This paper discusses the nature of four waves of technological innovations in forensic genetics alongside the social, legal and ethical aspect of these innovations. It emphasises the way in which technological advances and their socio-legal frameworks are co-produced, shaping technology expectations, social identities, and legal institutions. It also considers how imagined and actual uses of forensic genetic technologies are entangled with assertions about social order, affirmations of common values and civil rights, and promises about security and justice. Our comments seek to encourage the participation of scientific actors in the development of anticipatory governance deliberations concerning the widening application of forensic genetics in an increasing number of criminal and civil jurisdictions.
In the United States, those groups of persons eligible for compulsory DNA sampling by law enforcement authorities continue to expand. The collection of DNA samples from felony arrestees will likely be adopted by many more states after the U.S. Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Maryland v. King, which upheld a state law permitting the compulsory and warrantless DNA sampling from those arrested of serious offenses. At the time of the decision, 28 states and the federal government already had arrestee DNA collection statutes in place. Nevada became the 29th state to collect DNA from arrestees in May 2013, and several others have bills under consideration. Should states collect DNA from misdemeanor arrestees as well? This article considers this as yet largely unrealized but nevertheless important potential expansion of arrestee DNA databases. The collection of DNA samples from those arrested of relatively minor offenses would increase the number of samples, and perhaps consequently the number of "hits." On balance, however, such an expansion of current DNA laws raises enough serious concerns-chiefly about police discretion, inequitable enforcement, and cost-that legislators should refrain from changing arrestee DNA laws in this way.
The article presents DNA related data exchange mechanism established within the framework of the European Union for the transnational crime investigation. First of all, it provides with the comprehensive overview of legal and practical state of play, pointing out that approved legal basis seeks to ensure legality and reliability in this area by establishing information exchange purposes and competent authorities involved, setting up technical requirements for the DNA analysis and DNA data bases, laying down provisions on accreditation of forensic service providers, foreseeing at least minimum common data protection requirements. Secondly, it reveals that despite being the most exhaustive international regulation on DNA related data exchange among law enforcement and judicial authorities it misses effective data protection mechanism, does not harmonize neither backgrounds for DNA collection in criminal process in general nor storage requirements and that results the variation in categories of subjects related to the crime investigation and included in data bases of different Member States. These gaps make the use of data collected and stored in another Member State vulnerable from the perspective of different rules on evidences' legality within the criminal process. The article also reveals the model's weakness in terms of assessment of its efficiency as statistics gathered for the time being show only number of coincidences (hits) of searched DNA profiles, but not the impact on crime investigation and its results.
Forensic DNA Phenotyping ("FDP"), estimating the externally visible characteristics ("EVCs") of the source of human DNA left at a crime scene, is evolving from science fiction toward science fact. FDP can already identify a source's gender with 100% accuracy, and likely hair color, iris color, adult height, and a number of other EVCs with accuracy rates approaching 70%. Patent applications have been filed for approaches to generating 3D likenesses of DNA sources based on the DNA alone. Nonetheless, criminal investigators, particularly in the United States, have been reticent to apply FDP in their casework. The reticence is likely related to a number of perceived and real dilemmas associated with FDP: is FDP racial profiling, should we test unknown and unseen physical conditions, does testing for behavioral characteristics impermissibly violate the source's privacy, ought testing be permitted for samples from known sources or DNA databases, and should FDP be limited to use in investigations only or is FDP appropriate for use in a criminal court. As this article explains, although those dilemmas are substantive, they are not insurmountable, and can be quite easily managed with appropriate regulation and protocols. As FDP continues to develop, there will be less need for criminal investigators to shy away from FDP. Cold cases, missing persons, and victims in crimes without other evidence will one day soon all be well served by FDP.
In 2002, Caspi and colleagues proposed that a specific gene by environment (GxE) interaction is related to antisocial tendencies. Since then, a substantial body of literature has examined the potential implications of such a correlation for the criminal justice system, and in particular, for the attribution of responsibility and blame that lies at the core of that system. It is probably accurate to say that the majority position among criminal theorists is that evidence of such a nature does not undermine or seriously challenge existing notions of responsibility, and could not constitute a full defense to a criminal charge - although it may have a role to play in sentencing. Less consideration, however, has been given to the role such evidence may play in so-called 'partial defenses' - those like diminished responsibility (DR), which serve not to exculpate the defendant entirely, but rather, to mitigate his responsibility for the criminal act. This paper aims to assess the most important feature of the Caspi Sudy - the low variant gene for the production of Monoamine Oxidase Acid A gene (MAOA-L) - and its possible role in a defense of DR. We argue that, following the approach of common law jurisdictions to analogous situations, there is no principled reason to exclude evidence of MAOA-L as a basis of DR.
Antibiotic resistance (AR) represents a challenge for the treatment of infectious diseases. Traditionally, antibiotic resistance determinants have been retrieved from culturable bacteria which represent a minor fraction of the total microbial diversity found in natural environments such as soils. In this review, we summarize recent advances in the study of antibiotic resistance using two main culture-independent approaches: sequence-based metagenomics and functional metagenomics.
Forensic DNA methodologies have potential applications in the investigation of human trafficking cases. DNA and relationship testing may be useful for confirmation of biological relationship claims in immigration, identification of trafficked individuals who are missing persons, and family reunification of displaced individuals after mass disasters and conflicts. As these applications rely on the collection of DNA from non-criminals and potentially vulnerable individuals, questions arise as to how to address the ethical challenges of collection, security, and privacy of collected samples and DNA profiles. We administered a survey targeted to victims' advocates to gain preliminary understanding of perspectives regarding human trafficking definitions, DNA and sex workers, and perceived trust of authorities potentially involved in DNA collection. We asked respondents to consider the use of DNA for investigating adoption fraud, sex trafficking, and post-conflict child soldier cases. We found some key differences in perspectives on defining what qualifies as "trafficking." When we varied terminology between "sex worker" and "sex trafficking victim" we detected differences in perception on which authorities can be trusted. Respondents were supportive of the hypothetical models proposed to collect DNA. Most were favorable of DNA specimens being controlled by an authority outside of law enforcement. Participants voiced concerns focused on privacy, misuse of DNA samples and data, unintentional harms, data security, and infrastructure. These preliminary data indicate that while there is perceived value in programs to use DNA for investigating cases of human trafficking, these programs may need to consider levels of trust in authorities as their logistics are developed and implemented.