Contrary to a well-established view, public debt expansions may tighten the household borrowing constraint over time. Within an incomplete-markets model featuring an endogenous borrowing limit, we show that plausible debt-financed fiscal policies generate such tightening through an increase in the interest rate. The tightening makes constrained agents deleverage and reinforces the precautionary saving motive of the unconstrained. This appetite for assets impacts factor prices which, in some cases, amplify the households' reactions to the policies. For example, the tightening can substantially magnify the government spending multiplier through strengthening the typical negative wealth effect on labor supply induced by the fiscal stimulus. Moreover, the tightening affects the political support to the policies mainly through price effects. (Copyright: Elsevier)
{"title":"Public Debt Expansions and the Dynamics of the Household Borrowing Constraint","authors":"V. Ercolani, António R. Antunes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3612932","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3612932","url":null,"abstract":"Contrary to a well-established view, public debt expansions may tighten the household borrowing constraint over time. Within an incomplete-markets model featuring an endogenous borrowing limit, we show that plausible debt-financed fiscal policies generate such tightening through an increase in the interest rate. The tightening makes constrained agents deleverage and reinforces the precautionary saving motive of the unconstrained. This appetite for assets impacts factor prices which, in some cases, amplify the households' reactions to the policies. For example, the tightening can substantially magnify the government spending multiplier through strengthening the typical negative wealth effect on labor supply induced by the fiscal stimulus. Moreover, the tightening affects the political support to the policies mainly through price effects. (Copyright: Elsevier)","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125145382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we develop a model for tax amnesty applications in a multi-period setting. One key insight from the model is that applying for amnesty becomes more attractive at the moment when stricter enforcement is announced, even if the implementation of the policy is in the distant future. We use our model to make sense of how international tax information exchange agreements affects voluntary disclosure of wealth and income previously hidden in tax havens. Our data is from Norway. In accordance with the dynamic amnesty model we observe a strong announcement effect of a tax information exchange agreement between Norway and Switzerland and Luxembourg, the two most important tax havens for Norwegian tax evaders. However, the effect levels off very quickly, much faster than our model predicts. We think this is because the initial announcement of the tax agreement exaggerated the risk the agreement imposed to those who had hidden taxable income and wealth in Switzerland. We also estimate and find significant effects of the press releases the Norwegian Tax Authority issues to inform taxpayers about new international tax agreements and the amnesty, or voluntary disclosure, option that exists in the Norwegian tax code.
{"title":"The Impact of International Tax Information Exchange Agreements on the Use of Tax Amnesty: Evidence from Norway","authors":"Jonas Andersson, F. Schroyen, Gaute Torsvik","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3464252","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3464252","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we develop a model for tax amnesty applications in a multi-period setting. One key insight from the model is that applying for amnesty becomes more attractive at the moment when stricter enforcement is announced, even if the implementation of the policy is in the distant future. We use our model to make sense of how international tax information exchange agreements affects voluntary disclosure of wealth and income previously hidden in tax havens. Our data is from Norway. In accordance with the dynamic amnesty model we observe a strong announcement effect of a tax information exchange agreement between Norway and Switzerland and Luxembourg, the two most important tax havens for Norwegian tax evaders. However, the effect levels off very quickly, much faster than our model predicts. We think this is because the initial announcement of the tax agreement exaggerated the risk the agreement imposed to those who had hidden taxable income and wealth in Switzerland. We also estimate and find significant effects of the press releases the Norwegian Tax Authority issues to inform taxpayers about new international tax agreements and the amnesty, or voluntary disclosure, option that exists in the Norwegian tax code.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130025962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sharp declines in wealth-concentration occurred across Europe and the US during the 20th century. But this stylized fact is based on declared wealth. It is possible that today the richest are not less rich but rather that they are hiding much of their wealth. This paper proposes a method to measure this hidden wealth, in any form. In England, 1920-1992, elites are concealing 20-32% of their wealth. Among dynasties, hidden wealth, independent of declared wealth, predicts appearance in the Offshore Leaks Database of 2013-6, house values in 1999, and Oxbridge attendance, 1990-2016. Accounting for hidden wealth eliminates one-third of the observed decline of top 10% wealth-share over the past century.
{"title":"Hidden Wealth","authors":"N. Cummins","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3470253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3470253","url":null,"abstract":"Sharp declines in wealth-concentration occurred across Europe and the US during the 20th century. But this stylized fact is based on declared wealth. It is possible that today the richest are not less rich but rather that they are hiding much of their wealth. This paper proposes a method to measure this hidden wealth, in any form. In England, 1920-1992, elites are concealing 20-32% of their wealth. Among dynasties, hidden wealth, independent of declared wealth, predicts appearance in the Offshore Leaks Database of 2013-6, house values in 1999, and Oxbridge attendance, 1990-2016. Accounting for hidden wealth eliminates one-third of the observed decline of top 10% wealth-share over the past century.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127135247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies how the elimination of the corporate tax bias on bank leverage affects banks' credit provisioning using the introduction of an allowance for corporate equity (ACE) in Belgium. We find that affected banks increased their contribution within cross-border syndicated loan facilities relative to other foreign banks, and that this effect was stronger for relatively safe borrowers; in neighboring countries; and where Belgian banks had subsidiaries. We estimate that Belgian bank-lead loans had on average 20-50 basis points lower spreads when ACE was in effect. Finally, our results suggest a relatively large, positive credit supply effect domestically. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that 1 dollar of ACE tax deduction resulted in roughly 123 dollars of new loans overall.
{"title":"Eliminating the Tax Shield Through Allowance for Corporate Equity: Cross-Border Credit Supply Effects","authors":"Swarnava Biswas, Bálint Horváth, Wei Zhai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3271366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3271366","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how the elimination of the corporate tax bias on bank leverage affects banks' credit provisioning using the introduction of an allowance for corporate equity (ACE) in Belgium. We find that affected banks increased their contribution within cross-border syndicated loan facilities relative to other foreign banks, and that this effect was stronger for relatively safe borrowers; in neighboring countries; and where Belgian banks had subsidiaries. We estimate that Belgian bank-lead loans had on average 20-50 basis points lower spreads when ACE was in effect. Finally, our results suggest a relatively large, positive credit supply effect domestically. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that 1 dollar of ACE tax deduction resulted in roughly 123 dollars of new loans overall.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130715042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine spillovers to the Irish economy from US corporate income tax rate cuts and find they lead to a small but persistent increase in Irish economic output. Our analysis of the transmission channels shows that an increase in investment, employment and exports in the externally-financed industrial sector largely drives this expansion. We also find that output spillovers from US corporate income tax cuts are larger when there is slack in the Irish labour market. Our findings suggest that the changing structure of the Irish economy means any spillovers to real economic activity from the recent US corporate tax cuts could be relatively minor. However, the larger presence and shifting focus of foreign multinational corporations’ operations in Ireland means lessons from past US corporate tax cuts may be of limited value in predicting the effects of the recent US tax system reform.
{"title":"US Corporate Tax Cuts: Spillovers to the Irish Economy","authors":"Daragh Clancy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3418183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3418183","url":null,"abstract":"We examine spillovers to the Irish economy from US corporate income tax rate cuts and find they lead to a small but persistent increase in Irish economic output. Our analysis of the transmission channels shows that an increase in investment, employment and exports in the externally-financed industrial sector largely drives this expansion. We also find that output spillovers from US corporate income tax cuts are larger when there is slack in the Irish labour market. Our findings suggest that the changing structure of the Irish economy means any spillovers to real economic activity from the recent US corporate tax cuts could be relatively minor. However, the larger presence and shifting focus of foreign multinational corporations’ operations in Ireland means lessons from past US corporate tax cuts may be of limited value in predicting the effects of the recent US tax system reform.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127989379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This note reviews May 2019 OECD framework agreement report, “OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS: Progress Report July 2018-May 2019” on international taxation of the ‘digital economy’. The core conclusions of the review are: 1. The framework agreement proposals to-date represent complex, ambiguous and uncertainty-rich set of taxation reforms that pose serious questions about their potential effectiveness and impact on the advanced economies; 2. The framework agreement proposals represent a direct challenge to the national sovereignty over taxation and fiscal policies, including policies aimed at domestic economic development, support for the free capital mobility and promotion of the research and innovation-intensive growth; 3. The framework proposals represent a significant risk of skewing international markets institutions in favour of larger Multinational enterprises (MNCs) at the expense of smaller, younger and more competitive and more innovative firms; and 4. The framework proposals represent a significant risk of increasing monopolisation and monopsonisation of the modern economies.
{"title":"OECD-Led Tax Reforms: A Prescription for a Less Competitive Economy","authors":"Constantin Gurdgiev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3406260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3406260","url":null,"abstract":"This note reviews May 2019 OECD framework agreement report, “OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS: Progress Report July 2018-May 2019” on international taxation of the ‘digital economy’. The core conclusions of the review are: \u0000 \u00001. The framework agreement proposals to-date represent complex, ambiguous and uncertainty-rich set of taxation reforms that pose serious questions about their potential effectiveness and impact on the advanced economies; \u0000 \u00002. The framework agreement proposals represent a direct challenge to the national sovereignty over taxation and fiscal policies, including policies aimed at domestic economic development, support for the free capital mobility and promotion of the research and innovation-intensive growth; \u0000 \u00003. The framework proposals represent a significant risk of skewing international markets institutions in favour of larger Multinational enterprises (MNCs) at the expense of smaller, younger and more competitive and more innovative firms; and \u0000 \u00004. The framework proposals represent a significant risk of increasing monopolisation and monopsonisation of the modern economies.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129197291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We show that tax compliance is volatile and markedly responds to fiscal policy. To explore the consequence of this novel stylized fact, we build a model of sovereign debt with limited commitment and imperfect tax enforcement. Fiscal policy persistently affects the size of the informal economy, which impact future fiscal revenues and thus default risk. This mechanism captures a key empirical regularity of economies with imperfect tax enforcement: the low sensitivity of debt price to fiscal consolidations. The interaction of imperfect tax enforcement and limited commitment strongly constrains the dynamics of optimal fiscal policy. During default crises, high tax distortions force the government towards extreme fiscal policies, notably including costly austerity spells.
{"title":"Sovereign Default and Imperfect Tax Enforcement","authors":"Francesco Pappadà, Yanos Zylberberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3400076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3400076","url":null,"abstract":"We show that tax compliance is volatile and markedly responds to fiscal policy. To explore the consequence of this novel stylized fact, we build a model of sovereign debt with limited commitment and imperfect tax enforcement. Fiscal policy persistently affects the size of the informal economy, which impact future fiscal revenues and thus default risk. This mechanism captures a key empirical regularity of economies with imperfect tax enforcement: the low sensitivity of debt price to fiscal consolidations. The interaction of imperfect tax enforcement and limited commitment strongly constrains the dynamics of optimal fiscal policy. During default crises, high tax distortions force the government towards extreme fiscal policies, notably including costly austerity spells.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120919499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article discusses whether IAS/IFRS should be used as a starting point in the context of the Common Corporate Tax Base in the European Union. Non-European countries may also have an interest in the analysis on the use of IFRS to compute the corporate tax base, as well. After a background discussion on the application of IAS/IFRS as the start point for a tax base, some principles of tax bases are analyzed. Additionally, the disadvantages and advantages of using IAS/IFRS as the start point are presented. In the end, the creation of an independent tax accounting framework is recommended, which should have as the primary purpose taxation, and taxpayers and governments as the users of the information. In this new arena, the IAS/IFRS should be a valuable toolbox of concepts that can be adjusted for a tax perspective.
{"title":"Why is IFRS Not a Good Starting Point for a Tax Base?","authors":"Antonio Lopo Martinez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3383061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3383061","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses whether IAS/IFRS should be used as a starting point in the context of the Common Corporate Tax Base in the European Union. Non-European countries may also have an interest in the analysis on the use of IFRS to compute the corporate tax base, as well. After a background discussion on the application of IAS/IFRS as the start point for a tax base, some principles of tax bases are analyzed. Additionally, the disadvantages and advantages of using IAS/IFRS as the start point are presented. In the end, the creation of an independent tax accounting framework is recommended, which should have as the primary purpose taxation, and taxpayers and governments as the users of the information. In this new arena, the IAS/IFRS should be a valuable toolbox of concepts that can be adjusted for a tax perspective.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129229883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The ways in which multinational companies operate in the current economic context questions the adequacy of international coordination of corporate taxation. A conceptual approach would require abandoning the classic paradigms of the international tax system (permanent establishment, arm's length, transfer pricing); they remain at the basis of the “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” project (BEPS) elaborated by the OECD but are now obsolescent. The crisis of this system has been exacerbated by the Trump Reform and the explosion of the digital economy. The former introduces new regimes that undermine international cooperation and are in contrast with the WTO rules and with the double taxation treaties, regardless of the traditional OECD principles. The latter has features that cannot be governed by current tax rules, even if improved with the suggestions of the BEPS project. Solutions proposed at international level or applied by individual countries could lead to great uncertainty. A rational response to these challenges would rest on different bases, such as those of a system of formulary apportionment, with advantages in terms of simplicity, cost and certainty, fostering allocative efficiency and growth. Although this design is not feasible at international level, applying such a system in Europe, with the common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB), could ensure greater attractiveness and efficiency of the EU internal market: it would apply the same formulary system applied to other markets (e.g., the US market), while intra-European transactions are still regulated by the transfer pricing mechanism.
{"title":"The International Coordination of Corporate Taxation: Old Solutions for New Challenges?","authors":"Vieri Ceriani, Giacomo Ricotti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3395813","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3395813","url":null,"abstract":"The ways in which multinational companies operate in the current economic context questions the adequacy of international coordination of corporate taxation. A conceptual approach would require abandoning the classic paradigms of the international tax system (permanent establishment, arm's length, transfer pricing); they remain at the basis of the “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” project (BEPS) elaborated by the OECD but are now obsolescent. The crisis of this system has been exacerbated by the Trump Reform and the explosion of the digital economy. The former introduces new regimes that undermine international cooperation and are in contrast with the WTO rules and with the double taxation treaties, regardless of the traditional OECD principles. The latter has features that cannot be governed by current tax rules, even if improved with the suggestions of the BEPS project. Solutions proposed at international level or applied by individual countries could lead to great uncertainty. A rational response to these challenges would rest on different bases, such as those of a system of formulary apportionment, with advantages in terms of simplicity, cost and certainty, fostering allocative efficiency and growth. Although this design is not feasible at international level, applying such a system in Europe, with the common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB), could ensure greater attractiveness and efficiency of the EU internal market: it would apply the same formulary system applied to other markets (e.g., the US market), while intra-European transactions are still regulated by the transfer pricing mechanism.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116652383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The OECD pragmatic approach regarding hybrid entity mismatches is, without doubt, questionable. However, equally questionable is the absence of alternatives solutions proposed by either academics or tax policy makers , which demonstrates a sort of conformism as regards both the diagnosis of the problems and the solutions thereto, as if matching tax outcomes and taxing income somewhere – no matter where – were indeed the only possible path to deal with hybrid entity mismatches. In an attempt to break this inertia, this article argues for coordination in the tax characterization of entities as a straightforward and suitable alternative to replace the current OECD linking rules, and perhaps also, the consequentialist OECD approach to hybrid entity mismatches. For this purpose, three specific alternatives are explored for coordination in the tax characterization of entities, which include (1) supremacy of the tax characterization rules of the source state, (2) supremacy of the tax characterization rules of the residence state and (3) supremacy of the tax characterization rules of the home state. The analysis of these alternatives includes both hypotheticals and specific examples from domestic and supranational laws that are used to illustrate and support their effectiveness. The ultimate aim of this article is to demonstrate that coordination in the tax characterization of entities appears to be not only a more preferable path when compared to the OECD approach of matching tax outcomes, but also a more coherent and less costly alternative for both taxpayers and tax administrations.
{"title":"Hybrid Entity Mismatches: Exploring Three Alternatives for Coordination","authors":"L. Parada","doi":"10.54648/taxi2019003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/taxi2019003","url":null,"abstract":"The OECD pragmatic approach regarding hybrid entity mismatches is, without doubt, questionable. However, equally questionable is the absence of alternatives solutions proposed by either academics or tax policy makers , which demonstrates a sort of conformism as regards both the diagnosis of the problems and the solutions thereto, as if matching tax outcomes and taxing income somewhere – no matter where – were indeed the only possible path to deal with hybrid entity mismatches. In an attempt to break this inertia, this article argues for coordination in the tax characterization of entities as a straightforward and suitable alternative to replace the current OECD linking rules, and perhaps also, the consequentialist OECD approach to hybrid entity mismatches. For this purpose, three specific alternatives are explored for coordination in the tax characterization of entities, which include (1) supremacy of the tax characterization rules of the source state, (2) supremacy of the tax characterization rules of the residence state and (3) supremacy of the tax characterization rules of the home state. The analysis of these alternatives includes both hypotheticals and specific examples from domestic and supranational laws that are used to illustrate and support their effectiveness. The ultimate aim of this article is to demonstrate that coordination in the tax characterization of entities appears to be not only a more preferable path when compared to the OECD approach of matching tax outcomes, but also a more coherent and less costly alternative for both taxpayers and tax administrations.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116420724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：