{"title":"P. F. Strawson, Moral Theories and ‘The Problem of Blame’: ‘Freedom and Resentment’ Revisited","authors":"Marian Alvarez","doi":"10.1093/ARISUP/AKAB001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ARISUP/AKAB001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"95 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73502142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Culpability, Blame, and the Moral Dynamics of Social Power","authors":"Catriona Mackenzie","doi":"10.1093/ARISUP/AKAB002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ARISUP/AKAB002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81369288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Modal contingentists face a dilemma: there are two attractive principles of which they can only accept one. In this paper I show that the most natural way of resolving the dilemma leads to expressive limitations. I then develop an alternative resolution. In addition to overcoming the expressive limitations, the alternative picture allows for an attractive account of arithmetic and for a style of semantic theorizing that can be helpful to contingentists.
{"title":"Beta-Conversion and the Being Constraint","authors":"Agustín Rayo","doi":"10.1093/ARISUP/AKAB009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ARISUP/AKAB009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Modal contingentists face a dilemma: there are two attractive principles of which they can only accept one. In this paper I show that the most natural way of resolving the dilemma leads to expressive limitations. I then develop an alternative resolution. In addition to overcoming the expressive limitations, the alternative picture allows for an attractive account of arithmetic and for a style of semantic theorizing that can be helpful to contingentists.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80733208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Erratum to: Beta-Conversion and the Being Constraint","authors":"Agustín Rayo","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akab014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akab014","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"329 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80448240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The problem of consciousness arises when we depsychologize consciousness—that is, conceptualize it in terms of phenomenal feel rather than psychological function. Panpsychism offers an elegant solution to the problem, which takes depsychologization seriously. In doing so, however, it also illustrates the perils of depsychologization. Nagasawa highlights one dead end for panpsychism, and I shall argue that there are more. Panpsychism consigns consciousness to a metaphysical limbo where it is beyond the reach of science and lacks ethical and personal significance. The moral is that we should retrace our steps and question the depsychologized conception itself.
{"title":"Panpsychism and the Depsychologization of Consciousness","authors":"Keith Frankish","doi":"10.1093/ARISUP/AKAB012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ARISUP/AKAB012","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The problem of consciousness arises when we depsychologize consciousness—that is, conceptualize it in terms of phenomenal feel rather than psychological function. Panpsychism offers an elegant solution to the problem, which takes depsychologization seriously. In doing so, however, it also illustrates the perils of depsychologization. Nagasawa highlights one dead end for panpsychism, and I shall argue that there are more. Panpsychism consigns consciousness to a metaphysical limbo where it is beyond the reach of science and lacks ethical and personal significance. The moral is that we should retrace our steps and question the depsychologized conception itself.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"95 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75433646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Section I states Sandis’s view in his paper (particularism for actions, generalism for dispositions); Section II describes and begins to criticize Dancy-style particularism; Section III applies these criticisms to Sandis’s view; Section IV delineates an alternative view (my own) about actions, dispositions, and the particularism/generalism debate; Section V raises and considers a further puzzle, about how in general we should understand virtue ascriptions anyway.
{"title":"To Live Outside the Law You Must Be Honest","authors":"S. Chappell","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akab007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akab007","url":null,"abstract":"Section I states Sandis’s view in his paper (particularism for actions, generalism for dispositions); Section II describes and begins to criticize Dancy-style particularism; Section III applies these criticisms to Sandis’s view; Section IV delineates an alternative view (my own) about actions, dispositions, and the particularism/generalism debate; Section V raises and considers a further puzzle, about how in general we should understand virtue ascriptions anyway.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75471515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Moral particularism is often conceived as the view that there are no moral principles. However, its most fêted accounts focus almost exclusively on rules regarding actions and their features. Such action-centred particularism is, I argue, compatible with generalism at the level of character traits. The resulting view is a form of particularist virtue ethics. This endorses directives of the form ‘Be X’ but rejects any implication that the relevant X-ness must therefore always count in favour of an action.
{"title":"Virtue Ethics and Particularism","authors":"C. Sandis","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akab013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akab013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Moral particularism is often conceived as the view that there are no moral principles. However, its most fêted accounts focus almost exclusively on rules regarding actions and their features. Such action-centred particularism is, I argue, compatible with generalism at the level of character traits. The resulting view is a form of particularist virtue ethics. This endorses directives of the form ‘Be X’ but rejects any implication that the relevant X-ness must therefore always count in favour of an action.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"87 2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91150509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Toxic speech inflicts damage to mental and physical health. This process can be chronic or acute, temporary or permanent. Understanding how toxic speech inflicts these harms requires both an account of linguistic practices and, because language is inherently social, tools from epidemiology. This paper explores what we can learn from two epidemiological models: a common source model that emphasizes poisons, and a propagated transmission model that better fits contagions like viruses.
{"title":"Discursive Epidemiology: Two Models","authors":"Lynne Tirrell","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akab008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akab008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Toxic speech inflicts damage to mental and physical health. This process can be chronic or acute, temporary or permanent. Understanding how toxic speech inflicts these harms requires both an account of linguistic practices and, because language is inherently social, tools from epidemiology. This paper explores what we can learn from two epidemiological models: a common source model that emphasizes poisons, and a propagated transmission model that better fits contagions like viruses.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80951371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Two prejudices have hampered our understanding of John Stuart Mill’s central argument for free speech. One prejudice is that arguments for free speech can only be made in terms of values or rights. This prejudice causes us to miss the depth of Mill’s argument. He does not argue that silencing speech is harmful or violates rights, but instead that silencing speech is a uniquely self-undermining act; it undermines the ground upon which it is based. But even if we overcome this prejudice and appreciate the self-undermining character of Mill’s argument, the prejudice that epistemic justification is a completable task blinds us to the role of open-mindedness in his argument; and failing to see this leads us to wrongly conclude that his argument is invalid. It is only once we have overcome both prejudices that we can appreciate the depth and power of Mill’s argument for free speech.
两种偏见阻碍了我们对约翰•斯图尔特•密尔(John Stuart Mill)关于言论自由的核心论点的理解。一种偏见是，对言论自由的争论只能从价值观或权利的角度出发。这种偏见使我们错过了密尔论证的深度。他并不认为压制言论是有害的或侵犯了权利，而是认为压制言论是一种独特的自我破坏行为;它破坏了它赖以存在的基础。但即使我们克服了这种偏见并欣赏了密尔论证的自我破坏特征，认知证明是一项可完成的任务的偏见也使我们看不到他的论证中开放性的作用;如果看不到这一点，我们就会错误地得出结论，认为他的论证是无效的。只有当我们克服了这两种偏见，我们才能欣赏密尔关于言论自由的论证的深度和力量。
{"title":"Why Censorship is Self-Undermining: John Stuart Mill’s Neglected Argument for Free Speech","authors":"N. Shah","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akab010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akab010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Two prejudices have hampered our understanding of John Stuart Mill’s central argument for free speech. One prejudice is that arguments for free speech can only be made in terms of values or rights. This prejudice causes us to miss the depth of Mill’s argument. He does not argue that silencing speech is harmful or violates rights, but instead that silencing speech is a uniquely self-undermining act; it undermines the ground upon which it is based. But even if we overcome this prejudice and appreciate the self-undermining character of Mill’s argument, the prejudice that epistemic justification is a completable task blinds us to the role of open-mindedness in his argument; and failing to see this leads us to wrongly conclude that his argument is invalid. It is only once we have overcome both prejudices that we can appreciate the depth and power of Mill’s argument for free speech.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74526327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Deep personal relationships involve deep mutual understanding and strong mutual affection. This paper focuses on whether having deep personal relationships is one of the elements of well-being. Roger Crisp put forward thought experiments which might be taken to suggest that having deep personal relationships has only instrumental value as a means to other elements of well-being. The different conclusion this paper draws is that having deep personal relationships is an element of well-being if, but only if, the other people involved have qualities that merit affection for these people.
{"title":"Does Having Deep Personal Relationships Constitute an Element of Well-Being?","authors":"B. Hooker","doi":"10.1093/ARISUP/AKAB003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ARISUP/AKAB003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Deep personal relationships involve deep mutual understanding and strong mutual affection. This paper focuses on whether having deep personal relationships is one of the elements of well-being. Roger Crisp put forward thought experiments which might be taken to suggest that having deep personal relationships has only instrumental value as a means to other elements of well-being. The different conclusion this paper draws is that having deep personal relationships is an element of well-being if, but only if, the other people involved have qualities that merit affection for these people.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90638880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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