In this paper the Author analyzes the tax incentives implemented by the Italian legislator in order to foster the activity of Italian Charities and of other legal entities working in the so called 'Third Sector'. In the first part of the analysis, the author also try and investigate the Constitutional justifications for this kind of tax privileges. This paper was presented during the visit of the author at the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences of the University of Teheran. The approach followed and the point raised are consistent with the framework it was presented within.
{"title":"Giving to Charities: The Italian Tax Incentives","authors":"M. Greggi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2116946","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2116946","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper the Author analyzes the tax incentives implemented by the Italian legislator in order to foster the activity of Italian Charities and of other legal entities working in the so called 'Third Sector'. In the first part of the analysis, the author also try and investigate the Constitutional justifications for this kind of tax privileges. This paper was presented during the visit of the author at the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences of the University of Teheran. The approach followed and the point raised are consistent with the framework it was presented within.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134126506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Following the Information Society Directive of 2001 (introducing the concept of “fair compensation” for private copying into EU Law), total collection from levies on copying media and equipment in the EU tripled, from about €170m to more than €500m per annum. Levy schemes exist now in 22 out of 27 Member States (with only the UK, Ireland, Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg remaining outside). Despite their wide adoption, levy systems are little understood, both in respect of their rationale and their economic consequences. Tariffs are increasingly contested in court, leading to a large gap between claimed and collected revenues. The European Commission has announced “comprehensive legislative action” for 2012. This report offers the first independent empirical assessment of the European levy system as a whole. The research consolidates the evidence on levy setting, collection and distribution; reviews the scope of consumer permissions associated with levy payments; and reports the results of three product level studies (printer/scanners, portable music/video/game devices, and tablet computers), analysing the relationship between VAT, levy tariffs and retail prices in 20 levy and non�levy countries. Key findings: There are dramatic differences between countries in the methodology used for identifying leviable devices, setting tariffs, and allocating beneficiaries of the levy. There are levies on blank media in 22 EU countries, on MP3 players in 18 countries, on printers in 12 countries, on personal computers in 4 countries. Revenues collected per capita vary between €0.02 (Romania) and €2.6 (France). The distribution of levy revenues to recording artists is less than €0.01 per album These variations cannot be explained by an underlying concept of economic harm to rightholders from private copying The scope of consumer permissions under the statutory exceptions for private copying within the EU vary, and generally do not match with what consumers ordinarily understand as private activities In levy countries, the costs of levies as an indirect tax are not always passed on to the consumer. In competitive markets, such as those for printers, manufacturers of levied goods appear to absorb the levy. There appears to be a pan-European retail price range for many consumer devices regardless of levy schemes (with the exception of Scandinavia). In non-levy countries, such as the UK, a certain amount of private copying is already priced into retail purchases. For example, right holders have either explicitly permitted acts of format shifting, or decided not to enforce their exclusive rights. Commercial practice will not change as a result of introducing a narrowly conceived private copying exception. A more widely conceived exception that would cover private activities that take place in digital networks (such as downloading for personal use, or non-commercial adaptation and distribution within networks of friends) may be best understood no
{"title":"Private Copying and Fair Compensation: An Empirical Study of Copyright Levies in Europe","authors":"M. Kretschmer","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2710611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2710611","url":null,"abstract":"Following the Information Society Directive of 2001 (introducing the concept of “fair compensation” for private copying into EU Law), total collection from levies on copying media and equipment in the EU tripled, from about €170m to more than €500m per annum. Levy schemes exist now in 22 out of 27 Member States (with only the UK, Ireland, Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg remaining outside). Despite their wide adoption, levy systems are little understood, both in respect of their rationale and their economic consequences. Tariffs are increasingly contested in court, leading to a large gap between claimed and collected revenues. The European Commission has announced “comprehensive legislative action” for 2012. \u0000 \u0000This report offers the first independent empirical assessment of the European levy system as a whole. The research consolidates the evidence on levy setting, collection and distribution; reviews the scope of consumer permissions associated with levy payments; and reports the results of three product level studies (printer/scanners, portable music/video/game devices, and tablet computers), analysing the relationship between VAT, levy tariffs and retail prices in 20 levy and non�levy countries. \u0000 \u0000Key findings: \u0000 \u0000There are dramatic differences between countries in the methodology used for identifying leviable devices, setting tariffs, and allocating beneficiaries of the levy. There are levies on blank media in 22 EU countries, on MP3 players in 18 countries, on printers in 12 countries, on personal computers in 4 countries. Revenues collected per capita vary between €0.02 (Romania) and €2.6 (France). The distribution of levy revenues to recording artists is less than €0.01 per album \u0000 \u0000These variations cannot be explained by an underlying concept of economic harm to rightholders from private copying \u0000 \u0000The scope of consumer permissions under the statutory exceptions for private copying within the EU vary, and generally do not match with what consumers ordinarily understand as private activities \u0000 \u0000In levy countries, the costs of levies as an indirect tax are not always passed on to the consumer. In competitive markets, such as those for printers, manufacturers of levied goods appear to absorb the levy. There appears to be a pan-European retail price range for many consumer devices regardless of levy schemes (with the exception of Scandinavia). \u0000 \u0000In non-levy countries, such as the UK, a certain amount of private copying is already priced into retail purchases. For example, right holders have either explicitly permitted acts of format shifting, or decided not to enforce their exclusive rights. Commercial practice will not change as a result of introducing a narrowly conceived private copying exception. \u0000 \u0000A more widely conceived exception that would cover private activities that take place in digital networks (such as downloading for personal use, or non-commercial adaptation and distribution within networks of friends) may be best understood no","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122143748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
O. Bargain, Mathias Dolls, Dirk Neumann, A. Peichl, Sebastian Siegloch
Whether observed differences in redistributive policies across countries are the result of differences in social preferences or efficiency constraints is an important question that paves the debate about the optimality of welfare regimes. To shed new light on this question, we estimate labor supply elasticities on microdata and adopt an inverted optimal tax approach to characterize the redistributive preferences embodied in the welfare systems of 17 EU countries and the US. Implicit social welfare functions are broadly compatible with the fiction of an optimizing Paretian social planner. Some exceptions due to generous demogrant transfers are consistent with the ignorance of behavioral responses by some European governments and are partly corrected by recent policy developments. Heterogeneity in leisure-consumption preferences somewhat affect the international comparison in degrees of revealed inequality aversion, but differences in social preferences are significant only between broad groups of countries.
{"title":"Tax-Benefit Systems in Europe and the US: Between Equity and Efficiency","authors":"O. Bargain, Mathias Dolls, Dirk Neumann, A. Peichl, Sebastian Siegloch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1745715","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1745715","url":null,"abstract":"Whether observed differences in redistributive policies across countries are the result of differences in social preferences or efficiency constraints is an important question that paves the debate about the optimality of welfare regimes. To shed new light on this question, we estimate labor supply elasticities on microdata and adopt an inverted optimal tax approach to characterize the redistributive preferences embodied in the welfare systems of 17 EU countries and the US. Implicit social welfare functions are broadly compatible with the fiction of an optimizing Paretian social planner. Some exceptions due to generous demogrant transfers are consistent with the ignorance of behavioral responses by some European governments and are partly corrected by recent policy developments. Heterogeneity in leisure-consumption preferences somewhat affect the international comparison in degrees of revealed inequality aversion, but differences in social preferences are significant only between broad groups of countries.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131143691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates the impact of the 2001 tax reform in Germany on dividend announcement returns. With this major tax reform, the full imputation system was replaced by the half-income system, which had a significant impact on the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains for most investor classes. In an event study framework, we separate the tax effect of dividends from their positive signaling and agency cost effects to offer a more comprehensive picture of the valuation implications of dividends in Germany. Controlling for signaling and agency cost effects of dividends we find that the market response to positive dividend surprises is more pronounced under the full imputation system, where dividends are generally more favorable to investors from a tax perspective, than under the half-income system. Our results suggest that the observed decline in the dividend response coefficient is synchronized with the 2001 tax reform and hence attributable to the 2001 tax reform.
{"title":"Taxes and the Valuation of Dividends: A Study of Dividend Announcements in Germany","authors":"Christian Haesner, Deborah Schanz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1811742","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1811742","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the impact of the 2001 tax reform in Germany on dividend announcement returns. With this major tax reform, the full imputation system was replaced by the half-income system, which had a significant impact on the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains for most investor classes. In an event study framework, we separate the tax effect of dividends from their positive signaling and agency cost effects to offer a more comprehensive picture of the valuation implications of dividends in Germany. Controlling for signaling and agency cost effects of dividends we find that the market response to positive dividend surprises is more pronounced under the full imputation system, where dividends are generally more favorable to investors from a tax perspective, than under the half-income system. Our results suggest that the observed decline in the dividend response coefficient is synchronized with the 2001 tax reform and hence attributable to the 2001 tax reform.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133409865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Laurence Jacquet, E. Lehmann, Bruno Van der Linden
This paper characterizes the optimal redistributive tax schedule in a matching unemployment framework with endogenous (voluntary) nonparticipation and (involuntary) unemployment. The optimal employment tax rate is given by an inverse employment elasticity rule. This rule depends on the global response of the employment rate, which depends not only on the participation (labor supply) responses, but also on the vacancy posting (labor demand) responses and on the product of these two types of responses. For plausible parameters, our matching environment induces much lower employment tax rates than the usual competitive participation model.
{"title":"Optimal Redistributive Taxation with Both Labor Supply and Labor Demand Responses","authors":"Laurence Jacquet, E. Lehmann, Bruno Van der Linden","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1812527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1812527","url":null,"abstract":"This paper characterizes the optimal redistributive tax schedule in a matching unemployment framework with endogenous (voluntary) nonparticipation and (involuntary) unemployment. The optimal employment tax rate is given by an inverse employment elasticity rule. This rule depends on the global response of the employment rate, which depends not only on the participation (labor supply) responses, but also on the vacancy posting (labor demand) responses and on the product of these two types of responses. For plausible parameters, our matching environment induces much lower employment tax rates than the usual competitive participation model.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122193569","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jochen Hundsdoerfer, Sebastian Eichfelder, Kay Blaufus
We analyze the compliance costs of individual taxpyers resulting from the German income tax. using survey data that has been raised between December 2008 and April 2009, we find evidence for a considerably higher cost burden of self-employed taxpaxers. Taxable income and the demand for external support are positively correlated with compliance costs, while the time effort of female taxpayers is significantly lower. We also find evidence for a positive correlation of education and tax knowledge with the compliance burden. By contrast, a joint assessment of a married couple seems to reduce the monetized time effort. The aggregated cost burden of German income taxpayers amounts to 6.1-7.2 billion €, respectively 3.2-3.7 % of the income tax revenue in 2007. This estimate is higher than latest projections in a number of other European countries like Spain and Sweden, but significantly lower than results for the United States and Australia.
{"title":"The Hidden Burden of the Income Tax: Compliance Costs of German Individuals","authors":"Jochen Hundsdoerfer, Sebastian Eichfelder, Kay Blaufus","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1980211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1980211","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the compliance costs of individual taxpyers resulting from the German income tax. using survey data that has been raised between December 2008 and April 2009, we find evidence for a considerably higher cost burden of self-employed taxpaxers. Taxable income and the demand for external support are positively correlated with compliance costs, while the time effort of female taxpayers is significantly lower. We also find evidence for a positive correlation of education and tax knowledge with the compliance burden. By contrast, a joint assessment of a married couple seems to reduce the monetized time effort. The aggregated cost burden of German income taxpayers amounts to 6.1-7.2 billion €, respectively 3.2-3.7 % of the income tax revenue in 2007. This estimate is higher than latest projections in a number of other European countries like Spain and Sweden, but significantly lower than results for the United States and Australia.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130424171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
To evaluate the effect of an R&D subsidy one needs to know what the subsidized firms would have done without the incentive. This paper studies an Italian programme of subsidies for the applied development of innovations, exploiting a discontinuity in programme financing due to an unexpected shortage of public money. To identify the effect of the programme, the study implements a regression discontinuity design and compares firms that applied for funding before and after the shortage occurred. The results indicate that the programme was not effective in stimulating innovative investment.
{"title":"Evaluating the Impact of Innovation Incentives: Evidence from an Unexpected Shortage of Funds","authors":"G. de Blasio, Davide Fantino, G. Pellegrini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1830001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1830001","url":null,"abstract":"To evaluate the effect of an R&D subsidy one needs to know what the subsidized firms would have done without the incentive. This paper studies an Italian programme of subsidies for the applied development of innovations, exploiting a discontinuity in programme financing due to an unexpected shortage of public money. To identify the effect of the programme, the study implements a regression discontinuity design and compares firms that applied for funding before and after the shortage occurred. The results indicate that the programme was not effective in stimulating innovative investment.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122893896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many publications have been dedicated to the justification of death and inheritance taxes. A remarkable contribution is the study of the Dutch author Charles Herckenrath (1863-1935), who advocated a 100% rate – in effect, a total ban on succession of wealth to the heirs. In this paper Herckenrath’s views will be discussed against the background of alternative traditional views on the justification of inheritance taxation.
{"title":"Charles Herckenrath's Death Tax","authors":"O. Ydema, H. Vording","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2928112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2928112","url":null,"abstract":"Many publications have been dedicated to the justification of death and inheritance taxes. A remarkable contribution is the study of the Dutch author Charles Herckenrath (1863-1935), who advocated a 100% rate – in effect, a total ban on succession of wealth to the heirs. In this paper Herckenrath’s views will be discussed against the background of alternative traditional views on the justification of inheritance taxation.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126878732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An Estimation of the Revenue Loss from Introducing a Notional Interest Deduction on Nominal Capital into the German Corporate Tax. Capital income taxation in Germany distorts financing decisions of corporations as the after-tax cost of capital for equity is considerably higher than for debt. Since 2006 the German Council of Economic Experts has been proposing a neutral tax system similar to the Norwegian shareholder ACE tax. In the last German corporate and personal income tax reform in 2008/09 this proposal has not been realized because revenue losses were expected to be unacceptably high. In this paper we estimate the expected tax revenue losses of an alternative concept which also ensures neutrality with respect to financing decisions: a notional interest deduction on nominal capital and capital reserve. Data from the official German corporate income tax statistics are used. We show that revenue losses are relatively small.
对德国公司税中引入名义资本名义利息扣除所造成的税收损失的估计。德国的资本所得税扭曲了企业的融资决策，因为股权的税后资本成本远高于债务。自2006年以来，德国经济专家委员会(German Council of Economic Experts)一直在提议一种类似于挪威股东所得税的中性税制。在德国2008/09年进行的上一次企业税和个人所得税改革中，这一提议未能实现，因为预计收入损失将高得令人无法接受。在本文中，我们估计了另一个概念的预期税收损失，该概念也确保了融资决策的中立性:名义资本和资本准备金的名义利息扣除。本文使用了德国官方企业所得税统计数据。我们表明，收入损失相对较小。
{"title":"The Expected Revenue Loss from a Corporate Tax Which is Neutral with Respect to Financing Decisions (Was Kostet Eine Finanzierungsneutrale Besteuerung Von Kapitalgesellschaften?) (German)","authors":"Dirk Kiesewetter, Dominik Rumpf","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1689418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1689418","url":null,"abstract":"An Estimation of the Revenue Loss from Introducing a Notional Interest Deduction on Nominal Capital into the German Corporate Tax. Capital income taxation in Germany distorts financing decisions of corporations as the after-tax cost of capital for equity is considerably higher than for debt. Since 2006 the German Council of Economic Experts has been proposing a neutral tax system similar to the Norwegian shareholder ACE tax. In the last German corporate and personal income tax reform in 2008/09 this proposal has not been realized because revenue losses were expected to be unacceptably high. In this paper we estimate the expected tax revenue losses of an alternative concept which also ensures neutrality with respect to financing decisions: a notional interest deduction on nominal capital and capital reserve. Data from the official German corporate income tax statistics are used. We show that revenue losses are relatively small.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128619239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sven-Olov Daunfeldt, Carina Selander, Magnus Wikström
The purpose of the paper is to study the effect of taxation on dividend payments and ex-dividend price-changes in Sweden during 1991-1995. Tax changes in Sweden during the 1990s were implemented in such a way that they provide an opportunity to include direct measures of the tax-treatment of dividends and capital gains in the empirical analysis, in contrast to previous studies. The results indicate that tax-reforms can have large effects on dividend payments, while the effects on ex-dividend price-changes are less conclusive.
{"title":"Taxation, Dividend Payments and Ex-Day Price-Changes","authors":"Sven-Olov Daunfeldt, Carina Selander, Magnus Wikström","doi":"10.17578/13-1/2-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17578/13-1/2-6","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of the paper is to study the effect of taxation on dividend payments and ex-dividend price-changes in Sweden during 1991-1995. Tax changes in Sweden during the 1990s were implemented in such a way that they provide an opportunity to include direct measures of the tax-treatment of dividends and capital gains in the empirical analysis, in contrast to previous studies. The results indicate that tax-reforms can have large effects on dividend payments, while the effects on ex-dividend price-changes are less conclusive.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131272227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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