This paper tests the theory of mixed strategy equilibrium using Maradona's penalty kicks during his lifetime professional career. The results are remarkably consistent with equilibrium play in every respect: (i) Maradona's scoring probabilities are statistically identical across strategies; (ii) His choices are serially independent. These results show that Maradona's behavior is consistent with Nash's predictions, specifically with both implications of von Neumann's Minimax Theorem.
European soccer leagues operate on a ”promotion and relegation” system, in which poor-performing teams are moved to a lower division of play, and high-performing teams are moved up. Because of the prestige and television exposure of higher divisions, promotions and relegations have major financial and competitive consequences for clubs. I use a regression discontinuity design to study the consequences of promotion and relegation in Europe’s top soccer leagues, comparing just-relegated teams to just-surviving teams, and the same for promotion. On the field, both relegation and promotion have lasting impacts, with significant effects lasting 3 or more years, and the point estimates suggest even longer effects. The effects of promotion are slightly larger and more persistent. Financially, promotion is worth between $238–280 million over the next 7 years, while relegation costs between $225–262 million.
We study the allocation of revenues raised from the collective sale of broadcasting rights for the Spanish Football League (La Liga), which is strongly regulated by the Spanish government since 2015. The allocation process is decomposed in four dimensions: lower bounds, sport performance, economic performance, and broadcasting performance. For each dimension, we compare the allocation suggested by La Liga with other alternatives grounded on the fair allocation literature. Based on our analysis, we argue that the allocation process implemented by La Liga could be modified in meaningful ways, while still obeying regulation measures.
We study all-pay contests with complete information and two heterogeneous contestants who compete for a single prize. We combine two common designer's goals which are combined especially in sports contests; effort maximization and competitive balance. We focus on two cases when the designer's utility is either continuous or discontinuous in the contestants' efforts. We show that a maximum effort constraint is always efficient for increasing the designer's utility, namely, effort maximization under competitive balance.
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