{"title":"II—Plato on the Value of Knowledge in Ruling","authors":"M. Lane","doi":"10.1093/ARISUP/AKY010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ARISUP/AKY010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"16 1","pages":"49-67"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87798257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I argue that a pragmatic scepticism about metaphysical modality is a perfectly reasonable position to maintain. I then illustrate the difficulties and limitations associated with some strategies for defeating such scepticism. These strategies appeal to associations between metaphysical modality and the following: objective probability, counterfactuals and distinctive explanatory value.
{"title":"W(h)ither Metaphysical Necessity","authors":"John Divers","doi":"10.1093/ARISUP/AKY008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ARISUP/AKY008","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that a pragmatic scepticism about metaphysical modality is a perfectly reasonable position to maintain. I then illustrate the difficulties and limitations associated with some strategies for defeating such scepticism. These strategies appeal to associations between metaphysical modality and the following: objective probability, counterfactuals and distinctive explanatory value.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"7 1","pages":"1-25"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83682794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Epistemic Externalism offers one of the most prominent responses to the sceptical challenge. Externalism has commonly been interpreted (not least by externalists themselves) as postulating a crucial asymmetry between the actual world agent and their brain-in-a-vat (BIV) counterpart: while the actual agent is in a position to know she is not envatted, her BIV counterpart is not in a position to know that she is envatted, or in other words only the former is in a position to know whether or not she is envatted. In this paper, I argue that there is in fact no such asymmetry: assuming epistemic externalism, both the actual world agent and their BIV counterpart are in a position to know whether or not they are envatted. After an introduction (I), I present the main argument (II). I examine to what extent the argument survives when one accepts additional externalist-friendly commitments: semantic externalism, a sensitivity condition on knowledge, and epistemic contextualism (III). Finally, I discuss the implications of my conclusion to a variety of debates in epistemology (IV).
{"title":"I—How Both You and the Brain in a Vat Can Know Whether or Not You Are Envatted","authors":"Ofra Magidor","doi":"10.1093/ARISUP/AKY009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ARISUP/AKY009","url":null,"abstract":"Epistemic Externalism offers one of the most prominent responses to the sceptical challenge. Externalism has commonly been interpreted (not least by externalists themselves) as postulating a crucial asymmetry between the actual world agent and their brain-in-a-vat (BIV) counterpart: while the actual agent is in a position to know she is not envatted, her BIV counterpart is not in a position to know that she is envatted, or in other words only the former is in a position to know whether or not she is envatted. In this paper, I argue that there is in fact no such asymmetry: assuming epistemic externalism, both the actual world agent and their BIV counterpart are in a position to know whether or not they are envatted. After an introduction (I), I present the main argument (II). I examine to what extent the argument survives when one accepts additional externalist-friendly commitments: semantic externalism, a sensitivity condition on knowledge, and epistemic contextualism (III). Finally, I discuss the implications of my conclusion to a variety of debates in epistemology (IV).","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"40 1","pages":"151-181"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86666394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Powers have, in recent years, become a central component of many philosophers’ ontology of properties. While I have argued that powers exist at the fundamental level of properties, many other theorists of powers hold that there are non-fundamental powers also. In this paper I articulate my reasons for being sceptical about the existing reasons for holding that there are non-fundamental powers. However, I also want to promote a different argument for the existence of a certain class of non-fundamental powers: properties whose existence and nature have natural selection to thank. Such properties will include functional properties of organisms and so may include their mental properties also.
{"title":"I—Fundamental Powers, Evolved Powers, and Mental Powers","authors":"A. Bird","doi":"10.1093/ARISUP/AKY006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ARISUP/AKY006","url":null,"abstract":"Powers have, in recent years, become a central component of many philosophers’ ontology of properties. While I have argued that powers exist at the fundamental level of properties, many other theorists of powers hold that there are non-fundamental powers also. In this paper I articulate my reasons for being sceptical about the existing reasons for holding that there are non-fundamental powers. However, I also want to promote a different argument for the existence of a certain class of non-fundamental powers: properties whose existence and nature have natural selection to thank. Such properties will include functional properties of organisms and so may include their mental properties also.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"1 1","pages":"247-275"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86577877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"II—Self-Awareness and Korsgaard’s Naturalistic Explanation of the Good","authors":"M. Rowlands","doi":"10.1093/ARISUP/AKY012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ARISUP/AKY012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"81 1","pages":"133-149"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83905874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"I—Culture and Critique","authors":"S. Haslanger","doi":"10.1093/ARISUP/AKX001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ARISUP/AKX001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"49 1","pages":"149-173"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83369212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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