory and research on adolescent development suggest that the developmental process is far from complete with respect to further antisocial behavior, the jurisprudential indicia of adult competencies and culpability, and the natural history of more generalized transitions from adolescence to adult social roles and behaviors. Next, I assess the returns to crime control from current policies that punish adolescent offenders as adults to reduce crime and increase public safety. Recent controlled studies suggest that while punishment in criminal court for adolescent offenders in more certain and severe, utilitarian goals of lowering juvenile crime rates have not been achieved. Increasing substantive punishment for adolescents may in fact elevate crime rates and heighten the same public safety risks that the legislation is intended to reduce. Next, these empirical results are contextualized in theories of adolescent development and criminology to locate the sources of iatrogenic effects within prevailing policies of retribution and deterrence. Punishment of adolescents as adults exposes them to high levels of violence, attenuates their socialization to prosocial norms by constraining critical developmental transitions to a prison setting, and mortgaging their work prospects through the stigma of felony conviction. Punishment as an adult is analogized to toxic exposure that sharply elevates disease risk. The fourth section discusses the implications of this theoretical tension for the jurisprudence of adolescent criminality, and the theory and future of the juvenile court. This conclusion revisits the human rights dimensions of these developments in law and policy.
{"title":"This Will Hurt me More Than it Hurts You: Social and Legal Consequences of Criminalizing Delinquency","authors":"J. Fagan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.306531","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.306531","url":null,"abstract":"Since 1990, nearly every state has enacted new laws to expand the transfer adolescent offenders from juvenile to criminal courts for sentencing and punishment. What happens to adolescents once placed in the criminal justice system, the returns to crime control from these policies, and the potential violations of human rights that ensue, are the focus of this essay. The quick pace of change, the broad reach of the new laws, the potential for unintended negative outcomes, and the harsh conditions of adult punishment for juvenile offenders add new urgency to these questions. The first section discusses the tension between new laws and both jurisprudential theory and social science evidence on the culpability of adolescent offenders. Although waiver of juveniles to criminal court legally may signal the \"end of childhood\" for that offender, theory and research on adolescent development suggest that the developmental process is far from complete with respect to further antisocial behavior, the jurisprudential indicia of adult competencies and culpability, and the natural history of more generalized transitions from adolescence to adult social roles and behaviors. Next, I assess the returns to crime control from current policies that punish adolescent offenders as adults to reduce crime and increase public safety. Recent controlled studies suggest that while punishment in criminal court for adolescent offenders in more certain and severe, utilitarian goals of lowering juvenile crime rates have not been achieved. Increasing substantive punishment for adolescents may in fact elevate crime rates and heighten the same public safety risks that the legislation is intended to reduce. Next, these empirical results are contextualized in theories of adolescent development and criminology to locate the sources of iatrogenic effects within prevailing policies of retribution and deterrence. Punishment of adolescents as adults exposes them to high levels of violence, attenuates their socialization to prosocial norms by constraining critical developmental transitions to a prison setting, and mortgaging their work prospects through the stigma of felony conviction. Punishment as an adult is analogized to toxic exposure that sharply elevates disease risk. The fourth section discusses the implications of this theoretical tension for the jurisprudence of adolescent criminality, and the theory and future of the juvenile court. This conclusion revisits the human rights dimensions of these developments in law and policy.","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"16 1","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68531826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A Code of One's Own is an essay exploring the idea that we can learn about professionalism by reflecting on the humanities. The paper is modeled on Virginia Woolf's A Room of One's Own which is a series of lectures in six chapters. The essay uses those chapters to develop the idea that lawyers, through self-reflection and observation, can develop a professional code of their own. The paper was developed through co-teaching a course entitled, Law in Literature and Philosophy as well as by attending the Aspen Institute and the Glenmoor Institute of Justice for the Legal Profession, which are both Great Books seminars that examine different aspects of law and society.
{"title":"A Code of One's Own","authors":"Joseph P. Tomain","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.264420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.264420","url":null,"abstract":"A Code of One's Own is an essay exploring the idea that we can learn about professionalism by reflecting on the humanities. The paper is modeled on Virginia Woolf's A Room of One's Own which is a series of lectures in six chapters. The essay uses those chapters to develop the idea that lawyers, through self-reflection and observation, can develop a professional code of their own. The paper was developed through co-teaching a course entitled, Law in Literature and Philosophy as well as by attending the Aspen Institute and the Glenmoor Institute of Justice for the Legal Profession, which are both Great Books seminars that examine different aspects of law and society.","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"15 1","pages":"153"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68238107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The role of lawyer is widely understood by law students and practitioners as the entry into a simplified ethical world, one in which ordinary moral principles are cleared away by the hegemony of doctrines unique to the practice of law. This understanding is supported by and may originate in a particular view of lawyers' professional responsibility, a view in which a lawyer's ethical obligations as a professional are defined largely (though not entirely) by specialized legal rules - principally the codes of ethics and other rules that regulate lawyer conduct - and the policies thought to underlie those rules. There is nothing natural or even intuitive about defining lawyers' ethical obligations primarily in terms of compliance with rules. Indeed, there has long been a debate about whether black letter codifications can possibly serve as an adequate platform for ethical deliberation. But to acknowledge this debate is not to argue that there is some alternative way of thinking about lawyers' professional responsibility that is truly or actually natural. All fields of law must be constructed somehow. What is worth consideration is how a field is constructed in one way rather than another, and the effects of any given construction. Our thesis embraces two claims. The first claim is that within the traditional law school curriculum, law is constructed as a relatively autonomous discipline distinguished from other disciplines, including philosophical ethics, and that the discipline of law is subdivided into relatively separate fields. Thus, notwithstanding more than a century of developments in legal education and claims of progress in our understanding of law - notwithstanding the academy's apparent absorption of influences ranging from legal realism to critical legal studies to feminist jurisprudence to critical race theory to a host of law and analyses - students continue to be educated into a relatively Langdellian world view. The second claim is that within the traditional law school curriculum, Professional Responsibility is constructed as its own field of law. As a consequence, law students learn to think of law generally, and Professional Responsibility specifically, as disengaged from moral considerations. Part One of the article takes up the questions how and why the Professional Responsibility field has been traditionally structured in the law school curriculum on a legalistic model, i.e., as but another field of law separated from ordinary moral concerns. In Part Two, we point out that there is nothing about the concept of law that requires its separation from ordinary moral reasoning. We suggest that when law is constructed so as to be saturated with moral considerations, then the professional work of lawyers, and hence their professional responsibilities, can be understood to be similarly saturated. In Part Three, we explore some of what is at stake in our decisions about how to construct Professional Responsibility. We consider both the p
{"title":"Constructing the Field of Professional Responsibility","authors":"J. B. Baron, Richard Greenstein","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.256730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.256730","url":null,"abstract":"The role of lawyer is widely understood by law students and practitioners as the entry into a simplified ethical world, one in which ordinary moral principles are cleared away by the hegemony of doctrines unique to the practice of law. This understanding is supported by and may originate in a particular view of lawyers' professional responsibility, a view in which a lawyer's ethical obligations as a professional are defined largely (though not entirely) by specialized legal rules - principally the codes of ethics and other rules that regulate lawyer conduct - and the policies thought to underlie those rules. There is nothing natural or even intuitive about defining lawyers' ethical obligations primarily in terms of compliance with rules. Indeed, there has long been a debate about whether black letter codifications can possibly serve as an adequate platform for ethical deliberation. But to acknowledge this debate is not to argue that there is some alternative way of thinking about lawyers' professional responsibility that is truly or actually natural. All fields of law must be constructed somehow. What is worth consideration is how a field is constructed in one way rather than another, and the effects of any given construction. Our thesis embraces two claims. The first claim is that within the traditional law school curriculum, law is constructed as a relatively autonomous discipline distinguished from other disciplines, including philosophical ethics, and that the discipline of law is subdivided into relatively separate fields. Thus, notwithstanding more than a century of developments in legal education and claims of progress in our understanding of law - notwithstanding the academy's apparent absorption of influences ranging from legal realism to critical legal studies to feminist jurisprudence to critical race theory to a host of law and analyses - students continue to be educated into a relatively Langdellian world view. The second claim is that within the traditional law school curriculum, Professional Responsibility is constructed as its own field of law. As a consequence, law students learn to think of law generally, and Professional Responsibility specifically, as disengaged from moral considerations. Part One of the article takes up the questions how and why the Professional Responsibility field has been traditionally structured in the law school curriculum on a legalistic model, i.e., as but another field of law separated from ordinary moral concerns. In Part Two, we point out that there is nothing about the concept of law that requires its separation from ordinary moral reasoning. We suggest that when law is constructed so as to be saturated with moral considerations, then the professional work of lawyers, and hence their professional responsibilities, can be understood to be similarly saturated. In Part Three, we explore some of what is at stake in our decisions about how to construct Professional Responsibility. We consider both the p","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"15 1","pages":"537"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.256730","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68207348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Justifying assisted suicide: comments on the ongoing debate.","authors":"M I Urofsky","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82192,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame journal of law, ethics & public policy","volume":"14 2","pages":"893-943"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"22350830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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