Pub Date : 2018-08-21DOI: 10.1007/s40881-018-0053-6
Tingting Fu, L. Putterman
{"title":"When is punishment harmful to cooperation? A note on antisocial and perverse punishment","authors":"Tingting Fu, L. Putterman","doi":"10.1007/s40881-018-0053-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-018-0053-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"4 1","pages":"151 - 164"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2018-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40881-018-0053-6","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52944689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-06-06DOI: 10.1007/s40881-018-0052-7
B. Rockenbach, Sebastian Schneiders, Marcin Waligora
{"title":"Pushing the bad away: reverse Tullock contests","authors":"B. Rockenbach, Sebastian Schneiders, Marcin Waligora","doi":"10.1007/s40881-018-0052-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-018-0052-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"4 1","pages":"73 - 85"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2018-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40881-018-0052-7","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52944602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-18DOI: 10.1007/s40881-018-0047-4
K. Sadiraj, A. Schram
{"title":"Inside information in Ponzi schemes","authors":"K. Sadiraj, A. Schram","doi":"10.1007/s40881-018-0047-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-018-0047-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"4 1","pages":"29 - 45"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2018-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40881-018-0047-4","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52944520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-03-15DOI: 10.1007/s40881-018-0046-5
Ingrid Burfurd, Tom Wilkening
{"title":"Experimental guidance for eliciting beliefs with the Stochastic Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism","authors":"Ingrid Burfurd, Tom Wilkening","doi":"10.1007/s40881-018-0046-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-018-0046-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"4 1","pages":"15 - 28"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2018-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40881-018-0046-5","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52944410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-01Epub Date: 2018-06-04DOI: 10.1007/s40881-018-0049-2
Alessio Gaggero, Simon Appleton, Lina Song
In this study we investigate the effect of framing on bribery behaviour. To do this, we replicate Barr and Serra (Exp Econ, 12(4):488-503, (2009) and carry out a simple one-shot bribery game that mimics corruption. In one treatment, we presented the experiment in a framed version, in which wording was embedded with social context; in the other, we removed the social context and presented the game in a neutral manner. The contribution of this paper is that it offers a comparison of framing effects in two highly corrupt countries: China and Uganda. Our results provide evidence of strong and significant framing effects for Uganda, but not for China.
{"title":"Framing effects on bribery behaviour: experimental evidence from China and Uganda.","authors":"Alessio Gaggero, Simon Appleton, Lina Song","doi":"10.1007/s40881-018-0049-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-018-0049-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this study we investigate the effect of framing on bribery behaviour. To do this, we replicate Barr and Serra (Exp Econ, 12(4):488-503, (2009) and carry out a simple one-shot bribery game that mimics corruption. In one treatment, we presented the experiment in a framed version, in which wording was embedded with social context; in the other, we removed the social context and presented the game in a neutral manner. The contribution of this paper is that it offers a comparison of framing effects in two highly corrupt countries: China and Uganda. Our results provide evidence of strong and significant framing effects for Uganda, but not for China.</p>","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"4 1","pages":"86-97"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40881-018-0049-2","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37164738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-11-16DOI: 10.1007/s40881-017-0043-0
Loukas Balafoutas, Helena Fornwagner
{"title":"The limits of guilt","authors":"Loukas Balafoutas, Helena Fornwagner","doi":"10.1007/s40881-017-0043-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-017-0043-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"3 1","pages":"137 - 148"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2017-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40881-017-0043-0","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52944271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We report results from a replication of Solnick (Econ Inq 39(2):189, 2001), which finds using an ultimatum game that, in relation to males, more is demanded from female proposers and less is offered to female responders. We conduct Solnick’s (2001) game using participants from a large US university and a large Chinese university. We find little evidence of gender differences across proposer and responder decisions in both locations.
{"title":"Revisiting gender differences in ultimatum bargaining: experimental evidence from the US and China","authors":"Shuwen Li, Xiangdong Qin, Daniel Houser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3050080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3050080","url":null,"abstract":"We report results from a replication of Solnick (Econ Inq 39(2):189, 2001), which finds using an ultimatum game that, in relation to males, more is demanded from female proposers and less is offered to female responders. We conduct Solnick’s (2001) game using participants from a large US university and a large Chinese university. We find little evidence of gender differences across proposer and responder decisions in both locations.","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"4 1","pages":"180-190"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2017-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/ssrn.3050080","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48124205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-07-01Epub Date: 2017-05-16DOI: 10.1007/s40881-017-0035-0
Antonio A Arechar, Gordon Kraft-Todd, David G Rand
Online experiments allow researchers to collect datasets at times not typical of laboratory studies. We recruit 2,336 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk to examine if participant characteristics and behaviors differ depending on whether the experiment is conducted during the day versus night, and on weekdays versus weekends. Participants make incentivized decisions involving prosociality, punishment, and discounting, and complete a demographic and personality survey. We find no time or day differences in behavior, but do find that participants at nights and on weekends are less experienced with online studies; on weekends are less reflective; and at night are less conscientious and more neurotic. These results are largely robust to finer grained measures of time and day. We also find that those who participated earlier in the course of the study are more experienced, reflective, and agreeable, but less charitable than later participants.
在线实验允许研究人员在实验室研究以外的时间收集数据集。我们从 Amazon Mechanical Turk 招募了 2,336 名参与者，研究参与者的特征和行为是否会因实验在白天还是晚上、工作日还是周末进行而有所不同。参与者会做出涉及亲社会性、惩罚和贴现的激励决策，并完成一项人口统计学和人格调查。我们没有发现时间或日期上的行为差异，但发现晚上和周末的参与者在线学习经验较少；周末的参与者反思能力较弱；晚上的参与者自觉性较差，神经质程度较高。这些结果在更细化的时间和日期测量中基本是稳健的。我们还发现，较早参与研究的人比较晚参与研究的人更有经验、更善于反思、更合群，但却不那么乐善好施。
{"title":"Turking Overtime: How Participant Characteristics and Behavior Vary Over Time and Day on Amazon Mechanical Turk.","authors":"Antonio A Arechar, Gordon Kraft-Todd, David G Rand","doi":"10.1007/s40881-017-0035-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s40881-017-0035-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Online experiments allow researchers to collect datasets at times not typical of laboratory studies. We recruit 2,336 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk to examine if participant characteristics and behaviors differ depending on whether the experiment is conducted during the day versus night, and on weekdays versus weekends. Participants make incentivized decisions involving prosociality, punishment, and discounting, and complete a demographic and personality survey. We find no time or day differences in behavior, but do find that participants at nights and on weekends are less experienced with online studies; on weekends are less reflective; and at night are less conscientious and more neurotic. These results are largely robust to finer grained measures of time and day. We also find that those who participated earlier in the course of the study are more experienced, reflective, and agreeable, but less charitable than later participants.</p>","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"3 1","pages":"1-11"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2017-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5675003/pdf/nihms877212.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"35545955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-06-12DOI: 10.1007/s40881-017-0037-y
Björn Bartling, T. Gesche, N. Netzer
{"title":"Does the absence of human sellers bias bidding behavior in auction experiments?","authors":"Björn Bartling, T. Gesche, N. Netzer","doi":"10.1007/s40881-017-0037-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-017-0037-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"3 1","pages":"44 - 61"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2017-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40881-017-0037-y","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46280206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the impact of human subjects in the role of a seller on bidding in experimental second-price auctions. Overbidding is a robust finding in second-price auctions, and spite among bidders has been advanced as an explanation. If spite extends to the seller, then the absence of human sellers who receive the auction revenue may bias upwards the bidding behavior in existing experimental auctions. We derive the equilibrium bidding function in a model where bidders have preferences regarding both the payoffs of other bidders and the seller’s revenue. Overbidding is optimal when buyers are spiteful only towards other buyers. However, optimal bids are lower and potentially even truthful when spite extends to the seller. We experimentally test the model predictions by exogenously varying the presence of human subjects in the roles of the seller and competing bidders. We do not detect a systematic effect of the presence of a human seller on overbidding. We conclude that overbidding is not an artefact of the standard experimental implementation of second-price auctions in which human sellers are absent.
{"title":"Does the absence of human sellers bias bidding behavior in auction experiments?","authors":"Björn Bartling, T. Gesche, N. Netzer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2770532","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2770532","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the impact of human subjects in the role of a seller on bidding in experimental second-price auctions. Overbidding is a robust finding in second-price auctions, and spite among bidders has been advanced as an explanation. If spite extends to the seller, then the absence of human sellers who receive the auction revenue may bias upwards the bidding behavior in existing experimental auctions. We derive the equilibrium bidding function in a model where bidders have preferences regarding both the payoffs of other bidders and the seller’s revenue. Overbidding is optimal when buyers are spiteful only towards other buyers. However, optimal bids are lower and potentially even truthful when spite extends to the seller. We experimentally test the model predictions by exogenously varying the presence of human subjects in the roles of the seller and competing bidders. We do not detect a systematic effect of the presence of a human seller on overbidding. We conclude that overbidding is not an artefact of the standard experimental implementation of second-price auctions in which human sellers are absent.","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"3 1","pages":"44-61"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2017-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49068217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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