Pub Date : 2025-03-06DOI: 10.1016/j.aglobe.2025.100107
Marcus Noland
Over the past several years, North Korea has adopted legal changes that are increasing the centrality of the Workers Party of Korea and the state in agricultural production, distribution, and consumption. This development changes the basic nature of food insecurity in North Korea from one in which access to food is determined by the ability to purchase it in the market to one in which access to food is determined by political status. This development is of potential policy relevance: Although current conditions do not appear to be severe, if and when North Korea experiences another food crisis, foreign partners are likely to encounter a state-dominated model resembling the system that existed in the early 1990s at the onset of the famine and with it the attendant problems that humanitarian-relief agencies confronted at that time.
{"title":"Turning back the clock: The changing nature of North Korean food insecurity","authors":"Marcus Noland","doi":"10.1016/j.aglobe.2025.100107","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aglobe.2025.100107","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Over the past several years, North Korea has adopted legal changes that are increasing the centrality of the Workers Party of Korea and the state in agricultural production, distribution, and consumption. This development changes the basic nature of food insecurity in North Korea from one in which access to food is determined by the ability to purchase it in the market to one in which access to food is determined by political status. This development is of potential policy relevance: Although current conditions do not appear to be severe, if and when North Korea experiences another food crisis, foreign partners are likely to encounter a state-dominated model resembling the system that existed in the early 1990s at the onset of the famine and with it the attendant problems that humanitarian-relief agencies confronted at that time.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100126,"journal":{"name":"Asia and the Global Economy","volume":"5 1","pages":"Article 100107"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143548274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-13DOI: 10.1016/j.aglobe.2025.100106
Mykyta Simonov
The last decade has witnessed the development and implementation of two major infrastructure initiatives: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) by the United States and the G7 countries. The escalating political confrontation between China and the United States made these initiatives crucial for strengthening their geopolitical positions and economic dominance. This paper examines the impact of BRI on competitive strategies of the United States and its partners in response to China’s growing influence, thereby enhancing the understanding of contemporary political and economic dynamics. Key factors supporting the thesis of increasing competition and confrontation are considered, demonstrating that U.S. leadership leverages its infrastructure initiatives to oppose and constrain China’s influence at both the foreign policy and economic levels. Our analysis identifies factors directly influencing the development of these initiatives and compares the principles of BRI and PGII to objectively evaluate their effectiveness.
{"title":"The Belt and Road Initiative and Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment: Comparison and current status","authors":"Mykyta Simonov","doi":"10.1016/j.aglobe.2025.100106","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aglobe.2025.100106","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The last decade has witnessed the development and implementation of two major infrastructure initiatives: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) by the United States and the G7 countries. The escalating political confrontation between China and the United States made these initiatives crucial for strengthening their geopolitical positions and economic dominance. This paper examines the impact of BRI on competitive strategies of the United States and its partners in response to China’s growing influence, thereby enhancing the understanding of contemporary political and economic dynamics. Key factors supporting the thesis of increasing competition and confrontation are considered, demonstrating that U.S. leadership leverages its infrastructure initiatives to oppose and constrain China’s influence at both the foreign policy and economic levels. Our analysis identifies factors directly influencing the development of these initiatives and compares the principles of BRI and PGII to objectively evaluate their effectiveness.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100126,"journal":{"name":"Asia and the Global Economy","volume":"5 1","pages":"Article 100106"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143396055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-18DOI: 10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100102
Sandrine Levasseur
In this paper, we assess electric vehicle (EV) tax credits in the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the largest significant action in favour of climate change in US history. We find that the provisions of the IRA have so far done little to increase the uptake of EVs by US households, accounting at best for 10 % of monthly new light vehicle sales since the IRA was passed. This is well below most ex-ante estimates of EV uptake under the legislation. In contrast, the IRA has triggered EV battery plant projects in the United States, reinforcing the move by automakers to secure their supply chain since the Covid crisis. In total, current and projected GWh capacity would allow 17.0 million EVs to be powered annually by 2030, compared to the 1.2 million EVs sold in 2023. Thus, to date, the IRA has created a potentially huge imbalance between supply and demand in the US EV market. We also document the strategies followed by automakers to capture EV market share in the United States, with a focus on whether they are incumbents or startups, and whether they are based in allied countries.
{"title":"A two-year assessment of the IRA's subsidies to the electric vehicles in the US: Uptake and assembly plants for batteries and EVs","authors":"Sandrine Levasseur","doi":"10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100102","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100102","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, we assess electric vehicle (EV) tax credits in the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the largest significant action in favour of climate change in US history. We find that the provisions of the IRA have so far done little to increase the uptake of EVs by US households, accounting at best for 10 % of monthly new light vehicle sales since the IRA was passed. This is well below most <em>ex-ante</em> estimates of EV uptake under the legislation. In contrast, the IRA has triggered EV battery plant projects in the United States, reinforcing the move by automakers to secure their supply chain since the Covid crisis. In total, current and projected GWh capacity would allow 17.0 million EVs to be powered annually by 2030, compared to the 1.2 million EVs sold in 2023. Thus, to date, the IRA has created a potentially huge imbalance between supply and demand in the US EV market. We also document the strategies followed by automakers to capture EV market share in the United States, with a focus on whether they are incumbents or startups, and whether they are based in allied countries.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100126,"journal":{"name":"Asia and the Global Economy","volume":"5 1","pages":"Article 100102"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143177360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-01DOI: 10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100088
Byung-yeon Kim
{"title":"Guest editor's introduction","authors":"Byung-yeon Kim","doi":"10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100088","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100088","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":100126,"journal":{"name":"Asia and the Global Economy","volume":"4 2","pages":"Article 100088"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142704987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-01DOI: 10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100090
Le Quoc Hoi , Nguyen Thi Hoai Thu , Nguyen Xuan Hung , Phung Tu Uyen , Tran Thu Huong , Trinh Thi Huyen Minh , Hoang Thi Phuong Anh
This study assesses the impact of the Global Minimum Tax (GMT) on the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Vietnam. The authors rely on the analytical framework of UNCTAD (2022) and descriptive statistical methods to analyze and evaluate the impact of GMT on FDI attraction. The research findings indicate that the implementation of GMT will affect tax competitiveness, profit shifting, investment location, and investment scale in various degrees and directions. In particular, GMT may create conflicts between current tax laws and GMT rules, leading to inconsistencies and difficulties in enforcing tax regulations. Vietnam will have to compete with other countries in asserting tax jurisdiction over investment activities on its territory. GMT may negatively affect FDI inflows into Vietnam in sectors with a high tax elasticity to investments. Vietnam may be forced to move away from competition for attracting FDI solely based on corporate income tax and shift to new forms of competition. Based on these findings, the paper proposes several recommendations for the Vietnamese government to refine policies related to GMT.
{"title":"The impact of the Global Minimum Tax on Vietnam's foreign direct investment attraction","authors":"Le Quoc Hoi , Nguyen Thi Hoai Thu , Nguyen Xuan Hung , Phung Tu Uyen , Tran Thu Huong , Trinh Thi Huyen Minh , Hoang Thi Phuong Anh","doi":"10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100090","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100090","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study assesses the impact of the Global Minimum Tax (GMT) on the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Vietnam. The authors rely on the analytical framework of UNCTAD (2022) and descriptive statistical methods to analyze and evaluate the impact of GMT on FDI attraction. The research findings indicate that the implementation of GMT will affect tax competitiveness, profit shifting, investment location, and investment scale in various degrees and directions. In particular, GMT may create conflicts between current tax laws and GMT rules, leading to inconsistencies and difficulties in enforcing tax regulations. Vietnam will have to compete with other countries in asserting tax jurisdiction over investment activities on its territory. GMT may negatively affect FDI inflows into Vietnam in sectors with a high tax elasticity to investments. Vietnam may be forced to move away from competition for attracting FDI solely based on corporate income tax and shift to new forms of competition. Based on these findings, the paper proposes several recommendations for the Vietnamese government to refine policies related to GMT.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100126,"journal":{"name":"Asia and the Global Economy","volume":"4 2","pages":"Article 100090"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142704991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-01DOI: 10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100096
Seungho Jung , Dawool Kim , Kyoochul Kim
This study examines the impact of COVID-19 and border closures on North Korean markets by comparing the prices of key goods—rice, gasoline, diesel, and exchange rates—with those in the Chinese and global markets. By analyzing market price data, we assess North Korea's economic connectivity to international markets, particularly through China, and how pandemic-induced disruptions affected this linkage. Empirical results reveal that North Korean market prices for these goods generally maintain a long-term equilibrium relationship with international and Chinese prices, although the COVID-19 period disrupted this relationship. These findings suggest that North Korea's macroeconomic stability, especially price levels, is influenced by external factors through its economic ties with China.
{"title":"Impact of COVID-19 and border closures on North Korean markets: A comparison with international prices","authors":"Seungho Jung , Dawool Kim , Kyoochul Kim","doi":"10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100096","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100096","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the impact of COVID-19 and border closures on North Korean markets by comparing the prices of key goods—rice, gasoline, diesel, and exchange rates—with those in the Chinese and global markets. By analyzing market price data, we assess North Korea's economic connectivity to international markets, particularly through China, and how pandemic-induced disruptions affected this linkage. Empirical results reveal that North Korean market prices for these goods generally maintain a long-term equilibrium relationship with international and Chinese prices, although the COVID-19 period disrupted this relationship. These findings suggest that North Korea's macroeconomic stability, especially price levels, is influenced by external factors through its economic ties with China.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100126,"journal":{"name":"Asia and the Global Economy","volume":"4 2","pages":"Article 100096"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142704997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-01DOI: 10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100095
Joseph J. Capuno
Does identification with dominant but different ethnic groups lead individuals to diverge in their preferences for redistribution? This paper analyzes the role of the relative population size of an individual's ethnic group in shaping her attitude towards government's role in reducing income gaps in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Using a pool of nationally representative survey data, we classify the respondents according to their affiliations with dominant ethnic groups, and then apply probit regression models. Relative to the biggest ethnic group, the second biggest ethnic group is consistently found to have less preference for redistribution, after controlling for other factors. There are no systematic differences in such preferences between the biggest ethnic group and other smaller ethnic groups. Thus, in addition to shared norms and beliefs among ethnic group members, their group's dominance status, which determine their potential influence on domestic polices, also motivate their attitudes towards government redistribution.
{"title":"Identification with dominant ethnic groups and attitudes towards government redistribution in Southeast Asia","authors":"Joseph J. Capuno","doi":"10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100095","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100095","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Does identification with dominant but different ethnic groups lead individuals to diverge in their preferences for redistribution? This paper analyzes the role of the relative population size of an individual's ethnic group in shaping her attitude towards government's role in reducing income gaps in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Using a pool of nationally representative survey data, we classify the respondents according to their affiliations with dominant ethnic groups, and then apply probit regression models. Relative to the biggest ethnic group, the second biggest ethnic group is consistently found to have less preference for redistribution, after controlling for other factors. There are no systematic differences in such preferences between the biggest ethnic group and other smaller ethnic groups. Thus, in addition to shared norms and beliefs among ethnic group members, their group's dominance status, which determine their potential influence on domestic polices, also motivate their attitudes towards government redistribution.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100126,"journal":{"name":"Asia and the Global Economy","volume":"4 2","pages":"Article 100095"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143151038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-01DOI: 10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100085
Yuxin Peng (Ph.D. student at Ritsumeikan University)
After the RCEP implementation in 2022, trade differences emerged between Japan and South Korea with China, especially in semiconductors. Japan's exports to China declined, while South Korea's grew. This study uses qualitative and quantitative methods to explain post-RCEP semiconductor trade differences, focusing on value chain complementarity, new tariff rates, and U.S. factors. Three conclusions: 1) Within the global value chain, the different positions of Japan and South Korea in the semiconductor sectors compared to China result in varying levels of market complementarity between Japan and China and South Korea and China; South Korea, in particular, exhibits a significantly higher potential market. 2) In terms of reducing tariff barriers under RCEP, compared to Japan, South Korea experienced a more substantial decline in semiconductor tariff rates in the Chinese market. 3) The non-tariff barrier sanctions imposed by the United States on Chinese semiconductors in 2022 influenced trade choices for Japan and South Korea. Japan, being more loyal to the United States, tends to align with U.S. policies, leading to a reduction in semiconductor trade with China.
{"title":"Japan and South Korea's engagement in the Chinese market post-RCEP implementation: A case study of the semiconductor industry","authors":"Yuxin Peng (Ph.D. student at Ritsumeikan University)","doi":"10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100085","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>After the RCEP implementation in 2022, trade differences emerged between Japan and South Korea with China, especially in semiconductors. Japan's exports to China declined, while South Korea's grew. This study uses qualitative and quantitative methods to explain post-RCEP semiconductor trade differences, focusing on value chain complementarity, new tariff rates, and U.S. factors. Three conclusions: 1) Within the global value chain, the different positions of Japan and South Korea in the semiconductor sectors compared to China result in varying levels of market complementarity between Japan and China and South Korea and China; South Korea, in particular, exhibits a significantly higher potential market. 2) In terms of reducing tariff barriers under RCEP, compared to Japan, South Korea experienced a more substantial decline in semiconductor tariff rates in the Chinese market. 3) The non-tariff barrier sanctions imposed by the United States on Chinese semiconductors in 2022 influenced trade choices for Japan and South Korea. Japan, being more loyal to the United States, tends to align with U.S. policies, leading to a reduction in semiconductor trade with China.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100126,"journal":{"name":"Asia and the Global Economy","volume":"4 2","pages":"Article 100085"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667111524000094/pdfft?md5=a0af832f82ea4a06e998fabeb950aa3c&pid=1-s2.0-S2667111524000094-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141483872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-01DOI: 10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100099
Zheng Fang , Soon Hock Kang , Sandra Myo Han May
Using panel data from 63 countries in 2005–2021 and the generalised method of moments, this paper examines the impact of industrial robot utilisation on employment. Results show a 1 % increase in new industrial robot installations per 10,000 workers reduces the unemployment rate by 0.037 %-0.039 %. The impact is more pronounced for male workers (0.045 %) than female workers (0.033 %), and youth unemployment is more significantly affected. Lastly, automation is found to reduce the unemployment rate by 0.052 % for people with intermediate education, yet with little effect on those with basic or advanced educational attainment.
{"title":"Does automation really reduce jobs?","authors":"Zheng Fang , Soon Hock Kang , Sandra Myo Han May","doi":"10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100099","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100099","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using panel data from 63 countries in 2005–2021 and the generalised method of moments, this paper examines the impact of industrial robot utilisation on employment. Results show a 1 % increase in new industrial robot installations per 10,000 workers reduces the unemployment rate by 0.037 %-0.039 %. The impact is more pronounced for male workers (0.045 %) than female workers (0.033 %), and youth unemployment is more significantly affected. Lastly, automation is found to reduce the unemployment rate by 0.052 % for people with intermediate education, yet with little effect on those with basic or advanced educational attainment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100126,"journal":{"name":"Asia and the Global Economy","volume":"4 2","pages":"Article 100099"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142704994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-01DOI: 10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100091
Hiroya Akiba
This article examines the Marshall-Lerner (ML) condition from a broader perspective. Mundell (1968) regarded ML as the stability condition of the equilibrium, but not of the system. The violation of the ML condition by Japan's estimates is interpreted as a possible symptom of a negative exchange rate depreciation spiral in Thorbecke (2022). By constructing an open-economy macroeconomic model with three endogenous variables in three markets, and solving the model for the exchange rate, we examined the model's stability. Stability depends not only on the ML condition, but also on the configuration of the model's parameters. This implies that the ML condition alone is not responsible for the stability/instability of the model. Using the ML parameter estimated by Thorbecke (2022) and previously obtained money market parameters for the Japanese economy, we found that a simple model satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions for stability. However, for an extended model, some cases fail to satisfy stability conditions. We further investigate the possible cause of this failure, and suggest that the Bank of Japan's (BOJ) unconventional monetary policies implemented after the economic bubble burst may be responsible.
{"title":"The Marshall-Lerner Condition: Stability of an Equilibrium or a System?","authors":"Hiroya Akiba","doi":"10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100091","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100091","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article examines the Marshall-Lerner (ML) condition from a broader perspective. Mundell (1968) regarded ML as the stability condition of the equilibrium, but not of the system. The violation of the ML condition by Japan's estimates is interpreted as a possible symptom of a negative exchange rate depreciation spiral in Thorbecke (2022). By constructing an open-economy macroeconomic model with three endogenous variables in three markets, and solving the model for the exchange rate, we examined the model's stability. Stability depends not only on the ML condition, but also on the configuration of the model's parameters. This implies that the ML condition alone is not responsible for the stability/instability of the model. Using the ML parameter estimated by Thorbecke (2022) and previously obtained money market parameters for the Japanese economy, we found that a simple model satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions for stability. However, for an extended model, some cases fail to satisfy stability conditions. We further investigate the possible cause of this failure, and suggest that the Bank of Japan's (BOJ) unconventional monetary policies implemented after the economic bubble burst may be responsible.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100126,"journal":{"name":"Asia and the Global Economy","volume":"4 2","pages":"Article 100091"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142759407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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