Pub Date : 2025-03-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2025.100138
Leigh Gardner , Tehreem Husain
In 1924, John Maynard Keynes complained about the fact that Southern Rhodesia, which he described as “a place somewhere in the middle of Africa”, was able to raise loans on the London market on the same terms as a large English borough. Existing literature on the “empire effect” has contended that investors did not discriminate between the bond issues of different colonies, either because they adopted similar economic and financial policies or because they were considered to be subsidiary governments to metropolitan states. However, archival records suggest that this was not the case and that African bonds were particularly unpopular. Contemporaries stressed that maintaining low borrowing costs for African colonies required considerable behind the scenes interventions by the Crown Agents using reserve funds they held on behalf of other colonies. This paper presents preliminary data on the financial connections between colonies created by this practice, which it calls the “sinews” of empire, and examines the implications for debates about imperialism and financial globalisation.
{"title":"Sinews of empire? The Crown Agents for the Colonies and African government debt under colonial rule","authors":"Leigh Gardner , Tehreem Husain","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2025.100138","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2025.100138","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In 1924, John Maynard Keynes complained about the fact that Southern Rhodesia, which he described as “a place somewhere in the middle of Africa”, was able to raise loans on the London market on the same terms as a large English borough. Existing literature on the “empire effect” has contended that investors did not discriminate between the bond issues of different colonies, either because they adopted similar economic and financial policies or because they were considered to be subsidiary governments to metropolitan states. However, archival records suggest that this was not the case and that African bonds were particularly unpopular. Contemporaries stressed that maintaining low borrowing costs for African colonies required considerable behind the scenes interventions by the Crown Agents using reserve funds they held on behalf of other colonies. This paper presents preliminary data on the financial connections between colonies created by this practice, which it calls the “sinews” of empire, and examines the implications for debates about imperialism and financial globalisation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"17 ","pages":"Article 100138"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143682642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-13DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2025.100136
Adamu Braimah Abille , Ishmael Adjei
Most African countries are grappling with long-term fiscal slippages and escalating debt burdens due to high levels of non-concessional and overcapitalized borrowing. At the same time, the continent is paradoxically deemed a net creditor to the rest of the world owing to excessive capital flight. More concerning is the seemingly strong correlation between external debt and capital flight from these countries. While some studies have considered the moderating role of governance in the effect of capital flight on various sectors of African economies, how governance may moderate the correlation between external debt and capital flight remains empirically unexplored. Using unbalanced panel data on capital flight, external debt, and governance indicators from 1990 to 2020 for 20 African countries, we observe that; (i) the external debt–capital flight revolvement may be a short-run rather than a long-run phenomenon. (ii) The marginal effects show that improved governance indicators at least moderate the short-run positive correlation between external debt and capital flight. We discuss the policy implications.
{"title":"Does better governance abate the external debt–capital flight revolvement in sub-Saharan Africa?","authors":"Adamu Braimah Abille , Ishmael Adjei","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2025.100136","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2025.100136","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Most African countries are grappling with long-term fiscal slippages and escalating debt burdens due to high levels of non-concessional and overcapitalized borrowing. At the same time, the continent is paradoxically deemed a net creditor to the rest of the world owing to excessive capital flight. More concerning is the seemingly strong correlation between external debt and capital flight from these countries. While some studies have considered the moderating role of governance in the effect of capital flight on various sectors of African economies, how governance may moderate the correlation between external debt and capital flight remains empirically unexplored. Using unbalanced panel data on capital flight, external debt, and governance indicators from 1990 to 2020 for 20 African countries, we observe that; (i) the external debt–capital flight revolvement may be a short-run rather than a long-run phenomenon. (ii) The marginal effects show that improved governance indicators at least moderate the short-run positive correlation between external debt and capital flight. We discuss the policy implications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"17 ","pages":"Article 100136"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143455136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100132
Alex O. Acheampong , John Taden
This study evaluates the influence of natural resource rents and foreign aid on democracy using panel data from 45 SSA countries from 1980 to 2021. Using five different democracy indices, six different foreign aid variables and six different natural resource rent variables, our endogeneity-corrected results establish the following conclusions: (i) all the democracy indices respond positively and significantly to multilateral foreign aid, total development assistance committee (DAC) aid and bilateral aid from Australia, the USA, the United Nations, and the European Union (ii) the political resource curse, rentier and repression theories are valid for rent from mineral, gas and oil resources (iii) the democracy indices respond positively and significantly to rent from coal and forest resources (iv) the effect of foreign aid on the democracy indices is contingent on natural resource wealth (v) these findings are robust to an alternative econometric estimation technique and specifications. The policy implications are discussed.
{"title":"The contributions of foreign aid and natural resource wealth to democratic institutions: Evidence from over 40 years of sub-Sahara Africa's history","authors":"Alex O. Acheampong , John Taden","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100132","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100132","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study evaluates the influence of natural resource rents and foreign aid on democracy using panel data from 45 SSA countries from 1980 to 2021. Using five different democracy indices, six different foreign aid variables and six different natural resource rent variables, our endogeneity-corrected results establish the following conclusions: (i) all the democracy indices respond positively and significantly to multilateral foreign aid, total development assistance committee (DAC) aid and bilateral aid from Australia, the USA, the United Nations, and the European Union (ii) the political resource curse, rentier and repression theories are valid for rent from mineral, gas and oil resources (iii) the democracy indices respond positively and significantly to rent from coal and forest resources (iv) the effect of foreign aid on the democracy indices is contingent on natural resource wealth (v) these findings are robust to an alternative econometric estimation technique and specifications. The policy implications are discussed.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"16 ","pages":"Article 100132"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143097698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100130
Deepti Kohli
This paper focuses on the political aspect of intergovernmental transfers in India. By using a balanced panel data-set comprising of data on 28 Indian states and Union Territories for the period 2003–2023 for both Legislative Assembly and Parliamentary elections at the state-level, the aim is to investigate whether there occurs a politically motivated distribution of financial resources by the central government to the states in India? The analysis has been done for three categories of centre-state transfers: loans, grants and tax devolution. The regression estimations include various political controls such as, electoral competition between political parties, voter participation rate, government’s ideological leaning, centre-state partisan affiliation, government incumbency and a control for political lobbying. The findings of this study reveal a significant influence of various political forces on different categories of intergovernmental transfers in India. For instance, a greater political competition leads to a lowering of grants and a rise in tax devolution and loans provided by the central government in proportion to the state’s GDP. A left-leaning government ideology is found to entail an increase in the proportion of grants from the centre in proportion to the state’s GDP. In addition, a greater partisan affiliation between the central and state governments leads to an increase in the average proportion of grants and tax devolution provided to that state. Finally, an increase in the political contributions provided to the winning party in a state leads to a rise in the provision of loans and grants by the centre to that state, while tax devolution is dampened. All these results do provide some evidence in favour of electoral opportunism and lobbying at work in the distribution of financial resources across Indian states.
{"title":"Political determinants of centre-state transfers: An empirical analysis across Indian states","authors":"Deepti Kohli","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100130","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100130","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper focuses on the political aspect of intergovernmental transfers in India. By using a balanced panel data-set comprising of data on 28 Indian states and Union Territories for the period 2003–2023 for both Legislative Assembly and Parliamentary elections at the state-level, the aim is to investigate whether there occurs a politically motivated distribution of financial resources by the central government to the states in India? The analysis has been done for three categories of centre-state transfers: loans, grants and tax devolution. The regression estimations include various political controls such as, electoral competition between political parties, voter participation rate, government’s ideological leaning, centre-state partisan affiliation, government incumbency and a control for political lobbying. The findings of this study reveal a significant influence of various political forces on different categories of intergovernmental transfers in India. For instance, a greater political competition leads to a lowering of grants and a rise in tax devolution and loans provided by the central government in proportion to the state’s GDP. A left-leaning government ideology is found to entail an increase in the proportion of grants from the centre in proportion to the state’s GDP. In addition, a greater partisan affiliation between the central and state governments leads to an increase in the average proportion of grants and tax devolution provided to that state. Finally, an increase in the political contributions provided to the winning party in a state leads to a rise in the provision of loans and grants by the centre to that state, while tax devolution is dampened. All these results do provide some evidence in favour of electoral opportunism and lobbying at work in the distribution of financial resources across Indian states.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"16 ","pages":"Article 100130"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143097723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100129
Keiichi Iwase, Shuichi Ishida
This study introduces a two-dimensional matrix analysis method that utilizes revealed comparative advantage and revealed comparative disadvantage indices. It aims to clarify the impact of trade remedy measures on beneficiary industries' performance. We compare the effects of these measures across both growing and mature industries. In the former case, we examine the steel industries in China and India, while in the latter case, we focus on Japan's basic chemicals and other products. By tracking the changes in the revealed comparative advantage and disadvantage indices before and after the execution of each measure, we identify distinct patterns depending on the industry's developmental stage. Although trade remedy measures are defined as countermeasures against unfair trade practices, this distinction enables us to determine whether trade remedy measures serve as tools for enhancing and sustaining industrial competitiveness or averting competitive disadvantages effectively with implicit intentions of governments. Furthermore, this analytical framework also provides insights into industry conditions. Its versatility extends to potential applications in corporate management and policy evaluation.
{"title":"Trade remedy measures and their effects on industry performance, and implicit government intentions: Changes in revealed comparative advantage indices in China, India, and Japan","authors":"Keiichi Iwase, Shuichi Ishida","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100129","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100129","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study introduces a two-dimensional matrix analysis method that utilizes revealed comparative advantage and revealed comparative disadvantage indices. It aims to clarify the impact of trade remedy measures on beneficiary industries' performance. We compare the effects of these measures across both growing and mature industries. In the former case, we examine the steel industries in China and India, while in the latter case, we focus on Japan's basic chemicals and other products. By tracking the changes in the revealed comparative advantage and disadvantage indices before and after the execution of each measure, we identify distinct patterns depending on the industry's developmental stage. Although trade remedy measures are defined as countermeasures against unfair trade practices, this distinction enables us to determine whether trade remedy measures serve as tools for enhancing and sustaining industrial competitiveness or averting competitive disadvantages effectively with implicit intentions of governments. Furthermore, this analytical framework also provides insights into industry conditions. Its versatility extends to potential applications in corporate management and policy evaluation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"16 ","pages":"Article 100129"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143097722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2025.100133
Zhangkai Huang, David Daokui Li
{"title":"Editor's note: Market-preserving government, global value chains, trade remedies, center-state transfers, and foreign aid.","authors":"Zhangkai Huang, David Daokui Li","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2025.100133","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2025.100133","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"16 ","pages":"Article 100133"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143097699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100131
Yi-Jiang Wang
This paper offers a framework for understanding the origin of market-preserving government. The paper shows that when parties in a Hobbesian society end in an arms race rather than war, they can create a market-preserving government to maintain the no-war equilibrium at lower cost. The government can be small yet effective or larger and more efficient. Under certain conditions, the parties are better off completely disarming themselves, paving the road for a modern society with equal rights for all citizens and a government monopoly on violence. The war-economic theory of political development sheds light on historical experiences and contemporary policy issues.
{"title":"The nature of market-preserving government","authors":"Yi-Jiang Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100131","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100131","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper offers a framework for understanding the origin of market-preserving government. The paper shows that when parties in a Hobbesian society end in an arms race rather than war, they can create a market-preserving government to maintain the no-war equilibrium at lower cost. The government can be small yet effective or larger and more efficient. Under certain conditions, the parties are better off completely disarming themselves, paving the road for a modern society with equal rights for all citizens and a government monopoly on violence. The war-economic theory of political development sheds light on historical experiences and contemporary policy issues.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"16 ","pages":"Article 100131"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143097721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-19DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100128
Shai Dothan , Mitja Kovac , Rok Spruk
This paper examines the potential impact of institutional shocks on long-term development of property rights and on institutions regulating contracting. The paper seeks to demonstrate that the external institutional shocks might have an uncontemplated side-effect on the institutional development of Mexico. The analysis exploits the within-country variation in the presence of US administrative authorities during the Mexican-American conflict across Mexican states and cities. Using propensity score and nearest neighbour matching technique, we present some evidence of the potential long-term institutional implications of the presence of US administrative authorities. We show that the presence of US administrative authority generated an unexpected positive effect which could influence long-term property rights and contracting institutions of Mexican states. The positive impact of US administrative authorities’ presence are robust to a variety of specification checks and are particularly large for smaller cities.
{"title":"Long-term effects of deep institutional shocks: Historical evidence from Mexico","authors":"Shai Dothan , Mitja Kovac , Rok Spruk","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100128","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100128","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the potential impact of institutional shocks on long-term development of property rights and on institutions regulating contracting. The paper seeks to demonstrate that the external institutional shocks might have an uncontemplated side-effect on the institutional development of Mexico. The analysis exploits the within-country variation in the presence of US administrative authorities during the Mexican-American conflict across Mexican states and cities. Using propensity score and nearest neighbour matching technique, we present some evidence of the potential long-term institutional implications of the presence of US administrative authorities. We show that the presence of US administrative authority generated an unexpected positive effect which could influence long-term property rights and contracting institutions of Mexican states. The positive impact of US administrative authorities’ presence are robust to a variety of specification checks and are particularly large for smaller cities.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"16 ","pages":"Article 100128"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142700835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-14DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100127
José Firmino de Sousa Filho , Gervásio Ferreira dos Santos , Luiz Carlos de Santana Ribeiro , Rodrigo Barbosa de Cerqueira , Larissa Lopes Lima
We analyze the BRICs countries' role in Global Value Chains (GVCs) and their trade patterns in value-added and vertical specialization, using the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) from 2000-2014 with a decomposition model of intermediate goods and trade flows. Our findings reveal increased connectivity within global value chains, particularly for China and India. China significantly advances GVCs and intra-BRICs trade, focusing on high and medium-high technology industries. Brazil and Russia, however, have limited participation in GVCs, mainly engaging in value-added trade for medium-low and low-technology industries. Our network analysis reveals increasing connections between countries in global value chains, particularly for China and India. India excels in medium-technology goods and has increased its share in GVCs. While India and China demonstrate strong vertical specialization, Brazil and Russia concentrate major component exports on domestic value-added. Our study emphasizes the importance of expanding coordinated government policies among BRICs countries to foster value-added trade gains and industrial development. Governments in BRICs must address the strategic gaps to leverage their domestic resources effectively within the GVC framework.
{"title":"Global value chains and intra-BRICs trade in value-added","authors":"José Firmino de Sousa Filho , Gervásio Ferreira dos Santos , Luiz Carlos de Santana Ribeiro , Rodrigo Barbosa de Cerqueira , Larissa Lopes Lima","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100127","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100127","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze the BRICs countries' role in Global Value Chains (GVCs) and their trade patterns in value-added and vertical specialization, using the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) from 2000-2014 with a decomposition model of intermediate goods and trade flows. Our findings reveal increased connectivity within global value chains, particularly for China and India. China significantly advances GVCs and intra-BRICs trade, focusing on high and medium-high technology industries. Brazil and Russia, however, have limited participation in GVCs, mainly engaging in value-added trade for medium-low and low-technology industries. Our network analysis reveals increasing connections between countries in global value chains, particularly for China and India. India excels in medium-technology goods and has increased its share in GVCs. While India and China demonstrate strong vertical specialization, Brazil and Russia concentrate major component exports on domestic value-added. Our study emphasizes the importance of expanding coordinated government policies among BRICs countries to foster value-added trade gains and industrial development. Governments in BRICs must address the strategic gaps to leverage their domestic resources effectively within the GVC framework.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"16 ","pages":"Article 100127"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142700833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-24DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100126
Şevket Pamuk
State directed industrialization in developing countries became a common strategy after World War II. The success of a small number of countries in East Asia added new dimensions to the debates on the role of states in taming domestic and international market forces. However, it soon became evident that states and government-private sector relations in developing countries show a great deal of variation which is reflected in the different degrees of success with state directed industrialization. This paper focuses on a country which has experienced above average rates of industrialization but has not been amongst the most successful cases. It examines the evolution of the larger political order, the state-private sector relations and the related “micro” institutions in four periods. One key finding is that the international environment has not always been conducive to industrialization. Moreover, industrialization outcomes did not depend on a single or a specific set of institutions but on the relations between the political and private sector elites, and more generally, on the political economy.
{"title":"The state and industrialization in Turkey since the nineteenth century","authors":"Şevket Pamuk","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100126","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100126","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>State directed industrialization in developing countries became a common strategy after World War II. The success of a small number of countries in East Asia added new dimensions to the debates on the role of states in taming domestic and international market forces. However, it soon became evident that states and government-private sector relations in developing countries show a great deal of variation which is reflected in the different degrees of success with state directed industrialization. This paper focuses on a country which has experienced above average rates of industrialization but has not been amongst the most successful cases. It examines the evolution of the larger political order, the state-private sector relations and the related “micro” institutions in four periods. One key finding is that the international environment has not always been conducive to industrialization. Moreover, industrialization outcomes did not depend on a single or a specific set of institutions but on the relations between the political and private sector elites, and more generally, on the political economy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"16 ","pages":"Article 100126"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142658486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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