Pub Date : 2018-04-10DOI: 10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384847
Amal Srivastava
▪ Research demonstrated viability of assessing the impact of blocking airspaces, using a “what-if” analysis paradigm ▪ Data reduction technique resulted in efficiency data size and memory management, with negligible loss in accuracy ▪ Traffic projection model performed well, given the uncertainties of traffic pattern ▪ Research results are preliminary, further study to evaluate sensitivity of model performance to constraints such as location, airspace size and closure time are ongoing ▪ Alternate approach to projection based on using a grid to capture traffic is being explored ▪ Assessing additional impact metrics, namely delay and extra distance is being researched.
{"title":"Rapid assessment of air traffic impact of blocking airspaces: Integrated communications navigation and surveillance (ICNS) conference","authors":"Amal Srivastava","doi":"10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384847","url":null,"abstract":"▪ Research demonstrated viability of assessing the impact of blocking airspaces, using a “what-if” analysis paradigm ▪ Data reduction technique resulted in efficiency data size and memory management, with negligible loss in accuracy ▪ Traffic projection model performed well, given the uncertainties of traffic pattern ▪ Research results are preliminary, further study to evaluate sensitivity of model performance to constraints such as location, airspace size and closure time are ongoing ▪ Alternate approach to projection based on using a grid to capture traffic is being explored ▪ Assessing additional impact metrics, namely delay and extra distance is being researched.","PeriodicalId":112779,"journal":{"name":"2018 Integrated Communications, Navigation, Surveillance Conference (ICNS)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115737399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-10DOI: 10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384887
V. Vitan, G. Berz, Luca Saini, J. Arethens, B. Belabbas, P. Hotmar
The development of multi-constellation, multi-frequency GNSS is ongoing, with the aim to enable a robust and reliable navigation and approach service to airspace users. While this will greatly reduce vulnerability to space weather, unintentional interference and constellation weakness, some residual vulnerabilities will remain. In the current, predominantly GPS L1 GNSS environment, aviation has accepted that alternate positioning, navigation and timing capabilities based on terrestrial systems remain necessary. These reversionary area navigation capabilities are based primarily on DME/DME, while still providing some residual VOR/DME services. However, this reversionary capability has not been demonstrated to support the stringent RNP requirements that GNSS can support. Also, DME is criticized as being spectrum inefficient, and aviation-internal and aviation-external pressures to share the DME band with other services are increasing significantly. A key question for the future evolution of Communication, Navigation and Surveillance systems is what type of a reversionary capability will be needed in the future (terrestrial or space based), and what performance levels it needs to provide. To answer this question, supported by specific technology options, a project under the SESAR Horizon 2020 Framework (PJ14-03-04) is working on this topic under the title “Alternative Positioning, Navigation and Timing, A-PNT”. A-PNT is a complex, multi-disciplinary topic, with technical and operational aspects going across the CNS domains, and spectrum concerns being an underlying driver. The research activities in PJ14-03-04 are covering a selected set of potential technical solutions: take full advantage of the actual DME performance, DME enhancements (ensuring compatibility with legacy systems), LDACS NAV function and eLORAN. This paper will focus the discussion on the performance levels achievable by each of these technologies and their major advantages and drawbacks. The concept of a modular approach will be introduced as well (which allows the computation of a position solution with integrity based on inputs from various types of sensors). The paper includes contributions from the following SESAR partners: EUROCONTROL, DLR, Thales Avionics, Thales Air Systems and Honeywell Aerospace.
{"title":"Research on alternative positioning navigation and timing in Europe","authors":"V. Vitan, G. Berz, Luca Saini, J. Arethens, B. Belabbas, P. Hotmar","doi":"10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384887","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384887","url":null,"abstract":"The development of multi-constellation, multi-frequency GNSS is ongoing, with the aim to enable a robust and reliable navigation and approach service to airspace users. While this will greatly reduce vulnerability to space weather, unintentional interference and constellation weakness, some residual vulnerabilities will remain. In the current, predominantly GPS L1 GNSS environment, aviation has accepted that alternate positioning, navigation and timing capabilities based on terrestrial systems remain necessary. These reversionary area navigation capabilities are based primarily on DME/DME, while still providing some residual VOR/DME services. However, this reversionary capability has not been demonstrated to support the stringent RNP requirements that GNSS can support. Also, DME is criticized as being spectrum inefficient, and aviation-internal and aviation-external pressures to share the DME band with other services are increasing significantly. A key question for the future evolution of Communication, Navigation and Surveillance systems is what type of a reversionary capability will be needed in the future (terrestrial or space based), and what performance levels it needs to provide. To answer this question, supported by specific technology options, a project under the SESAR Horizon 2020 Framework (PJ14-03-04) is working on this topic under the title “Alternative Positioning, Navigation and Timing, A-PNT”. A-PNT is a complex, multi-disciplinary topic, with technical and operational aspects going across the CNS domains, and spectrum concerns being an underlying driver. The research activities in PJ14-03-04 are covering a selected set of potential technical solutions: take full advantage of the actual DME performance, DME enhancements (ensuring compatibility with legacy systems), LDACS NAV function and eLORAN. This paper will focus the discussion on the performance levels achievable by each of these technologies and their major advantages and drawbacks. The concept of a modular approach will be introduced as well (which allows the computation of a position solution with integrity based on inputs from various types of sensors). The paper includes contributions from the following SESAR partners: EUROCONTROL, DLR, Thales Avionics, Thales Air Systems and Honeywell Aerospace.","PeriodicalId":112779,"journal":{"name":"2018 Integrated Communications, Navigation, Surveillance Conference (ICNS)","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127124807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-10DOI: 10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384844
R. Kerczewski, R. Apaza, A. Downey, John Wang, Konstantin J. Matheou
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) project works to develop tools and technologies essential for safely enabling civilian low-altitude UAS operations. Currently there is no established infrastructure to enable and safely manage the widespread use of low-altitude airspace and UAS operations, regardless of the type of UAS. The UTM technical challenge will develop comprehensive and validated airspace operations and integration requirements to safely enable large-scale persistent access to visual line of sight and autonomous beyond visual line of sight small UAS in low-altitude airspace. Within the UTM project, a number of communications technologies to support UTM command and control (C2) are under investigation. In particular, commercial networked cellular systems are being tested and assessed for their ability to meet the reliability, scalability, cybersecurity and redundancy required. NASA Glenn Research Center is studying some of the aspects of employing such networks for UTM C2 communications. This includes the development of a test platform for sensing and characterizing the airborne C2 communications environment at various altitudes and in various terrains and topologies, measuring such aspects as received signal strength and interference. System performance aspects such as latency in the link, handover performance, packet error loss rate, drop outs, coverage gaps and other aspects impacting UTM operation will also be assessed. In this paper we explore some of the C2 approaches being proposed and demonstrated in the UTM project, the reliability, availability and other general C2 performance requirements, and approaches to evaluating and analyzing UTM C2 links based on commercial cellular networks.
{"title":"Assessing C2 communications for UAS traffic management","authors":"R. Kerczewski, R. Apaza, A. Downey, John Wang, Konstantin J. Matheou","doi":"10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384844","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384844","url":null,"abstract":"The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) project works to develop tools and technologies essential for safely enabling civilian low-altitude UAS operations. Currently there is no established infrastructure to enable and safely manage the widespread use of low-altitude airspace and UAS operations, regardless of the type of UAS. The UTM technical challenge will develop comprehensive and validated airspace operations and integration requirements to safely enable large-scale persistent access to visual line of sight and autonomous beyond visual line of sight small UAS in low-altitude airspace. Within the UTM project, a number of communications technologies to support UTM command and control (C2) are under investigation. In particular, commercial networked cellular systems are being tested and assessed for their ability to meet the reliability, scalability, cybersecurity and redundancy required. NASA Glenn Research Center is studying some of the aspects of employing such networks for UTM C2 communications. This includes the development of a test platform for sensing and characterizing the airborne C2 communications environment at various altitudes and in various terrains and topologies, measuring such aspects as received signal strength and interference. System performance aspects such as latency in the link, handover performance, packet error loss rate, drop outs, coverage gaps and other aspects impacting UTM operation will also be assessed. In this paper we explore some of the C2 approaches being proposed and demonstrated in the UTM project, the reliability, availability and other general C2 performance requirements, and approaches to evaluating and analyzing UTM C2 links based on commercial cellular networks.","PeriodicalId":112779,"journal":{"name":"2018 Integrated Communications, Navigation, Surveillance Conference (ICNS)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124883914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-10DOI: 10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384839
Ebrahim Rahnama, Mostafa Asaadi, Kaveh Parto
One of the ATSEP1 activities which has considerable effect on safety is activities which should be done prior, during and after flight inspection and among these activities prior flight inspection has a considerable importance among them. ATSEP activities prior flight check due to technological and tools shortcoming include just ground test which does not completely fulfill the requirements of this because the maintenance activities and measurements confined to the signal in a limited height from ground. These shortcomings became significant in case of some naviads that the propagation beam formed in a considerably height above earth which glide path from ILS2 NAVAID is a good example and from visual aids navigation systems PAPI3 lights also have a same condition. In this paper doing prior flight inspection which called pre-flight checks proposed to be done by the use of an equipped UAV4 with required instruments to measure GP5-LLZ6 navigation systems and PAPI lights to ensure the accuracy of the data transmission of these NAVAIDs and performing the required adjustments if required for any change or displacement prior performing the Flight Inspection. This method has been examined for the first time on GP navigation system in SHOHADAYE ILAM Airport of IRAN, which the result was completely satisfactory and considerably reduced maintenance activities prior and during flight inspection and finally reduced flight inspection time due to equipment fine tuning.
{"title":"PRE-flight checks of navigation systems and PAPI lights using a UAV","authors":"Ebrahim Rahnama, Mostafa Asaadi, Kaveh Parto","doi":"10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384839","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384839","url":null,"abstract":"One of the ATSEP1 activities which has considerable effect on safety is activities which should be done prior, during and after flight inspection and among these activities prior flight inspection has a considerable importance among them. ATSEP activities prior flight check due to technological and tools shortcoming include just ground test which does not completely fulfill the requirements of this because the maintenance activities and measurements confined to the signal in a limited height from ground. These shortcomings became significant in case of some naviads that the propagation beam formed in a considerably height above earth which glide path from ILS2 NAVAID is a good example and from visual aids navigation systems PAPI3 lights also have a same condition. In this paper doing prior flight inspection which called pre-flight checks proposed to be done by the use of an equipped UAV4 with required instruments to measure GP5-LLZ6 navigation systems and PAPI lights to ensure the accuracy of the data transmission of these NAVAIDs and performing the required adjustments if required for any change or displacement prior performing the Flight Inspection. This method has been examined for the first time on GP navigation system in SHOHADAYE ILAM Airport of IRAN, which the result was completely satisfactory and considerably reduced maintenance activities prior and during flight inspection and finally reduced flight inspection time due to equipment fine tuning.","PeriodicalId":112779,"journal":{"name":"2018 Integrated Communications, Navigation, Surveillance Conference (ICNS)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121117231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-10DOI: 10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384841
D. Mielke
The growth of the market for unmanned aircraft (UA) is not expected to stop during the next years. The absence of a crew aboard of UAs requires both a certain level of autonomy of the vehicle and a reliable communication channel between the remote pilot and the aircraft. In our recent work, we proposed the C-Band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (CDACS) as a data link for this purpose. This paper describes the requirements to a command and control link for unmanned aircraft in terms of expected throughput among other criteria and proposes a simple cell and communication channel design based on these values. Furthermore, we provide concepts for the frame design of CDACS in both communication directions that will be evaluated during an upcoming measurement campaign.
{"title":"Frame structure of the C-band digital aeronautical communications system","authors":"D. Mielke","doi":"10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384841","url":null,"abstract":"The growth of the market for unmanned aircraft (UA) is not expected to stop during the next years. The absence of a crew aboard of UAs requires both a certain level of autonomy of the vehicle and a reliable communication channel between the remote pilot and the aircraft. In our recent work, we proposed the C-Band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (CDACS) as a data link for this purpose. This paper describes the requirements to a command and control link for unmanned aircraft in terms of expected throughput among other criteria and proposes a simple cell and communication channel design based on these values. Furthermore, we provide concepts for the frame design of CDACS in both communication directions that will be evaluated during an upcoming measurement campaign.","PeriodicalId":112779,"journal":{"name":"2018 Integrated Communications, Navigation, Surveillance Conference (ICNS)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133990529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-10DOI: 10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384834
E. Theunissen, Tessa Hope Veerman
In the aeronautical, automotive and nautical domain, automation of collision avoidance maneuvering is being addressed. In the automotive domain, the potential occurrence of so-called dilemma situations imposes yet unresolved challenges to the design of the automation. In the aeronautical domain, systems enabling (pilot-supervised) automated selection and execution of collision avoidance maneuvers have been certified. To prevent the need for a collision avoidance maneuver, aircraft have to remain Well Clear. For today's Detect and Avoid systems, the pilot has to choose and initiate the Well Clear maneuver. In this paper, a roadmap for a stepwise increase in automation of Detect and Avoid systems is discussed and the associated challenges are identified. It is argued that, similar to the automotive domain, beyond a certain level of automation, the ethical question under what conditions pilot judgment can be automated must be answered, and that this may well determine the upper limit to the level of automation that is acceptable.
{"title":"Automated detect and avoid: Autonomy and ethics","authors":"E. Theunissen, Tessa Hope Veerman","doi":"10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384834","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384834","url":null,"abstract":"In the aeronautical, automotive and nautical domain, automation of collision avoidance maneuvering is being addressed. In the automotive domain, the potential occurrence of so-called dilemma situations imposes yet unresolved challenges to the design of the automation. In the aeronautical domain, systems enabling (pilot-supervised) automated selection and execution of collision avoidance maneuvers have been certified. To prevent the need for a collision avoidance maneuver, aircraft have to remain Well Clear. For today's Detect and Avoid systems, the pilot has to choose and initiate the Well Clear maneuver. In this paper, a roadmap for a stepwise increase in automation of Detect and Avoid systems is discussed and the associated challenges are identified. It is argued that, similar to the automotive domain, beyond a certain level of automation, the ethical question under what conditions pilot judgment can be automated must be answered, and that this may well determine the upper limit to the level of automation that is acceptable.","PeriodicalId":112779,"journal":{"name":"2018 Integrated Communications, Navigation, Surveillance Conference (ICNS)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125712097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-10DOI: 10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384843
J. Downey, Bryan L. Schoenholz, M. Piasecki, R. Kerczewski
The growing demand for Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) operating beyond the line of sight (BLOS) has resulted in an increased interest in using existing commercial satellite communication capabilities for UAS command and control (C2) communications. The World Radiocommunication Conference in 2015 designated portions of Ku-Band and Ka-Band fixed satellite service (FSS) spectrum to support UAS C2 communications, provided that potential interference with existing co-allocated users in these bands is addressed. As the user base in this new spectrum allocation expands, there is an increased potential for interference with existing terrestrial communication systems operating under fixed service (FS) allocations. The portion of Ka-Band spectrum allocated for UAS C2 avoids significant interference issues, but the Ku-Band allocation contains a co-primary F S allocation, creating potential interference problems. Therefore, UAS must identify solutions to avoid interfering with these existing FS ground sites while maintaining good links with satellite constellations. UAS operating with conventional fixed feed parabolic antennas will have difficulty in meeting interference thresholds, especially at high latitudes where the antennas will operate with low elevation angles. As a means of addressing this limitation, NASA is investigating the use of a phased array antenna to enable mitigation of interference into ground-based FS receivers. In this paper, a novel lightweight conformal phased array antenna will be presented that can use null-steering and/or beam shaping to avoid ground interference while simultaneously providing strong satellite microwave links for communications. The reduced weight of this design and ability to integrate into the fuselage of smaller UAS platforms will also be discussed as a potential solution to provide BLOS operation via spectrum sharing for an expanding user base. This paper will review design aspects of the conformal phased array antenna, describe the intended benefits in reducing interference with FS ground stations, and describe phased array development and test plans.
{"title":"Phased array antenna for the mitigation of UAS interference","authors":"J. Downey, Bryan L. Schoenholz, M. Piasecki, R. Kerczewski","doi":"10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384843","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384843","url":null,"abstract":"The growing demand for Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) operating beyond the line of sight (BLOS) has resulted in an increased interest in using existing commercial satellite communication capabilities for UAS command and control (C2) communications. The World Radiocommunication Conference in 2015 designated portions of Ku-Band and Ka-Band fixed satellite service (FSS) spectrum to support UAS C2 communications, provided that potential interference with existing co-allocated users in these bands is addressed. As the user base in this new spectrum allocation expands, there is an increased potential for interference with existing terrestrial communication systems operating under fixed service (FS) allocations. The portion of Ka-Band spectrum allocated for UAS C2 avoids significant interference issues, but the Ku-Band allocation contains a co-primary F S allocation, creating potential interference problems. Therefore, UAS must identify solutions to avoid interfering with these existing FS ground sites while maintaining good links with satellite constellations. UAS operating with conventional fixed feed parabolic antennas will have difficulty in meeting interference thresholds, especially at high latitudes where the antennas will operate with low elevation angles. As a means of addressing this limitation, NASA is investigating the use of a phased array antenna to enable mitigation of interference into ground-based FS receivers. In this paper, a novel lightweight conformal phased array antenna will be presented that can use null-steering and/or beam shaping to avoid ground interference while simultaneously providing strong satellite microwave links for communications. The reduced weight of this design and ability to integrate into the fuselage of smaller UAS platforms will also be discussed as a potential solution to provide BLOS operation via spectrum sharing for an expanding user base. This paper will review design aspects of the conformal phased array antenna, describe the intended benefits in reducing interference with FS ground stations, and describe phased array development and test plans.","PeriodicalId":112779,"journal":{"name":"2018 Integrated Communications, Navigation, Surveillance Conference (ICNS)","volume":"97 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122182251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-10DOI: 10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384831
A. Barón, R. Babiceanu, R. Seker
There has been a need to use effective dependability frameworks for designing and testing systems in safety-critical industries such as aviation and aerospace. These frameworks are modeled to meet the industry standards in order to ensure the required assurance levels are met. The current frameworks include reliability, safety, and availability through including the respective requirements. Cybersecurity has taken a foreground place in the safety-critical industry, however. Hence, security assessment cannot be ignored when considering a system dependability framework. There is an understanding that nowadays aircrafts are not purely physical, they contain both integrated hardware and software; which allows for attacks, threats, and unforeseeable software behavior that once were not conceived in the aircraft design. Additionally, the modern aircrafts operate as networked elements, forming a cloud, which we refer as the Internet of Wings (IoW). The framework wishing to address cybersecurity issues has to account for the changes in the environment in which the aircraft operates. This inclusion, in turn, results in increased complexity of the framework. The complexity of a design framework is exacerbated by the rapid changes that happen in the cybersecurity facet of an aircraft. The framework wishing to address cybersecurity issues has to account for the changes in the environment in which the aircraft operates. This inclusion, in turn, results in increased complexity of the framework. The complexity of a design framework is exacerbated by the rapid changes that happen in the cybersecurity facet of an aircraft. This work focuses on the development of a framework that includes cybersecurity and respective requirements to comply with the aircraft security constrains. Additionally, the framework includes trustworthiness solutions that allow for the cybersecurity requirements to complement the system dependability requirements. The result will be a system design that provides services that can be trusted. The suggested framework also takes into account that cybersecurity protection is updated continuously as a result of the ongoing discovery of new attacks and vulnerabilities that could affect the system. The framework aims to model cybersecurity and dependability requirements in aviation and aerospace systems to allow designing system services that can justifiably be trusted.
{"title":"Trustworthiness requirements and models for aviation and aerospace systems","authors":"A. Barón, R. Babiceanu, R. Seker","doi":"10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384831","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384831","url":null,"abstract":"There has been a need to use effective dependability frameworks for designing and testing systems in safety-critical industries such as aviation and aerospace. These frameworks are modeled to meet the industry standards in order to ensure the required assurance levels are met. The current frameworks include reliability, safety, and availability through including the respective requirements. Cybersecurity has taken a foreground place in the safety-critical industry, however. Hence, security assessment cannot be ignored when considering a system dependability framework. There is an understanding that nowadays aircrafts are not purely physical, they contain both integrated hardware and software; which allows for attacks, threats, and unforeseeable software behavior that once were not conceived in the aircraft design. Additionally, the modern aircrafts operate as networked elements, forming a cloud, which we refer as the Internet of Wings (IoW). The framework wishing to address cybersecurity issues has to account for the changes in the environment in which the aircraft operates. This inclusion, in turn, results in increased complexity of the framework. The complexity of a design framework is exacerbated by the rapid changes that happen in the cybersecurity facet of an aircraft. The framework wishing to address cybersecurity issues has to account for the changes in the environment in which the aircraft operates. This inclusion, in turn, results in increased complexity of the framework. The complexity of a design framework is exacerbated by the rapid changes that happen in the cybersecurity facet of an aircraft. This work focuses on the development of a framework that includes cybersecurity and respective requirements to comply with the aircraft security constrains. Additionally, the framework includes trustworthiness solutions that allow for the cybersecurity requirements to complement the system dependability requirements. The result will be a system design that provides services that can be trusted. The suggested framework also takes into account that cybersecurity protection is updated continuously as a result of the ongoing discovery of new attacks and vulnerabilities that could affect the system. The framework aims to model cybersecurity and dependability requirements in aviation and aerospace systems to allow designing system services that can justifiably be trusted.","PeriodicalId":112779,"journal":{"name":"2018 Integrated Communications, Navigation, Surveillance Conference (ICNS)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128861851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-10DOI: 10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384835
Jaewoo Jung, C. Ippolito, Christopher Rogers, R. Kerczewski, A. Downey, Konstantin J. Matheou
As part of NASA's Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management Project, flight experiments are planned to characterize the radio frequency environment at altitudes up to 400 ft. to better understand how small unmanned aircraft system command and control links can be expected to perform in the low altitude environment. The flight experiments will use a radio frequency channel sensing payload attached to a small unmanned aircraft. In terms of the payload being capable of measuring relatively low-level signals at altitude, electromagnetic interference emanating from the vehicle itself could potentially complicate the measurement process. For this reason, NASA recognized the importance of identifying and measuring the electromagnetic interference performance of the unmanned aircraft planned for these flight experiments, a Dà-Jiãng Innovations Science and Technology Co., Ltd S1000+ Spreading Wing. This vehicle was measured in a controlled electromagnetic interference test chamber at the NASA Ames Research Center. The S1000 is a carbon fiber based platform with eight rotors. As such, the electromagnetic interference test results represent potential performance of a number of similar small unmanned aircraft types. Unmanned aircraft platforms significantly different from the S1000 may also require electromagnetic interference testing, and the method employed for NASA's S1000 electromagnetic interference tests can be applied to other platforms. In this paper, we describe the Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management project, the radio frequency channel sensing payload, the electromagnetic interference testing method and test results for the S1000, and discuss the implications of these results.
{"title":"Small unmanned aircraft electromagnetic interference (EMI) initial assessment","authors":"Jaewoo Jung, C. Ippolito, Christopher Rogers, R. Kerczewski, A. Downey, Konstantin J. Matheou","doi":"10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384835","url":null,"abstract":"As part of NASA's Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management Project, flight experiments are planned to characterize the radio frequency environment at altitudes up to 400 ft. to better understand how small unmanned aircraft system command and control links can be expected to perform in the low altitude environment. The flight experiments will use a radio frequency channel sensing payload attached to a small unmanned aircraft. In terms of the payload being capable of measuring relatively low-level signals at altitude, electromagnetic interference emanating from the vehicle itself could potentially complicate the measurement process. For this reason, NASA recognized the importance of identifying and measuring the electromagnetic interference performance of the unmanned aircraft planned for these flight experiments, a Dà-Jiãng Innovations Science and Technology Co., Ltd S1000+ Spreading Wing. This vehicle was measured in a controlled electromagnetic interference test chamber at the NASA Ames Research Center. The S1000 is a carbon fiber based platform with eight rotors. As such, the electromagnetic interference test results represent potential performance of a number of similar small unmanned aircraft types. Unmanned aircraft platforms significantly different from the S1000 may also require electromagnetic interference testing, and the method employed for NASA's S1000 electromagnetic interference tests can be applied to other platforms. In this paper, we describe the Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management project, the radio frequency channel sensing payload, the electromagnetic interference testing method and test results for the S1000, and discuss the implications of these results.","PeriodicalId":112779,"journal":{"name":"2018 Integrated Communications, Navigation, Surveillance Conference (ICNS)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123579438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-10DOI: 10.1109/ICNSURV.2018.8384832
K. Sampigethaya, P. Kopardekar, Jerry Davis
Millions of small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) aircraft of various shapes and capabilities will soon fly at low altitudes in urban environments for ambitious applications. It is critical to ensure these remotely piloted aircraft fly safely, predictably, and efficiently in this challenging airspace, without endangering themselves and other occupants sharing that airspace or in proximity. Concepts, technologies, processes, and policies to solve this hard problem of UAS Traffic Management (UTM) are being explored. But, cyber security considerations are largely missing. This paper bridges this gap and addresses UTM cyber security needs and issues. It contributes a comprehensive framework to understand, identify, classify, and assess security threats to UTM, including those resulting from sUAS vulnerabilities. Promising threat mitigations, major challenges, and research directions are discussed to secure UTM.
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