Pub Date : 2021-11-08DOI: 10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8832
Stephen M. Leahy
The governing laws within the United States center the experience of white, cis- gender, able-bodied males and largely ignore the existence and experience of menstruating individuals within the workplace. Despite the progress made since Judy Blume’s watershed novel, Are You There, God? It’s Me, Margaret, the topic of menstruation is still avoided, shamed, stigmatized, and misunderstood. One possibility to advance the rights of menstruating individuals and recognize these cyclical realities is menstrual leave, or “period policies.” The goal of this type of legislation is to address the intersectional indignities of menstrual injustice and normalize periods through more accommodating employment regulations. However, the dialogue surrounding these policies has been limited and risks leaving behind individuals who are already excluded from many workplace protections, compounding the discrimination and disparate treatment experienced.
{"title":"Benefits and Challenges to “Period Policies” – Menstruating Individuals Are Empowered Through Inclusive Dialogue and Advocacy","authors":"Stephen M. Leahy","doi":"10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8832","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 \u0000The governing laws within the United States center the experience of white, cis- gender, able-bodied males and largely ignore the existence and experience of menstruating individuals within the workplace. \u0000Despite the progress made since Judy Blume’s watershed novel, Are You There, God? It’s Me, Margaret, the topic of menstruation is still avoided, shamed, stigmatized, and misunderstood. One possibility to advance the rights of menstruating individuals and recognize these cyclical realities is menstrual leave, or “period policies.” The goal of this type of legislation is to address the intersectional indignities of menstrual injustice and normalize periods through more accommodating employment regulations. However, the dialogue surrounding these policies has been limited and risks leaving behind individuals who are already excluded from many workplace protections, compounding the discrimination and disparate treatment experienced. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42769544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-08DOI: 10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8820
Laura Agyropulo Coryton, Lucy Russell
Tampon tax and period poverty activist movements are growing in tandem worldwide. These movements are reshaping the way we think about menstruation and what governments can do to tackle period-based injustices. Through this Essay, two United Kingdom (UK) period activists will explore how these UK movements were erected, how they interact with the global movements, and how Brexit has impacted UK menstruation activism and law-making. Finally, they will look ahead to discuss what they believe the future of period activism might look like.
{"title":"Paying for Our Periods: The Campaign to Tackle Period Poverty and End the Tampon Tax in the UK","authors":"Laura Agyropulo Coryton, Lucy Russell","doi":"10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8820","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Tampon tax and period poverty activist movements are growing in tandem worldwide. These movements are reshaping the way we think about menstruation and what governments can do to tackle period-based injustices. Through this Essay, two United Kingdom (UK) period activists will explore how these UK movements were erected, how they interact with the global movements, and how Brexit has impacted UK menstruation activism and law-making. Finally, they will look ahead to discuss what they believe the future of period activism might look like. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42279995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-08DOI: 10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8819
E. Cooper
When I think about all that is wrong in the world—the threat to democracy in the United States, the persistent systemic and individually-inflicted racism, the devastation wrought by COVID-19—I find myself asking, “Why do I care so much about menstrual laws and policies?” The answer, I have realized, is quite simple: the failure of the government and private institutions to adopt sane, respectful, smart policies concerning menstruation is an affront to dignity. Myriad policies intruding on a menstruator’s right to dignity are described throughout this Symposium and include: failing to include menstrual products in emergency- preparedness or response packages; not supplying public school students with free access to quality products; denying free and ready access to such products to people who are incarcerated or detained through our country’s immigration policies; imposing state and use taxes on such products as though they are “non-essential” goods; and not permitting menstruators to bring their own products into the bar exam.
{"title":"What's Law Got to Do With It? Dignity and Menstruation","authors":"E. Cooper","doi":"10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8819","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 \u0000When I think about all that is wrong in the world—the threat to democracy in the United States, the persistent systemic and individually-inflicted racism, the devastation wrought by COVID-19—I find myself asking, “Why do I care so much about menstrual laws and policies?” The answer, I have realized, is quite simple: the failure of the government and private institutions to adopt sane, respectful, smart policies concerning menstruation is an affront to dignity. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Myriad policies intruding on a menstruator’s right to dignity are described throughout this Symposium and include: failing to include menstrual products in emergency- preparedness or response packages; not supplying public school students with free access to quality products; denying free and ready access to such products to people who are incarcerated or detained through our country’s immigration policies; imposing state and use taxes on such products as though they are “non-essential” goods; and not permitting menstruators to bring their own products into the bar exam. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46419192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-08DOI: 10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8834
Maria Ni Fhlatharta
Every day, millions of people make decisions about menstruation. They make decisions about what sanitary products to use, about pain relief, about with whom they will discuss their experience of menstruation. They make decisions about contraception to induce amenorrhea. These decisions may be influenced by family, poverty, society, and culture, but they remain, for the most part, up to the individual. However, this right to autonomy is not extended to all people equally. Some disabled people, for example, have these decisions made by substituted decision makers, including the courts. This is in violation of their rights; nevertheless, this practice continues in various jurisdictions, including through guardianship and conservatorship laws.
{"title":"Menstrual Regulation as a Means of Reproductive Control: The Law's Response to Disabled Bodies and Menstruation","authors":"Maria Ni Fhlatharta","doi":"10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8834","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8834","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 \u0000Every day, millions of people make decisions about menstruation. They make decisions about what sanitary products to use, about pain relief, about with whom they will discuss their experience of menstruation. They make decisions about contraception to induce amenorrhea. These decisions may be influenced by family, poverty, society, and culture, but they remain, for the most part, up to the individual. However, this right to autonomy is not extended to all people equally. Some disabled people, for example, have these decisions made by substituted decision makers, including the courts. This is in violation of their rights; nevertheless, this practice continues in various jurisdictions, including through guardianship and conservatorship laws. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44863635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-08DOI: 10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8828
L. B. Inniss
Time frames relationships of power, especially in the context of law. One of the clearest ways in which time is implicated in both law and society is via discourses about women’s biological functions. This Article is an introduction to a larger project that analyzes legal discourses regarding a crucial aspect of women’s calendrically-associated biological functions: women’s menstrual periods. Over the course of the project, I explore legal discourses about menstruation through the notion of what literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin calls “chronotopes”—a connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships. Temporality, Bakhtin argues, is closely associated with certain paradigmatic spaces, and the combination of shapes, ideologies, and identities. Legal discussions of women’s menstrual bleeding are key sites for the discursive creation and maintenance of certain ideologies of womanhood. These discussions appear in a wide variety of contexts and in ways that either explicitly reference or implicitly index ideologies of female identity. All are characterized by efforts to mark them as narratives linked to other temporally prior or future moments, and are often indices of chronologically or spatially related stigmas and taboos. While legal discourses of menstruation do not give a complete account of the category “woman,” they provide cogent examples of how womanhood ideologies are constructed in legal contexts.
{"title":"It's About Bloody Time and Space","authors":"L. B. Inniss","doi":"10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8828","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 \u0000Time frames relationships of power, especially in the context of law. One of the clearest ways in which time is implicated in both law and society is via discourses about women’s biological functions. This Article is an introduction to a larger project that analyzes legal discourses regarding a crucial aspect of women’s calendrically-associated biological functions: women’s menstrual periods. Over the course of the project, I explore legal discourses about menstruation through the notion of what literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin calls “chronotopes”—a connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships. Temporality, Bakhtin argues, is closely associated with certain paradigmatic spaces, and the combination of shapes, ideologies, and identities. Legal discussions of women’s menstrual bleeding are key sites for the discursive creation and maintenance of certain ideologies of womanhood. These discussions appear in a wide variety of contexts and in ways that either explicitly reference or implicitly index ideologies of female identity. All are characterized by efforts to mark them as narratives linked to other temporally prior or future moments, and are often indices of chronologically or spatially related stigmas and taboos. While legal discourses of menstruation do not give a complete account of the category “woman,” they provide cogent examples of how womanhood ideologies are constructed in legal contexts. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43935577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-08DOI: 10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8825
B. Goldblatt, L. Steele
During the past few years, scholars and activists have increasingly engaged with law as a means to challenge stigma, silence, and disadvantages associated with menstruation. Menstrual items (predominantly in the form of disposable menstrual products) are becoming increasingly prominent in this “legal turn.” There have been legislative reforms to provide access to free menstrual items, litigation and legislative reforms to remove taxes on menstrual products, legislative reforms on product safety and environmental sustainability of menstrual items, and water and sanitation hygiene (‘WASH’) policies and guidelines in the context of international development interventions that focus on access to menstrual items. As regulation of disposable menstrual products assumes greater prominence in legal doctrine, feminist legal scholars are increasingly evaluating the impacts of such laws on menstruators, including in the context of diverse experiences of menstruation and menstrual injustice. But what can disposable menstrual products themselves tell us of law? In this Essay we take an object-informed approach to law in the specific context of disposable menstrual products. What insights about law might these objects provide, and how do these insights deepen our understanding of law’s relationship to menstruation, menstruators, and the worlds in which menstruators are situated? What can we appreciate about law’s role in defining, as well as recognizing and responding to, the diversity of experiences related to menstruation? How do menstrual items nuance our understanding of agency in relation to menstrual injustice? And what do these objects tell us about the limits and challenges of using law to achieve justice in relation to the embodied experiences of people who menstruate? Part II introduces some key contributions to feminist legal thinking on materiality and objects, which informs our analysis of disposable menstrual products as law’s objects. Part III introduces some of the critical threads in scholarship on disposable menstrual products, including how they relate to diversity and materiality of experiences of menstruation. Then, we turn in Part IV to explore what disposable menstrual products tell us about law’s role in menstruation, using the recent laws introduced in Scotland as a case study.
{"title":"Disposable Menstrual Products as Law's Objects","authors":"B. Goldblatt, L. Steele","doi":"10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8825","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8825","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 \u0000During the past few years, scholars and activists have increasingly engaged with law as a means to challenge stigma, silence, and disadvantages associated with menstruation. Menstrual items (predominantly in the form of disposable menstrual products) are becoming increasingly prominent in this “legal turn.” There have been legislative reforms to provide access to free menstrual items, litigation and legislative reforms to remove taxes on menstrual products, legislative reforms on product safety and environmental sustainability of menstrual items, and water and sanitation hygiene (‘WASH’) policies and guidelines in the context of international development interventions that focus on access to menstrual items. \u0000As regulation of disposable menstrual products assumes greater prominence in legal doctrine, feminist legal scholars are increasingly evaluating the impacts of such laws on menstruators, including in the context of diverse experiences of menstruation and menstrual injustice. But what can disposable menstrual products themselves tell us of law? In this Essay we take an object-informed approach to law in the specific context of disposable menstrual products. What insights about law might these objects provide, and how do these insights deepen our understanding of law’s relationship to menstruation, menstruators, and the worlds in which menstruators are situated? What can we appreciate about law’s role in defining, as well as recognizing and responding to, the diversity of experiences related to menstruation? How do menstrual items nuance our understanding of agency in relation to menstrual injustice? And what do these objects tell us about the limits and challenges of using law to achieve justice in relation to the embodied experiences of people who menstruate? \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Part II introduces some key contributions to feminist legal thinking on materiality and objects, which informs our analysis of disposable menstrual products as law’s objects. Part III introduces some of the critical threads in scholarship on disposable menstrual products, including how they relate to diversity and materiality of experiences of menstruation. Then, we turn in Part IV to explore what disposable menstrual products tell us about law’s role in menstruation, using the recent laws introduced in Scotland as a case study. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47986669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-08DOI: 10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8841
Deborah A. Widiss
The burgeoning menstrual justice movement highlights that women, girls, transgender men and boys, and non-binary persons may face discrimination or harassment due to their menstruation in workplaces, schools, prisons, and many other aspects of life. In recent years, a few courts have suggested such discrimination may violate Title VII, the federal law that prohibits sex discrimination in employment. Their analysis focuses on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), an amendment to Title VII passed in response to a Supreme Court case holding that pregnancy discrimination was not sex discrimination. The PDA overrode the decision by explicitly defining sex as including “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” The menstruation discrimination cases thus implicate more general questions of how statutory overrides should be interpreted, a subject I’ve explored extensively in prior work. My research suggests that this nascent litigation campaign may face two distinct challenges. The first is that courts will simply deny the claims, reasoning that menstruation is not directly addressed by the text of the PDA and therefore should not be recognized as sex discrimination. The second—which is more subtle, and also perhaps more likely—is that courts could find such discrimination to be actionable, but do so relying solely on the PDA’s explicit reference to “medical conditions” related to pregnancy. While that would be helpful for addressing discrimination in workplaces, it could open the door to arguments that menstruation is outside the ambit of sex discrimination laws that were not amended in a manner analogous to how Title VII was amended. To avoid these potential risks, theorists and advocates should seek to establish that menstruation discrimination is discrimination on the basis of “sex” itself, in that it is a condition linked to female reproductive organs and associated with stereotypes about women’s inferiority. That reasoning, which suggests that the PDA is properly interpreted as signaling Congress’s disapproval with the Supreme Court’s unduly narrow understanding of what constitutes sex discrimination in the earlier pregnancy case, should apply not only to Title VII, but also to the interpretation of statutory and regulatory prohibitions on sex discrimination in non-employment contexts.
{"title":"Menstruation Discrimination and the Problem of Shadow Precedents","authors":"Deborah A. Widiss","doi":"10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8841","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 \u0000The burgeoning menstrual justice movement highlights that women, girls, transgender men and boys, and non-binary persons may face discrimination or harassment due to their menstruation in workplaces, schools, prisons, and many other aspects of life. In recent years, a few courts have suggested such discrimination may violate Title VII, the federal law that prohibits sex discrimination in employment. Their analysis focuses on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), an amendment to Title VII passed in response to a Supreme Court case holding that pregnancy discrimination was not sex discrimination. The PDA overrode the decision by explicitly defining sex as including “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” \u0000The menstruation discrimination cases thus implicate more general questions of how statutory overrides should be interpreted, a subject I’ve explored extensively in prior work. My research suggests that this nascent litigation campaign may face two distinct challenges. The first is that courts will simply deny the claims, reasoning that menstruation is not directly addressed by the text of the PDA and therefore should not be recognized as sex discrimination. The second—which is more subtle, and also perhaps more likely—is that courts could find such discrimination to be actionable, but do so relying solely on the PDA’s explicit reference to “medical conditions” related to pregnancy. While that would be helpful for addressing discrimination in workplaces, it could open the door to arguments that menstruation is outside the ambit of sex discrimination laws that were not amended in a manner analogous to how Title VII was amended. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000To avoid these potential risks, theorists and advocates should seek to establish that menstruation discrimination is discrimination on the basis of “sex” itself, in that it is a condition linked to female reproductive organs and associated with stereotypes about women’s inferiority. That reasoning, which suggests that the PDA is properly interpreted as signaling Congress’s disapproval with the Supreme Court’s unduly narrow understanding of what constitutes sex discrimination in the earlier pregnancy case, should apply not only to Title VII, but also to the interpretation of statutory and regulatory prohibitions on sex discrimination in non-employment contexts. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46016875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-08DOI: 10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8836
C. Spivack
By now, there is a robust body of scholarship critiquing the taxation of menstrual products from material, expressive, constitutional, and human rights perspectives. This literature highlights the issue of access to sanitary products in prisons, in secondary schools, and in poor countries. Invoking the expressive function of law, scholars have noted how the tax signals to women that their basic physical and health needs are not human necessities that merit tax exemption—like say Viagra—but are rather luxuries that should be taxed—like cigarettes and alcohol. In this tax regime, human needs considered basic enough to merit tax relief—thinning hair, for example—are male needs. So what else is new? As Catherine Mackinnon asked, ironically, decades ago: Are women human? In this Article, I want to turn the expressive critique of tampon taxation in the direction of semiotics. Culture constitutes systems of signs through which we understand our world. These signs convey meaning though their difference from other signs, not through any intrinsic meaning. Tax law has its own signs. By imposing differing tax regimes on people and things, it tells us how to read them. For example, through differing taxation, it tells us what a family is (one organized around a formal marriage) and is not (networks of dependence organized around cohabitants), what work is (labor exchanged for goods) and is not (housework), etc. Taxes also tell us which goods are luxuries and which are necessities by imposing a luxury tax on certain items and exempting others.
{"title":"Are Women Human? Tampon Taxes and the Semiotics of Exclusion","authors":"C. Spivack","doi":"10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8836","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52214/cjgl.v41i1.8836","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 \u0000By now, there is a robust body of scholarship critiquing the taxation of menstrual products from material, expressive, constitutional, and human rights perspectives. This literature highlights the issue of access to sanitary products in prisons, in secondary schools, and in poor countries. Invoking the expressive function of law, scholars have noted how the tax signals to women that their basic physical and health needs are not human necessities that merit tax exemption—like say Viagra—but are rather luxuries that should be taxed—like cigarettes and alcohol. In this tax regime, human needs considered basic enough to merit tax relief—thinning hair, for example—are male needs. So what else is new? As Catherine Mackinnon asked, ironically, decades ago: Are women human? \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000In this Article, I want to turn the expressive critique of tampon taxation in the direction of semiotics. Culture constitutes systems of signs through which we understand our world. These signs convey meaning though their difference from other signs, not through any intrinsic meaning. Tax law has its own signs. By imposing differing tax regimes on people and things, it tells us how to read them. For example, through differing taxation, it tells us what a family is (one organized around a formal marriage) and is not (networks of dependence organized around cohabitants), what work is (labor exchanged for goods) and is not (housework), etc. Taxes also tell us which goods are luxuries and which are necessities by imposing a luxury tax on certain items and exempting others. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47445316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-30DOI: 10.52214/CJGL.V40I3.8650
Michelle Xiao Liu, Alexandra K. Creel Benton
Sexual abuse against women and girls in Malawi is pervasive, and survivors face significant barriers in their quest for justice. One particular barrier—the “corroboration rule”—stands out as a discriminatory and onerous roadblock for women and girls who seek justice as victims of sex crimes. The corroboration rule is a common law rule of evidence and criminal procedure that requires prosecutors trying sex offence cases to have independent evidence in addition to a victim’s testimony, even if that testimony is credible and shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the sex crime. This heightened evidentiary standard for victims of sex crimes is based on the stereotype that women and girls are apt to lie about being raped and that their word alone—no matter how clear, convincing, or credible—should not be enough to put a rapist behind bars. Because of the rule, too many women and girls in Malawi are not treated equally in the criminal justice system, and rarely are those who sexually abuse them brought to justice in court. This fosters a climate of impunity for rapists and sexual abusers. While many countries around the world used to require the corroboration rule in sexual offences, in the modern era, Malawi stands apart from the rest of the world as one of the few countries that still requires its use as a matter of common law. However, with a constitution that guarantees equality for women and girls and equal access to justice under the law, and as a State Party to treaties that guarantee the same, Malawi’s Parliament should abolish the corroboration rule.
{"title":"Beyond Belief: How the \"Corroboration Rule\" in Malawi Obstructs Justice for Victims of Sex Crimes and Discriminates Against Women and Girls on the Basis of Sex—A Call for Legislative Change","authors":"Michelle Xiao Liu, Alexandra K. Creel Benton","doi":"10.52214/CJGL.V40I3.8650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52214/CJGL.V40I3.8650","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 \u0000Sexual abuse against women and girls in Malawi is pervasive, and survivors face significant barriers in their quest for justice. One particular barrier—the “corroboration rule”—stands out as a discriminatory and onerous roadblock for women and girls who seek justice as victims of sex crimes. \u0000The corroboration rule is a common law rule of evidence and criminal procedure that requires prosecutors trying sex offence cases to have independent evidence in addition to a victim’s testimony, even if that testimony is credible and shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the sex crime. This heightened evidentiary standard for victims of sex crimes is based on the stereotype that women and girls are apt to lie about being raped and that their word alone—no matter how clear, convincing, or credible—should not be enough to put a rapist behind bars. Because of the rule, too many women and girls in Malawi are not treated equally in the criminal justice system, and rarely are those who sexually abuse them brought to justice in court. This fosters a climate of impunity for rapists and sexual abusers. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000While many countries around the world used to require the corroboration rule in sexual offences, in the modern era, Malawi stands apart from the rest of the world as one of the few countries that still requires its use as a matter of common law. However, with a constitution that guarantees equality for women and girls and equal access to justice under the law, and as a State Party to treaties that guarantee the same, Malawi’s Parliament should abolish the corroboration rule. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41783850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-30DOI: 10.52214/CJGL.V40I3.8651
Julia Rigal
Abstract
摘要
{"title":"Ending Prostitution Exploitation: How New York State Can Better Support Survivors of the Sex Trade Through Legislative Reform","authors":"Julia Rigal","doi":"10.52214/CJGL.V40I3.8651","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52214/CJGL.V40I3.8651","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract","PeriodicalId":84468,"journal":{"name":"Columbia journal of gender and law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41530690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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