Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume最新文献

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II—Lost Memory and Contested Recollection: A Response to Professor Adamson 失去的记忆和有争议的回忆:对亚当森教授的回应

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume

Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/ARISUP/AKZ005

G. Boys-Stones

引用次数: 0

I—The Virtues of Relativism 1、相对主义的优点

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume

Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/ARISUP/AKZ013

M. Baghramian

引用次数: 14

I—What Is Impostor Syndrome? 什么是冒名顶替综合症?

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume

Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/ARISUP/AKZ003

K. Hawley

People are described as suffering from impostor syndrome when they feel that their external markers of success are unwarranted, and fear being revealed as a fraud. Impostor syndrome is commonly framed as a troubling individual pathology, to be overcome through self-help strategies or therapy. But in many situations an individual’s impostor attitudes can be epistemically justified, even if they are factually mistaken: hostile social environments can create epistemic obstacles to self-knowledge. The concept of impostor syndrome prevalent in popular culture needs greater critical scrutiny, as does its source, the concept of impostor phenomenon which features in psychological research.

当人们觉得自己外在的成功标志是没有根据的，并且害怕被发现是骗子时，他们就会被描述为患有骗子综合症。冒充者综合症通常被认为是一种令人不安的个体病理，需要通过自助策略或治疗来克服。但在许多情况下，个人的冒名顶替态度在认识论上是合理的，即使他们实际上是错误的:敌对的社会环境会给自我认识造成认识论上的障碍。流行文化中流行的冒名顶替综合症的概念需要更严格的审查，它的来源，心理学研究中的冒名顶替现象的概念也需要更严格的审查。

引用次数: 9

II—What Should ‘Impostor Syndrome’ Be? “骗子综合症”应该是什么?

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume

Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/ARISUP/AKZ006

S. Paul

引用次数: 6

II—Deception and the Desires That Speak against It 欺骗和反对欺骗的欲望

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume

Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/ARISUP/AKZ012

Christoph Fehige, U. Wessels

引用次数: 0

II—Waking, Knowing, and Being Conscious 二、觉醒、认知和意识

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume

Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/ARISUP/AKZ009

J. Stazicker

引用次数: 0

I—Waking Up and Being Conscious 1 .醒来并保持意识

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume

Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/ARISUP/AKZ002

Matthew Soteriou

引用次数: 3

I—Prospects for a Naturalistic Explanation of the Good 一、对善的自然主义解释的展望

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume

Pub Date : 2018-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/ARISUP/AKY001

Christine M. Korsgaard

In this paper I explore the possibility of explaining why there is such a thing as the good in naturalistic terms. More specifically, I seek an explanation of the fact that some things are good-for human beings and the other animals in the final sense of good: worth aiming at. I trace the existence of the final good to the existence of conscious agents. I propose that the final good for an animal is her own well-functioning as the kind of creature she is, taken as an end of action, and that having this as her final good makes her better at the activity she is necessarily engaged in, namely living. I. The Problem Lately I have been working on a theory of the good which aspires to be, in a certain sense, naturalistic (Korsgaard, 2013; 2014/2015; 2018, chapter 2). The sense of ‘naturalistic’ that I have in mind is explanatory rather than reductive. What I mean is that I am looking for a way to explain why there is such a thing as the good — why some things are good and some are bad, some things are better and some are worse. I seek an explanation that does not appeal to any irreducibly normative facts, and is consistent with a scientific conception of the world, but does not aspire to reduce the good to something else like pleasure or the satisfaction of desire. I accept the sort of argument, associated with G. E. Moore Prospects for a Naturalistic Explanation of the Good Christine M. Korsgaard p. 2 2 (1903) but originally advanced by Richard Price (1758) that says that although such things could turn out in fact to be good, or could even turn out to be ‘The Good,’ we cannot simply identify the concept of the good with any natural property or condition. The concept of the good might apply to pleasure or satisfaction, but it is not the concept of pleasure or satisfaction. For reasons I will explain, the sense of ‘good’ that I take to be most fundamental is what I call the ‘final’ sense of good, in contrast with what I call the ‘evaluative’ or ‘functional’ sense of the good. Speaking roughly, something is evaluatively or functionally good when it has the properties that enable it to serve its function or to serve it well. Something is finally good when it is the sort of thing that is worth having, or aiming at, for its own sake. In this paper, what I have to say will be limited in one important way. Elsewhere I have argued that the notion of something’s being good for someone — that is for some person, animal, or group — is prior to the notion of something’s being good simply or absolutely (Korsgaard, 2013, 2014/2015, section 2). It is prior in the sense that you can construct a conception of what is good absolutely out of a conception of what is good for someone, but not the reverse. If you start with a conception of what is good absolutely, it is impossible to arrive at an intelligible conception of something’s being good for someone, a notion that identifies the ‘forness’ relation in the right way. For purposes of this paper I take that as a given,

在这篇论文中，我探讨了用自然主义的术语来解释为什么存在“善”这种东西的可能性。更具体地说，我寻求一个事实的解释，即有些事情对人类和其他动物是好的，在最终意义上是好的:值得瞄准。我把终极善的存在追溯到意识主体的存在。我认为，动物的终极善，是她作为生物自身的良好运作，作为行动的目的，把这作为她的终极善，使她更擅长她必须从事的活动，也就是生活。最近，我一直在研究一种善的理论，在某种意义上，它渴望成为自然主义的(Korsgaard, 2013;2014/2015;我心目中的“自然主义”感是解释性的，而不是还原性的。我的意思是，我在寻找一种方法来解释为什么会有好的东西——为什么有些东西是好的，有些是坏的，有些东西是好的，有些是坏的。我寻求一种解释，它不诉诸任何不可简化的规范事实，与科学的世界观相一致，但不渴望将善简化为快乐或欲望的满足之类的东西。我接受与g·e·摩尔关于善的自然主义解释的展望(Christine M. Korsgaard p. 22(1903))有关的论点，但最初是由理查德·普赖斯(Richard Price)(1758)提出的，该论点认为，尽管这些事情实际上可能是好的，或者甚至可能是“好”，但我们不能简单地将善的概念与任何自然属性或条件等同起来。善的概念可能适用于快乐或满足，但它不是快乐或满足的概念。由于我将解释的原因，我认为最基本的“善”感是我所谓的“最终”善感，与我所谓的“评估”或“功能”善感形成对比。粗略地说，当某物具有使其能够服务于其功能或很好地服务于其功能的属性时，它在评估上或功能上是好的。当某样东西本身就值得拥有或追求时，它就是好的。在本文中，我所要讲的内容将受到一个重要方面的限制。在其他地方，我认为某物对某人有益的概念-即对某些人，动物或群体有益-先于某物简单或绝对有益的概念(Korsgaard, 2013, 2014/2015，第2节)。它是先验的，因为你可以从对某人有益的概念中构建出绝对有益的概念，而不是相反。如果你从一个绝对好的概念开始，就不可能得出一个可理解的概念，即某物对某人有好处，这个概念以正确的方式识别了" forness "关系。为了本文的目的，我认为这是一个既定的事实，因此，事实上，我认为，简单地将善与某种自然属性等同起来，往往会阻碍解释它为何存在的任何努力。对善的自然主义解释的展望Christine M. Korsgaard，第33页我想要解释的观点是某事对某人是好的。所以在这篇论文中，我将探讨产生一种自然主义解释的前景，解释为什么存在所谓的善，即在最终的善的意义上，对某人来说什么是善。特别是，我将探索这样一个事实的前景，即存在这样一种东西，即意识主体的存在的好处，因为在我看来，这是最有希望探索的方向。2关于为什么存在功能性善或可评估性善的自然主义解释首先，我将从可评估性善或可评估性善的自然主义定义入手。当某物具有使其能够很好地发挥其功能的属性时，它在评价或功能意义上是好的。我在这里使用的"功能"的概念，是我认为亚里士多德在谈到事物的"原初"时所使用的概念。在“亚里士多德的功能论证”中，我认为，虽然对于某些事物来说，将“ergon”与事物的目的联系起来是有意义的，但对于更复杂的实体来说，亚里士多德的想法更好地体现在思考“事物如何做它所做的事情”，即它做它特有的事情的方式(Korsgaard 2008, pp. 134-140;特别是138139年)。这其中的一个含义是，只有了解事物如何工作的人才真正知道它的功能是什么。我们都知道电脑有很多用途:文字处理、文件存储、上网等等。但只有计算机科学家知道计算机是如何工作的，还有《对善的自然主义解释的展望》克里斯汀·m·科斯加德，第44页，所以它是如何做这些事情的，谁知道它的功能。

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引用次数: 1

II—‘This Is the Bad Case’: What Brains in Vats Can Know “这是一个糟糕的情况”:缸里的大脑能知道什么

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume

Pub Date : 2018-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/ARISUP/AKY011

Aidan McGlynn

引用次数: 2

I—Plato’s Philebus and Some ‘Value of Knowledge’ Problems 柏拉图的《菲利伯斯》与“知识的价值”问题

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume

Pub Date : 2018-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/ARISUP/AKY013

V. Harte

引用次数: 0

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