This paper provides an analysis of the empirical data of shareholders’ say on pay in Italian general meetings in 2012, 2013 and 2014. Reference is made to both approval votes (by controlling shareholders) and dissenting votes sometimes casted by minority shareholders (mainly, foreign institutional investors). The dissenting vote, in particular, shows a paramount critical value as originating by shareholders who are independent from the directors involved by the resolution - unlike the controlling shareholders who have nominated and subsequently elected the directors (to whom may often be linked by family or economic ties). We also examine the consequences of the shareholders’ vote on the remuneration policy adopted by the issuers in the following financial year to understand whether shareholders’ resolution has been taken into account. The analysis will help to evaluate - also considering comparative experiences (English and Israeli law) - how to build legislation in future with particular reference to the implementation of the European Commission Proposal to amend the Shareholder Rights’ Directive n. 36/2007/CE.
{"title":"Say on Pay in Italian General Meetings: Results and Future Perspectives","authors":"Sabrina Bruno, F. Bianconi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2559070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2559070","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides an analysis of the empirical data of shareholders’ say on pay in Italian general meetings in 2012, 2013 and 2014. Reference is made to both approval votes (by controlling shareholders) and dissenting votes sometimes casted by minority shareholders (mainly, foreign institutional investors). The dissenting vote, in particular, shows a paramount critical value as originating by shareholders who are independent from the directors involved by the resolution - unlike the controlling shareholders who have nominated and subsequently elected the directors (to whom may often be linked by family or economic ties). We also examine the consequences of the shareholders’ vote on the remuneration policy adopted by the issuers in the following financial year to understand whether shareholders’ resolution has been taken into account. The analysis will help to evaluate - also considering comparative experiences (English and Israeli law) - how to build legislation in future with particular reference to the implementation of the European Commission Proposal to amend the Shareholder Rights’ Directive n. 36/2007/CE.","PeriodicalId":10506,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Law School","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86700890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The financial institutions that E-Commerce nowadays relies almost exclusively on, to serve as third parties to process electronic payments can hardly avoid disputes that arise through such mediation. In order to have a decentralized currency which would eliminate the need for any mediator and would make the transaction effortless and secure, Bitcoin, cryptography based digital currency, was introduced by a pseudonymous software developer, Satoshi Nakamoto, in 2009. This paper aims to analyse and understand the technicalities as well as the advantages and disadvantages involved in the implementation of such a virtual currency. However, the grey areas of such implementation arise out of the novelties of its own creation, whether it is the aspect of anonymity or the complete lack of regulation. The paper also delves on the widely debated issues of legality and viability of Bitcoins, as a universally acceptable currency, replacing fiat money.
{"title":"Bitcoins - A Viable Currency? Regulatory and Legal Issues","authors":"Raghavi Viswanath, V. Tadwalkar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2531729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2531729","url":null,"abstract":"The financial institutions that E-Commerce nowadays relies almost exclusively on, to serve as third parties to process electronic payments can hardly avoid disputes that arise through such mediation. In order to have a decentralized currency which would eliminate the need for any mediator and would make the transaction effortless and secure, Bitcoin, cryptography based digital currency, was introduced by a pseudonymous software developer, Satoshi Nakamoto, in 2009. This paper aims to analyse and understand the technicalities as well as the advantages and disadvantages involved in the implementation of such a virtual currency. However, the grey areas of such implementation arise out of the novelties of its own creation, whether it is the aspect of anonymity or the complete lack of regulation. The paper also delves on the widely debated issues of legality and viability of Bitcoins, as a universally acceptable currency, replacing fiat money.","PeriodicalId":10506,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Law School","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81713699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Spanish Abstract: La presente obra marca varios hitos tanto contextuales como metodológicos y operativos que encuentran una correlación inmediata con nuestra realidad histórica. Desde una óptica académica, Fraga Lo Curto permite situar contextualmente su trabajo al delimitar el Análisis Económico del Derecho en el primer capítulo de esta obra. Ello resulta muy valioso para un área genuina del Derecho que por meras razones históricas ha sido comúnmente timoneada por estudiosos de Derecho Administrativo, diluyéndose y sacrificando así elementos meteorológicos propios, y su denuedo interdisciplinario. La calidad evidente de esta obra, la instituye como una importantísima adición a los esfuerzos previos por consolidar un eje académico dedicado al entendimiento de la interfaz entre el Derecho y la Economía más allá de la clásica cápsula que supone el movimiento de Derecho y Economía; construyendo así sobre importantes iniciativas previas en Venezuela. English Abstract: This work marks several contextual, methodological and operational milestones that are immediately correlated with our historical reality. From an academic perspective, Fraga Lo Curto provides a conceptual locus to his work by circumscribing it to the 'economic analysis of law' in the first chapter of his book. This is very valuable to a genuine area of law that mere historical reasons has been commonly helmed by administrative law scholars, diluted and thus sacrificing his own methodological and interdisciplinary boldness. The visionary quality of this work hereby establishes it as an important addition to previous efforts in consolidating an academic hub dedicated to understanding the interface between law and economics beyond the classic capsule of the 'Law and Economics' movement; construing upon previous initiatives important in Venezuela.
西班牙文摘:这项工作标志着几个里程碑，在背景、方法和操作上都与我们的历史现实直接相关。从学术的角度来看，Fraga Lo Curto通过界定法律的经济分析，将他的工作置于语境中。这对于一个真正的法律领域来说是非常有价值的，因为纯粹的历史原因，行政法学者经常操纵这个领域，从而稀释和牺牲自己的气象因素及其跨学科的力量。这项工作的明显质量使它成为对以前努力的一个非常重要的补充，这些努力旨在巩固一个学术轴，致力于理解法律和经济之间的接口，超越法律和经济运动的经典胶囊;以委内瑞拉以前的重要倡议为基础。English Abstract: This work上下文标志若干方法和运作的里程碑,而后立即correlated with our历史现实。From an academic perspective, Fraga Curto概念提供到申诉其work by circumscribing it to the‘economic analysis of law in the first其章的书。对于一个真正的法律领域来说，这是非常宝贵的，它的历史原因常常被行政法律学者削弱，从而牺牲了它自己的方法和跨学科的力量。这里的这项工作具有远见卓识的特点，使它成为对以往努力的重要补充，巩固一个学术中心，致力于超越“法律和经济”运动的经典胶囊，了解法律和经济之间的接口;在委内瑞拉之前的重要举措的基础上。
{"title":"Prólogo Al Libro “Control e Inflación: La Inviabilidad Del Sistema Venezolano De Planificación Centralizada De Precios” Por: Luis Fraga Lo Curto (Foreword to: 'Control and Inflation: The Infeasibility of the Venezuelan Centralized Pricing System')","authors":"José Miguel Azpúrua Alfonzo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2699408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2699408","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Spanish Abstract:</b> La presente obra marca varios hitos tanto contextuales como metodológicos y operativos que encuentran una correlación inmediata con nuestra realidad histórica. Desde una óptica académica, Fraga Lo Curto permite situar contextualmente su trabajo al delimitar el Análisis Económico del Derecho en el primer capítulo de esta obra. Ello resulta muy valioso para un área genuina del Derecho que por meras razones históricas ha sido comúnmente timoneada por estudiosos de Derecho Administrativo, diluyéndose y sacrificando así elementos meteorológicos propios, y su denuedo interdisciplinario. La calidad evidente de esta obra, la instituye como una importantísima adición a los esfuerzos previos por consolidar un eje académico dedicado al entendimiento de la interfaz entre el Derecho y la Economía más allá de la clásica cápsula que supone el movimiento de Derecho y Economía; construyendo así sobre importantes iniciativas previas en Venezuela. <b>English Abstract:</b> This work marks several contextual, methodological and operational milestones that are immediately correlated with our historical reality. From an academic perspective, Fraga Lo Curto provides a conceptual locus to his work by circumscribing it to the 'economic analysis of law' in the first chapter of his book. This is very valuable to a genuine area of law that mere historical reasons has been commonly helmed by administrative law scholars, diluted and thus sacrificing his own methodological and interdisciplinary boldness. The visionary quality of this work hereby establishes it as an important addition to previous efforts in consolidating an academic hub dedicated to understanding the interface between law and economics beyond the classic capsule of the 'Law and Economics' movement; construing upon previous initiatives important in Venezuela.","PeriodicalId":10506,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Law School","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78482794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This white paper evaluates the legal workability and constitutionality of what is frequently considered the most feasible mechanism for RGGI to use in regulating imports: an obligation on RGGI “load serving entities” (LSEs) — those companies responsible for supplying electricity to end-use customers — to purchase allowances to account for the emissions associated with the electricity they sell that is imported. Ultimately, although there are many design complexities yet to be worked out, we find that an LSE-centered approach could present a viable pathway forward for RGGI states’ regulation of imports. It is likely to create long-term price signals about the value of clean energy and to help prevent emissions “leakage.” And importantly, an LSE-centered mechanism has a good chance of being found constitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause and Federal Power Act preemption. However, an LSE-centered approach also has some features that may be considered drawbacks: it would likely increase consumer prices within RGGI without sending any immediate price signals to out-of-state generators to incentivize their emissions reductions (instead, such price signals will develop over time as new clean generation and demand-side resources come on-line). Given these features, RGGI states will want to think carefully about whether an LSE-centered imports mechanism accomplishes their goals.
{"title":"Regulating Imports into RGGI: Toward a Legal, Workable Solution","authors":"S. Welton, M. Gerrard, Jason Munster","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2315207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2315207","url":null,"abstract":"This white paper evaluates the legal workability and constitutionality of what is frequently considered the most feasible mechanism for RGGI to use in regulating imports: an obligation on RGGI “load serving entities” (LSEs) — those companies responsible for supplying electricity to end-use customers — to purchase allowances to account for the emissions associated with the electricity they sell that is imported. Ultimately, although there are many design complexities yet to be worked out, we find that an LSE-centered approach could present a viable pathway forward for RGGI states’ regulation of imports. It is likely to create long-term price signals about the value of clean energy and to help prevent emissions “leakage.” And importantly, an LSE-centered mechanism has a good chance of being found constitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause and Federal Power Act preemption. However, an LSE-centered approach also has some features that may be considered drawbacks: it would likely increase consumer prices within RGGI without sending any immediate price signals to out-of-state generators to incentivize their emissions reductions (instead, such price signals will develop over time as new clean generation and demand-side resources come on-line). Given these features, RGGI states will want to think carefully about whether an LSE-centered imports mechanism accomplishes their goals.","PeriodicalId":10506,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Law School","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74580887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Intermediaries are a pervasive feature of modern economies. This article draws attention to an under-theorized cost arising from the use of specialized intermediaries — a systematic shift in the mix of transactions consummated. The interests of intermediaries are imperfectly aligned with the parties to a transaction. Intermediaries seek to maximize their fees, a transaction cost from the perspective of the parties. Numerous factors, including the requirement that a transaction create value in excess of the associated fees to proceed and an intermediary’s interest in maintaining a good reputation, constrain an intermediary’s tendency to use its influence in a self-serving manner. Nonetheless, these constraints are generally imperfect. As a result, when parties rely upon influential intermediaries, there is often a shift in the total mix of transactions consummated toward the transaction type that yields the greatest fee for the intermediary involved. This “fee effect” does more than influence the allocation of gains from trade. The primary cost takes the form of a foregone gain, that is, the difference between the welfare gains produced by the transaction actually consummated and the greater gains that would have been produced had the transaction type not been biased by the intermediary’s self interest. Moreover, reliance upon financial intermediaries can give rise to externalities, altering how capital is allocated in socially costly ways. The article’s contributions are two-fold. First, it provides a theoretical framework for assessing an intermediary’s tendency and capacity to use its influence in a way that affects the type of transaction consummated. This enables parallels to be drawn across disparate settings. Second, applying that framework, the article shows why fee effects may be particularly great in financial markets. In addition, the article considers ways to address fee effects. As a first step, the article suggests that policymakers and market participants should “follow the fees” to better understand the effects of intermediary influence.
{"title":"Fee Effects","authors":"Kathryn Judge","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2270072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2270072","url":null,"abstract":"Intermediaries are a pervasive feature of modern economies. This article draws attention to an under-theorized cost arising from the use of specialized intermediaries — a systematic shift in the mix of transactions consummated. The interests of intermediaries are imperfectly aligned with the parties to a transaction. Intermediaries seek to maximize their fees, a transaction cost from the perspective of the parties. Numerous factors, including the requirement that a transaction create value in excess of the associated fees to proceed and an intermediary’s interest in maintaining a good reputation, constrain an intermediary’s tendency to use its influence in a self-serving manner. Nonetheless, these constraints are generally imperfect. As a result, when parties rely upon influential intermediaries, there is often a shift in the total mix of transactions consummated toward the transaction type that yields the greatest fee for the intermediary involved. This “fee effect” does more than influence the allocation of gains from trade. The primary cost takes the form of a foregone gain, that is, the difference between the welfare gains produced by the transaction actually consummated and the greater gains that would have been produced had the transaction type not been biased by the intermediary’s self interest. Moreover, reliance upon financial intermediaries can give rise to externalities, altering how capital is allocated in socially costly ways. The article’s contributions are two-fold. First, it provides a theoretical framework for assessing an intermediary’s tendency and capacity to use its influence in a way that affects the type of transaction consummated. This enables parallels to be drawn across disparate settings. Second, applying that framework, the article shows why fee effects may be particularly great in financial markets. In addition, the article considers ways to address fee effects. As a first step, the article suggests that policymakers and market participants should “follow the fees” to better understand the effects of intermediary influence.","PeriodicalId":10506,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Law School","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82662861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
International cooperation on economic migration has been difficult to achieve. The interests of emigration countries (“source countries”) and immigration countries (“destination countries”) seem impossible to align. These countries disagree on who should migrate: source countries resist migration that leads to a brain drain, while destination countries welcome these very migrants given that they are likely to be the most productive citizens and the least likely to become fiscal burdens on the destination country. In addition, destination countries resist migration that leads to domestic unemployment through labor replacement. As a result, international economic migration remains restricted at a substantial cost to world welfare.
{"title":"Sharing the Risks and Rewards of Economic Migration","authors":"A. Bradford","doi":"10.7916/D8Z31ZB6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8Z31ZB6","url":null,"abstract":"International cooperation on economic migration has been difficult to achieve. The interests of emigration countries (“source countries”) and immigration countries (“destination countries”) seem impossible to align. These countries disagree on who should migrate: source countries resist migration that leads to a brain drain, while destination countries welcome these very migrants given that they are likely to be the most productive citizens and the least likely to become fiscal burdens on the destination country. In addition, destination countries resist migration that leads to domestic unemployment through labor replacement. As a result, international economic migration remains restricted at a substantial cost to world welfare.","PeriodicalId":10506,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Law School","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75362284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Infrastructure across the country must expand rapidly. Industrialization, especially based on manufacturing has also to accelerate. Urbanization is inevitable. Land is essential requirement for all these processes. Government also needs to acquire land for a variety of public purposes. In every case, Land acquisition must take place in a manner that fully protects the interests of land owners and also of those whose livelihoods depend on the land being acquired. Under our Constitution, land is a State subject but land acquisition is a Concurrent subject. So far, the basic law governing the land acquisition process has been the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Although it has been amended from time to time, it is painfully evident that the basic law has become archaic. The land acquisition process in India has now assumed a controversial and debatable dimension as there are serious objections to the acquisition of land by the government for various projects. The recent uproar against the land acquisition in Greater Noida where farmers from at least 20 villages (Saini, Itwari, Bisrakh, Haibatur and Patwari, among others) agitating over land takeover by the Uttar Pradesh Government. Objective:Critical study of the acquisition of land for development purpose & right to livelihood. In this research paper the author focused on the problem of acquisition of land in the light of a case study of Greater Noida.
{"title":"Land Acquisition & Human Right Approach: A Case Study","authors":"Dr. Yuvraj Dilip Patil","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2001917","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2001917","url":null,"abstract":"Infrastructure across the country must expand rapidly. Industrialization, especially based on manufacturing has also to accelerate. Urbanization is inevitable. Land is essential requirement for all these processes. Government also needs to acquire land for a variety of public purposes. In every case, Land acquisition must take place in a manner that fully protects the interests of land owners and also of those whose livelihoods depend on the land being acquired. Under our Constitution, land is a State subject but land acquisition is a Concurrent subject. So far, the basic law governing the land acquisition process has been the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Although it has been amended from time to time, it is painfully evident that the basic law has become archaic. The land acquisition process in India has now assumed a controversial and debatable dimension as there are serious objections to the acquisition of land by the government for various projects. The recent uproar against the land acquisition in Greater Noida where farmers from at least 20 villages (Saini, Itwari, Bisrakh, Haibatur and Patwari, among others) agitating over land takeover by the Uttar Pradesh Government. Objective:Critical study of the acquisition of land for development purpose & right to livelihood. In this research paper the author focused on the problem of acquisition of land in the light of a case study of Greater Noida.","PeriodicalId":10506,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Law School","volume":"67 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82581118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article reconsiders the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009 and the present debate about the regulation of finance in the light of a vision of how finance can better serve the American economy and American democracy. The central claim is that regulation as conventionally understood cannot adequately redress the problems, and seize the opportunities, revealed by the crisis. We should approach financial regulation as the first step in a series of institutional innovations designed to put finance more effectively at the service of the real economy (financial deepening) while broadening economic opportunity in the country (financial democratization). I develop and defend this thesis by arguing for four subsidiary claims. A first subsidiary claim is that a major part of the causal background to the crisis was an inconclusive hollowing out of the New Deal regime for the governance of finance. That regime failed to be replaced by an alternative coherent scheme. Instead, it gave way to a ramshackle compromise -- powerful, opaque, recalcitrant, and damaging. Such a situation -- I argue -- represents the rule rather than the exception in the history of law and institutions. The outcome of the hollowing out in the United States was a weakening of the links of finance to the real economy, paradoxically accompanied by the hypertrophy of the financial sector. A second subsidiary claim is that the New Deal critics and reformers of finance, such as Louis Brandeis and William Douglas, were right in their intuition that a strong link exists between the legal and institutional requirements of financial deepening and of financial democratization. A third subsidiary claim is that to make good on this intuition in today's circumstances we need a new agenda of reform with an explicit and ambitious institutional content. Such an agenda includes the transfer of sophisticated financial capabilities to the country's remarkable network of local banks as well as a vast expansion and popularization of financial services, channeling long-term saving into long-term productive investment. A fourth subsidiary claim is that law and legal thought provide the chief storehouse of the ideas and methods needed to conceive and to implement such innovations. Prevailing styles of economic theory, including those underlying the dominant practice of “law and economics,” remain largely bereft of institutional imagination. This article illustrates how a revised practice of legal and institutional analysis can help fill this lacuna. In so doing, this piece takes "law and economics" in another direction.
{"title":"American Finance and American Democracy: Towards an Institutionalist 'Law and Economics'","authors":"T. Lothian","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1996653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1996653","url":null,"abstract":"This article reconsiders the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009 and the present debate about the regulation of finance in the light of a vision of how finance can better serve the American economy and American democracy. The central claim is that regulation as conventionally understood cannot adequately redress the problems, and seize the opportunities, revealed by the crisis. We should approach financial regulation as the first step in a series of institutional innovations designed to put finance more effectively at the service of the real economy (financial deepening) while broadening economic opportunity in the country (financial democratization). I develop and defend this thesis by arguing for four subsidiary claims. A first subsidiary claim is that a major part of the causal background to the crisis was an inconclusive hollowing out of the New Deal regime for the governance of finance. That regime failed to be replaced by an alternative coherent scheme. Instead, it gave way to a ramshackle compromise -- powerful, opaque, recalcitrant, and damaging. Such a situation -- I argue -- represents the rule rather than the exception in the history of law and institutions. The outcome of the hollowing out in the United States was a weakening of the links of finance to the real economy, paradoxically accompanied by the hypertrophy of the financial sector. A second subsidiary claim is that the New Deal critics and reformers of finance, such as Louis Brandeis and William Douglas, were right in their intuition that a strong link exists between the legal and institutional requirements of financial deepening and of financial democratization. A third subsidiary claim is that to make good on this intuition in today's circumstances we need a new agenda of reform with an explicit and ambitious institutional content. Such an agenda includes the transfer of sophisticated financial capabilities to the country's remarkable network of local banks as well as a vast expansion and popularization of financial services, channeling long-term saving into long-term productive investment. A fourth subsidiary claim is that law and legal thought provide the chief storehouse of the ideas and methods needed to conceive and to implement such innovations. Prevailing styles of economic theory, including those underlying the dominant practice of “law and economics,” remain largely bereft of institutional imagination. This article illustrates how a revised practice of legal and institutional analysis can help fill this lacuna. In so doing, this piece takes \"law and economics\" in another direction.","PeriodicalId":10506,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Law School","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75063518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
RESUMEN: China ahora es el segundo pais que mas empresas Global Fortune 500 tiene en el mundo. Casi todas ellas son empresas estatales (SOEs, acronimo en ingles) organizadas dentro de grandes grupos empresariales, con un organismo central gubernamental denominado SASAC como accionista controlador fi nal. A pesar de la importancia de estos grupos para la economia domestica china y su estrategia de invertir en el exterior, muchas de las particularidades del sector SOE –especialmente su estructura organizacional y las caracteristicas de gobierno corporativo de los distintos grupos empresariales– permanecen en la penumbra. Para salir de esa oscuridad se requiere dejar el analisis habitual basado en los costos de agencia de las empresas que cotizan en bolsa, predominante en la bibliografia sobre gobierno corporativo. Por el contrario, examinamos la ecologia relacional en la que se mueven los grupos SOE, con atencion en los mecanismos institucionalizados que unen los grupos empresariales con otros organos del Estado-partido. Pensamos que a traves de estos enlaces, las elites administradoras de la economia china han ensamblado lo que Mancur Olson llamo una “coalicion englobante total” –una organizacion cuyos miembros deben tanto a la sociedad, lo que hace que tengan grandes incentivos para estar muy pendientes de la productividad del grupo SOE. Exponiendo de esta manera los mecanismos del capitalismo de Estado chino surgen muchas interrogantes para los investigadores y para los responsables de politicas publicas, las que se incrementan a medida que se expande la interaccion global de las empresas chinas. Por ejemplo, ?se explica adecuadamente el ascenso de las SOEs chinas mediante las teorias ordinarias de la bibliografia comparada de gobierno corporativo? ?Como podria transformar la trayec
{"title":"We are the (National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China","authors":"Li-wen Lin, C. Milhaupt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1952623","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1952623","url":null,"abstract":"RESUMEN: China ahora es el segundo pais que mas empresas Global Fortune 500 tiene en el mundo. Casi todas ellas son empresas estatales (SOEs, acronimo en ingles) organizadas dentro de grandes grupos empresariales, con un organismo central gubernamental denominado SASAC como accionista controlador fi nal. A pesar de la importancia de estos grupos para la economia domestica china y su estrategia de invertir en el exterior, muchas de las particularidades del sector SOE –especialmente su estructura organizacional y las caracteristicas de gobierno corporativo de los distintos grupos empresariales– permanecen en la penumbra. Para salir de esa oscuridad se requiere dejar el analisis habitual basado en los costos de agencia de las empresas que cotizan en bolsa, predominante en la bibliografia sobre gobierno corporativo. Por el contrario, examinamos la ecologia relacional en la que se mueven los grupos SOE, con atencion en los mecanismos institucionalizados que unen los grupos empresariales con otros organos del Estado-partido. Pensamos que a traves de estos enlaces, las elites administradoras de la economia china han ensamblado lo que Mancur Olson llamo una “coalicion englobante total” –una organizacion cuyos miembros deben tanto a la sociedad, lo que hace que tengan grandes incentivos para estar muy pendientes de la productividad del grupo SOE. Exponiendo de esta manera los mecanismos del capitalismo de Estado chino surgen muchas interrogantes para los investigadores y para los responsables de politicas publicas, las que se incrementan a medida que se expande la interaccion global de las empresas chinas. Por ejemplo, ?se explica adecuadamente el ascenso de las SOEs chinas mediante las teorias ordinarias de la bibliografia comparada de gobierno corporativo? ?Como podria transformar la trayec","PeriodicalId":10506,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Law School","volume":"76 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85747953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When investments are non-verifiable, inducing cooperative investments with simple contracts may not be as difficult as previously thought. Indeed, modeling 'expectation damages' close to legal practice, we show that the default remedy of contract law induces the first best. Yet, in order to lower informational requirements of courts, parties may opt for a 'specific performance' regime which grants the breached-against buyer an option to choose 'restitution' if the tender's value falls below some (exogenously given) quality threshold. In order to implement this regime, no more information needs to be verifiable than is implicitly assumed in Che and Hausch (1999).
{"title":"Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments","authors":"A. Stremitzer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1162792","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1162792","url":null,"abstract":"When investments are non-verifiable, inducing cooperative investments with simple contracts may not be as difficult as previously thought. Indeed, modeling 'expectation damages' close to legal practice, we show that the default remedy of contract law induces the first best. Yet, in order to lower informational requirements of courts, parties may opt for a 'specific performance' regime which grants the breached-against buyer an option to choose 'restitution' if the tender's value falls below some (exogenously given) quality threshold. In order to implement this regime, no more information needs to be verifiable than is implicitly assumed in Che and Hausch (1999).","PeriodicalId":10506,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Law School","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81106795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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