Pub Date : 2007-04-28DOI: 10.12987/yale/9780300106190.003.0006
T. Carter
Oklahoma! was a surprising success on Broadway, and although the Theatre Guild considered other possible creative teams for new musicals, the now-sealed Rodgers and Hammerstein partnership proved hard to resist. A touring company was in place by late summer 1943, and Oklahoma! traveled internationally after the end of World War II (not least, to London’s West End in 1947); meanwhile, the Guild needed to replace cast members leaving one or other productions of the show. In 1953, Rodgers and Hammerstein bought the Guild’s rights to all three of the shows they had done under its auspices (including Carousel and Allegro). In part, this was to maximize their profits from intended film versions. The 1955 film of Oklahoma! took advantage of the new Todd-AO wide-screen process and location shooting to produce a vivid rendition of the show that, however, also needed to be followed, or resisted, in subsequent stage versions.
{"title":"From Stage to Screen","authors":"T. Carter","doi":"10.12987/yale/9780300106190.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12987/yale/9780300106190.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Oklahoma! was a surprising success on Broadway, and although the Theatre Guild considered other possible creative teams for new musicals, the now-sealed Rodgers and Hammerstein partnership proved hard to resist. A touring company was in place by late summer 1943, and Oklahoma! traveled internationally after the end of World War II (not least, to London’s West End in 1947); meanwhile, the Guild needed to replace cast members leaving one or other productions of the show. In 1953, Rodgers and Hammerstein bought the Guild’s rights to all three of the shows they had done under its auspices (including Carousel and Allegro). In part, this was to maximize their profits from intended film versions. The 1955 film of Oklahoma! took advantage of the new Todd-AO wide-screen process and location shooting to produce a vivid rendition of the show that, however, also needed to be followed, or resisted, in subsequent stage versions.","PeriodicalId":82221,"journal":{"name":"Oklahoma law review","volume":"56 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77627225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-04-28DOI: 10.12987/YALE/9780300106190.003.0004
T. Carter
Although there was a complete libretto for what became Oklahoma! when the typical five weeks of rehearsals began on 8 February 1943, plus a number of the songs, there was still much work to do. The principal cast was fixed, including Alfred Drake (Curly), Joan Roberts (Laurey), Celeste Holm (Ado Annie), and Joseph Buloff (Ali Hakim), but others still needed to be recruited (Howard da Silva as Jud Fry). Some roles were expanded (Gertie Cummings) and others dropped (Lotta Gonzales, who was to have ended up marrying Ali Hakim). Act 1 was fixed early on, but act 2 was subject to constant revision even during the tryouts in New Haven and Boston (when the show was titled Away We Go!). In part this was due to problems of staging, but Rodgers and Hammerstein also remained unclear on the musical contents until the week before the Broadway opening, on 31 March 1943.
{"title":"Heading for Broadway","authors":"T. Carter","doi":"10.12987/YALE/9780300106190.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12987/YALE/9780300106190.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Although there was a complete libretto for what became Oklahoma! when the typical five weeks of rehearsals began on 8 February 1943, plus a number of the songs, there was still much work to do. The principal cast was fixed, including Alfred Drake (Curly), Joan Roberts (Laurey), Celeste Holm (Ado Annie), and Joseph Buloff (Ali Hakim), but others still needed to be recruited (Howard da Silva as Jud Fry). Some roles were expanded (Gertie Cummings) and others dropped (Lotta Gonzales, who was to have ended up marrying Ali Hakim). Act 1 was fixed early on, but act 2 was subject to constant revision even during the tryouts in New Haven and Boston (when the show was titled Away We Go!). In part this was due to problems of staging, but Rodgers and Hammerstein also remained unclear on the musical contents until the week before the Broadway opening, on 31 March 1943.","PeriodicalId":82221,"journal":{"name":"Oklahoma law review","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81996635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-04-28DOI: 10.12987/YALE/9780300106190.003.0002
T. Carter
Theresa Helburn was initially uncertain about whether to treat Green Grow the Lilacs as a “cowboy play” with songs by the likes of Woody Guthrie and Tex Ritter, as something aspiring to higher artistic status (music by Aaron Copland or Roy Harris), or somewhere in between. Richard Rodgers also needed to deal with his longtime but collapsing partnership with Lorenz Hart. Even after Helburn had fixed on Rodgers and Hammerstein, in summer 1942, there were important decisions to be made about the director (eventually, it was Rouben Mamoulian), choreographer (Agnes de Mille, chosen because of her work on Copland’s Rodeo), and the casting of the show. The Guild approached various Hollywood stars (Deanna Durbin, Groucho Marx, Anthony Quinn, Shirley Temple) but took a different path in the end. No less troublesome was how to generate the large amount of money needed to get a musical onto the stage.
特蕾莎·赫尔本(Theresa Helburn)最初不确定是将《绿色种植紫丁香》(Green Grow the Lilacs)视为伍迪·格思里(Woody Guthrie)和特克斯·里特(Tex Ritter)等人创作的“牛仔剧”，还是将其视为追求更高艺术地位的作品(由亚伦·科普兰(Aaron Copland)或罗伊·哈里斯(Roy Harris)创作)，还是介于两者之间。理查德·罗杰斯还需要处理他与洛伦兹·哈特长期但即将破裂的合作关系。即使在1942年夏天，赫尔本确定了罗杰斯和哈默斯坦之后，关于导演(最终是鲁本·马穆里安)、编舞(艾格尼丝·德·米勒，因为她在科普兰的牛仔竞技表演中所做的工作而被选中)和演出的选角，还需要做出一些重要的决定。工会曾接触过许多好莱坞明星(迪安娜·德宾、格劳乔·马克思、安东尼·奎因、秀兰·邓波儿)，但最终选择了不同的道路。同样麻烦的是，如何筹集到将音乐剧搬上舞台所需的大笔资金。
{"title":"Contracts and Commitments","authors":"T. Carter","doi":"10.12987/YALE/9780300106190.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12987/YALE/9780300106190.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Theresa Helburn was initially uncertain about whether to treat Green Grow the Lilacs as a “cowboy play” with songs by the likes of Woody Guthrie and Tex Ritter, as something aspiring to higher artistic status (music by Aaron Copland or Roy Harris), or somewhere in between. Richard Rodgers also needed to deal with his longtime but collapsing partnership with Lorenz Hart. Even after Helburn had fixed on Rodgers and Hammerstein, in summer 1942, there were important decisions to be made about the director (eventually, it was Rouben Mamoulian), choreographer (Agnes de Mille, chosen because of her work on Copland’s Rodeo), and the casting of the show. The Guild approached various Hollywood stars (Deanna Durbin, Groucho Marx, Anthony Quinn, Shirley Temple) but took a different path in the end. No less troublesome was how to generate the large amount of money needed to get a musical onto the stage.","PeriodicalId":82221,"journal":{"name":"Oklahoma law review","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80136952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For many peoples in the developing world, "homeland security" has a meaning very different from its post-September 11 meaning in the United States. In many cases, peoples who have a shared cultural conception of "territory" within nation-states have begun to adopt the dominant Western property paradigm of land titling to formalize their rights to that territory. Many view this paradigm and the individualization of property rights it facilitates as an inevitable outcome of the inexorable march of social evolution, evidenced by the end of the twentieth century collapse of communism. The Enlightenment era conception of fungible individual property emerged triumphant. Moreover, it has been enshrined in the fundamental human rights charters and domestic constitutions of the twentieth century.' Yet a closer inspection yields a much more nuanced analysis of the nature and forms of property ownership around the world and its treatment within the rights-based framework of humanitarian law. The literature suggests that communally held lands, often referred to as "common property," have remained robust and adaptable in the face of the forces of globalization, and continue to persist in even the most developed nations.'This Article begins with a brief review of the literature of common property - an area of intense and interdisciplinary scholarly interest sparked by Garrett Hardin's famous essay, The Tragedy of the Commons. In Part II we briefly review the modem view of common property and its relationship with international development theory. Part III describes the historical development of the three-generational conceptual framework for international human rights law and the right to property within that framework. Part IV discusses key national jurisprudence that has attempted to reverse the colonial legacy of indigenous homeland alienation and the inter-American human rights system.
{"title":"Defending the Polygon: The Emerging Human Right to Communal Property","authors":"T. Ankersen, T. Ruppert","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2675733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2675733","url":null,"abstract":"For many peoples in the developing world, \"homeland security\" has a meaning very different from its post-September 11 meaning in the United States. In many cases, peoples who have a shared cultural conception of \"territory\" within nation-states have begun to adopt the dominant Western property paradigm of land titling to formalize their rights to that territory. Many view this paradigm and the individualization of property rights it facilitates as an inevitable outcome of the inexorable march of social evolution, evidenced by the end of the twentieth century collapse of communism. The Enlightenment era conception of fungible individual property emerged triumphant. Moreover, it has been enshrined in the fundamental human rights charters and domestic constitutions of the twentieth century.' Yet a closer inspection yields a much more nuanced analysis of the nature and forms of property ownership around the world and its treatment within the rights-based framework of humanitarian law. The literature suggests that communally held lands, often referred to as \"common property,\" have remained robust and adaptable in the face of the forces of globalization, and continue to persist in even the most developed nations.'This Article begins with a brief review of the literature of common property - an area of intense and interdisciplinary scholarly interest sparked by Garrett Hardin's famous essay, The Tragedy of the Commons. In Part II we briefly review the modem view of common property and its relationship with international development theory. Part III describes the historical development of the three-generational conceptual framework for international human rights law and the right to property within that framework. Part IV discusses key national jurisprudence that has attempted to reverse the colonial legacy of indigenous homeland alienation and the inter-American human rights system.","PeriodicalId":82221,"journal":{"name":"Oklahoma law review","volume":"178 1","pages":"681"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68249984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Because the federal government is a party, as plaintiff or defendant, in between one-fifth and one-quarter of all civil cases in the federal courts, any student of federal litigation should develop an understanding of the unique principles, rules, and statutes that govern when the sovereign is a party to a court action. As but one concrete indication of the importance of the subject, the Supreme Court continues to devote substantial attention to recurring questions of sovereign immunity, the distinctive jurisdictional statutes governing litigation with the United States, special forums for adjudication of particular types of governmental disputes, the limitations on governmental liability in tort and contract, and the availability of and standards for awards of attorney's fees against the government and its agencies. The concept of sovereign immunity - that is, the immunity of the United States from suit without its express permission - underlies and permeates this field of litigation with the federal government. As Justice Holmes admonished nearly a century ago, "[m]en must turn square corners when they deal with the Government." Rock Island, A. & L.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920) (Holmes, J.). Yet, far too often, attorneys representing clients against the government fail to heed - or even recognize - this classic proverb of federal government litigation. The reason is that they fail to appreciate the persisting influence of sovereign immunity. The purpose of this article is to provide something of a primer on the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity, for both practicing lawyers and scholars. In this article, the author draws together the sometimes scattered pieces of the federal sovereign immunity puzzle, including a consideration of the opposing arguments on the legitimacy of the doctrine, the contested history of the doctrine, a discussion of its evolution in Supreme Court decisions, a summary of the current state of the doctrine, an outline of the tapestry of statutory authorizations for suit against the federal government, and an analysis of the continuing tension underlying the doctrine as now played out in judicial construction of statutory waivers. [This article is adapted from a chapter in Gregory Sisk's forthcoming treatise on Litigation with the Federal Government, which is scheduled for publication in 2005 by the American Law Institute - American Bar Association.]
由于联邦政府作为原告或被告，在联邦法院审理的五分之一到四分之一的民事案件中是一方，任何学习联邦诉讼的学生都应该了解当君主作为法院诉讼的一方时所适用的独特原则、规则和法规。作为这一主题重要性的一个具体迹象，最高法院继续大量关注主权豁免、管辖与美国诉讼的独特司法法规、裁决特定类型政府争端的特别论坛、对侵权和合同中的政府责任的限制、以及针对政府及其机构的律师费奖励的可得性和标准。主权豁免的概念——即美国在未经其明确许可的情况下免于诉讼——是这一与联邦政府的诉讼领域的基础和渗透。正如霍姆斯大法官在近一个世纪前所告诫的那样，“当他们与政府打交道时，他们必须改变立场。”洛克岛，a.l.r.公司诉美国，254 U.S. 141, 143(1920)(霍姆斯，J.)。然而，很多时候，代表客户反对政府的律师没有注意到——甚至没有意识到——这条联邦政府诉讼的经典谚语。原因是他们没有认识到主权豁免的持久影响。本文的目的是为执业律师和学者提供一些关于联邦主权豁免理论的入门知识。在这篇文章中，作者汇集了联邦主权豁免这一有时分散的难题，包括考虑关于该学说合法性的对立论点，该学说的争议历史，讨论其在最高法院判决中的演变，总结该学说的现状，概述对联邦政府提起诉讼的法定授权，以及对这一原则持续存在的紧张关系的分析现在在法定豁免的司法构建中发挥了作用。[本文改编自Gregory Sisk即将出版的关于与联邦政府诉讼的论文中的一章，该论文计划于2005年由美国法律研究所-美国律师协会出版。]
{"title":"A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity","authors":"Gregory C. Sisk","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.722602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.722602","url":null,"abstract":"Because the federal government is a party, as plaintiff or defendant, in between one-fifth and one-quarter of all civil cases in the federal courts, any student of federal litigation should develop an understanding of the unique principles, rules, and statutes that govern when the sovereign is a party to a court action. As but one concrete indication of the importance of the subject, the Supreme Court continues to devote substantial attention to recurring questions of sovereign immunity, the distinctive jurisdictional statutes governing litigation with the United States, special forums for adjudication of particular types of governmental disputes, the limitations on governmental liability in tort and contract, and the availability of and standards for awards of attorney's fees against the government and its agencies. The concept of sovereign immunity - that is, the immunity of the United States from suit without its express permission - underlies and permeates this field of litigation with the federal government. As Justice Holmes admonished nearly a century ago, \"[m]en must turn square corners when they deal with the Government.\" Rock Island, A. & L.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920) (Holmes, J.). Yet, far too often, attorneys representing clients against the government fail to heed - or even recognize - this classic proverb of federal government litigation. The reason is that they fail to appreciate the persisting influence of sovereign immunity. The purpose of this article is to provide something of a primer on the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity, for both practicing lawyers and scholars. In this article, the author draws together the sometimes scattered pieces of the federal sovereign immunity puzzle, including a consideration of the opposing arguments on the legitimacy of the doctrine, the contested history of the doctrine, a discussion of its evolution in Supreme Court decisions, a summary of the current state of the doctrine, an outline of the tapestry of statutory authorizations for suit against the federal government, and an analysis of the continuing tension underlying the doctrine as now played out in judicial construction of statutory waivers. [This article is adapted from a chapter in Gregory Sisk's forthcoming treatise on Litigation with the Federal Government, which is scheduled for publication in 2005 by the American Law Institute - American Bar Association.]","PeriodicalId":82221,"journal":{"name":"Oklahoma law review","volume":"58 1","pages":"439"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67810551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Direct-to-consumer genetic tests, government oversight, and the First Amendment: what the government can (and can't) do to protect the public's health.","authors":"Gail H Javitt, Erica Stanley, Kathy Hudson","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82221,"journal":{"name":"Oklahoma law review","volume":"57 2","pages":"251-302"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24911943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In light of the STARLINK(R) incident, food companies may think of avoiding transgenic crops altogether as a source of food ingredients. This article discusses three risks that accompany the decision not to use products of agricultural biotechnology. Risk One is the Risk of Legal Liability for Damages. Legal Liability may arise through product liability for design defect in the food. Legal liability may also arise through contribution and indemnity for worker safety and environmental damages through agronomic practices that create additional hazards in comparison to agricultural biotechnology crops. Risk Two is the Risk of Environmental Compliance. Food companies may be held responsible by environmental agencies for increased environmental harms caused by non-transgenic crop production. Moreover, environmental agencies may adopt technology-forcing regulations and agricultural biotechnology may be the best available technology. Risk Three is the Risk of Scientific Ignorance. Making public policy about agricultural biotechnology based on scientific misinformation creates both a societal and moral risk domestically and internationally.
{"title":"The Risks of Going Non-GMO","authors":"D. Kershen","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.278948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.278948","url":null,"abstract":"In light of the STARLINK(R) incident, food companies may think of avoiding transgenic crops altogether as a source of food ingredients. This article discusses three risks that accompany the decision not to use products of agricultural biotechnology. Risk One is the Risk of Legal Liability for Damages. Legal Liability may arise through product liability for design defect in the food. Legal liability may also arise through contribution and indemnity for worker safety and environmental damages through agronomic practices that create additional hazards in comparison to agricultural biotechnology crops. Risk Two is the Risk of Environmental Compliance. Food companies may be held responsible by environmental agencies for increased environmental harms caused by non-transgenic crop production. Moreover, environmental agencies may adopt technology-forcing regulations and agricultural biotechnology may be the best available technology. Risk Three is the Risk of Scientific Ignorance. Making public policy about agricultural biotechnology based on scientific misinformation creates both a societal and moral risk domestically and internationally.","PeriodicalId":82221,"journal":{"name":"Oklahoma law review","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68325458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2000-01-01DOI: 10.4324/9780203390290-16
William L. Foreman
{"title":"Constitutional Law: Hutchins v. District of Columbia : The Constitutional Dilemma over Juvenile Curfews","authors":"William L. Foreman","doi":"10.4324/9780203390290-16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203390290-16","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82221,"journal":{"name":"Oklahoma law review","volume":"53 1","pages":"717"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70584333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Promoting medical research without sacrificing patient autonomy: legal and ethical issues raised by the waiver of informed consent for emergency research.","authors":"S J Carnahan","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82221,"journal":{"name":"Oklahoma law review","volume":"52 4","pages":"565-91"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"22316181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Informed consent in Oklahoma: a search for reasonableness and predictability in the aftermath of Scott v. Bradford.","authors":"E S Fisher","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82221,"journal":{"name":"Oklahoma law review","volume":"49 4","pages":"651-75"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"25821233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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