The passage of the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act will lead to a significant increase in US wind and solar power investment. Renewable power generation requires more land than fossil fuel fired power generation. The land that will be allocated to renewables depends on several demand side and supply side factors that include the land’s renewable power potential, cost of acquisition, proximity to final power consumers, and local land use regulations. We find that Republican areas issue generation permits faster than progressive areas. We present evidence that rural Republican areas have a cost advantage for generating wind power; however, Democratic areas have sited more solar capacity. We use our statistical model to identify Republican Congressional districts that have the potential to scale up green power production. We thank Tatyana Deryugina, Catherine Wolfram, and Shaina Clorfeine for excellent comments.
{"title":"Do Red States Have a Comparative Advantage in Generating Green Power?","authors":"Robert Huang, Matthew E. Kahn","doi":"10.1086/727882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/727882","url":null,"abstract":"The passage of the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act will lead to a significant increase in US wind and solar power investment. Renewable power generation requires more land than fossil fuel fired power generation. The land that will be allocated to renewables depends on several demand side and supply side factors that include the land’s renewable power potential, cost of acquisition, proximity to final power consumers, and local land use regulations. We find that Republican areas issue generation permits faster than progressive areas. We present evidence that rural Republican areas have a cost advantage for generating wind power; however, Democratic areas have sited more solar capacity. We use our statistical model to identify Republican Congressional districts that have the potential to scale up green power production. We thank Tatyana Deryugina, Catherine Wolfram, and Shaina Clorfeine for excellent comments.","PeriodicalId":87249,"journal":{"name":"Environmental and energy policy and the economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140524439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tihitina Andarge, Yongjie Ji, Bonnie L. Keeler, David A. Keiser, Conor McKenzie
Since President Clinton’s 1994 Executive Order 12898, federal agencies have been required to conduct environmental justice (EJ) analyses of federal rules and regulations. More recently, the Biden Administration has instituted several major efforts to reform regulatory review and promote a more equitable distribution of environmental benefits and burdens. This paper seeks to understand how prior guidelines have been implemented in federal regulatory reviews related to the Clean Water Act and provide a baseline for future studies of the distributional effects of clean water regulations. We reviewed 18 regulatory impact assessments relating to the Clean Water Act conducted since 1992. Only five of these studies conducted a quantitative analysis of distributional impacts and none of the 18 rules were determined to have disproportionately adverse effects on low-income or minority communities. Anticipating that future regulatory review will require more comprehensive distributional analyses, we combine national data on the location of all regulated point sources of water pollution with demographic characteristics to develop a baseline assessment of the distribution of water pollution facilities. Overall, we find that discharge locations tend to be located in areas that are poorer, have a higher White population share, and have less education. We find that rurality partly explains this pattern. The top 40% of census block groups in terms of rural population share contain almost all water pollution discharge locations. We conclude with a discussion of the policy implications of these analyses and suggestions for future work. JEL Codes: Q50; Q52; Q53; Q56; Q58
{"title":"Environmental Justice and the Clean Water Act: Implications for Economic Analyses of Clean Water Regulations","authors":"Tihitina Andarge, Yongjie Ji, Bonnie L. Keeler, David A. Keiser, Conor McKenzie","doi":"10.1086/727879","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/727879","url":null,"abstract":"Since President Clinton’s 1994 Executive Order 12898, federal agencies have been required to conduct environmental justice (EJ) analyses of federal rules and regulations. More recently, the Biden Administration has instituted several major efforts to reform regulatory review and promote a more equitable distribution of environmental benefits and burdens. This paper seeks to understand how prior guidelines have been implemented in federal regulatory reviews related to the Clean Water Act and provide a baseline for future studies of the distributional effects of clean water regulations. We reviewed 18 regulatory impact assessments relating to the Clean Water Act conducted since 1992. Only five of these studies conducted a quantitative analysis of distributional impacts and none of the 18 rules were determined to have disproportionately adverse effects on low-income or minority communities. Anticipating that future regulatory review will require more comprehensive distributional analyses, we combine national data on the location of all regulated point sources of water pollution with demographic characteristics to develop a baseline assessment of the distribution of water pollution facilities. Overall, we find that discharge locations tend to be located in areas that are poorer, have a higher White population share, and have less education. We find that rurality partly explains this pattern. The top 40% of census block groups in terms of rural population share contain almost all water pollution discharge locations. We conclude with a discussion of the policy implications of these analyses and suggestions for future work. JEL Codes: Q50; Q52; Q53; Q56; Q58","PeriodicalId":87249,"journal":{"name":"Environmental and energy policy and the economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140523345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sarah E. Anderson, A. Plantinga, Matthew Wibbenmeyer
With wildfires becoming more severe and more damaging in the western United States, fuels management projects intended to reduce the severity of wildfire are becoming an increasingly important management tool. Yet the statutory requirements for federal agencies to incorporate public input in their siting decisions combined with the greater political efficacy of wealthier, more educated communities have the potential to lead to inequities in their distribution. In this paper, we show that the likelihood that a community receives a nearby fuels management project is greater for wealthier, whiter, and more educated communities, even after controlling for differences in risk from wildfire. We further investigate the Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program (CFLRP), a cost-share program operated by the US Forest Service. Communities near CFLRP projects tend to have higher socioeconomic status. However, participation in cost-share programs does not appear to depend critically on wealth because we find no difference in the wealth of communities near CFLRP projects compared with all US Forest Service fuels projects, including those with no matching requirements. Rather, the racial makeup and educational attainment of communities are more strongly associated with nearby cost-share projects.
{"title":"Unequal Treatments: Federal Wildfire Fuels Projects and Socioeconomic Status of Nearby Communities","authors":"Sarah E. Anderson, A. Plantinga, Matthew Wibbenmeyer","doi":"10.1086/722676","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/722676","url":null,"abstract":"With wildfires becoming more severe and more damaging in the western United States, fuels management projects intended to reduce the severity of wildfire are becoming an increasingly important management tool. Yet the statutory requirements for federal agencies to incorporate public input in their siting decisions combined with the greater political efficacy of wealthier, more educated communities have the potential to lead to inequities in their distribution. In this paper, we show that the likelihood that a community receives a nearby fuels management project is greater for wealthier, whiter, and more educated communities, even after controlling for differences in risk from wildfire. We further investigate the Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program (CFLRP), a cost-share program operated by the US Forest Service. Communities near CFLRP projects tend to have higher socioeconomic status. However, participation in cost-share programs does not appear to depend critically on wealth because we find no difference in the wealth of communities near CFLRP projects compared with all US Forest Service fuels projects, including those with no matching requirements. Rather, the racial makeup and educational attainment of communities are more strongly associated with nearby cost-share projects.","PeriodicalId":87249,"journal":{"name":"Environmental and energy policy and the economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83579811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Does the growth of renewable energy benefit US workers, and which workers stand to benefit the most? Until now, evidence on green energy jobs has been limited due to measurement issues. We use data on nearly all jobs posted online in the United States, as collected by Burning Glass Technologies, and we create a new measure of green jobs, defined here as solar and wind jobs. We use job titles and task requirements to define green jobs. We find that both solar and wind job postings have more than tripled since 2010, with solar jobs seeing especially strong growth that precedes the growth of new installed solar capacity. In 2019, we identify approximately 52,500 solar job openings and 13,500 wind job openings. Solar jobs are mostly (33%) in sales occupations and in the utilities industry (16%). Wind jobs are most represented among installation and maintenance occupations (37%) and in the manufacturing industry (29%). Green jobs are created in occupations that are about 21% higher paying than average. The pay premium is even higher for jobs with a low educational requirement. Finally, green jobs tend to locate in counties with high shares of employment in fossil fuel extraction. Overall, our results suggest that the growth of renewable energy leads to the creation of relatively high-paying jobs, which are more often than not located in areas that stand to lose from a decline in fossil fuel extraction jobs.
{"title":"Green Energy Jobs in the United States: What Are They, and Where Are They?","authors":"E. Curtis, I. Marinescu","doi":"10.1086/722677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/722677","url":null,"abstract":"Does the growth of renewable energy benefit US workers, and which workers stand to benefit the most? Until now, evidence on green energy jobs has been limited due to measurement issues. We use data on nearly all jobs posted online in the United States, as collected by Burning Glass Technologies, and we create a new measure of green jobs, defined here as solar and wind jobs. We use job titles and task requirements to define green jobs. We find that both solar and wind job postings have more than tripled since 2010, with solar jobs seeing especially strong growth that precedes the growth of new installed solar capacity. In 2019, we identify approximately 52,500 solar job openings and 13,500 wind job openings. Solar jobs are mostly (33%) in sales occupations and in the utilities industry (16%). Wind jobs are most represented among installation and maintenance occupations (37%) and in the manufacturing industry (29%). Green jobs are created in occupations that are about 21% higher paying than average. The pay premium is even higher for jobs with a low educational requirement. Finally, green jobs tend to locate in counties with high shares of employment in fossil fuel extraction. Overall, our results suggest that the growth of renewable energy leads to the creation of relatively high-paying jobs, which are more often than not located in areas that stand to lose from a decline in fossil fuel extraction jobs.","PeriodicalId":87249,"journal":{"name":"Environmental and energy policy and the economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80126737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper quantifies and decomposes recent trends in US particulate matter (PM2.5) disparities from the electricity sector using a high-resolution pollution transport model. Between 2000 and 2018, PM2.5 concentrations from electricity fell by 89% for the average individual, more than double the decline rate in overall US ambient PM2.5 concentrations. Across racial/ethnic groups, we detect a dramatic convergence: since 2000, the Black-white PM2.5 disparity from electricity has narrowed by 95% and the Hispanic-white PM2.5 disparity has narrowed by 93%, though these disparities still exist in 2018. A decomposition reveals nearly all of these disparity trends can be attributed roughly equally to improvements in emissions intensities and compositional changes in electric generators, with small contributions from scale and residential location changes. This suggests both local air pollution policies and recent coal-to-natural gas fuel switching have played major roles in reducing US racial/ethnic pollution disparities from electricity. Although we detect similarly large PM2.5 improvements for the average low- and high-income individual, PM2.5 disparities by income are relatively small, with little change over time.
{"title":"Decomposing Trends in US Air Pollution Disparities from Electricity","authors":"Danae Hernández-Cortés, Kyle C. Meng, P. Weber","doi":"10.1086/722674","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/722674","url":null,"abstract":"This paper quantifies and decomposes recent trends in US particulate matter (PM2.5) disparities from the electricity sector using a high-resolution pollution transport model. Between 2000 and 2018, PM2.5 concentrations from electricity fell by 89% for the average individual, more than double the decline rate in overall US ambient PM2.5 concentrations. Across racial/ethnic groups, we detect a dramatic convergence: since 2000, the Black-white PM2.5 disparity from electricity has narrowed by 95% and the Hispanic-white PM2.5 disparity has narrowed by 93%, though these disparities still exist in 2018. A decomposition reveals nearly all of these disparity trends can be attributed roughly equally to improvements in emissions intensities and compositional changes in electric generators, with small contributions from scale and residential location changes. This suggests both local air pollution policies and recent coal-to-natural gas fuel switching have played major roles in reducing US racial/ethnic pollution disparities from electricity. Although we detect similarly large PM2.5 improvements for the average low- and high-income individual, PM2.5 disparities by income are relatively small, with little change over time.","PeriodicalId":87249,"journal":{"name":"Environmental and energy policy and the economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85550228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We categorize the primary incentive-based mechanisms under consideration for addressing greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generation—pricing carbon, setting intensity standards, and subsidizing clean electricity—and compare their market outcomes under similar expansions of clean electricity generation. Although pricing emissions gives strong incentives to first eliminate generation with the highest social cost, a clean electricity standard incentivizes earliest phaseout of the generation with the highest private cost. We show that the importance of this distinction depends on the correlation between private costs and emissions rates. We then estimate this correlation for US electricity generation and fuel prices as of 2019. The results indicate that the emissions difference between a carbon tax and clean electricity standard that phase out the fossil fuel generation over the same time frame may actually be quite small, though it depends on fossil-fuel prices during the phaseout. We also discuss how each of these policy options is likely to affect electricity prices, quantity demanded, government revenue, and economic efficiency. Large preexisting markups of retail electricity prices over marginal costs are likely to considerably weaken or even reverse the usual assumed efficiency advantage of carbon pricing policies over alternatives, including direct subsidization of clean electricity generation.
{"title":"Carbon Pricing, Clean Electricity Standards, and Clean Electricity Subsidies on the Path to Zero Emissions","authors":"S. Borenstein, Ryan P. Kellogg","doi":"10.1086/722675","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/722675","url":null,"abstract":"We categorize the primary incentive-based mechanisms under consideration for addressing greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generation—pricing carbon, setting intensity standards, and subsidizing clean electricity—and compare their market outcomes under similar expansions of clean electricity generation. Although pricing emissions gives strong incentives to first eliminate generation with the highest social cost, a clean electricity standard incentivizes earliest phaseout of the generation with the highest private cost. We show that the importance of this distinction depends on the correlation between private costs and emissions rates. We then estimate this correlation for US electricity generation and fuel prices as of 2019. The results indicate that the emissions difference between a carbon tax and clean electricity standard that phase out the fossil fuel generation over the same time frame may actually be quite small, though it depends on fossil-fuel prices during the phaseout. We also discuss how each of these policy options is likely to affect electricity prices, quantity demanded, government revenue, and economic efficiency. Large preexisting markups of retail electricity prices over marginal costs are likely to considerably weaken or even reverse the usual assumed efficiency advantage of carbon pricing policies over alternatives, including direct subsidization of clean electricity generation.","PeriodicalId":87249,"journal":{"name":"Environmental and energy policy and the economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79662154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Weisbach, Samuel Kortum, Michael B. Wang, Y. Yao
Climate policies vary widely across countries, with some countries imposing stringent emissions policies and others doing very little. When climate policies vary across countries, energy-intensive industries have an incentive to relocate to places with few or no emissions restrictions, an effect known as leakage. Relocated industries would continue to pollute but would be operating in a less desirable location. We consider solutions to the leakage problem in a simple setting where one region of the world imposes a climate policy and the rest of the world is passive. We solve the model analytically and also calibrate and simulate the model. Our model and analysis imply: (1) optimal climate policies tax both the supply of fossil fuels and the demand for fossil fuels; (2) on the demand side, absent administrative costs, optimal policies would tax both the use of fossil fuels in domestic production and the domestic consumption of goods created with fossil fuels, but with the tax rate on production lower due to leakage; (3) taxing only production (on the demand side), however, would be substantially simpler and almost as effective as taxing both production and consumption, because it would avoid the need for border adjustments on imports of goods; and (4) the effectiveness of the latter strategy depends on a low foreign elasticity of energy supply, which means that forming a taxing coalition to ensure a low foreign elasticity of energy supply can act as a substitute for border adjustments on goods.
{"title":"Trade, Leakage, and the Design of a Carbon Tax","authors":"D. Weisbach, Samuel Kortum, Michael B. Wang, Y. Yao","doi":"10.1086/722673","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/722673","url":null,"abstract":"Climate policies vary widely across countries, with some countries imposing stringent emissions policies and others doing very little. When climate policies vary across countries, energy-intensive industries have an incentive to relocate to places with few or no emissions restrictions, an effect known as leakage. Relocated industries would continue to pollute but would be operating in a less desirable location. We consider solutions to the leakage problem in a simple setting where one region of the world imposes a climate policy and the rest of the world is passive. We solve the model analytically and also calibrate and simulate the model. Our model and analysis imply: (1) optimal climate policies tax both the supply of fossil fuels and the demand for fossil fuels; (2) on the demand side, absent administrative costs, optimal policies would tax both the use of fossil fuels in domestic production and the domestic consumption of goods created with fossil fuels, but with the tax rate on production lower due to leakage; (3) taxing only production (on the demand side), however, would be substantially simpler and almost as effective as taxing both production and consumption, because it would avoid the need for border adjustments on imports of goods; and (4) the effectiveness of the latter strategy depends on a low foreign elasticity of energy supply, which means that forming a taxing coalition to ensure a low foreign elasticity of energy supply can act as a substitute for border adjustments on goods.","PeriodicalId":87249,"journal":{"name":"Environmental and energy policy and the economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87596271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
More stringent fuel-economy standards and increased popularity of electric vehicles (EVs) are contributing to an erosion in federal motor vehicle fuel excise tax revenues. One solution to this problem is a vehicle miles traveled (VMT) tax. I consider the distributional implications of a federal tax swap where a VMT tax is used to finance a reduction in the federal excise tax on gasoline. The distributional impact of this tax swap depends on the sign of the income elasticity of demand for fuel intensity. Using data from the 2017 National Household Travel Survey, I find that the income elasticity of fuel intensity is negative and that this revenue-neutral tax swap is mildly progressive for all household incomes below $200,000. How the progressivity of a tax swap changes as fuel-economy standards are raised and EV market penetration increases depends on who purchases EVs and more efficient vehicles. I demonstrate how federal policy will likely influence those who buy EVs and the ultimate distribution of the tax swap. In addition, I find the tax swap benefits rural drivers and has no appreciable differential impacts on Black and Hispanic households.
{"title":"The Distributional Impacts of a VMT-Gas Tax Swap","authors":"G. Metcalf","doi":"10.1086/722672","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/722672","url":null,"abstract":"More stringent fuel-economy standards and increased popularity of electric vehicles (EVs) are contributing to an erosion in federal motor vehicle fuel excise tax revenues. One solution to this problem is a vehicle miles traveled (VMT) tax. I consider the distributional implications of a federal tax swap where a VMT tax is used to finance a reduction in the federal excise tax on gasoline. The distributional impact of this tax swap depends on the sign of the income elasticity of demand for fuel intensity. Using data from the 2017 National Household Travel Survey, I find that the income elasticity of fuel intensity is negative and that this revenue-neutral tax swap is mildly progressive for all household incomes below $200,000. How the progressivity of a tax swap changes as fuel-economy standards are raised and EV market penetration increases depends on who purchases EVs and more efficient vehicles. I demonstrate how federal policy will likely influence those who buy EVs and the ultimate distribution of the tax swap. In addition, I find the tax swap benefits rural drivers and has no appreciable differential impacts on Black and Hispanic households.","PeriodicalId":87249,"journal":{"name":"Environmental and energy policy and the economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89645468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Barbara Annicchiarico, S. Carattini, C. Fischer, Garth Heutel
We study the relationship between business cycles and the design and effects of environmental policies, particularly those with economy-wide significance like climate policies. First, we provide a brief review of the literature related to this topic, from initial explorations using real business-cycle models to New Keynesian extensions, open-economy variations, and issues of monetary policy and financial regulations. Next, we provide a list of the main findings that emerge from this literature that are potentially most relevant to policy makers, including the impacts of policy on volatility and how to design policy to adjust to cycles. Finally, we propose several important remaining research questions.
{"title":"Business Cycles and Environmental Policy: A Primer","authors":"Barbara Annicchiarico, S. Carattini, C. Fischer, Garth Heutel","doi":"10.1086/717222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/717222","url":null,"abstract":"We study the relationship between business cycles and the design and effects of environmental policies, particularly those with economy-wide significance like climate policies. First, we provide a brief review of the literature related to this topic, from initial explorations using real business-cycle models to New Keynesian extensions, open-economy variations, and issues of monetary policy and financial regulations. Next, we provide a list of the main findings that emerge from this literature that are potentially most relevant to policy makers, including the impacts of policy on volatility and how to design policy to adjust to cycles. Finally, we propose several important remaining research questions.","PeriodicalId":87249,"journal":{"name":"Environmental and energy policy and the economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84462134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We summarize the history of US coal-fired plant retirements over the past decade, describe planned future retirements, and forecast the remaining operating life for every operating coal-fired generator at each plant. Nearly one-third of the coal fleet retired during the 2010s and a quarter of the remaining capacity has announced plans to retire. We summarize the technology and location trends that are correlated with the observed retirements. We then describe a theoretical model of the retirement decision coal generator owners face. We use retirements from the past decade to quantify the relationships in the model for retired generators. Our model predicts that three-quarters of coal generation capacity will retire in the next 20 years, with most of that retirement concentrated in the next 5 years. Policy has limited ability to affect retirement times. A $20 per megawatt-hour electricity subsidy extends the average life of a generator by 6 years. A $51 per ton carbon tax brings forward retirement dates by about 2 years. In all scenarios, a handful of electricity generators remain on the grid beyond our forecast horizon.
{"title":"Coal-Fired Power Plant Retirements in the United States","authors":"Rebecca J. Davis, J. Holladay, Charles Sims","doi":"10.1086/717217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/717217","url":null,"abstract":"We summarize the history of US coal-fired plant retirements over the past decade, describe planned future retirements, and forecast the remaining operating life for every operating coal-fired generator at each plant. Nearly one-third of the coal fleet retired during the 2010s and a quarter of the remaining capacity has announced plans to retire. We summarize the technology and location trends that are correlated with the observed retirements. We then describe a theoretical model of the retirement decision coal generator owners face. We use retirements from the past decade to quantify the relationships in the model for retired generators. Our model predicts that three-quarters of coal generation capacity will retire in the next 20 years, with most of that retirement concentrated in the next 5 years. Policy has limited ability to affect retirement times. A $20 per megawatt-hour electricity subsidy extends the average life of a generator by 6 years. A $51 per ton carbon tax brings forward retirement dates by about 2 years. In all scenarios, a handful of electricity generators remain on the grid beyond our forecast horizon.","PeriodicalId":87249,"journal":{"name":"Environmental and energy policy and the economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84203748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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