Pub Date : 2011-11-02eCollection Date: 2011-01-01DOI: 10.3389/fnevo.2011.00005
William D Lassek, Steven J C Gaulin
Because the first neurons evolved in an environment high in the n-3 (omega-3) fatty acid docosahexaenoic acid (DHA), this fatty acid became a major component of neural structure and function and makes up 10% of the dry weight of the human brain. Since n-3 fatty acids must come from the diet, this suggests a possible positive role for dietary n-3 fatty acids in cognition and a possible negative role for n-6 fatty acids, which compete with n-3 for access to critical enzymes. Because human females must provide DHA for the growth of the unusually large brains of their offspring from maternal fat stored during childhood, their need for DHA is especially great. We used stepwise regression to determine whether particular dietary fatty acids and other nutrients were related to cognitive performance in over 4000 American children aged 6-16 from the Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey; a variety of possible biological, social, and environmental risk factors were statistically controlled. In this context the only dietary factors related to cognitive performance were n-3 and n-6 fatty acids. Dietary n-3 fatty acids were positively related to cognitive test scores in male and female children, while n-6 showed the reverse relationship, significantly so in females. In female children the positive effects of n-3 intake were twice as strong as in males and exceeded the negative effects of lead exposure. This suggests that increasing dietary intake of n-3 and decreasing n-6 fatty acids may have cognitive benefits in children, especially in females.
{"title":"Sex differences in the relationship of dietary Fatty acids to cognitive measures in american children.","authors":"William D Lassek, Steven J C Gaulin","doi":"10.3389/fnevo.2011.00005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3389/fnevo.2011.00005","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Because the first neurons evolved in an environment high in the n-3 (omega-3) fatty acid docosahexaenoic acid (DHA), this fatty acid became a major component of neural structure and function and makes up 10% of the dry weight of the human brain. Since n-3 fatty acids must come from the diet, this suggests a possible positive role for dietary n-3 fatty acids in cognition and a possible negative role for n-6 fatty acids, which compete with n-3 for access to critical enzymes. Because human females must provide DHA for the growth of the unusually large brains of their offspring from maternal fat stored during childhood, their need for DHA is especially great. We used stepwise regression to determine whether particular dietary fatty acids and other nutrients were related to cognitive performance in over 4000 American children aged 6-16 from the Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey; a variety of possible biological, social, and environmental risk factors were statistically controlled. In this context the only dietary factors related to cognitive performance were n-3 and n-6 fatty acids. Dietary n-3 fatty acids were positively related to cognitive test scores in male and female children, while n-6 showed the reverse relationship, significantly so in females. In female children the positive effects of n-3 intake were twice as strong as in males and exceeded the negative effects of lead exposure. This suggests that increasing dietary intake of n-3 and decreasing n-6 fatty acids may have cognitive benefits in children, especially in females.</p>","PeriodicalId":88241,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in evolutionary neuroscience","volume":" ","pages":"5"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3389/fnevo.2011.00005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40138744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-09-22eCollection Date: 2011-01-01DOI: 10.3389/fnevo.2011.00003
Andrew C Gallup, Omar Tonsi Eldakar
Recent evidence suggests that yawning is a thermoregulatory behavior. To explore this possibility further, the frequency of contagious yawning in humans was measured while outdoors in a desert climate in the United States during two distinct temperature ranges and seasons (winter: 22°C; early summer: 37°C). As predicted, the proportion of pedestrians who yawned in response to seeing pictures of people yawning differed significantly between the two conditions (winter: 45%; summer: 24%). Across conditions yawning occurred at lower ambient temperatures, and the tendency to yawn during each season was associated with the length of time spent outside prior to being tested. Participants were more likely to yawn in the milder climate after spending long periods of time outside, while prolonged exposure to ambient temperatures at or above body temperature was associated with reduced yawning. This is the first report to show that the incidence of yawning in humans is associated with seasonal climate variation, further demonstrating that yawn-induced contagion effects can be mediated by factors unrelated to individual social characteristics or cognitive development.
{"title":"Contagious yawning and seasonal climate variation.","authors":"Andrew C Gallup, Omar Tonsi Eldakar","doi":"10.3389/fnevo.2011.00003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3389/fnevo.2011.00003","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Recent evidence suggests that yawning is a thermoregulatory behavior. To explore this possibility further, the frequency of contagious yawning in humans was measured while outdoors in a desert climate in the United States during two distinct temperature ranges and seasons (winter: 22°C; early summer: 37°C). As predicted, the proportion of pedestrians who yawned in response to seeing pictures of people yawning differed significantly between the two conditions (winter: 45%; summer: 24%). Across conditions yawning occurred at lower ambient temperatures, and the tendency to yawn during each season was associated with the length of time spent outside prior to being tested. Participants were more likely to yawn in the milder climate after spending long periods of time outside, while prolonged exposure to ambient temperatures at or above body temperature was associated with reduced yawning. This is the first report to show that the incidence of yawning in humans is associated with seasonal climate variation, further demonstrating that yawn-induced contagion effects can be mediated by factors unrelated to individual social characteristics or cognitive development.</p>","PeriodicalId":88241,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in evolutionary neuroscience","volume":"3 ","pages":"3"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3389/fnevo.2011.00003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"30033790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-07-18eCollection Date: 2011-01-01DOI: 10.3389/fnevo.2011.00002
Raúl Sobrero, Laura J May-Collado, Ingi Agnarsson, Cristián E Hernández
Brains are the centers of the nervous system of animals, controlling the organ systems of the body and coordinating responses to changes in the ecological and social environment. The evolution of traits that correlate with cognitive ability, such as relative brain size is thus of broad interest. Brain mass relative to body mass (BM) varies among mammals, and diverse factors have been proposed to explain this variation. A recent study provided evidence that energetics play an important role in brain evolution (Isler and van Schaik, 2006). Using composite phylogenies and data drawn from multiple sources, these authors showed that basal metabolic rate (BMR) correlates with brain mass across mammals. However, no such relationship was found within rodents. Here we re-examined the relationship between BMR and brain mass within Rodentia using a novel species-level phylogeny. Our results are sensitive to parameter evaluation; in particular how species mass is estimated. We detect no pattern when applying an approach used by previous studies, where each species BM is represented by two different numbers, one being the individual that happened to be used for BMR estimates of that species. However, this approach may compromise the analysis. When using a single value of BM for each species, whether representing a single individual, or available species mean, our findings provide evidence that brain mass (independent of BM) and BMR are correlated. These findings are thus consistent with the hypothesis that large brains evolve when the payoff for increased brain mass is greater than the energetic cost they incur.
大脑是动物神经系统的中枢,控制着身体的各个器官系统,并协调对生态和社会环境变化的反应。因此,大脑相对大小等与认知能力相关的特征的进化受到广泛关注。不同哺乳动物的脑质量相对于体质量(BM)各不相同,人们提出了多种因素来解释这种差异。最近的一项研究提供了证据,证明能量在大脑进化中扮演了重要角色(Isler 和 van Schaik,2006 年)。这些作者利用从多种来源获得的综合系统发育和数据表明,基础代谢率(BMR)与哺乳动物的脑质量相关。然而,在啮齿类动物中却没有发现这种关系。在这里,我们利用新的物种水平系统发育,重新研究了啮齿类动物的基础代谢率与脑质量之间的关系。我们的结果对参数评估很敏感,尤其是物种质量的估算方式。在应用以前研究中使用的方法时,我们没有发现任何模式,即每个物种的脑质量由两个不同的数字表示,其中一个数字是恰好用于估算该物种脑质量的个体。然而,这种方法可能会影响分析结果。当使用每个物种的单一 BM 值(无论是代表单个个体还是可用的物种平均值)时,我们的研究结果提供了大脑质量(独立于 BM)与 BMR 相关的证据。因此,这些发现符合这样的假设,即当大脑质量增加的回报大于其产生的能量成本时,大大脑就会进化。
{"title":"Expensive Brains: \"Brainy\" Rodents have Higher Metabolic Rate.","authors":"Raúl Sobrero, Laura J May-Collado, Ingi Agnarsson, Cristián E Hernández","doi":"10.3389/fnevo.2011.00002","DOIUrl":"10.3389/fnevo.2011.00002","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Brains are the centers of the nervous system of animals, controlling the organ systems of the body and coordinating responses to changes in the ecological and social environment. The evolution of traits that correlate with cognitive ability, such as relative brain size is thus of broad interest. Brain mass relative to body mass (BM) varies among mammals, and diverse factors have been proposed to explain this variation. A recent study provided evidence that energetics play an important role in brain evolution (Isler and van Schaik, 2006). Using composite phylogenies and data drawn from multiple sources, these authors showed that basal metabolic rate (BMR) correlates with brain mass across mammals. However, no such relationship was found within rodents. Here we re-examined the relationship between BMR and brain mass within Rodentia using a novel species-level phylogeny. Our results are sensitive to parameter evaluation; in particular how species mass is estimated. We detect no pattern when applying an approach used by previous studies, where each species BM is represented by two different numbers, one being the individual that happened to be used for BMR estimates of that species. However, this approach may compromise the analysis. When using a single value of BM for each species, whether representing a single individual, or available species mean, our findings provide evidence that brain mass (independent of BM) and BMR are correlated. These findings are thus consistent with the hypothesis that large brains evolve when the payoff for increased brain mass is greater than the energetic cost they incur.</p>","PeriodicalId":88241,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in evolutionary neuroscience","volume":"3 ","pages":"2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3141350/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"30050553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-05-25eCollection Date: 2011-01-01DOI: 10.3389/fnevo.2011.00001
Adam McNamara
Memes are the fundamental unit of cultural evolution and have been left upon the periphery of cognitive neuroscience due to their inexact definition and the consequent presumption that they are impossible to measure. Here it is argued that although a precise definition of memes is rather difficult it does not preclude highly controlled experiments studying the neural substrates of their initiation and replication. In this paper, memes are termed as either internally or externally represented (i-memes/e-memes) in relation to whether they are represented as a neural substrate within the central nervous system or in some other form within our environment. It is argued that neuroimaging technology is now sufficiently advanced to image the connectivity profiles of i-memes and critically, to measure changes to i-memes over time, i.e., as they evolve. It is argued that it is wrong to simply pass off memes as an alternative term for "stimulus" and "learnt associations" as it does not accurately account for the way in which natural stimuli may dynamically "evolve" as clearly observed in our cultural lives.
{"title":"Can we measure memes?","authors":"Adam McNamara","doi":"10.3389/fnevo.2011.00001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3389/fnevo.2011.00001","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Memes are the fundamental unit of cultural evolution and have been left upon the periphery of cognitive neuroscience due to their inexact definition and the consequent presumption that they are impossible to measure. Here it is argued that although a precise definition of memes is rather difficult it does not preclude highly controlled experiments studying the neural substrates of their initiation and replication. In this paper, memes are termed as either internally or externally represented (i-memes/e-memes) in relation to whether they are represented as a neural substrate within the central nervous system or in some other form within our environment. It is argued that neuroimaging technology is now sufficiently advanced to image the connectivity profiles of i-memes and critically, to measure changes to i-memes over time, i.e., as they evolve. It is argued that it is wrong to simply pass off memes as an alternative term for \"stimulus\" and \"learnt associations\" as it does not accurately account for the way in which natural stimuli may dynamically \"evolve\" as clearly observed in our cultural lives.</p>","PeriodicalId":88241,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in evolutionary neuroscience","volume":"3 ","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3389/fnevo.2011.00001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"30278497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-01-31eCollection Date: 2011-01-01DOI: 10.3389/fnevo.2010.00111
Jay Schulkin
Social regulation of the internal milieu is a fundamental behavioral adaptation. Cephalic capability is reflected by anticipatory behaviors to serve systemic physiological regulation. Homeostatic regulation, a dominant perspective, reflects reactive responses; allostatic regulation, the physiology of change, emphasizes longer-term anticipatory, and feedforward systems. Steroids, such as cortisol, and peptides such as corticotrophin releasing hormone are but one example of such anticipatory regulatory systems. The concept of "allostasis" is in part to take account of anticipatory control amidst diverse forms of adaptation underlying this regulatory adaptation that supports social contact and the internal milieu.
{"title":"Social allostasis: anticipatory regulation of the internal milieu.","authors":"Jay Schulkin","doi":"10.3389/fnevo.2010.00111","DOIUrl":"10.3389/fnevo.2010.00111","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Social regulation of the internal milieu is a fundamental behavioral adaptation. Cephalic capability is reflected by anticipatory behaviors to serve systemic physiological regulation. Homeostatic regulation, a dominant perspective, reflects reactive responses; allostatic regulation, the physiology of change, emphasizes longer-term anticipatory, and feedforward systems. Steroids, such as cortisol, and peptides such as corticotrophin releasing hormone are but one example of such anticipatory regulatory systems. The concept of \"allostasis\" is in part to take account of anticipatory control amidst diverse forms of adaptation underlying this regulatory adaptation that supports social contact and the internal milieu.</p>","PeriodicalId":88241,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in evolutionary neuroscience","volume":"2 ","pages":"111"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3389/fnevo.2010.00111","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"29711786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-12-30eCollection Date: 2010-01-01DOI: 10.3389/fnevo.2010.00110
Lora M Cope, Jana Schaich Borg, Carla L Harenski, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Debra Lieberman, Prashanth K Nyalakanti, Vince D Calhoun, Kent A Kiehl
Evolutionary approaches to dissecting our psychological architecture underscore the importance of both function and structure. Here we focus on both the function and structure of our neural circuitry and report a functional bilateral asymmetry associated with the processing of immoral stimuli. Many processes in the human brain are associated with functional specialization unique to one hemisphere. With respect to emotions, most research points to right-hemispheric lateralization. Here we provide evidence that not all emotional stimuli share right-hemispheric lateralization. Across three studies employing different paradigms, the processing of negative morally laden stimuli was found to be highly left-lateralized. Regions of engagement common to the three studies include the left medial prefrontal cortex, left temporoparietal junction, and left posterior cingulate. These data support the hypothesis that processing of immoral stimuli preferentially engages left hemispheric processes and sheds light on our evolved neural architecture.
{"title":"Hemispheric Asymmetries during Processing of Immoral Stimuli.","authors":"Lora M Cope, Jana Schaich Borg, Carla L Harenski, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Debra Lieberman, Prashanth K Nyalakanti, Vince D Calhoun, Kent A Kiehl","doi":"10.3389/fnevo.2010.00110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3389/fnevo.2010.00110","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Evolutionary approaches to dissecting our psychological architecture underscore the importance of both function and structure. Here we focus on both the function and structure of our neural circuitry and report a functional bilateral asymmetry associated with the processing of immoral stimuli. Many processes in the human brain are associated with functional specialization unique to one hemisphere. With respect to emotions, most research points to right-hemispheric lateralization. Here we provide evidence that not all emotional stimuli share right-hemispheric lateralization. Across three studies employing different paradigms, the processing of negative morally laden stimuli was found to be highly left-lateralized. Regions of engagement common to the three studies include the left medial prefrontal cortex, left temporoparietal junction, and left posterior cingulate. These data support the hypothesis that processing of immoral stimuli preferentially engages left hemispheric processes and sheds light on our evolved neural architecture.</p>","PeriodicalId":88241,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in evolutionary neuroscience","volume":"2 ","pages":"110"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3389/fnevo.2010.00110","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"29691904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-11-25eCollection Date: 2010-01-01DOI: 10.3389/fnevo.2010.00109
Simon Baron-Cohen, Ofer Golan, Sally Wheelwright, Yael Granader, Jacqueline Hill
Background: Whilst previous studies have examined comprehension of the emotional lexicon at different ages in typically developing children, no survey has been conducted looking at this across different ages from childhood to adolescence.
Purpose: To report how the emotion lexicon grows with age.
Method: Comprehension of 336 emotion words was tested in n = 377 children and adolescents, aged 4-16 years old, divided into 6 age-bands. Parents or teachers of children under 12, or adolescents themselves, were asked to indicate which words they knew the meaning of.
Results: Between 4 and 11 years old, the size of the emotional lexicon doubled every 2 years, but between 12 and 16 years old, developmental rate of growth of the emotional lexicon leveled off. This survey also allows emotion words to be ordered in terms of difficulty.
Conclusions: Studies using emotion terms in English need to be developmentally sensitive, since during childhood there is considerable change. The absence of change after adolescence may be an artifact of the words included in this study. This normative developmental data-set for emotion vocabulary comprehension may be useful when testing for delays in this ability, as might arise for environmental or neurodevelopmental reasons.
{"title":"Emotion word comprehension from 4 to 16 years old: a developmental survey.","authors":"Simon Baron-Cohen, Ofer Golan, Sally Wheelwright, Yael Granader, Jacqueline Hill","doi":"10.3389/fnevo.2010.00109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3389/fnevo.2010.00109","url":null,"abstract":"<p><strong>Background: </strong>Whilst previous studies have examined comprehension of the emotional lexicon at different ages in typically developing children, no survey has been conducted looking at this across different ages from childhood to adolescence.</p><p><strong>Purpose: </strong>To report how the emotion lexicon grows with age.</p><p><strong>Method: </strong>Comprehension of 336 emotion words was tested in n = 377 children and adolescents, aged 4-16 years old, divided into 6 age-bands. Parents or teachers of children under 12, or adolescents themselves, were asked to indicate which words they knew the meaning of.</p><p><strong>Results: </strong>Between 4 and 11 years old, the size of the emotional lexicon doubled every 2 years, but between 12 and 16 years old, developmental rate of growth of the emotional lexicon leveled off. This survey also allows emotion words to be ordered in terms of difficulty.</p><p><strong>Conclusions: </strong>Studies using emotion terms in English need to be developmentally sensitive, since during childhood there is considerable change. The absence of change after adolescence may be an artifact of the words included in this study. This normative developmental data-set for emotion vocabulary comprehension may be useful when testing for delays in this ability, as might arise for environmental or neurodevelopmental reasons.</p>","PeriodicalId":88241,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in evolutionary neuroscience","volume":"2 ","pages":"109"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3389/fnevo.2010.00109","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"29529907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-09-24eCollection Date: 2010-01-01DOI: 10.3389/fnevo.2010.00108
Melanie L Shoup-Knox, Andrew C Gallup, Gordon G Gallup, Ewan C McNay
Recent research suggests that yawning is an adaptive behavior that functions to promote brain thermoregulation among homeotherms. To explore the relationship between brain temperature and yawning we implanted thermocoupled probes in the frontal cortex of rats to measure brain temperature before, during and after yawning. Temperature recordings indicate that yawns and stretches occurred during increases in brain temperature, with brain temperatures being restored to baseline following the execution of each of these behaviors. The circulatory changes that accompany yawning and stretching may explain some of the thermal similarities surrounding these events. These results suggest that yawning and stretching may serve to maintain brain thermal homeostasis.
{"title":"Yawning and stretching predict brain temperature changes in rats: support for the thermoregulatory hypothesis.","authors":"Melanie L Shoup-Knox, Andrew C Gallup, Gordon G Gallup, Ewan C McNay","doi":"10.3389/fnevo.2010.00108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3389/fnevo.2010.00108","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Recent research suggests that yawning is an adaptive behavior that functions to promote brain thermoregulation among homeotherms. To explore the relationship between brain temperature and yawning we implanted thermocoupled probes in the frontal cortex of rats to measure brain temperature before, during and after yawning. Temperature recordings indicate that yawns and stretches occurred during increases in brain temperature, with brain temperatures being restored to baseline following the execution of each of these behaviors. The circulatory changes that accompany yawning and stretching may explain some of the thermal similarities surrounding these events. These results suggest that yawning and stretching may serve to maintain brain thermal homeostasis.</p>","PeriodicalId":88241,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in evolutionary neuroscience","volume":"2 ","pages":"108"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3389/fnevo.2010.00108","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"29429198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-06-23eCollection Date: 2010-01-01DOI: 10.3389/fnevo.2010.00007
Alfredo Ardila
Some numerical knowledge, such as the immediate recognition of small quantities, is observed in animals. The development of arithmetical abilities found in man's evolution as well as in child's development represents a long process following different stages. Arithmetical abilities are relatively recent in human history and are clearly related with counting, i.e., saying aloud a series of number words that correspond to a collection of objects. Counting probably began with finger sequencing, and that may explain the 10-base found in most numerical systems. From a neuropsychological perspective, there is a strong relationship between numerical knowledge and finger recognition, and both are impaired in cases of left posterior parietal damage (angular or Gerstmann's syndrome). Writing numbers appeared earlier in human history than written language. Positional digit value is clearly evident in Babylonians, and around 1,000 BC the zero was introduced. Contemporary neuroimaging techniques, specifically fMRI, have demonstrated that the left parietal lobe, particularly the intraparietal sulcus, is systematically activated during a diversity of tasks; other areas, particularly the frontal lobe, are also involved in processing numerical information and solving arithmetical problems. It can be conjectured that numerical abilities continue evolving due to advances in mathematical knowledge and the introduction of new technologies.
{"title":"On the evolution of calculation abilities.","authors":"Alfredo Ardila","doi":"10.3389/fnevo.2010.00007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3389/fnevo.2010.00007","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Some numerical knowledge, such as the immediate recognition of small quantities, is observed in animals. The development of arithmetical abilities found in man's evolution as well as in child's development represents a long process following different stages. Arithmetical abilities are relatively recent in human history and are clearly related with counting, i.e., saying aloud a series of number words that correspond to a collection of objects. Counting probably began with finger sequencing, and that may explain the 10-base found in most numerical systems. From a neuropsychological perspective, there is a strong relationship between numerical knowledge and finger recognition, and both are impaired in cases of left posterior parietal damage (angular or Gerstmann's syndrome). Writing numbers appeared earlier in human history than written language. Positional digit value is clearly evident in Babylonians, and around 1,000 BC the zero was introduced. Contemporary neuroimaging techniques, specifically fMRI, have demonstrated that the left parietal lobe, particularly the intraparietal sulcus, is systematically activated during a diversity of tasks; other areas, particularly the frontal lobe, are also involved in processing numerical information and solving arithmetical problems. It can be conjectured that numerical abilities continue evolving due to advances in mathematical knowledge and the introduction of new technologies.</p>","PeriodicalId":88241,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in evolutionary neuroscience","volume":"2 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3389/fnevo.2010.00007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"29200806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-02-22eCollection Date: 2010-01-01DOI: 10.3389/neuro.18.005.2010
Alvaro Machado Dias
Studies of culturally-based phenomena within neuroscientific frameworks represent one of the most dynamic tendencies in contemporary cognitive science. They have provided the foundations of social neuroscience, which comprise studies on brain correlates of social cognition, abilities, and disabilities (Cacioppo, 2002), and have contributed to the consolidation of evolutionary neuroscience as a multidisciplinary epistemological field, which frequently involves social neuroscientific topics, considered in terms of their function and evolutionary basis (for an authoritative introduction and discussion: Platek et al., 2007). The new horizons that these studies revealed now allow for neuroscientific approaches to topics that once were conceived to be beyond the scope of a naturalistic framework, because they remained subordinated to contingent dimensions of the cultural environment (e.g., embodiment; Campbell and Garcia, 2009). Such efforts have widened the scope of social neuroscience and raise very interesting perspectives for evolutionary neuroscience, in terms of the adaptations and brain circuits that appear to lie at the base of these phenomena, as well as suggest an incursion into a dialogue with studies pointing in the opposite direction, which question the bases of certain universal cognitive and behavioral phenomena that are, by and large, thought of in terms of their functional basis – like Everett et al. (2005) did in relation to universal grammar, when arguing that the Piraha language has no recursion, no subordination, no numeral, and “in effect, no phrase structure” (Everett, 2007, p. 4); and like Henrich et al. (2010) did in their critical review of research on “WEIRD” people (“Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic”), which they claim to have biased several generalizations about “human nature”, from perception (e.g., different standpoints in relation to the Mueller-Lyer illusion) to abstract cognition (e.g., egocentric vs. geocentric reasoning styles in tasks requiring spatial cognition)1. The study of the relation between culturally-specific phenomena and brain activity has been named neuroanthropology (a term coined by E. D. Lewis, from the University of Melbourne) and proposes to be “the study of the experiential and neurobiological aspects of cultural activity” (Dominguez Duque et al., 2009, p. 3). Considered within this perspective, it seems compelling to assume that we are moving into the era of neuroanthropology (see: Campbell and Garcia, 2009), where the tradition of studies of culturally-dependent phenomena meets the tradition of studying brain mechanisms to consolidate a new epistemological field. However, the thesis that this paper endorses is that the consolidation of neuroanthropology as a new and legitimate epistemological tradition will require significant new efforts. The first thing that is important to bear in mind is that the authority of new fields of research rely on the premise that th
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