One of the little-known aspects of bitcoin is the nature of the proof of work system. There are many people, especially those who support a UASF or PoW change that believe a distributed system should be completed as a mesh. In this, they confuse centralised systems with centrality. The truth of the matter, no matter which proof of work system is implemented, they all follow a maximal growth curve that reflects the nature of the firm is detailed in 1937 by Ronald Coase. In this paper, we address the issues of using alternate proof of work systems with regards to either incorporating alternate functions in an extension of simply securing the network against the use of proof of work systems in an attempt to create a one person one vote scenario in place of economic incentivisation.
{"title":"Proof of Work as it Relates to the Theory of the Firm","authors":"C. Wright","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2993312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2993312","url":null,"abstract":"One of the little-known aspects of bitcoin is the nature of the proof of work system. There are many people, especially those who support a UASF or PoW change that believe a distributed system should be completed as a mesh. In this, they confuse centralised systems with centrality. The truth of the matter, no matter which proof of work system is implemented, they all follow a maximal growth curve that reflects the nature of the firm is detailed in 1937 by Ronald Coase. In this paper, we address the issues of using alternate proof of work systems with regards to either incorporating alternate functions in an extension of simply securing the network against the use of proof of work systems in an attempt to create a one person one vote scenario in place of economic incentivisation.","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73113032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper summarizes the significant developments in patent law in the twelve months ending in April 2017.
本文总结了截至2017年4月的12个月内专利法的重大发展。
{"title":"Recent Developments in Patent Law (Spring 2017)","authors":"Mark A. Lemley, M. Laupheimer, James C. Yoon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2959553","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2959553","url":null,"abstract":"This paper summarizes the significant developments in patent law in the twelve months ending in April 2017.","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82360706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this Article, we compare U.S. patent litigation across districts and consider possible explanations for the Eastern District of Texas’ popularity with patent plaintiffs. Rather than any one explanation, we conclude that what makes the Eastern District so attractive to patent plaintiffs is the accumulated effect of several marginal advantages — particularly with respect to the relative timing of discovery deadlines, transfer decisions, and claim construction — that make it predictably expensive for accused infringers to defend patent suits filed in East Texas. These findings tend to support ongoing efforts to pass patent reform legislation that would presumptively stay discovery in patent suits pending claim construction and motions to transfer or dismiss. However, we also observe that courts in the Eastern District of Texas have exercised their discretion in ways that dampen the effect of prior legislative and judicial reforms that were aimed (at least in part) at deterring abusive patent suits. Given courts’ broad discretion to control how cases proceed, this additional finding suggests that restricting venue in patent cases may well be the single most effective reform available to Congress or the courts to limit patentees’ ability to impose unnecessary and unwarranted costs on companies accused of patent infringement.
{"title":"Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas","authors":"B. Love, James C. Yoon","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2835799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2835799","url":null,"abstract":"In this Article, we compare U.S. patent litigation across districts and consider possible explanations for the Eastern District of Texas’ popularity with patent plaintiffs. Rather than any one explanation, we conclude that what makes the Eastern District so attractive to patent plaintiffs is the accumulated effect of several marginal advantages — particularly with respect to the relative timing of discovery deadlines, transfer decisions, and claim construction — that make it predictably expensive for accused infringers to defend patent suits filed in East Texas. These findings tend to support ongoing efforts to pass patent reform legislation that would presumptively stay discovery in patent suits pending claim construction and motions to transfer or dismiss. However, we also observe that courts in the Eastern District of Texas have exercised their discretion in ways that dampen the effect of prior legislative and judicial reforms that were aimed (at least in part) at deterring abusive patent suits. Given courts’ broad discretion to control how cases proceed, this additional finding suggests that restricting venue in patent cases may well be the single most effective reform available to Congress or the courts to limit patentees’ ability to impose unnecessary and unwarranted costs on companies accused of patent infringement.","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"20 1","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42063359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Portuguese Abstract: O Direito do Consumidor e tradicionalmente compreendido no Brasil como unico mecanismo capaz de proteger o consumidor como sujeito vulneravel no mercado de consumo. Sob essa logica, multiplicam-se leis e regulamentos destinados a tutelar os interesses dos consumidores. Entretanto, as principais tecnicas adotadas falham em atingir os objetivos propostos, concentram mercados e excluem consumidores de menor poder aquisitivo, dentre outras consequencias nao intencionais. O presente artigo analisa pesquisas empiricas para demonstrar os problemas que essas tecnicas apresentam. Ao final, sao propostas alternativas ao sistema de protecao ao consumidor centralizado na legislacao.English Abstract: Consumer Law is traditionally regarded in Brazil as the only mechanism able to protect consumers as vulnerable actors within the market. Following this rationale, the number of laws and regulations, intended to safeguard consumers’ interests, continues to grow. However, the main regulatory techniques: fail to achieve the proposed goals, concentrate markets, and exclude low-income consumers from them, on top of other unintended consequences. The paper identifies issues with these techniques based on empirical research and elaborates on alternatives to the state-centered consumer protection system.
{"title":"Uma Análise Econômica Do Direito Do Consumidor: Como Leis Consumeristas Prejudicam Os Mais Pobres Sem Beneficiar Consumidores (An Economic Analysis of Consumer Law: How Legislation Harms the Poor without Protecting the Consumers)","authors":"B. Bodart","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2870931","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2870931","url":null,"abstract":"Portuguese Abstract: O Direito do Consumidor e tradicionalmente compreendido no Brasil como unico mecanismo capaz de proteger o consumidor como sujeito vulneravel no mercado de consumo. Sob essa logica, multiplicam-se leis e regulamentos destinados a tutelar os interesses dos consumidores. Entretanto, as principais tecnicas adotadas falham em atingir os objetivos propostos, concentram mercados e excluem consumidores de menor poder aquisitivo, dentre outras consequencias nao intencionais. O presente artigo analisa pesquisas empiricas para demonstrar os problemas que essas tecnicas apresentam. Ao final, sao propostas alternativas ao sistema de protecao ao consumidor centralizado na legislacao.English Abstract: Consumer Law is traditionally regarded in Brazil as the only mechanism able to protect consumers as vulnerable actors within the market. Following this rationale, the number of laws and regulations, intended to safeguard consumers’ interests, continues to grow. However, the main regulatory techniques: fail to achieve the proposed goals, concentrate markets, and exclude low-income consumers from them, on top of other unintended consequences. The paper identifies issues with these techniques based on empirical research and elaborates on alternatives to the state-centered consumer protection system.","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78524505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) provides that a defendant in a patent case may be sued where the defendant is incorporated or has a regular and established place of business and has infringed the patent. This Court made clear in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 223 (1957), that those were the only permissible venues for a patent case. But the Federal Circuit has rejected Fourco and the plain meaning of § 1400(b), instead permitting a patent plaintiff to file suit against a defendant anywhere there is personal jurisdiction over that defendant. The result has been rampant forum shopping, particularly by patent trolls. 44% of 2015 patent lawsuits were filed in a single district: the Eastern District of Texas, a forum with plaintiff-friendly rules and practices, and where few of the defendants are incorporated or have established places of business. And an estimated 86% of 2015 patent cases were filed somewhere other than the jurisdictions specified in the statute. Colleen V. Chien & Michael Risch, Recalibrating Patent Venue, Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-1 (Sept. 1, 2016), Table 3. This Court should grant certiorari to review the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) because the Federal Circuit’s dubious interpretation of the statute plays an outsized and detrimental role, both legally and economically, in the patent system.
28 U.S.C.§1400(b)规定，专利案件中的被告可以在被告注册成立或拥有固定营业地并侵犯专利的情况下被起诉。本院在Fourco Glass Co.诉Transmirra Prods案中明确表示。公司，353 U.S. 222, 223(1957)，这些是专利案件唯一允许的场所。但联邦巡回法院驳回了Fourco和第1400(b)条的明确含义，而是允许专利原告在任何对被告有属人管辖权的地方对被告提起诉讼。其结果是论坛抢购猖獗，尤其是专利流氓。2015年44%的专利诉讼都是在一个地区提起的:德克萨斯州东区，这是一个对原告友好的规则和惯例的论坛，而且很少有被告是公司或建立了营业场所。据估计，2015年86%的专利案件是在法规规定的司法管辖区以外的地方提交的。Colleen V. Chien & Michael Risch，重新校准专利地点，Santa Clara university，法律研究论文No. 10-1(2016年9月1日)，表3。本院应批准调卷审查28 U.S.C.§1400(b)的含义，因为联邦巡回法院对该法规的可疑解释在专利制度中无论在法律上还是在经济上都发挥了巨大的有害作用。
{"title":"Brief of Amici Curiae 56 Professors of Law and Economics in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, No. 16-341","authors":"Colleen V. Chien, Mark A. Lemley, B. Love, A. Rai","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2853696","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2853696","url":null,"abstract":"28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) provides that a defendant in a patent case may be sued where the defendant is incorporated or has a regular and established place of business and has infringed the patent. This Court made clear in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 223 (1957), that those were the only permissible venues for a patent case. But the Federal Circuit has rejected Fourco and the plain meaning of § 1400(b), instead permitting a patent plaintiff to file suit against a defendant anywhere there is personal jurisdiction over that defendant. The result has been rampant forum shopping, particularly by patent trolls. 44% of 2015 patent lawsuits were filed in a single district: the Eastern District of Texas, a forum with plaintiff-friendly rules and practices, and where few of the defendants are incorporated or have established places of business. And an estimated 86% of 2015 patent cases were filed somewhere other than the jurisdictions specified in the statute. Colleen V. Chien & Michael Risch, Recalibrating Patent Venue, Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-1 (Sept. 1, 2016), Table 3. This Court should grant certiorari to review the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) because the Federal Circuit’s dubious interpretation of the statute plays an outsized and detrimental role, both legally and economically, in the patent system.","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"58 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84196603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the most prominent features of China’s transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy is the emergence of entrepreneurship, although previous literature discusses this phenomenon descriptively rather than prescriptively. In this article, we consider entrepreneurship developments in China since the end of the 1970s and argue that the role of entrepreneurship in the economy has changed considerably over the last four decades. Our perception is that initially, China’s entrepreneurship development stemmed from China’s economic transition, but currently, entrepreneurship is both influenced by and influences economic development. We propose a conceptual model of the role of entrepreneurship in China’s contemporary economy, which we test using a unique database for 31 Chinese regions during the period from 1997 to 2009. Our analysis shows that two types of entrepreneurial organizations (siyingqiye and getihu) in China play important but distinct roles in stimulating China’s economic development.
{"title":"Economic Transition and Entrepreneurship Development in China","authors":"Ying Zhang, Andre J. van Stel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3623292","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3623292","url":null,"abstract":"One of the most prominent features of China’s transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy is the emergence of entrepreneurship, although previous literature discusses this phenomenon descriptively rather than prescriptively. In this article, we consider entrepreneurship developments in China since the end of the 1970s and argue that the role of entrepreneurship in the economy has changed considerably over the last four decades. Our perception is that initially, China’s entrepreneurship development stemmed from China’s economic transition, but currently, entrepreneurship is both influenced by and influences economic development. We propose a conceptual model of the role of entrepreneurship in China’s contemporary economy, which we test using a unique database for 31 Chinese regions during the period from 1997 to 2009. Our analysis shows that two types of entrepreneurial organizations (siyingqiye and getihu) in China play important but distinct roles in stimulating China’s economic development.","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"83 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86513545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper empirically analyzes in a time-varying context if the U.S. corporate Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and bond markets of 81 reference entities reflect the same information on their prices between October 2004 and December 2010. The analysis shows that the theoretical no-arbitrage relation between CDS and bond spreads holds during economic stable times, but is violated as soon as markets are exposed to economic turmoil as in the financial crisis starting in August 2007. The difference between CDS and bond spreads, called the basis, is more volatile the lower the firms are rated. The price discovery is unaffected by the reference entities' credit rating and is strongly time-varying. Nevertheless the CDS spreads lead the price discovery process. Price discovery is significantly influenced uniquely by counterparty risk only when economic risks achieve abnormal levels as during the 2007/2008 financial crisis. Other risks as interbank liquidity risk, global risk and financing costs aren't considered by CDS traders when markets are facing abnormal risks. The more the markets are exposed to counterparty risk, defined as the risk that the CDS seller defaults, the less the price discovery takes place in the CDS market and therefore the more the bond spreads tend to reflect credit risk more efficiently than the CDS spreads. Thus market participants have the tendency to abscond from the CDS market as soon as counterparty risk is elevated. Because price discovery still takes place in the CDS market, economic risks are strongly underestimated by market participants.
{"title":"Price Discovery Dynamics of Corporate Credit Default Swaps and Bonds","authors":"Josephine Molleyres","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2817819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2817819","url":null,"abstract":"This paper empirically analyzes in a time-varying context if the U.S. corporate Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and bond markets of 81 reference entities reflect the same information on their prices between October 2004 and December 2010. The analysis shows that the theoretical no-arbitrage relation between CDS and bond spreads holds during economic stable times, but is violated as soon as markets are exposed to economic turmoil as in the financial crisis starting in August 2007. The difference between CDS and bond spreads, called the basis, is more volatile the lower the firms are rated. The price discovery is unaffected by the reference entities' credit rating and is strongly time-varying. Nevertheless the CDS spreads lead the price discovery process. Price discovery is significantly influenced uniquely by counterparty risk only when economic risks achieve abnormal levels as during the 2007/2008 financial crisis. Other risks as interbank liquidity risk, global risk and financing costs aren't considered by CDS traders when markets are facing abnormal risks. The more the markets are exposed to counterparty risk, defined as the risk that the CDS seller defaults, the less the price discovery takes place in the CDS market and therefore the more the bond spreads tend to reflect credit risk more efficiently than the CDS spreads. Thus market participants have the tendency to abscond from the CDS market as soon as counterparty risk is elevated. Because price discovery still takes place in the CDS market, economic risks are strongly underestimated by market participants.","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88111905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Most people in medieval Europe lived at subsistence in a violent feudal world. Adam Smith explained both the long-term stability of the feudal system and how the towns escaped this violence trap through political exchange that fostered their ability to enter long-distance trade, significant division of labor, and economic growth and development. Violence is central to Smith's approach to development, which Smith scholars have systematically under-appreciated. In the face of episodic violence, individuals had little incentives to be industrious, to save, or to invest. Smith argued that the medieval towns escaped the violence trap through trade expansion. In Smith's view, development required three mutually reinforcing elements – liberty; commerce, including long-distance trade; and security from all forms of violence.
{"title":"The Medieval Expansion of Long-Distance Trade: Adam Smith on the Town's Escape from the Violent and Low-Growth Feudal Equilibrium","authors":"Barry R. Weingast","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2789131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2789131","url":null,"abstract":"Most people in medieval Europe lived at subsistence in a violent feudal world. Adam Smith explained both the long-term stability of the feudal system and how the towns escaped this violence trap through political exchange that fostered their ability to enter long-distance trade, significant division of labor, and economic growth and development. Violence is central to Smith's approach to development, which Smith scholars have systematically under-appreciated. In the face of episodic violence, individuals had little incentives to be industrious, to save, or to invest. Smith argued that the medieval towns escaped the violence trap through trade expansion. In Smith's view, development required three mutually reinforcing elements – liberty; commerce, including long-distance trade; and security from all forms of violence.","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"238 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77023143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The patent system seems in the midst of truly dramatic change. The last twenty years have seen the rise of a new business model – the patent troll – that grew to become a majority of all patent lawsuits. They have seen a significant expansion in the number of patents granted and a fundamental change in the industries in which those patents are filed. They have seen the passage of the most important legislative reform in the last sixty years, a law that reoriented legal challenges to patents away from courts and toward the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). And they have seen remarkable changes in nearly every important legal doctrine, from patent eligibility to obviousness to infringement to remedies. These changes have prompted alarm in a number of quarters. From the 1990s to the 2000s, as the number of patents and patent troll suits skyrocketed, technology companies and academics worried about the “crisis” in the patent system – a crisis of overprotection that might interfere with rather than promote innovation. By 2015, as patent reform took effect and the Supreme Court undid many of the Federal Circuit’s expansions of patent rights, it was patent owners who were speaking of a crisis in the patent system – a crisis of underprotection that might leave innovators without adequate protection. Depending on one’s perspective, then, the sky seems to have been falling on the patent system for some time. Despite the undeniable significance of these changes in both directions, something curious has happened to the fundamental characteristics of the patent ecosystem during this period: very little. Whether we look at the number of patent applications filed, the number of patents issued, the number of lawsuits filed, the patentee win rate in those lawsuits, or the market for patent licenses, the data show very little evidence that patent owners and challengers are behaving differently because of changes in the law. The patent system, then, seems surprisingly resilient to changes in the law. This is a puzzle. In this article, I document this phenomenon and give some thought to why the fundamental characteristics of the patent system seem resistant to even major changes in patent law and procedure. The results pose some profound questions not only for efforts at patent reform but for the role of the patent system in society as a whole.
{"title":"The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System","authors":"Mark A. Lemley","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2784456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2784456","url":null,"abstract":"The patent system seems in the midst of truly dramatic change. The last twenty years have seen the rise of a new business model – the patent troll – that grew to become a majority of all patent lawsuits. They have seen a significant expansion in the number of patents granted and a fundamental change in the industries in which those patents are filed. They have seen the passage of the most important legislative reform in the last sixty years, a law that reoriented legal challenges to patents away from courts and toward the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). And they have seen remarkable changes in nearly every important legal doctrine, from patent eligibility to obviousness to infringement to remedies. These changes have prompted alarm in a number of quarters. From the 1990s to the 2000s, as the number of patents and patent troll suits skyrocketed, technology companies and academics worried about the “crisis” in the patent system – a crisis of overprotection that might interfere with rather than promote innovation. By 2015, as patent reform took effect and the Supreme Court undid many of the Federal Circuit’s expansions of patent rights, it was patent owners who were speaking of a crisis in the patent system – a crisis of underprotection that might leave innovators without adequate protection. Depending on one’s perspective, then, the sky seems to have been falling on the patent system for some time. Despite the undeniable significance of these changes in both directions, something curious has happened to the fundamental characteristics of the patent ecosystem during this period: very little. Whether we look at the number of patent applications filed, the number of patents issued, the number of lawsuits filed, the patentee win rate in those lawsuits, or the market for patent licenses, the data show very little evidence that patent owners and challengers are behaving differently because of changes in the law. The patent system, then, seems surprisingly resilient to changes in the law. This is a puzzle. In this article, I document this phenomenon and give some thought to why the fundamental characteristics of the patent system seem resistant to even major changes in patent law and procedure. The results pose some profound questions not only for efforts at patent reform but for the role of the patent system in society as a whole.","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89303812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The “grand bargain” of workers’ compensation, whereby workers relinquished the right to sue their employers in exchange for no-fault occupational injury insurance, was one of the great tort reforms of the Twentieth Century. However, there is one U.S. state that has always permitted employers to decline workers’ compensation coverage, and in which many firms (“nonsubscribers”) have chosen to do so: Texas. This study examines the impact of Texas nonsubscription on fifteen large, multistate nonsubscribers that provided their Texas employees with customized occupational injury insurance benefits (“private plans”) in lieu of workers’ compensation coverage between 1998 and 2010. As economic theory would lead one to expect, nonsubscription generated considerable cost savings. My preferred estimates suggest that costs per worker hour fell by about 44 percent. These savings were driven by a drop in the frequency of more serious claims involving replacement of lost wages, and by a decline in costs per claim. Both medical and wage-replacement costs fell substantially. Although the decline in wage-replacement costs was larger in percentage terms than the drop in medical costs, the latter was equally financially consequential since medical costs comprise a larger share of total costs. The second stage, which compares the effect of nonsubscription across different types of injuries, finds that non-traumatic injury claims were more responsive to nonsubscription than traumatic ones. In part, this disparity reflects the fact that private plans categorically exclude some non-traumatic injuries from the scope of coverage. Yet even those non-traumatic injuries that were not excluded from coverage declined more than traumatic injuries, consistent with aggressive claim screening by employers and/or a decline in over-claiming and over-utilization by employees in the nonsubscription environment. The third stage examines the effect of nonsubscription on severe, traumatic injuries, which are generally the least susceptible to reporting bias and moral hazard. The sizable and significant decline in such injuries is consistent with an improvement in real safety, although it could also be explained by aggressive claim screening. The final stage of the study probes whether four ubiquitous features of private plans – non-coverage of permanent partial disabilities, categorical exclusion of many diseases and some non-traumatic injuries, capped benefits, and lack of chiropractic care – explain the observed trends. Surprisingly, these features account for little of the estimated cost savings. Although many study participants describe limited provider choice and 24-hour reporting windows as major cost drivers, data limitations preclude me from identifying their respective impacts. Overall, my findings suggest an urgent need for policymakers to examine the economic and distributional effects of converting workers’ compensation from a cornerstone of the social welfare state into an op
{"title":"Rejecting the Grand Bargain: What Happens When Large Companies Opt Out of Workers’ Compensation?","authors":"Alison D. Morantz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2750134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2750134","url":null,"abstract":"The “grand bargain” of workers’ compensation, whereby workers relinquished the right to sue their employers in exchange for no-fault occupational injury insurance, was one of the great tort reforms of the Twentieth Century. However, there is one U.S. state that has always permitted employers to decline workers’ compensation coverage, and in which many firms (“nonsubscribers”) have chosen to do so: Texas. This study examines the impact of Texas nonsubscription on fifteen large, multistate nonsubscribers that provided their Texas employees with customized occupational injury insurance benefits (“private plans”) in lieu of workers’ compensation coverage between 1998 and 2010. As economic theory would lead one to expect, nonsubscription generated considerable cost savings. My preferred estimates suggest that costs per worker hour fell by about 44 percent. These savings were driven by a drop in the frequency of more serious claims involving replacement of lost wages, and by a decline in costs per claim. Both medical and wage-replacement costs fell substantially. Although the decline in wage-replacement costs was larger in percentage terms than the drop in medical costs, the latter was equally financially consequential since medical costs comprise a larger share of total costs. The second stage, which compares the effect of nonsubscription across different types of injuries, finds that non-traumatic injury claims were more responsive to nonsubscription than traumatic ones. In part, this disparity reflects the fact that private plans categorically exclude some non-traumatic injuries from the scope of coverage. Yet even those non-traumatic injuries that were not excluded from coverage declined more than traumatic injuries, consistent with aggressive claim screening by employers and/or a decline in over-claiming and over-utilization by employees in the nonsubscription environment. The third stage examines the effect of nonsubscription on severe, traumatic injuries, which are generally the least susceptible to reporting bias and moral hazard. The sizable and significant decline in such injuries is consistent with an improvement in real safety, although it could also be explained by aggressive claim screening. The final stage of the study probes whether four ubiquitous features of private plans – non-coverage of permanent partial disabilities, categorical exclusion of many diseases and some non-traumatic injuries, capped benefits, and lack of chiropractic care – explain the observed trends. Surprisingly, these features account for little of the estimated cost savings. Although many study participants describe limited provider choice and 24-hour reporting windows as major cost drivers, data limitations preclude me from identifying their respective impacts. Overall, my findings suggest an urgent need for policymakers to examine the economic and distributional effects of converting workers’ compensation from a cornerstone of the social welfare state into an op","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90158285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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