This presentation, at the first webinar of the T20 Task Force 1 on Trade, Investment, and Growth during the SaudArabian G20 Presidency, argues for twin effort
{"title":"How to Attract ‘Digital FDI’ and Sustainable FDI for COVID-19 Recovery?","authors":"Matthew Stephenson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3621464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3621464","url":null,"abstract":"This presentation, at the first webinar of the T20 Task Force 1 on Trade, Investment, and Growth during the SaudArabian G20 Presidency, argues for twin effort","PeriodicalId":105668,"journal":{"name":"Development Economics: Regional & Country Studies eJournal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114543393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article focusses on describing the odds of the Africa Cup of Nations edition champions retaining the cup in the next edition using the percentage of players recruited to defend the cup that were also recruited in the previous edition, and whether the coach in the previous edition is retained or not. The paper considers the editions in the period from 1992 to 2017 to come up with a description of the odds. Only 11 records are considered. Since the sample is small, bootstrapping is used (case-resampling with resampling done 1000 times). Logistic regression model is fit using penalised maximum likelihood (to avoid bias due to using small samples). Results show that the expected odds of the champions retaining the cup when they have not retained any player and the coach who were recruited in the previous edition are about 1.850 to 3.031. For every 1% of players who participated in previous edition and are retained, the expected odds of retaining the cup decrease by about 94.12% to 95.08%. When the coach in the previous edition is retained the expected odds of the team retaining the cup are about 343.31% to 462.21% higher than when the coach is not retained. The difference in odds of retaining the cup in cases where a coach is retained and a coach is not retained is not significant when about 77.19% or more of the players who won the cup in the previous edition are recruited.
{"title":"Africa Cup of Nations- the Odds of Retaining Glory","authors":"A. Musopole","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3604126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3604126","url":null,"abstract":"This article focusses on describing the odds of the Africa Cup of Nations edition champions retaining the cup in the next edition using the percentage of players recruited to defend the cup that were also recruited in the previous edition, and whether the coach in the previous edition is retained or not. The paper considers the editions in the period from 1992 to 2017 to come up with a description of the odds. Only 11 records are considered. Since the sample is small, bootstrapping is used (case-resampling with resampling done 1000 times). Logistic regression model is fit using penalised maximum likelihood (to avoid bias due to using small samples). Results show that the expected odds of the champions retaining the cup when they have not retained any player and the coach who were recruited in the previous edition are about 1.850 to 3.031. For every 1% of players who participated in previous edition and are retained, the expected odds of retaining the cup decrease by about 94.12% to 95.08%. When the coach in the previous edition is retained the expected odds of the team retaining the cup are about 343.31% to 462.21% higher than when the coach is not retained. The difference in odds of retaining the cup in cases where a coach is retained and a coach is not retained is not significant when about 77.19% or more of the players who won the cup in the previous edition are recruited.","PeriodicalId":105668,"journal":{"name":"Development Economics: Regional & Country Studies eJournal","volume":"143 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116907889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper aims to examine and compare the profitability of Islamic and conventional banks located in 20 African countries over the period 2009-2018. Based on a sample of 21 Islamic banks and 297 conventional banks, this study shows that Islamic banks perform better than conventional banks in Africa. This result is driven by large banks.
{"title":"A Note on the Profitability of African Banks: Islamic versus Conventional","authors":"Whelsy Boungou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3603046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3603046","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to examine and compare the profitability of Islamic and conventional banks located in 20 African countries over the period 2009-2018. Based on a sample of 21 Islamic banks and 297 conventional banks, this study shows that Islamic banks perform better than conventional banks in Africa. This result is driven by large banks.","PeriodicalId":105668,"journal":{"name":"Development Economics: Regional & Country Studies eJournal","volume":"240 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132513910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the feasibility of international monetary policy coordination among the ASEAN-5 + 3 countries using the two-production-factor Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DGSE) models. It explores three types of interaction regimes among these countries: (1) No Coordination; (2) Bilateral Coordination; and (3)Multilateral Coordination. We find 18 feasible Bilateral Coordination schemes and four feasible Multilateral Coordination schemes for the ASEAN-5 + 3 countries. The best among these schemes is the Multilateral Coordination scheme that involves all the ASEAN-5 + 3 countries. Therefore, we suggest that the ASEAN-5 + 3 countries should adopt this scheme if coordinating monetary policies.
{"title":"Is International Monetary Policy Coordination Feasible for the ASEAN-5 + 3 Countries?","authors":"E. Sugandi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3657666","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3657666","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the feasibility of international monetary policy coordination among the ASEAN-5 + 3 countries using the two-production-factor Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DGSE) models. It explores three types of interaction regimes among these countries: (1) No Coordination; (2) Bilateral Coordination; and (3)Multilateral Coordination. We find 18 feasible Bilateral Coordination schemes and four feasible Multilateral Coordination schemes for the ASEAN-5 + 3 countries. The best among these schemes is the Multilateral Coordination scheme that involves all the ASEAN-5 + 3 countries. Therefore, we suggest that the ASEAN-5 + 3 countries should adopt this scheme if coordinating monetary policies.","PeriodicalId":105668,"journal":{"name":"Development Economics: Regional & Country Studies eJournal","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123772493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It has been argued that “General Purpose Technologies” (GPTs) have the power to change the pace and direction of economic progress. Although there is empirical evidence on the virtuous effect of the diffusion of these technologies, this evidence is mostly based, if not exclusively, on measures of their usage. This article studies the economic consequences of the technological adoption of a GPT, i.e. on those who are able to produce, transform or complement with it. It focuses on the case of Electrical & Electronic (E&E) technologies at the beginning of the twentieth century and shows how places that produced E&E technologies using an extensive measure of adoption grew faster and paid higher wages than others between 1920 and 1930. To do so it relies on a novel database containing patenting activity at the county level that dates back to 1836, text mining techniques to identify E&E patents, and demographic and economic data from the US Census Bureau.
{"title":"Following the Trail of a General Purpose Technology:Electrical & Electronic Technological Adoption in the1920s","authors":"S. Petralia","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3144071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3144071","url":null,"abstract":"It has been argued that “General Purpose Technologies” (GPTs) have the power to change the pace and direction of economic progress. Although there is empirical evidence on the virtuous effect of the diffusion of these technologies, this evidence is mostly based, if not exclusively, on measures of their usage. This article studies the economic consequences of the technological adoption of a GPT, i.e. on those who are able to produce, transform or complement with it. It focuses on the case of Electrical & Electronic (E&E) technologies at the beginning of the twentieth century and shows how places that produced E&E technologies using an extensive measure of adoption grew faster and paid higher wages than others between 1920 and 1930. To do so it relies on a novel database containing patenting activity at the county level that dates back to 1836, text mining techniques to identify E&E patents, and demographic and economic data from the US Census Bureau.","PeriodicalId":105668,"journal":{"name":"Development Economics: Regional & Country Studies eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121860084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-29DOI: 10.2499/p15738coll2.133704
Hiroyuki Takeshima, Manmeet Ajmani, D. Roy, A. Fadhillah, Yanyan Liu
Despite the growth of agrifood markets, and gradual structural transformation, smallholders persist in Asia. Such patterns are at odds with the views that market growth should encourage more specialization whereby smallholders’ transition to either larger farmers or specialized non-farm households. Using the panel household data in Vietnam, this study investigates how participation in agrifood markets affect smallholder households’ economies of scope (EOS) in diversifying into agriculture and non-agricultural income-earning activities. We find that, greater agrifood market participation proxied by the increased food purchase generally increases EOS between agriculture and non-agricultural activities at the household level. Moreover, it leads to greater labor productivity in agriculture, and also increases female household members’ diversifications into both agriculture and non-agricultural income-earning activities. These effects are relatively stronger and more consistent than conventional indicators of agrifood product sales or proximity to the market. The results shed more light on how exactly smallholders in Vietnam persist in the face of agrifood market growth, and what kind of their relations with such a growing market can be promoted in ways that enhance their livelihoods in the short- to medium- terms.
{"title":"Agrifood Market Participation, Household Economies of Specialization and Diversification: Evidence From Vietnam","authors":"Hiroyuki Takeshima, Manmeet Ajmani, D. Roy, A. Fadhillah, Yanyan Liu","doi":"10.2499/p15738coll2.133704","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2499/p15738coll2.133704","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the growth of agrifood markets, and gradual structural transformation, smallholders persist in Asia. Such patterns are at odds with the views that market growth should encourage more specialization whereby smallholders’ transition to either larger farmers or specialized non-farm households. Using the panel household data in Vietnam, this study investigates how participation in agrifood markets affect smallholder households’ economies of scope (EOS) in diversifying into agriculture and non-agricultural income-earning activities. We find that, greater agrifood market participation proxied by the increased food purchase generally increases EOS between agriculture and non-agricultural activities at the household level. Moreover, it leads to greater labor productivity in agriculture, and also increases female household members’ diversifications into both agriculture and non-agricultural income-earning activities. These effects are relatively stronger and more consistent than conventional indicators of agrifood product sales or proximity to the market. The results shed more light on how exactly smallholders in Vietnam persist in the face of agrifood market growth, and what kind of their relations with such a growing market can be promoted in ways that enhance their livelihoods in the short- to medium- terms.","PeriodicalId":105668,"journal":{"name":"Development Economics: Regional & Country Studies eJournal","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123816303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines the effect of life expectancy on fertility, education, and labor force participation. Using birth and sibling histories from the Demographic Health Surveys conducted in sub‐Saharan Africa, I construct a time series of age‐specific birth rates and mortality rates at the country‐region level. I use these data to test the implications of a general equilibrium model linking life expectancy to fertility, human capital, and labor supply. My results suggest that increases in life expectancy reduce fertility, increase education, and increase labor force participation. Overall, my empirical results suggest that in sub‐Saharan Africa, increases in life expectancy will have a positive impact on growth through fertility, education, and labor supply but that the effect will be small. My results also rule out the possibility that recent shocks to adult mortality in high HIV prevalence countries will reduce fertility, increase labor productivity, and lead to faster growth.
{"title":"Life Expectancy and Economic Development: Evidence from Microdata","authors":"Belgi Turan","doi":"10.1111/rode.12665","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12665","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the effect of life expectancy on fertility, education, and labor force participation. Using birth and sibling histories from the Demographic Health Surveys conducted in sub‐Saharan Africa, I construct a time series of age‐specific birth rates and mortality rates at the country‐region level. I use these data to test the implications of a general equilibrium model linking life expectancy to fertility, human capital, and labor supply. My results suggest that increases in life expectancy reduce fertility, increase education, and increase labor force participation. Overall, my empirical results suggest that in sub‐Saharan Africa, increases in life expectancy will have a positive impact on growth through fertility, education, and labor supply but that the effect will be small. My results also rule out the possibility that recent shocks to adult mortality in high HIV prevalence countries will reduce fertility, increase labor productivity, and lead to faster growth.","PeriodicalId":105668,"journal":{"name":"Development Economics: Regional & Country Studies eJournal","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132306146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Each country faces unique challenges in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic India’s relatively low healthcare resources, limited state capacity, and large populat
{"title":"Pandemic Policy in Developing Countries: Recommendations for India","authors":"S. Rajagopalan, A. Tabarrok","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3593011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3593011","url":null,"abstract":"Each country faces unique challenges in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic India’s relatively low healthcare resources, limited state capacity, and large populat","PeriodicalId":105668,"journal":{"name":"Development Economics: Regional & Country Studies eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121067921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We assess India’s healthcare capacity by comparing several countrywide and state-level metrics: per capita spending on healthcare, healthcare spending priority
我们通过比较几个全国性和州级指标来评估印度的医疗保健能力:人均医疗保健支出,医疗保健支出优先级
{"title":"Assessing Healthcare Capacity in India","authors":"S. Rajagopalan, Abishek Choutagunta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3570651","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3570651","url":null,"abstract":"We assess India’s healthcare capacity by comparing several countrywide and state-level metrics: per capita spending on healthcare, healthcare spending priority","PeriodicalId":105668,"journal":{"name":"Development Economics: Regional & Country Studies eJournal","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132087442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
African countries have been among the last to be hit by the global coronavirus pandemic. Yet, as the cases rise and governments rightfully take the necessary measures to slow the spread of the virus, the continent is likely to face widespread economic fallout as business slows to a near halt. Some countries like Angola and Nigeria, were already going to feel the pain from an oil price war – largely driven by a falling out between Saudi Arabia and Russia – but a pandemic that has already pummelled stock markets across the globe will only be an add-on to the unavoidable economic damage expected in the short term for these countries.The reality is that many countries across the globe are on recession watch…some countries may already be in a recession (albeit not yet by the technical rules of a fall in GDP in two successive quarters). For Algeria, things are very complicated because the country does not have a pro-business energy policy. The perennial issue the hydrocarbons law still has not been reformed. Add to that the problems of security and corruption, and you end up with conditions that are unfavourable to private investment. Moreover, oil companies have seen billions of dollars of their value wiped out losing 10% to 15%. This will therefore limit investment.
The COVID-19 could lead to Africa’s export revenues from fuels falling at around US$ 101 billion in 2020. Remittances and tourism are also being affected as the virus continues to spread worldwide, resulting in a decline in FDI flows; capital flight; domestic financial market tightening; and a slow-down in investments – hence job losses. Pharmaceuticals, imported largely from Europe and other COVID-19 affected partners from outside the continent, could see their prices increasing and availability reduced for Africans. With nearly two-thirds of African countries being net importers of basic food, shortages are feared to severely impact food availability and food security. Negative consequences are expected to worsen with the crisis becoming a pandemic. In addition, a decline in commodity prices could lead to fiscal pressures for Africa’s economic power houses such as South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and Angola.
{"title":"The Aftermatch of the Coronavirus in Selected African Economies","authors":"Professor Alain Ndedi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3565931","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3565931","url":null,"abstract":"African countries have been among the last to be hit by the global coronavirus pandemic. Yet, as the cases rise and governments rightfully take the necessary measures to slow the spread of the virus, the continent is likely to face widespread economic fallout as business slows to a near halt. Some countries like Angola and Nigeria, were already going to feel the pain from an oil price war – largely driven by a falling out between Saudi Arabia and Russia – but a pandemic that has already pummelled stock markets across the globe will only be an add-on to the unavoidable economic damage expected in the short term for these countries.The reality is that many countries across the globe are on recession watch…some countries may already be in a recession (albeit not yet by the technical rules of a fall in GDP in two successive quarters). For Algeria, things are very complicated because the country does not have a pro-business energy policy. The perennial issue the hydrocarbons law still has not been reformed. Add to that the problems of security and corruption, and you end up with conditions that are unfavourable to private investment. Moreover, oil companies have seen billions of dollars of their value wiped out losing 10% to 15%. This will therefore limit investment. <br><br>The COVID-19 could lead to Africa’s export revenues from fuels falling at around US$ 101 billion in 2020. Remittances and tourism are also being affected as the virus continues to spread worldwide, resulting in a decline in FDI flows; capital flight; domestic financial market tightening; and a slow-down in investments – hence job losses. Pharmaceuticals, imported largely from Europe and other COVID-19 affected partners from outside the continent, could see their prices increasing and availability reduced for Africans. With nearly two-thirds of African countries being net importers of basic food, shortages are feared to severely impact food availability and food security. Negative consequences are expected to worsen with the crisis becoming a pandemic. In addition, a decline in commodity prices could lead to fiscal pressures for Africa’s economic power houses such as South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and Angola.<br>","PeriodicalId":105668,"journal":{"name":"Development Economics: Regional & Country Studies eJournal","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131296669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}