{"title":"Spatial representations in sensory modalities","authors":"Tony Cheng","doi":"10.1111/mila.12409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12409","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":110770,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126510126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rules of use","authors":"Indrek Reiland","doi":"10.1111/mila.12404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12404","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":110770,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124845565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Public language, private language, and subsymbolic theories of mind","authors":"Gabe Dupre","doi":"10.1111/mila.12400","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12400","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":110770,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"142 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115106590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
these problems and may serve as a foundation for further developments of representational approach to olfactory experiences.
这些问题可以作为嗅觉体验表征方法进一步发展的基础。
{"title":"Tracking representationalism and olfaction","authors":"Błażej Skrzypulec","doi":"10.1111/mila.12398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12398","url":null,"abstract":"these problems and may serve as a foundation for further developments of representational approach to olfactory experiences.","PeriodicalId":110770,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"17 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129792951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent work questions whether previously reported unconscious perceptual effects are genuinely unconscious, or due to weak conscious perception. Some philosophers and psychologists react by rejecting unconscious perception or by holding that it has been overestimated. I argue that the most significant attack on unconscious perception commits the criterion content fallacy: the fallacy of interpreting evidence that observers were conscious of something as evidence that they were conscious of task-relevant features. This fallacy is prevalent in consciousness research: if unconscious perception exists, scientists could routinely underestimate it. I conclude with methodological recommendations for moving the debate forward.
{"title":"How (not) to underestimate unconscious perception","authors":"M. Michel","doi":"10.1111/mila.12406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12406","url":null,"abstract":"Recent work questions whether previously reported unconscious perceptual effects are genuinely unconscious, or due to weak conscious perception. Some philosophers and psychologists react by rejecting unconscious perception or by holding that it has been overestimated. I argue that the most significant attack on unconscious perception commits the criterion content fallacy: the fallacy of interpreting evidence that observers were conscious of something as evidence that they were conscious of task-relevant features. This fallacy is prevalent in consciousness research: if unconscious perception exists, scientists could routinely underestimate it. I conclude with methodological recommendations for moving the debate forward.","PeriodicalId":110770,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128631295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What is diffuse attention?","authors":"A. Prettyman","doi":"10.1111/mila.12365","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12365","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":110770,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132092749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract: The new Bayesian paradigm in the psychology of reasoning aims tointegrate the study of human reasoning, decision making, and rationality. It is supportedby two findings. One, most people judge the probability of the indicative conditional,P(if A then B), to be the conditional probability, P(B|A), as implied by the Ramsey test.Two, they judge if A then B to be void when A is false. Their three-valued responsetable used to be called ‘defective’, but should be termed the de Finetti table. We showhow to study general de Finetti truth tables for negations, conjunctions, disjunctions, andconditionals. 1. Introduction Bayesian models of cognition have become increasingly prominent in thepsychology of reasoning in recent years, and this trend has resulted in thedevelopment of a new Bayesian paradigm (Manktelow, Over and Elqayam, 2011;Oaksford and Chater, 2007, 2009; Over, 2009; Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2010). Theolder binary paradigm in the psychology of reasoning focused on deduction fromassumptions. Propositions were classified as either true or false, or consistent orinconsistent with each other. Conclusions either followed necessarily or not atall. If the participants in a reasoning experiment did not assume the premises, butrelied on their subjectively relevant beliefs, or they inferred conclusions that didnot necessarily follow, they were deemed to be biased and to commit fallacies. Thisolder paradigm inspired many theoretical models (mental rules, mental models,rules or schemas, and others) but limited the field of research to the study of thehuman deduction ability (Evans, 2012). The new paradigm recognizes that mostinferences in everyday affairs and science, whether logically valid or not, are fromuncertain beliefs or hypotheses and not assumptions, and that reasoning must takeaccount of this uncertainty if it is to be useful for acquiring rational beliefs andmaking rational decisions. The basic goal of the new paradigm is to integrate thepsychology of reasoning and the psychology of judgment and decision making andprovide a full account of human reasoning, decision making, and rationality.
{"title":"New Psychological Paradigm for Conditionals and General de Finetti Tables","authors":"Jean Baratgin, D. Over, G. Politzer","doi":"10.1111/MILA.12042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MILA.12042","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: The new Bayesian paradigm in the psychology of reasoning aims tointegrate the study of human reasoning, decision making, and rationality. It is supportedby two findings. One, most people judge the probability of the indicative conditional,P(if A then B), to be the conditional probability, P(B|A), as implied by the Ramsey test.Two, they judge if A then B to be void when A is false. Their three-valued responsetable used to be called ‘defective’, but should be termed the de Finetti table. We showhow to study general de Finetti truth tables for negations, conjunctions, disjunctions, andconditionals. 1. Introduction Bayesian models of cognition have become increasingly prominent in thepsychology of reasoning in recent years, and this trend has resulted in thedevelopment of a new Bayesian paradigm (Manktelow, Over and Elqayam, 2011;Oaksford and Chater, 2007, 2009; Over, 2009; Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2010). Theolder binary paradigm in the psychology of reasoning focused on deduction fromassumptions. Propositions were classified as either true or false, or consistent orinconsistent with each other. Conclusions either followed necessarily or not atall. If the participants in a reasoning experiment did not assume the premises, butrelied on their subjectively relevant beliefs, or they inferred conclusions that didnot necessarily follow, they were deemed to be biased and to commit fallacies. Thisolder paradigm inspired many theoretical models (mental rules, mental models,rules or schemas, and others) but limited the field of research to the study of thehuman deduction ability (Evans, 2012). The new paradigm recognizes that mostinferences in everyday affairs and science, whether logically valid or not, are fromuncertain beliefs or hypotheses and not assumptions, and that reasoning must takeaccount of this uncertainty if it is to be useful for acquiring rational beliefs andmaking rational decisions. The basic goal of the new paradigm is to integrate thepsychology of reasoning and the psychology of judgment and decision making andprovide a full account of human reasoning, decision making, and rationality.","PeriodicalId":110770,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"166 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115714092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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