Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.5840/acpaproc202094146
{"title":"American Catholic Philosophical Association Secretary’s Report (2020)","authors":"","doi":"10.5840/acpaproc202094146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/acpaproc202094146","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":82372,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71107610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ACPAPROC2021427121
Ryan Miller
Attempts to find perennial elements in Aristotle’s cosmology are doomed to failure because his distinction of sub- and supra-lunary realms no longer holds. More fruitful approaches to the contemporary importance of Aristotelian cosmology must focus on parities of reasoning rather than content. This paper highlights the striking parallels between Aristotle’s use of symmetry arguments in cosmology and instances of Noether’s First Theorem in contemporary physics. Both observe simple motion, find symmetries in that motion, argue from those symmetries to notions of conservation, and then conclude to cosmological structure. These parallels reveal an enduring relevance for Aristotelian cosmology that does not depend on positing an enduring content to his cosmological claims.
{"title":"Perennial Symmetry Arguments: Aristotle’s Heavenly Cosmology and Noether’s First Theorem","authors":"Ryan Miller","doi":"10.5840/ACPAPROC2021427121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ACPAPROC2021427121","url":null,"abstract":"Attempts to find perennial elements in Aristotle’s cosmology are doomed to failure because his distinction of sub- and supra-lunary realms no longer holds. More fruitful approaches to the contemporary importance of Aristotelian cosmology must focus on parities of reasoning rather than content. This paper highlights the striking parallels between Aristotle’s use of symmetry arguments in cosmology and instances of Noether’s First Theorem in contemporary physics. Both observe simple motion, find symmetries in that motion, argue from those symmetries to notions of conservation, and then conclude to cosmological structure. These parallels reveal an enduring relevance for Aristotelian cosmology that does not depend on positing an enduring content to his cosmological claims.","PeriodicalId":82372,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71108103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ACPAPROC202161130
Anselm Ramelow
However much scientific paradigms shift, the shifts are not so arbitrary that we would relinquish without need the simpler, more economic and elegant theories for more complicated ones. This is not just a matter of convenience but implies an objective fact about the universe, namely a reliable perfection that can only be assumed on the basis of the intelligent design of a benevolent creator God. Earlier thinkers may have been more aware that this is an assumption (e.g., Kant) and presupposes God’s benevolent intentions (Leibniz). This assumption of a unified order of reality in general constitutes itself a perennial consensus through the ages, whether in Aquinas, Leibniz, the German Idealists or American Transcendentalists. Dissenters such as William James or Nietzsche serve to highlight the assumption as theological—an assumption that is fortunately confirmed by our best available evidence, as well as by the way we do science and live our lives.
{"title":"A Perennial Theology of Nature","authors":"Anselm Ramelow","doi":"10.5840/ACPAPROC202161130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ACPAPROC202161130","url":null,"abstract":"However much scientific paradigms shift, the shifts are not so arbitrary that we would relinquish without need the simpler, more economic and elegant theories for more complicated ones. This is not just a matter of convenience but implies an objective fact about the universe, namely a reliable perfection that can only be assumed on the basis of the intelligent design of a benevolent creator God. Earlier thinkers may have been more aware that this is an assumption (e.g., Kant) and presupposes God’s benevolent intentions (Leibniz). This assumption of a unified order of reality in general constitutes itself a perennial consensus through the ages, whether in Aquinas, Leibniz, the German Idealists or American Transcendentalists. Dissenters such as William James or Nietzsche serve to highlight the assumption as theological—an assumption that is fortunately confirmed by our best available evidence, as well as by the way we do science and live our lives.","PeriodicalId":82372,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71108130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ACPAPROC2021426117
Marie George
Aristotle’s division of living things into three categories has been challenged of late as to the distinction between plants and animals on the grounds that plants too are sentient. I argue that the life activities that plants carry on go on in us without sentience and would not be carried on any better with sentience, and thus are reasonably thought to go in plants in a non-sentient manner. Complementing this expectation is the fact that research on the various movements of plants accounts for them without reference to sensation, but rather by specifying various physical causes. I also show that certain proponents of plant sentience engage in faulty reasoning, including the fallacy of the accident (e.g., the plant responds to something having a quality that a sentient being would sense; therefore it senses) and equivocation (e.g., plants sense different external cues; therefore they are sentient).
{"title":"A Defense of the Distinction Between Plants and Animals","authors":"Marie George","doi":"10.5840/ACPAPROC2021426117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ACPAPROC2021426117","url":null,"abstract":"Aristotle’s division of living things into three categories has been challenged of late as to the distinction between plants and animals on the grounds that plants too are sentient. I argue that the life activities that plants carry on go on in us without sentience and would not be carried on any better with sentience, and thus are reasonably thought to go in plants in a non-sentient manner. Complementing this expectation is the fact that research on the various movements of plants accounts for them without reference to sensation, but rather by specifying various physical causes. I also show that certain proponents of plant sentience engage in faulty reasoning, including the fallacy of the accident (e.g., the plant responds to something having a quality that a sentient being would sense; therefore it senses) and equivocation (e.g., plants sense different external cues; therefore they are sentient).","PeriodicalId":82372,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71107736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ACPAPROC2021428122
R. E. Houser
{"title":"Aquinas the Avicennian: Prologue to the Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics","authors":"R. E. Houser","doi":"10.5840/ACPAPROC2021428122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ACPAPROC2021428122","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":82372,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71107876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ACPAPROC2021429124
J. D. Groot
Hylomorphism is a word for Aristotle’s belief that matter and form constitute a unity in natural things. Engaging with the work of Rémi Brague on the cosmos, I propose hylomorphism as central to the contemporary philosophy of nature that Brague seeks. Between the pre-philosophical standpoint and philosophy, there is an intermediate cognitive stage of making initial distinctions that ground philosophical truths. Philosophy of nature is the home of many of these initial distinctions. A key theme introduced in Physics 2.2 is the thinking of things in the way they are capable of existing. Analyses of Physics 2.2. and De Anima 2.3 exhibit the recognition of being as something different from the sheer existing of things. Aristotle points out mistakes in thinking about form and elucidates ontological dependencies. There are implications for the understanding of human disability.
{"title":"The Significance of Hylomorphism","authors":"J. D. Groot","doi":"10.5840/ACPAPROC2021429124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ACPAPROC2021429124","url":null,"abstract":"Hylomorphism is a word for Aristotle’s belief that matter and form constitute a unity in natural things. Engaging with the work of Rémi Brague on the cosmos, I propose hylomorphism as central to the contemporary philosophy of nature that Brague seeks. Between the pre-philosophical standpoint and philosophy, there is an intermediate cognitive stage of making initial distinctions that ground philosophical truths. Philosophy of nature is the home of many of these initial distinctions. A key theme introduced in Physics 2.2 is the thinking of things in the way they are capable of existing. Analyses of Physics 2.2. and De Anima 2.3 exhibit the recognition of being as something different from the sheer existing of things. Aristotle points out mistakes in thinking about form and elucidates ontological dependencies. There are implications for the understanding of human disability.","PeriodicalId":82372,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71107899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5840/acpaproc201993131
{"title":"Secretary’s Report (2019)","authors":"","doi":"10.5840/acpaproc201993131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/acpaproc201993131","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":82372,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71107445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ACPAPROC2021428123
Ignacio de Ribera-Martin
Discussions on Aristotle’s account of homonymy in natural philosophy have not paid attention to its distinct use in the Generation of animals. I show that Aristotle’s use of homonymy in this treatise is relevant to the question of how to name living substances in the process of generation. In the GA, Aristotle uses homonymy to argue that embryos must have soul. These embryos, when the heart has been distinctly set apart, satisfy the criterion set in Metaph. IX.7 to be an animal in dunamis. In the GA, Aristotle refers to this embryo as an animal—albeit incomplete, because it cannot yet carry out all the functions signified by the name—and not as a homonym. The phenomenon of generation thus calls for a refinement of the principle of Functional Determination, according to which something is what its names signifies only if it can carry out the functions signified by the name.
{"title":"Generation and Homonymy in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals","authors":"Ignacio de Ribera-Martin","doi":"10.5840/ACPAPROC2021428123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ACPAPROC2021428123","url":null,"abstract":"Discussions on Aristotle’s account of homonymy in natural philosophy have not paid attention to its distinct use in the Generation of animals. I show that Aristotle’s use of homonymy in this treatise is relevant to the question of how to name living substances in the process of generation. In the GA, Aristotle uses homonymy to argue that embryos must have soul. These embryos, when the heart has been distinctly set apart, satisfy the criterion set in Metaph. IX.7 to be an animal in dunamis. In the GA, Aristotle refers to this embryo as an animal—albeit incomplete, because it cannot yet carry out all the functions signified by the name—and not as a homonym. The phenomenon of generation thus calls for a refinement of the principle of Functional Determination, according to which something is what its names signifies only if it can carry out the functions signified by the name.","PeriodicalId":82372,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71107890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ACPAPROC2021429125
E. Polsky
Thomistic commentators agree that Thomas Aquinas at least nominally allows for “to be” (esse) to signify not only an act contrasted with essence in creatures, but also the essence itself of those creatures. Nevertheless, it is almost unheard of for any author to interpret Thomas’s use of the word “esse” as referring to essence. Against this tendency, this paper argues that Thomas’s In V Metaphysics argument that every predication signifies esse provides an important instance of Thomas using “esse” to signify essence. This reading of In V Metaphysics, which this paper defends against Gyula Klima’s alternative interpretation, suggests significant reinterpretations of Thomas’s technical terms “esse substantiale” and “esse in rerum natura” as well as Thomas’s use of “is,” both as a copula and as a principal predicate.
{"title":"“In As Many Ways As Something Is Predicated . . . in That Many Ways Is Something Signified to Be”","authors":"E. Polsky","doi":"10.5840/ACPAPROC2021429125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ACPAPROC2021429125","url":null,"abstract":"Thomistic commentators agree that Thomas Aquinas at least nominally allows for “to be” (esse) to signify not only an act contrasted with essence in creatures, but also the essence itself of those creatures. Nevertheless, it is almost unheard of for any author to interpret Thomas’s use of the word “esse” as referring to essence. Against this tendency, this paper argues that Thomas’s In V Metaphysics argument that every predication signifies esse provides an important instance of Thomas using “esse” to signify essence. This reading of In V Metaphysics, which this paper defends against Gyula Klima’s alternative interpretation, suggests significant reinterpretations of Thomas’s technical terms “esse substantiale” and “esse in rerum natura” as well as Thomas’s use of “is,” both as a copula and as a principal predicate.","PeriodicalId":82372,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71107990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ACPAPROC2021426120
Christopher V. Mirus
Working within the Aristotelian tradition, I argue that relation is not a category but a transcendental property of being. By this I mean that all substances are actualized, and hence defined, relationally: all actuality is interactuality.Interactuality is the locus for the relational categories of substance, action, being-affected, number, and most types of quality. The interactuality of corporeal beings is further conditioned by relations of setting; here we find the relational categories of place (where), quantity in the sense of size, quality in the sense of shape, and time (when). In offering a relational account of substance, I distinguish between external relata (physical environment, objects of sensation and knowledge as external) and internal relata (one’s body, objects of sensation and knowledge as internal). This distinction between external and internal relata is transcended in the case of the Trinity, insofar as the divine persons are both perfectly distinct and perfectly united.
{"title":"Relation is not a Category: A Sketch of Relation as a Transcendental","authors":"Christopher V. Mirus","doi":"10.5840/ACPAPROC2021426120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ACPAPROC2021426120","url":null,"abstract":"Working within the Aristotelian tradition, I argue that relation is not a category but a transcendental property of being. By this I mean that all substances are actualized, and hence defined, relationally: all actuality is interactuality.Interactuality is the locus for the relational categories of substance, action, being-affected, number, and most types of quality. The interactuality of corporeal beings is further conditioned by relations of setting; here we find the relational categories of place (where), quantity in the sense of size, quality in the sense of shape, and time (when). In offering a relational account of substance, I distinguish between external relata (physical environment, objects of sensation and knowledge as external) and internal relata (one’s body, objects of sensation and knowledge as internal). This distinction between external and internal relata is transcended in the case of the Trinity, insofar as the divine persons are both perfectly distinct and perfectly united.","PeriodicalId":82372,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71107358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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