this paper a MindCORE Abstract: We suggest that pain processing has a modular architecture. We begin by motivating the (widely assumed but seldom defended) conjecture that pain processing comprises inferential mechanisms. We then note that pain exhibits a characteristic form of judgement independence. On the assumption that pain processing is inferential, we argue that its judgement independence is indicative of modular (encapsulated) mechanisms. Indeed, we go further, suggesting that it renders the modularity of pain mechanisms a default hypothesis to be embraced pending convincing counterevidence. Finally, we consider what a modular pain architecture might look like, and question alleged counterevidence to our proposal.
{"title":"Is pain modular?","authors":"L. Casser, S. Clarke","doi":"10.1111/mila.12430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12430","url":null,"abstract":"this paper a MindCORE Abstract: We suggest that pain processing has a modular architecture. We begin by motivating the (widely assumed but seldom defended) conjecture that pain processing comprises inferential mechanisms. We then note that pain exhibits a characteristic form of judgement independence. On the assumption that pain processing is inferential, we argue that its judgement independence is indicative of modular (encapsulated) mechanisms. Indeed, we go further, suggesting that it renders the modularity of pain mechanisms a default hypothesis to be embraced pending convincing counterevidence. Finally, we consider what a modular pain architecture might look like, and question alleged counterevidence to our proposal.","PeriodicalId":110770,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123205709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sufferers of eating disorders often hold false beliefs about their own body size. Such beliefs appear to violate norms of epistemic rationality, being neither grounded by nor responsive to appropriate forms of evidence. Contrary to appearances, I defend the rationality of these beliefs. I argue that they are in fact grounded in and reinforced by appropriate evidence, emanating from proprioceptive misperception of bodily boundaries. This argument has farreaching implications for the explanation and treatment of eating disorders, as well as debates over the relationship between rationality and human psychology.
{"title":"The rationality of eating disorders","authors":"Stephen Gadsby","doi":"10.1111/mila.12421","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12421","url":null,"abstract":"Sufferers of eating disorders often hold false beliefs about their own body size. Such beliefs appear to violate norms of epistemic rationality, being neither grounded by nor responsive to appropriate forms of evidence. Contrary to appearances, I defend the rationality of these beliefs. I argue that they are in fact grounded in and reinforced by appropriate evidence, emanating from proprioceptive misperception of bodily boundaries. This argument has farreaching implications for the explanation and treatment of eating disorders, as well as debates over the relationship between rationality and human psychology.","PeriodicalId":110770,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129229927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Slurring expressions display puzzling behaviour when embedded, such as under negation and in attitude and speech reports. They frequently appear to retain their characteristic qualities, like offensiveness and propen-sity to derogate. Yet it is sometimes possible to under-stand them as lacking these qualities. A theory of slurring expressions should explain this variability . We develop an explanation that deploys the linguistic notion of focus. Our proposal is that a speaker can conversationally implicate metalinguistic claims about the aptness of a focused slurring expression. This explanation of variability relies on independently motivated mechanisms and is compatible with any theory of slurring expressions.
{"title":"Focus on slurs","authors":"Poppy Mankowitz, Ashley Shaw","doi":"10.1111/mila.12410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12410","url":null,"abstract":"Slurring expressions display puzzling behaviour when embedded, such as under negation and in attitude and speech reports. They frequently appear to retain their characteristic qualities, like offensiveness and propen-sity to derogate. Yet it is sometimes possible to under-stand them as lacking these qualities. A theory of slurring expressions should explain this variability . We develop an explanation that deploys the linguistic notion of focus. Our proposal is that a speaker can conversationally implicate metalinguistic claims about the aptness of a focused slurring expression. This explanation of variability relies on independently motivated mechanisms and is compatible with any theory of slurring expressions.","PeriodicalId":110770,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123574233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In many cases, the use of a conditional is felt to be inappropriate unless the antecedent is relevant to the consequent. A number of authors have recently considered this relevance effect, noting that it is difficult to defeat and concluding that it is part of the conventional meaning of conditionals rather than the pragmatics of their use. However, there are also systematic counter-examples to the relevance requirement, where a conditional is used precisely to convey the irrelevance of antecedent to consequent. I argue that both types of conditionals are better understood in terms of the interaction of a unified interpretation of conditionals that does not make reference to relevance, and a separate process of the establishment of coherence relations among successive clauses in discourse, regardless of whether conditionals are involved. This theory is supported by the distribution of discourse particles such as then and still in conditionals and other sentence and text types. I also show that this theory is consistent with previous experimental studies that have been claimed to support the conventionalist position, and to falsify an account of the relevance requirement based on coherence.
{"title":"Decomposing relevance in conditionals","authors":"Daniel Lassiter","doi":"10.1111/mila.12418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12418","url":null,"abstract":"In many cases, the use of a conditional is felt to be inappropriate unless the antecedent is relevant to the consequent. A number of authors have recently considered this relevance effect, noting that it is difficult to defeat and concluding that it is part of the conventional meaning of conditionals rather than the pragmatics of their use. However, there are also systematic counter-examples to the relevance requirement, where a conditional is used precisely to convey the irrelevance of antecedent to consequent. I argue that both types of conditionals are better understood in terms of the interaction of a unified interpretation of conditionals that does not make reference to relevance, and a separate process of the establishment of coherence relations among successive clauses in discourse, regardless of whether conditionals are involved. This theory is supported by the distribution of discourse particles such as then and still in conditionals and other sentence and text types. I also show that this theory is consistent with previous experimental studies that have been claimed to support the conventionalist position, and to falsify an account of the relevance requirement based on coherence.","PeriodicalId":110770,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131585313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Consciousness as a natural kind and the methodological puzzle of consciousness","authors":"Henry Taylor","doi":"10.1111/mila.12413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12413","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":110770,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125062485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Correspondence Boyd Millar, Department of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, 1 Brookings Dr., St. Louis, MO 63130, USA. Email: millar.boyd@gmail.com Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that property illusions—cases in which we perceive a property, but that property is not the property it seems to us to be in virtue of our perceptual experience—and veridical illusions—cases in which we veridically perceive an object's properties, but our experience of some specific property is nonetheless unsuccessful or illusory—can occur. I defend the contrary view. First, I maintain that there are compelling reasons to conclude that property illusions and veridical illusions cannot occur; and second, I maintain that the considerations supporting the possibility of such cases are uncompelling.
{"title":"Misperceiving properties","authors":"Boyd Millar","doi":"10.1111/mila.12416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12416","url":null,"abstract":"Correspondence Boyd Millar, Department of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, 1 Brookings Dr., St. Louis, MO 63130, USA. Email: millar.boyd@gmail.com Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that property illusions—cases in which we perceive a property, but that property is not the property it seems to us to be in virtue of our perceptual experience—and veridical illusions—cases in which we veridically perceive an object's properties, but our experience of some specific property is nonetheless unsuccessful or illusory—can occur. I defend the contrary view. First, I maintain that there are compelling reasons to conclude that property illusions and veridical illusions cannot occur; and second, I maintain that the considerations supporting the possibility of such cases are uncompelling.","PeriodicalId":110770,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133632114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Correspondence Simon A. B. Brown, Department of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University, 281 Gilman Hall, 3400 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218, USA. Email: simonabbrown@gmail.com Recent influential accounts of temporal representation— the use of mental representations with explicit temporal contents, such as before and after relations and durations—sharply distinguish representation from mere sensitivity. A common, important picture of intertemporal rationality is that it consists in maximizing total expected discounted utility across time. By analyzing reinforcement learning algorithms, this article shows that, given such notions of temporal representation and intertemporal rationality, it would be possible for an agent to achieve inter-temporal rationality without temporal representation. It then explores potential upshots of this result for theorizing about rationality and representation.
{"title":"Inter‐temporal rationality without temporal representation","authors":"Simon A. B. Brown","doi":"10.1111/mila.12405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12405","url":null,"abstract":"Correspondence Simon A. B. Brown, Department of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University, 281 Gilman Hall, 3400 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218, USA. Email: simonabbrown@gmail.com Recent influential accounts of temporal representation— the use of mental representations with explicit temporal contents, such as before and after relations and durations—sharply distinguish representation from mere sensitivity. A common, important picture of intertemporal rationality is that it consists in maximizing total expected discounted utility across time. By analyzing reinforcement learning algorithms, this article shows that, given such notions of temporal representation and intertemporal rationality, it would be possible for an agent to achieve inter-temporal rationality without temporal representation. It then explores potential upshots of this result for theorizing about rationality and representation.","PeriodicalId":110770,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"208 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114125319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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