Pub Date : 2022-12-16DOI: 10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.208
Stephen Dilley, Grzegorz Malec
Przedmiotem niniejszego artykułu jest trójstopniowa analiza pozytywnego (positiva) użycia teologii przez Karola Darwina w pierwszym wydaniu O powstawaniu gatunków. Po pierwsze, skupię się na występującym w tym dziele języku teologicznym, który przejawia się we fragmentach dotyczących pojmowalności Boga, Jego uczciwości, sposobów stwarzania, związku między Nim a prawami przyrody i tego, że nie odpowiada On za istniejące w przyrodzie cierpienia. Twierdzę, że Darwin użył teologii pozytywnej, aby uzasadnić teorię dziedziczenia z modyfikacjami (oraz nadać jej kształt) i podważyć ideę specjalnego stworzenia. Po drugie, przedstawię krytyczną analizę tej teologii, biorąc za podstawę późniejsze przemyślenia Darwina, aby pokazać, że z epistemicznego punktu widzenia w teologii pozytywnej obecnej w O powstawaniu gatunków można dostrzec różne wewnętrzne napięcia. Po trzecie, skupię się na względnym epistemicznym znaczeniu teologii pozytywnej dla argumentacji przedstawionej w dziele Darwina. Wszystko wskazuje na to, że ta teologia odgrywała służebną i pomocniczą rolę dla naukowych poglądów angielskiego przyrodnika.
{"title":"Rola teologii w książce Karola Darwina „O powstawaniu gatunków”","authors":"Stephen Dilley, Grzegorz Malec","doi":"10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.208","url":null,"abstract":"Przedmiotem niniejszego artykułu jest trójstopniowa analiza pozytywnego (positiva) użycia teologii przez Karola Darwina w pierwszym wydaniu O powstawaniu gatunków. Po pierwsze, skupię się na występującym w tym dziele języku teologicznym, który przejawia się we fragmentach dotyczących pojmowalności Boga, Jego uczciwości, sposobów stwarzania, związku między Nim a prawami przyrody i tego, że nie odpowiada On za istniejące w przyrodzie cierpienia. Twierdzę, że Darwin użył teologii pozytywnej, aby uzasadnić teorię dziedziczenia z modyfikacjami (oraz nadać jej kształt) i podważyć ideę specjalnego stworzenia. Po drugie, przedstawię krytyczną analizę tej teologii, biorąc za podstawę późniejsze przemyślenia Darwina, aby pokazać, że z epistemicznego punktu widzenia w teologii pozytywnej obecnej w O powstawaniu gatunków można dostrzec różne wewnętrzne napięcia. Po trzecie, skupię się na względnym epistemicznym znaczeniu teologii pozytywnej dla argumentacji przedstawionej w dziele Darwina. Wszystko wskazuje na to, że ta teologia odgrywała służebną i pomocniczą rolę dla naukowych poglądów angielskiego przyrodnika.","PeriodicalId":103828,"journal":{"name":"Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127190272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-02DOI: 10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.207
M. Wagner
The term “eclipse of Darwinism” was popularized by Julian Huxley, who used it to describe the period before the emergence of the evolutionary synthesis. The idea of the “eclipse” was later criticized, because it was used to show the superiority of the synthesis over earlier evolutionary theories. This historiography was opposed by Peter Bowler and Mark Largent. According to Bowler, Darwin was not a central figure in nineteenth-century biology. Rather, most naturalists worked within a different evolutionary paradigm. Largent suggested replacing the term “eclipse” with “interphase of Darwinism”, which would better reflect its nature as a preparatory phase for the creation of the synthesis. However, the philosophical presuppositions on which these interpretations were built, while helping them to avoid the errors of their predecessors, also led to new problems. The problems with the interpretations of the “eclipse” can be explained by its “liminal” character. Liminality is an intermediate period between the old and the new. Because of its transgressivity, a liminal period is hard to integrate within a given structure and is mostly excluded from the latter. When analyzing works of historians dealing with the “eclipse” we encounter a common tendency towards excluding this period from historical narratives.
{"title":"The Liminal Nature of the “Eclipse of Darwinism” as a Critical Phase in the History of Evolutionary Biology","authors":"M. Wagner","doi":"10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.207","url":null,"abstract":"The term “eclipse of Darwinism” was popularized by Julian Huxley, who used it to describe the period before the emergence of the evolutionary synthesis. The idea of the “eclipse” was later criticized, because it was used to show the superiority of the synthesis over earlier evolutionary theories. This historiography was opposed by Peter Bowler and Mark Largent. According to Bowler, Darwin was not a central figure in nineteenth-century biology. Rather, most naturalists worked within a different evolutionary paradigm. Largent suggested replacing the term “eclipse” with “interphase of Darwinism”, which would better reflect its nature as a preparatory phase for the creation of the synthesis. However, the philosophical presuppositions on which these interpretations were built, while helping them to avoid the errors of their predecessors, also led to new problems. The problems with the interpretations of the “eclipse” can be explained by its “liminal” character. Liminality is an intermediate period between the old and the new. Because of its transgressivity, a liminal period is hard to integrate within a given structure and is mostly excluded from the latter. When analyzing works of historians dealing with the “eclipse” we encounter a common tendency towards excluding this period from historical narratives.","PeriodicalId":103828,"journal":{"name":"Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy","volume":"138 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128384281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-17DOI: 10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.206
M. Esfeld
The argument of this paper is that the rationale, potential and limits of modern science are evident in Descartes, and in respect of its basic Cartesian features are still valid today. Its rationale is objectivity, its potential is a great improvement in human living conditions, and its limit is that, due to its striving for objectivity, modern science cannot in principle encompass human thought and action. Cartesian dualism is therefore well grounded, and can be elaborated on without any commitment to two autonomous types of substances.
{"title":"The Metaphysics of Cartesian Science","authors":"M. Esfeld","doi":"10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.206","url":null,"abstract":"The argument of this paper is that the rationale, potential and limits of modern science are evident in Descartes, and in respect of its basic Cartesian features are still valid today. Its rationale is objectivity, its potential is a great improvement in human living conditions, and its limit is that, due to its striving for objectivity, modern science cannot in principle encompass human thought and action. Cartesian dualism is therefore well grounded, and can be elaborated on without any commitment to two autonomous types of substances.","PeriodicalId":103828,"journal":{"name":"Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130370130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-03DOI: 10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.205
Gonzalo Munévar
The triumph of the Copernican revolution is commonly associated with the introduction of the scientific method, mainly by Galileo. The nature of science presumably depends on the way observation passes judgment on theory. This is how, according to empiricism, the practice of science improves our worldviews. Some historically inclined philosophers of science, most notably Kuhn and Feyerabend, have insisted on paying attention to what Galileo actually said and did. Shockingly, he drives a dagger through the heart of empiricism: observation does not have such priority over theory, because observation itself assumes theory. This is what he argues when dismantling Aristotle’s Tower Argument, according to which a stone dropped from a tower falls straight down to the base of the tower. If this is so, the Earth cannot rotate, for it would carry the tower with it, making our observation of the stone’s flight wildly different. According to Galileo, to conclude that the stone really falls vertically requires the assumption that the Earth does not move – the theoretical issue in question. Given Galileo’s proper understanding of the nature of science, I view Feyerabend’s principle of proliferation as the realization that a good strategy for the latter is to elaborate radical alternatives and, on their basis, reconsider what counts as evidence. Moreover, a science produced by human brains should be analyzed on the basis of evolutionary theory and neuroscience. From that perspective, we may be able to defend a sensible notion of relativism. These considerations have led me to the main arguments of my new book, A Theory of Wonder: Evolution, Brain, and the Radical Nature of Science (Philosophy of Science, Vernon Press, Wilmington — Malaga 2021). I hope to entice the reader into a discussion of some of the issues developed there.
{"title":"The Origin of Modern Physical Science: Some Passages from A Theory of Wonder","authors":"Gonzalo Munévar","doi":"10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.205","url":null,"abstract":"The triumph of the Copernican revolution is commonly associated with the introduction of the scientific method, mainly by Galileo. The nature of science presumably depends on the way observation passes judgment on theory. This is how, according to empiricism, the practice of science improves our worldviews. Some historically inclined philosophers of science, most notably Kuhn and Feyerabend, have insisted on paying attention to what Galileo actually said and did. Shockingly, he drives a dagger through the heart of empiricism: observation does not have such priority over theory, because observation itself assumes theory. This is what he argues when dismantling Aristotle’s Tower Argument, according to which a stone dropped from a tower falls straight down to the base of the tower. If this is so, the Earth cannot rotate, for it would carry the tower with it, making our observation of the stone’s flight wildly different. According to Galileo, to conclude that the stone really falls vertically requires the assumption that the Earth does not move – the theoretical issue in question. Given Galileo’s proper understanding of the nature of science, I view Feyerabend’s principle of proliferation as the realization that a good strategy for the latter is to elaborate radical alternatives and, on their basis, reconsider what counts as evidence. Moreover, a science produced by human brains should be analyzed on the basis of evolutionary theory and neuroscience. From that perspective, we may be able to defend a sensible notion of relativism. These considerations have led me to the main arguments of my new book, A Theory of Wonder: Evolution, Brain, and the Radical Nature of Science (Philosophy of Science, Vernon Press, Wilmington — Malaga 2021). I hope to entice the reader into a discussion of some of the issues developed there.","PeriodicalId":103828,"journal":{"name":"Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy","volume":"2003 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125780311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-06DOI: 10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.203
Scott Turner
Darwinism, in all its various forms, seeks to explain evolution without the intervention of intelligence, purposefulness or intentionality: in short, via the abolition of purpose. Yet life is arguably a profoundly purposeful phenomenon, most evident in the phenomenon of adaptation. Modern Darwinism fails because it has no coherent theory of adaptation, and hence no coherent theory of life. Without this, it cannot claim to be a coherent theory of evolution. Here, I argue that a coherent theory of evolution will arrive when the inherent purposefulness of life can be reincorporated into our evolutionary thinking. Life’s fundamental property of homeo-stasis, coupled with the expanding conception of hereditary memo-ry emerging from epigenetics and niche construction theory, can credibly restore purpose to our thinking about evolution. The evolution of lineages will no longer then be under the control of natural selection, but rather imbued with striving and intentionality: with “wanting” to evolve.
{"title":"Do Species Want to Evolve?","authors":"Scott Turner","doi":"10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.203","url":null,"abstract":"Darwinism, in all its various forms, seeks to explain evolution without the intervention of intelligence, purposefulness or intentionality: in short, via the abolition of purpose. Yet life is arguably a profoundly purposeful phenomenon, most evident in the phenomenon of adaptation. Modern Darwinism fails because it has no coherent theory of adaptation, and hence no coherent theory of life. Without this, it cannot claim to be a coherent theory of evolution. Here, I argue that a coherent theory of evolution will arrive when the inherent purposefulness of life can be reincorporated into our evolutionary thinking. Life’s fundamental property of homeo-stasis, coupled with the expanding conception of hereditary memo-ry emerging from epigenetics and niche construction theory, can credibly restore purpose to our thinking about evolution. The evolution of lineages will no longer then be under the control of natural selection, but rather imbued with striving and intentionality: with “wanting” to evolve.","PeriodicalId":103828,"journal":{"name":"Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126191791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-22DOI: 10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.202
B. Monton
In 2009, when I was a philosophy professor at University of Colorado Boulder, I published a book with Broadview Press, Seeking God in Science: An Atheist Defends Intelligent Design. In the book, I show respect for what the proponents of intelligent design are up to. I engage with them as intellectually respectable fellow inquirers, not as opponents in a culture war. In the first decade of the 2000s, the topic of intelligent design had so much heightened emotion and vitriol associated with it — I’d like to think that my book played a role in calming the tensions.
{"title":"How Can an Atheist Defend Intelligent Design?","authors":"B. Monton","doi":"10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.202","url":null,"abstract":"In 2009, when I was a philosophy professor at University of Colorado Boulder, I published a book with Broadview Press, Seeking God in Science: An Atheist Defends Intelligent Design. In the book, I show respect for what the proponents of intelligent design are up to. I engage with them as intellectually respectable fellow inquirers, not as opponents in a culture war. In the first decade of the 2000s, the topic of intelligent design had so much heightened emotion and vitriol associated with it — I’d like to think that my book played a role in calming the tensions.","PeriodicalId":103828,"journal":{"name":"Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126962620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-08DOI: 10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.201
Hicham Jakha
Without doubt, one of the most important questions that has kept philosophers busy, at least ever since the ancient Greeks, is the nature of the mind. Grappling with this question for ages, thinkers from various fields of inquiry have put forward their views concerning the mind and its nature. An interdisciplinary approach to the human mind has emerged in our contemporary era, where philosophy continuously supplements, inter alia, neurobiology and cognitive science with fresh perspectives on this issue. Philosophy’s role in advancing the debate surrounding it has certainly been central, and should be regarded as so by nonphilosophers as well. In a work recently published as part of the Cambridge Elements series, Janet Levin brings together the most important contemporary theories that attempt to answer the question of the mental. In her book, The Metaphysics of Mind (2022), she acknowledges that the metaphysical questions surrounding the mind should be distinguished from the epistemological and moral ones. While taking into consideration the implications of the epistemological and moral questions for the metaphysics of mind, Levin focuses primarily on the metaphysical questions.
{"title":"From Mind to Body and Back","authors":"Hicham Jakha","doi":"10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.201","url":null,"abstract":"Without doubt, one of the most important questions that has kept philosophers busy, at least ever since the ancient Greeks, is the nature of the mind. Grappling with this question for ages, thinkers from various fields of inquiry have put forward their views concerning the mind and its nature. An interdisciplinary approach to the human mind has emerged in our contemporary era, where philosophy continuously supplements, inter alia, neurobiology and cognitive science with fresh perspectives on this issue. Philosophy’s role in advancing the debate surrounding it has certainly been central, and should be regarded as so by nonphilosophers as well. In a work recently published as part of the Cambridge Elements series, Janet Levin brings together the most important contemporary theories that attempt to answer the question of the mental. In her book, The Metaphysics of Mind (2022), she acknowledges that the metaphysical questions surrounding the mind should be distinguished from the epistemological and moral ones. While taking into consideration the implications of the epistemological and moral questions for the metaphysics of mind, Levin focuses primarily on the metaphysical questions.","PeriodicalId":103828,"journal":{"name":"Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129432847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-01DOI: 10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.200
Albert Łukasik
{"title":"Człowiek zwierzęciem zróżnicowanym: Jacek Neckar, Ewolucyjna psychologia osobowości. O psychologicznej naturze człowieka w ujęciu darwinowskim, Wydawnictwo Akademickie SEDNO, Warszawa 2018, s. 267.","authors":"Albert Łukasik","doi":"10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.200","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.200","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":103828,"journal":{"name":"Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132490553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-04DOI: 10.53763/fag.2022.19.1.199
S. Konstańczak
Artykuł przedstawia dziewiętnastowieczny spór filozoficzny, jaki na temat antropogenezy toczyli ze sobą Karol Libelt i Stefan Pawlicki. Powodem rozpoczęcia sporu były znaleziska archeologiczne na Jeziorze Czeszewskim należącym do posiadłości Libelta. Spór w istocie dotyczył tego, czy chronologia dziejów ludzkości zawarta w Biblii jest możliwa do podważenia, czy też nadal zachowuje swoją aktualność. Stanowisko o nadrzędności świadectw empirycznych reprezentował Libelt, a stanowisko zachowawcze zajął Pawlicki. Tym samym był to w istocie spór dwóch światopoglądów, w którym dla obu polemistów archeologia była tylko narzędziem uzasadniającym własne przekonania. W artykule została omówiona argumentacja, jaką posługiwali się obaj filozofowie, broniąc swych stanowisk, oraz jak interpretowali odkrycia archeologiczne. W konkluzji został oceniony wpływ, jaki ten spór wywarł na samych filozofów oraz na polską naukę.
{"title":"Spór o antropogenezę w polskiej filozofii dziewiętnastego wieku","authors":"S. Konstańczak","doi":"10.53763/fag.2022.19.1.199","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53763/fag.2022.19.1.199","url":null,"abstract":"Artykuł przedstawia dziewiętnastowieczny spór filozoficzny, jaki na temat antropogenezy toczyli ze sobą Karol Libelt i Stefan Pawlicki. Powodem rozpoczęcia sporu były znaleziska archeologiczne na Jeziorze Czeszewskim należącym do posiadłości Libelta. Spór w istocie dotyczył tego, czy chronologia dziejów ludzkości zawarta w Biblii jest możliwa do podważenia, czy też nadal zachowuje swoją aktualność. Stanowisko o nadrzędności świadectw empirycznych reprezentował Libelt, a stanowisko zachowawcze zajął Pawlicki. Tym samym był to w istocie spór dwóch światopoglądów, w którym dla obu polemistów archeologia była tylko narzędziem uzasadniającym własne przekonania. W artykule została omówiona argumentacja, jaką posługiwali się obaj filozofowie, broniąc swych stanowisk, oraz jak interpretowali odkrycia archeologiczne. W konkluzji został oceniony wpływ, jaki ten spór wywarł na samych filozofów oraz na polską naukę.","PeriodicalId":103828,"journal":{"name":"Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121562218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-21DOI: 10.53763/fag.2022.19.1.198
A. Rosenberg
In the 40 years since its first promulgation, contemporary eliminativism about intentional content has secured considerable additional support in the form of both neuroscientific findings and an absence of significant counter-evidence within the now greatly expanded study of the brain and its components. This paper reports some of the most telling of these results. Three serious issues remain to be dealt with by philosophical proponents of eliminativism: claims that neuroscience’s frequent use of the word “representation” requires or presupposes that neural circuitry actually carries such content, claims that the phenomenology of first-person introspection reveals the undeniable existence of intentional content, and arguments to the effect that eliminativism is self-refuting, contradictory or pragmatically paradoxical, owing to its claim that there are no true assertions. This paper addresses these three arguments against eliminativism.
{"title":"How to be an Eliminativist","authors":"A. Rosenberg","doi":"10.53763/fag.2022.19.1.198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53763/fag.2022.19.1.198","url":null,"abstract":"In the 40 years since its first promulgation, contemporary eliminativism about intentional content has secured considerable additional support in the form of both neuroscientific findings and an absence of significant counter-evidence within the now greatly expanded study of the brain and its components. This paper reports some of the most telling of these results. Three serious issues remain to be dealt with by philosophical proponents of eliminativism: claims that neuroscience’s frequent use of the word “representation” requires or presupposes that neural circuitry actually carries such content, claims that the phenomenology of first-person introspection reveals the undeniable existence of intentional content, and arguments to the effect that eliminativism is self-refuting, contradictory or pragmatically paradoxical, owing to its claim that there are no true assertions. This paper addresses these three arguments against eliminativism.","PeriodicalId":103828,"journal":{"name":"Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129489932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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