Journal of Government and Economics最新文献

There is a long-standing debate over the merits of confidential and transparent pay. Yet, as some states and counties in the U.S. have implemented policies that prohibit employers from asking about historical pay, many top tech companies such as Apple have introduced corresponding policies. In particular, this paper examines whether they have impacted employment. In this paper, we use the implementation of the salary history ban as a ”quasi-natural experiment” to assess the impact of the policy on employment using a staggered difference-in-differences method based on county-level panel data from 2013 to 2021. The study shows that the salary history ban does not significantly contribute to the increase in employment levels in general; even the implementation of the salary history ban reduces employment in local firms by an average of 1.04% relative to firms in areas where the policy is not implemented. This paper provides new empirical evidence on the effects of salary history bans and provides a reference for further improvements in corporate payroll management systems in practice.

We present a financial history of the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) using a new dataset derived from the Bank of England minutes. We argue that the war and the associated actions of the Bank of England led to a transformation of the financial system. Additionally, while there was short-term crowding out of private investment when interest rates rose due to the issue of war-related government debt, in the long-run there was crowding in: government spending led to an increase in private sector investment.

Before 1941, U.S. regulatory bodies were unrestricted. By 1946, several states and the federal government had imposed restrictions. It further took 40 years for every state to enact an Administrative Procedures Act (APA), a law that dictates how regulatory agencies promulgate regulations. Despite being overlooked, APAs significantly impact states in often missed or ignored ways. We analyzed each state's rulemaking procedures at four different points in time to see if they've increased or decreased restrictions on regulatory agencies. We created two indexes: a Restrictiveness index, a summative index, and another derived from multiple correspondence analysis. We studied how legislative professionalism, interest group constraint, citizen ideology, and government partisanism affect APA restrictions.

This paper builds a model of dynamic tournaments under incomplete contract situations to analyze how the government, as a national development strategy, induces incentives or forms of competition between multiple companies (between state-owned enterprises (SOEs), between private-owned enterprises (POEs), or between SOEs and POEs) in the long-run. This paper can be considered as a model analysis of “controlled competition” under “State Capitalism”, in which the government participates in the market as an active player, such as in China, Singapore, and in a broad sense, in Japanese Industrial Policy in the past. In addition to clarifying the incentive mechanism embedded in this model, we also examine the problems and areas for improvement from the perspective of incentive design. In particular, in the long-term competition between two heterogeneous companies, it would be a beneficial policy for the government if the feedback effect could be mitigated by handicapping the winner and favoring the loser, thereby restoring the competitive pressure that had decreased. At the same time, as excessive competition-inhibiting discriminatory prizes (“Cronyism”) greatly impede investment incentives for both companies, these can be viewed as a "government failure", and thus the institution should be redesigned to correct such obstacles, thereby maintaining appropriate competitive pressures.