This paper analyzes the last financial crisis in the perspective of financial innovation focussing on the dynamics of systemic externalities in banking. After discussing the peculiar nature of banking and its external effects to society, it shows that one major determinant of the financial crisis was the failure of regulation to address the evolution of financial intermediation under uncertainty. Differently from the standard explanations, which are variously based on unanticipated opportunism and/or irrationality of financial intermediaries, this analysis suggests that regulation has not been insufficient. On the contrary, regulation has been so overly demanding towards traditional banking to promote unregulated forms of financial intermediation, thereby exacerbating the externalities of financial innovation. In contrast to the initiatives of regulatory reform on both sides of the Atlantic, which address the accidental aspects of the last financial crisis, this paper contends that the overhaul of financial regulation should focus on the general problem of banks’ dealing with uncertainty. As uncertainty makes externalities in banking most dangerous, this approach could fare better in preventing the next crisis. Three major implications are derived from this analysis. First, regulation should avoid inducing banks to make leveraged bets on new forms of short-term funding in order to compete with unregulated intermediaries. The latter should be prevented from engaging in the functional core of banking, maturity transformation, which is the recurrent source of systemic externalities. Second, in relying upon ratings, regulation should correct the incentives it provides to rating agencies to inflate their grades by making them liable for rating intractable uncertainties instead of measurable risks. Finally, regulation should avoid tampering with the corporate governance of banks. Allowing bank managers to protect their autonomy via contractual choices is a more promising solution to short-termism in carrying out financial innovation than regulation of bankers’ pay.
{"title":"The Role and the Future of Regulation in the Financial Crisis: The Uncertainty Perspective","authors":"A. M. Pacces","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1551266","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1551266","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the last financial crisis in the perspective of financial innovation focussing on the dynamics of systemic externalities in banking. After discussing the peculiar nature of banking and its external effects to society, it shows that one major determinant of the financial crisis was the failure of regulation to address the evolution of financial intermediation under uncertainty. Differently from the standard explanations, which are variously based on unanticipated opportunism and/or irrationality of financial intermediaries, this analysis suggests that regulation has not been insufficient. On the contrary, regulation has been so overly demanding towards traditional banking to promote unregulated forms of financial intermediation, thereby exacerbating the externalities of financial innovation. In contrast to the initiatives of regulatory reform on both sides of the Atlantic, which address the accidental aspects of the last financial crisis, this paper contends that the overhaul of financial regulation should focus on the general problem of banks’ dealing with uncertainty. As uncertainty makes externalities in banking most dangerous, this approach could fare better in preventing the next crisis. Three major implications are derived from this analysis. First, regulation should avoid inducing banks to make leveraged bets on new forms of short-term funding in order to compete with unregulated intermediaries. The latter should be prevented from engaging in the functional core of banking, maturity transformation, which is the recurrent source of systemic externalities. Second, in relying upon ratings, regulation should correct the incentives it provides to rating agencies to inflate their grades by making them liable for rating intractable uncertainties instead of measurable risks. Finally, regulation should avoid tampering with the corporate governance of banks. Allowing bank managers to protect their autonomy via contractual choices is a more promising solution to short-termism in carrying out financial innovation than regulation of bankers’ pay.","PeriodicalId":10000,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Securities Regulation (Sub-Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81844213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There are important differences in the strong national one-stop regulation of derivatives markets in Australia compared to the new provincial regulation in Canada in the Derivatives Act 2008 (Quebec). Each jurisdiction has lessons for the other. This article builds on the common histories of Canadian and Australian financial services with an Australian analysis of the Quebec Act, Canadian provincial financial services regulation and Canada’s new ‘passport’ system for financial market regulation. The Quebec Act, designed to underpin the focusing of Canadian derivatives trading on the Montreal Exchange, is an important global precedent for modern derivatives regulation. It is in line with the IOSCO aims for financial market regulation, including licensing and clearing. It regulates OTC derivatives, with a carve-out for defined ‘accredited counterparties’, and it sets a different standard for the conduct of business by meeting the accepted standards of the derivatives industry. However, as financial markets continue to merge across national borders in the move towards globalisation, different jurisdictions like Australia and Canada continue to use different wording for the same concepts which does not facilitate the persuasive authority of local case law and regulatory releases.The future of the Quebec Act is uncertain, as it may be superseded if the Canadian federal government proceeds with its plan to establish a federal securities commission which would include regulation of exchange-traded derivatives. One model for the future is that participation by the Canadian provinces in a federal scheme may be on a voluntary basis, at least initially. Another model is a single federal regulator for all provinces other than Quebec, with a passport system between the new federal regulator and Quebec. Most provinces and territories are strong supporters of a federal regulatory body, while Quebec announced in July 2009 that it would challenge the constitutionality of the proposed federal legislation. Although this may impact on Quebec's derivatives market and regulation, the Quebec Act remains an important study in derivatives regulation.
{"title":"New Regulation of Derivatives Markets in Canada – An Australian Perspective","authors":"P. Latimer","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1601249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1601249","url":null,"abstract":"There are important differences in the strong national one-stop regulation of derivatives markets in Australia compared to the new provincial regulation in Canada in the Derivatives Act 2008 (Quebec). Each jurisdiction has lessons for the other. This article builds on the common histories of Canadian and Australian financial services with an Australian analysis of the Quebec Act, Canadian provincial financial services regulation and Canada’s new ‘passport’ system for financial market regulation. The Quebec Act, designed to underpin the focusing of Canadian derivatives trading on the Montreal Exchange, is an important global precedent for modern derivatives regulation. It is in line with the IOSCO aims for financial market regulation, including licensing and clearing. It regulates OTC derivatives, with a carve-out for defined ‘accredited counterparties’, and it sets a different standard for the conduct of business by meeting the accepted standards of the derivatives industry. However, as financial markets continue to merge across national borders in the move towards globalisation, different jurisdictions like Australia and Canada continue to use different wording for the same concepts which does not facilitate the persuasive authority of local case law and regulatory releases.The future of the Quebec Act is uncertain, as it may be superseded if the Canadian federal government proceeds with its plan to establish a federal securities commission which would include regulation of exchange-traded derivatives. One model for the future is that participation by the Canadian provinces in a federal scheme may be on a voluntary basis, at least initially. Another model is a single federal regulator for all provinces other than Quebec, with a passport system between the new federal regulator and Quebec. Most provinces and territories are strong supporters of a federal regulatory body, while Quebec announced in July 2009 that it would challenge the constitutionality of the proposed federal legislation. Although this may impact on Quebec's derivatives market and regulation, the Quebec Act remains an important study in derivatives regulation.","PeriodicalId":10000,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Securities Regulation (Sub-Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85141399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-10-06DOI: 10.1108/17576381011055325
Carolyn Sissoko
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to analyze the consequences of the “safe harbor” provisions of the US Bankruptcy Code that were enacted from 1984 through 2005 and that protect certain financial contracts from standard bankruptcy procedures. Design/methodology/approach - Qualitative methods are used to evaluate whether these provisions of the Bankruptcy Code were successful in their stated goal of reducing systemic risk in the financial system. A model of systemic risk is presented verbally in order to frame the discussion. Findings - Recent evidence indicates that the “safe harbor” provisions, in fact, destabilized the financial system by encouraging collateralized interbank lending, discouraging careful analysis of the credit risk of counterparties and increasing the risk that creditors will run on a financial firm. Practical implications - This paper indicates that the rewriting of the Bankruptcy Code to favor financial firms has had a profoundly destabilizing effect on the financial system. To put the financial system on more secure foundations, the author proposes that large complex financial institutions be prohibited from posting collateral on over the counter derivative transactions and that the repo-related bankruptcy amendments passed in 2005 be repealed. Originality/value - This paper proposes an original framework for understanding systemic risk which drives the results in the paper.
{"title":"The Legal Foundations of Financial Collapse","authors":"Carolyn Sissoko","doi":"10.1108/17576381011055325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/17576381011055325","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to analyze the consequences of the “safe harbor” provisions of the US Bankruptcy Code that were enacted from 1984 through 2005 and that protect certain financial contracts from standard bankruptcy procedures. Design/methodology/approach - Qualitative methods are used to evaluate whether these provisions of the Bankruptcy Code were successful in their stated goal of reducing systemic risk in the financial system. A model of systemic risk is presented verbally in order to frame the discussion. Findings - Recent evidence indicates that the “safe harbor” provisions, in fact, destabilized the financial system by encouraging collateralized interbank lending, discouraging careful analysis of the credit risk of counterparties and increasing the risk that creditors will run on a financial firm. Practical implications - This paper indicates that the rewriting of the Bankruptcy Code to favor financial firms has had a profoundly destabilizing effect on the financial system. To put the financial system on more secure foundations, the author proposes that large complex financial institutions be prohibited from posting collateral on over the counter derivative transactions and that the repo-related bankruptcy amendments passed in 2005 be repealed. Originality/value - This paper proposes an original framework for understanding systemic risk which drives the results in the paper.","PeriodicalId":10000,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Securities Regulation (Sub-Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87440375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract: The relationship between the investment firm and its (potential) client was traditionally the exclusive domain of private law. The leading role of private law in determining the investment firm-client relationship, however, has recently been put under pressure as a result of the EC securities regulation increasingly becoming relevant for this relationship. This article explores to what extent private law in the area of the investment firm-client relationship has been superseded by supervision standards following the implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) 2004 in national legal systems. The author concludes that although there has been a major shift in focus from private law to supervision standards, private law has not lost its importance for the investment firm-client relationship. As a result, private law and the way in which private law and supervision standards interact may have a major impact upon the ability of the MiFID to pursue its policy goals. It is submitted therefore that the EU legislator should take the relationship between national private law systems and the EC securities regulation much more seriously than this has been the case so far. Zusammenfassung: Das Verhältnis zwischen Wertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmen und seinen (potenziellen) Kunden war traditionell eine exklusive Domäne des Privatrechts. Diese Führungsrolle des Privatrechts bei der Feststellung des Verhältnisses zwischen dem Wertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmen und dem Kunden hat in letzter Zeit aufgrund der wachsenden Relevanz der Europäischen Union (EU) – Wertpapierregulierung innerhalb dieses Verhältnisses an Bedeutung eingebüßt. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, in welchem Umfang das Privatrecht im Bereich des Verhältnisses zwischen dem Wertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmen und dem Kunden durch die Aufsichtsstandards verdrängt wurde, die 2004 durch die Richtlinie über Märkte für Finanzinstrumente (MiFID) in die nationalen Rechtssysteme implementiert werden mussten. Der Verfasser folgert, dass obwohl eine große Akzentuierung vom Privatrecht zu den Aufsichtsstandards hin erfolgte, das Privatrecht für das Verhältnis zwischen dem Wertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmen und dem Kunden nicht an Bedeutung eingebüßt hat. Aus diesem Grund könnte das Privatrecht sowie die Weise, in der das Privatrecht und die Aufsichtsstandards zusammenwirken, einen entscheidenden Einfluss auf das Fähigkeit der MiFID haben, ihre politischen Ziele zu erreichen. Aus diesem Grund wird vorgeschlagen, dass der europäische Gesetzgeber das Verhältnis zwischen dem nationalen Privatrecht und der EU-Wertpapierregulierung ernster nehmen sollte, als er es bis jetzt getan hat.
{"title":"European Securities Regulation, Private Law and the Investment Firm-Client Relationship","authors":"O. Cherednychenko","doi":"10.54648/erpl2009056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/erpl2009056","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Abstract: The relationship between the investment firm and its (potential) client was traditionally the exclusive domain of private law. The leading role of private law in determining the investment firm-client relationship, however, has recently been put under pressure as a result of the EC securities regulation increasingly becoming relevant for this relationship. This article explores to what extent private law in the area of the investment firm-client relationship has been superseded by supervision standards following the implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) 2004 in national legal systems. The author concludes that although there has been a major shift in focus from private law to supervision standards, private law has not lost its importance for the investment firm-client relationship. As a result, private law and the way in which private law and supervision standards interact may have a major impact upon the ability of the MiFID to pursue its policy goals. It is submitted therefore that the EU legislator should take the relationship between national private law systems and the EC securities regulation much more seriously than this has been the case so far. \u0000Zusammenfassung: Das Verhältnis zwischen Wertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmen und seinen (potenziellen) Kunden war traditionell eine exklusive Domäne des Privatrechts. Diese Führungsrolle des Privatrechts bei der Feststellung des Verhältnisses zwischen dem Wertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmen und dem Kunden hat in letzter Zeit aufgrund der wachsenden Relevanz der Europäischen Union (EU) – Wertpapierregulierung innerhalb dieses Verhältnisses an Bedeutung eingebüßt. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, in welchem Umfang das Privatrecht im Bereich des Verhältnisses zwischen dem Wertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmen und dem Kunden durch die Aufsichtsstandards verdrängt wurde, die 2004 durch die Richtlinie über Märkte für Finanzinstrumente (MiFID) in die nationalen Rechtssysteme implementiert werden mussten. Der Verfasser folgert, dass obwohl eine große Akzentuierung vom Privatrecht zu den Aufsichtsstandards hin erfolgte, das Privatrecht für das Verhältnis zwischen dem Wertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmen und dem Kunden nicht an Bedeutung eingebüßt hat. Aus diesem Grund könnte das Privatrecht sowie die Weise, in der das Privatrecht und die Aufsichtsstandards zusammenwirken, einen entscheidenden Einfluss auf das Fähigkeit der MiFID haben, ihre politischen Ziele zu erreichen. Aus diesem Grund wird vorgeschlagen, dass der europäische Gesetzgeber das Verhältnis zwischen dem nationalen Privatrecht und der EU-Wertpapierregulierung ernster nehmen sollte, als er es bis jetzt getan hat.","PeriodicalId":10000,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Securities Regulation (Sub-Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85492380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This four-part study is a critical analysis of several reports dealing with the reform of the financial system in the United States. The study uses Minsky’s framework of analysis and focuses on the implications of Ponzi finance for regulatory and supervisory policies. The main conclusion of the study is that, while all reports make some valuable suggestions, they fail to deal with the socioeconomic dynamics that emerge during long periods of economic stability. As a consequence, it is highly doubtful that the principal suggestions contained in the reports will provide any applicable means to limit the worsening of financial fragility over periods of economic stability. The study also concludes that any meaningful systemic and prudential regulatory changes should focus on the analysis of expected and actual cash flows (sources and stability) rather than capital equity, and on preventing the emergence of Ponzi processes. The latter tend to emerge over long periods of economic stability and are not necessarily engineered by crooks. On the contrary, the pursuit of economic growth may involve the extensive use of Ponzi financial processes in legal economic activities. The study argues that some Ponzi processes - more precisely, pyramid Ponzi processes - should not be allowed to proceed, no matter how severe the immediate impact on economic growth, standards of living, or competitiveness. This is so because pyramid Ponzi processes always collapse, regardless how efficient financial markets are, how well informed and well behaved individuals are, or whether there is a 'bubble' or not. The longer the process is allowed to proceed, the more destructive it becomes. Pyramid Ponzi processes cannot be risk-managed or buffered against; if economic growth is to be based on a solid financial foundation, these processes cannot be allowed to continue. Finally, a supervisory and regulatory process focused on detecting Ponzi processes would be much more flexible and adaptive, since it would not be preoccupied with either functional or product limits, or with arbitrary ratios of 'prudence.' Rather, it would oversee all financial institutions and all products, no matter how new or marginal they might be. See also, Working Paper Nos. 574.1, 574.3, and 574.4.
{"title":"A Critical Assessment of Seven Reports on Financial Reform: A Minskyan Perspective, Part II","authors":"Éric Tymoigne","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1458485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1458485","url":null,"abstract":"This four-part study is a critical analysis of several reports dealing with the reform of the financial system in the United States. The study uses Minsky’s framework of analysis and focuses on the implications of Ponzi finance for regulatory and supervisory policies. The main conclusion of the study is that, while all reports make some valuable suggestions, they fail to deal with the socioeconomic dynamics that emerge during long periods of economic stability. As a consequence, it is highly doubtful that the principal suggestions contained in the reports will provide any applicable means to limit the worsening of financial fragility over periods of economic stability. The study also concludes that any meaningful systemic and prudential regulatory changes should focus on the analysis of expected and actual cash flows (sources and stability) rather than capital equity, and on preventing the emergence of Ponzi processes. The latter tend to emerge over long periods of economic stability and are not necessarily engineered by crooks. On the contrary, the pursuit of economic growth may involve the extensive use of Ponzi financial processes in legal economic activities. The study argues that some Ponzi processes - more precisely, pyramid Ponzi processes - should not be allowed to proceed, no matter how severe the immediate impact on economic growth, standards of living, or competitiveness. This is so because pyramid Ponzi processes always collapse, regardless how efficient financial markets are, how well informed and well behaved individuals are, or whether there is a 'bubble' or not. The longer the process is allowed to proceed, the more destructive it becomes. Pyramid Ponzi processes cannot be risk-managed or buffered against; if economic growth is to be based on a solid financial foundation, these processes cannot be allowed to continue. Finally, a supervisory and regulatory process focused on detecting Ponzi processes would be much more flexible and adaptive, since it would not be preoccupied with either functional or product limits, or with arbitrary ratios of 'prudence.' Rather, it would oversee all financial institutions and all products, no matter how new or marginal they might be. See also, Working Paper Nos. 574.1, 574.3, and 574.4.","PeriodicalId":10000,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Securities Regulation (Sub-Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82028179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Paola Musile Tanzi, Adalberto Alberici, G. Gabbi, Manuela Gallo, L. Nadotti, R. Pisani, Maurizio Poli, D. Previati, Paola Schwizer, Valeria Stefanelli, Renata Trinca Colonel
This research focuses on the advancement of the Compliance function within banks, investment and insurance companies and on the effect of applying Community regulations as called for by the MiFID Directive. Eighty four financial intermediaries: banks, investment companies and insurance companies took part in this research. Two criteria have been used to interpret the results: 1) the prevailing workability within international and domestic intermediaries; 2) the intermediary typology, creating a distinction between banks, and of these cooperative banks, other financial intermediaries (investment companies) and insurance companies. The research continues what was carried out during 2007, where thirty five intermediaries, namely banks and investment companies were appraised. The present research broadens the spectrum to also include insurance companies. The data was collected using a questionnaire created and analysed by a group of researchers of the Research Division of SDA Bocconi School of Management. The collection phase of the data began in January 2009 and ended in March 2009. The research activity was carried out with the support of SIA SSB Group and in collaboration with AICOM (Associazione Italiana Compliance). With reference to the contents within this study is divided into four research areas: 1) positioning of the Compliance function within the organization; 2) the roles attributed to the Compliance function; 3) the methods used to measure, transfer and mitigate Compliance risk within investment services; 4) how the Compliance function interacts within and outside its structure. A fifth section is included in this report which focuses on the methodology of the research. The research is divided into three parts: I) the main progression steps of the Compliance function within financial intermediaries; II) how the MiFID compliant rules of the game have evolved in the investment services; III) the aim, the sample under investigation and the research methodology.
{"title":"The Evolution of Compliance Function and Compliance Risk in Investment Services","authors":"Paola Musile Tanzi, Adalberto Alberici, G. Gabbi, Manuela Gallo, L. Nadotti, R. Pisani, Maurizio Poli, D. Previati, Paola Schwizer, Valeria Stefanelli, Renata Trinca Colonel","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1446759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1446759","url":null,"abstract":"This research focuses on the advancement of the Compliance function within banks, investment and insurance companies and on the effect of applying Community regulations as called for by the MiFID Directive. Eighty four financial intermediaries: banks, investment companies and insurance companies took part in this research. Two criteria have been used to interpret the results: 1) the prevailing workability within international and domestic intermediaries; 2) the intermediary typology, creating a distinction between banks, and of these cooperative banks, other financial intermediaries (investment companies) and insurance companies. The research continues what was carried out during 2007, where thirty five intermediaries, namely banks and investment companies were appraised. The present research broadens the spectrum to also include insurance companies. The data was collected using a questionnaire created and analysed by a group of researchers of the Research Division of SDA Bocconi School of Management. The collection phase of the data began in January 2009 and ended in March 2009. The research activity was carried out with the support of SIA SSB Group and in collaboration with AICOM (Associazione Italiana Compliance). With reference to the contents within this study is divided into four research areas: 1) positioning of the Compliance function within the organization; 2) the roles attributed to the Compliance function; 3) the methods used to measure, transfer and mitigate Compliance risk within investment services; 4) how the Compliance function interacts within and outside its structure. A fifth section is included in this report which focuses on the methodology of the research. The research is divided into three parts: I) the main progression steps of the Compliance function within financial intermediaries; II) how the MiFID compliant rules of the game have evolved in the investment services; III) the aim, the sample under investigation and the research methodology.","PeriodicalId":10000,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Securities Regulation (Sub-Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87682533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-04-29DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2009.00322.x
G. Karolyi
This article discusses the main contributions and findings of Hochberg, Sapienza and Vissing-Jorgensen's 'A Lobbying Approach to Evaluating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.' I offer a synopsis of the Journal of Accounting Research conference discussion of the paper as well as provide some broader perspectives on the two main lines of inquiry to which the paper contributes. The first perspective focuses on the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and, in particular, how this study and others face the challenge of benchmarking of the price and quantity effects of the Act. I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the authors' identification strategy that separates out firms whose insiders actively lobbied the Securities and Exchange Commission's rule-making process in the aftermath of SOX. The second perspective considers the motivations for and consequences of lobbying activity. I survey existing research in Economics, Accounting and Management which shows that lobbying propensity is predictable, confirms it is most likely to be conducted by agents most affected by the rule changes, but also warns that there are firm-specific, industry-specific, and even issue-specific factors that can complicate these interpretations.
{"title":"Discussion of 'A Lobbying Approach to Evaluating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002'","authors":"G. Karolyi","doi":"10.1111/j.1475-679X.2009.00322.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2009.00322.x","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses the main contributions and findings of Hochberg, Sapienza and Vissing-Jorgensen's 'A Lobbying Approach to Evaluating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.' I offer a synopsis of the Journal of Accounting Research conference discussion of the paper as well as provide some broader perspectives on the two main lines of inquiry to which the paper contributes. The first perspective focuses on the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and, in particular, how this study and others face the challenge of benchmarking of the price and quantity effects of the Act. I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the authors' identification strategy that separates out firms whose insiders actively lobbied the Securities and Exchange Commission's rule-making process in the aftermath of SOX. The second perspective considers the motivations for and consequences of lobbying activity. I survey existing research in Economics, Accounting and Management which shows that lobbying propensity is predictable, confirms it is most likely to be conducted by agents most affected by the rule changes, but also warns that there are firm-specific, industry-specific, and even issue-specific factors that can complicate these interpretations.","PeriodicalId":10000,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Securities Regulation (Sub-Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91421899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This is the congressional testimony of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., before the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.
这是小约翰·c·科菲教授在美国参议院银行、住房和城市事务委员会面前的国会证词。
{"title":"Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities Markets","authors":"J. Coffee","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1372194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1372194","url":null,"abstract":"This is the congressional testimony of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., before the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.","PeriodicalId":10000,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Securities Regulation (Sub-Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90968617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is a great deal of confusion regarding the factors that led to Enron's collapse. This important book addresses this problem by providing a coherent explanation of the accounting and finance problems associated with the collapse. The Skilling-Lay trial, as it is related to accounting or finance issues, is critically described as well. Through its well-balanced take on events surrounding the trial, the book therefore enables readers to analyze the validity of the arguments offered by the U.S. attorneys.
{"title":"Accounting/Finance Lessons of Enron: A Case Study","authors":"H. Bierman","doi":"10.1142/6706","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/6706","url":null,"abstract":"There is a great deal of confusion regarding the factors that led to Enron's collapse. This important book addresses this problem by providing a coherent explanation of the accounting and finance problems associated with the collapse. The Skilling-Lay trial, as it is related to accounting or finance issues, is critically described as well. Through its well-balanced take on events surrounding the trial, the book therefore enables readers to analyze the validity of the arguments offered by the U.S. attorneys.","PeriodicalId":10000,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Securities Regulation (Sub-Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78084899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Overinvestment in certain firms or sectors induced by corporate fraud, where informed insiders strategically manipulate outside investors' beliefs by exaggerating financial performance and economic prospects, has been endemic historically, and has recently attracted much attention. Building on the coordination problem faced by dispersed and changing owners of widely-held firms, we present a theory that reconciles corporate fraud and overinvestment in efficient capital markets. Shareholders attempt to design managerial compensation contracts to both elicit valuable information from insiders and to ameliorate their investment coordination problem. However, for a wide range of conditions, the optimal contract induces overstatements by managers, i.e., exaggerated disclosures regarding future investment opportunities, and subsequent overinvestment by rational investors. Our framework helps explain why instances of corporate fraud and overinvestment tend to follow the introduction of new technologies, concentrate in industries with valuable growth options, and intensify when firms have better access to external capital markets. We also link managerial career concerns to the likelihood of overinvestment, compare information precision in internal versus external capital markets, and provide a new perspective on the design of corporate charters.
{"title":"Overinvestment and Corporate Fraud in Efficient Capital Markets","authors":"Nisan Langberg, Praveen Kumar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.894904","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.894904","url":null,"abstract":"Overinvestment in certain firms or sectors induced by corporate fraud, where informed insiders strategically manipulate outside investors' beliefs by exaggerating financial performance and economic prospects, has been endemic historically, and has recently attracted much attention. Building on the coordination problem faced by dispersed and changing owners of widely-held firms, we present a theory that reconciles corporate fraud and overinvestment in efficient capital markets. Shareholders attempt to design managerial compensation contracts to both elicit valuable information from insiders and to ameliorate their investment coordination problem. However, for a wide range of conditions, the optimal contract induces overstatements by managers, i.e., exaggerated disclosures regarding future investment opportunities, and subsequent overinvestment by rational investors. Our framework helps explain why instances of corporate fraud and overinvestment tend to follow the introduction of new technologies, concentrate in industries with valuable growth options, and intensify when firms have better access to external capital markets. We also link managerial career concerns to the likelihood of overinvestment, compare information precision in internal versus external capital markets, and provide a new perspective on the design of corporate charters.","PeriodicalId":10000,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Securities Regulation (Sub-Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80063855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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