Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4324/9780429038891-16
B. Crow, F. Bouman, O. Hospes
{"title":"Finance in Context: Exploring Diverse Exchange Conditions","authors":"B. Crow, F. Bouman, O. Hospes","doi":"10.4324/9780429038891-16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429038891-16","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":115960,"journal":{"name":"Financial Landscapes Reconstructed","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133644283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4324/9780429038891-17
D. Steinwand, F. Bouman, O. Hospes
The recent literature on rural finance emphasizes the important role played by various informal lenders. In Thailand, however, their share of total loans has declined from about 90 percent to 30-50 percent between 1965 and 1991, according to official figures (Thisyamondol et al. 1965; Siamwalla et al. 1990; Onchan 1992). This decline is largely explained by the rapid expansion of the loan portfolio of the BAAC, the Thai Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (Quinones and Encarnacion 1988). Researchers expect a further decline in the market share of informal lenders in the course of economic development. Their future role is seen “as a complement to formal finance”, operating in “specific niches” of comparative advantage (Asian Development Bank 1990). According to ADB only the remote, backward areas will probably remain a stronghold of informal lenders, where they serve the credit needs of the poorer segments of society. Their proximity to their clients reduces transaction costs in the predominantly unsecured credit-business. This chapter reports on a survey of the financial landscape in a Thai village located only 70 kilometers east of Bangkok (see also Steinwand 1991). Research was conducted from January to June 1990. The village is situated in the Bangkok-Chonburi area, which is by no means a backward, remote area, but rather characterized by tremendous economic growth. Its future is seen by Thai officials as “one long megalopolis, interlinked with certain breaks of rural areas, but basically... one long urban, industrial, recreational zone” (Bangkok Post 8.2.1990). The chapter will illustrate the variety of borrowing and lending patterns against the background of specific economic activities. It will focus on the changes in these patterns which have resulted from the rapid economic growth in that region and suggest that the scope of responses of informal financial activities to “modern times”, at least in the medium term, is wider than commonly assumed. They raise doubts about the results of the nation-wide surveys of recent years and the figures on the decline of informal finance market share.
最近关于农村金融的文献强调了各种非正式贷款人所起的重要作用。然而，根据官方数据(Thisyamondol et al. 1965;Siamwalla等人，1990;Onchan 1992)。这种下降的主要原因是泰国农业银行和农业合作社的贷款组合迅速扩大(Quinones和encaracion, 1988年)。研究人员预计，在经济发展的过程中，非正规贷款机构的市场份额将进一步下降。它们未来的作用被视为“对正规金融的补充”，在具有比较优势的“特定利基”中运作(亚洲开发银行，1990年)。亚行认为，只有偏远落后地区可能仍将是非正规贷款机构的据点，它们在那里满足社会较贫困阶层的信贷需求。在主要的无担保信贷业务中，他们与客户的接近程度降低了交易成本。本章报告了对位于曼谷以东仅70公里的一个泰国村庄的金融景观的调查(另见Steinwand 1991)。研究于1990年1月至6月进行。这个村庄位于曼谷-春武里地区，这绝不是一个落后、偏远的地区，而是一个经济飞速发展的地区。泰国官员认为，它的未来是“一个长长的特大城市，与某些农村地区相连，但基本上……一个长长的城市、工业和娱乐区”(曼谷邮报1990年2月8日)。本章将在具体经济活动的背景下说明各种借贷模式。报告将集中讨论由于该区域经济迅速增长而造成的这些模式的变化，并指出至少在中期，非正式金融活动对“现代”的反应范围比一般认为的要大。他们对近年来全国范围内的调查结果和非正式金融市场份额下降的数据提出了质疑。
{"title":"Moneylending and Modern Times: Informal Credit in Thailand","authors":"D. Steinwand, F. Bouman, O. Hospes","doi":"10.4324/9780429038891-17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429038891-17","url":null,"abstract":"The recent literature on rural finance emphasizes the important role played by various informal lenders. In Thailand, however, their share of total loans has declined from about 90 percent to 30-50 percent between 1965 and 1991, according to official figures (Thisyamondol et al. 1965; Siamwalla et al. 1990; Onchan 1992). This decline is largely explained by the rapid expansion of the loan portfolio of the BAAC, the Thai Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (Quinones and Encarnacion 1988). Researchers expect a further decline in the market share of informal lenders in the course of economic development. Their future role is seen “as a complement to formal finance”, operating in “specific niches” of comparative advantage (Asian Development Bank 1990). According to ADB only the remote, backward areas will probably remain a stronghold of informal lenders, where they serve the credit needs of the poorer segments of society. Their proximity to their clients reduces transaction costs in the predominantly unsecured credit-business. This chapter reports on a survey of the financial landscape in a Thai village located only 70 kilometers east of Bangkok (see also Steinwand 1991). Research was conducted from January to June 1990. The village is situated in the Bangkok-Chonburi area, which is by no means a backward, remote area, but rather characterized by tremendous economic growth. Its future is seen by Thai officials as “one long megalopolis, interlinked with certain breaks of rural areas, but basically... one long urban, industrial, recreational zone” (Bangkok Post 8.2.1990). The chapter will illustrate the variety of borrowing and lending patterns against the background of specific economic activities. It will focus on the changes in these patterns which have resulted from the rapid economic growth in that region and suggest that the scope of responses of informal financial activities to “modern times”, at least in the medium term, is wider than commonly assumed. They raise doubts about the results of the nation-wide surveys of recent years and the figures on the decline of informal finance market share.","PeriodicalId":115960,"journal":{"name":"Financial Landscapes Reconstructed","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125198946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Four development decades have passed since the early 1950s. During that period we have become masters in the art of underdevelopment: at the levels of experts, institutions, governments and donors. Underdevelopment in large parts of the world has been expertly prepared, government-made and donorsupported. Of course, there are exceptional cases of successful development. Yet by treating them as such, there is little to be learned from them. We are now rich in experience and hope to have learned from it – like the proverbial banker who invariably gains from making a loan: either in monetary terms, when the loan is paid back, or in experience, when it is not.
{"title":"From Cheap Credit to Easy Money: How to Undermine Rural Finance and Development","authors":"H. D. Seibel, F. Bouman, O. Hospes","doi":"10.4324/9780429038891-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429038891-2","url":null,"abstract":"Four development decades have passed since the early 1950s. During that period we have become masters in the art of underdevelopment: at the levels of experts, institutions, governments and donors. Underdevelopment in large parts of the world has been expertly prepared, government-made and donorsupported. Of course, there are exceptional cases of successful development. Yet by treating them as such, there is little to be learned from them. We are now rich in experience and hope to have learned from it – like the proverbial banker who invariably gains from making a loan: either in monetary terms, when the loan is paid back, or in experience, when it is not.","PeriodicalId":115960,"journal":{"name":"Financial Landscapes Reconstructed","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131423047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter deals with NGO programs of lending to micro enterprises in the Philippines. It contains four sections: a brief background on the programs themselves, the premises underlying them, questions of sustainability, and some research priorities. The programs discussed represent a major attempt underway in the Philippines to reconstruct the nature of the financial landscapes by using NGOs and “peoples organizations” as intermediaries to make a major dent on poverty by lending to micro enterprises. The term micro-enterprise program refers to the promotion of small self-employment activities through the provision of credit, training and other inputs. Two types of approaches will be briefly described in this chapter: the first approach is to concentrate on qualitative change of a limited number of enterprises, offering them a rather comprehensive range of services. The second approach, that refers to so-called “minimalist programs”, is directed at expansion of a large number of enterprises through the provision of a minimum of services. NGOs and peoples organizations such as cooperatives and credit unions are usually regarded as semiformal. Although regulated in certain aspects they retain the essential informality of the informal sector. Thus the programs discussed in this paper can be viewed as an attempt to develop and use the semi-formal sector to fill a void left not only by the formal, but also by the informal sector, which practices its own form of credit rationing. To the extent the informal sector does lend to micro enterprises, these programs can also be viewed as an attempt to improve the terms of such lending, by providing stronger competition to the informal sector. There is a long history of NGO involvement in livelihood programs in the Philippines, based originally on grant assistance from bilateral donors, international NGOs, and even the private corporate sector (through the Philippine Business for Social Progress.) However, in the 1980s government agencies also became increasingly involved through direct lending to beneficiaries. The most salient of the earlier government programs was the KKK launched in 1981. It fell into some disrepute when it became overly politicized in the selection of beneficiaries and had a very low repayment rate. The Philippines has recently undertaken a major devolution of functions and resources to the local governments under the Local Government Code. However, the interests of the poor are expected to be better protected in future local-government implemented programs by the statutorily granted representation of NGO representatives on provincial and municipal governments (of unto 25 percent of the strength of their legislative bodies). Livelihood programs were revived under the Aquino administration as a major component of the antipoverty program and proliferated until as many as 154 programs, according to one count, were being run by nine line-agencies, some of them lending directly to borrowers.
{"title":"Lending to Micro Enterprises Through NGOs in the Philippines","authors":"P. Ghate, F. Bouman, O. Hospes","doi":"10.4324/9780429038891-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429038891-8","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter deals with NGO programs of lending to micro enterprises in the Philippines. It contains four sections: a brief background on the programs themselves, the premises underlying them, questions of sustainability, and some research priorities. The programs discussed represent a major attempt underway in the Philippines to reconstruct the nature of the financial landscapes by using NGOs and “peoples organizations” as intermediaries to make a major dent on poverty by lending to micro enterprises. The term micro-enterprise program refers to the promotion of small self-employment activities through the provision of credit, training and other inputs. Two types of approaches will be briefly described in this chapter: the first approach is to concentrate on qualitative change of a limited number of enterprises, offering them a rather comprehensive range of services. The second approach, that refers to so-called “minimalist programs”, is directed at expansion of a large number of enterprises through the provision of a minimum of services. NGOs and peoples organizations such as cooperatives and credit unions are usually regarded as semiformal. Although regulated in certain aspects they retain the essential informality of the informal sector. Thus the programs discussed in this paper can be viewed as an attempt to develop and use the semi-formal sector to fill a void left not only by the formal, but also by the informal sector, which practices its own form of credit rationing. To the extent the informal sector does lend to micro enterprises, these programs can also be viewed as an attempt to improve the terms of such lending, by providing stronger competition to the informal sector. There is a long history of NGO involvement in livelihood programs in the Philippines, based originally on grant assistance from bilateral donors, international NGOs, and even the private corporate sector (through the Philippine Business for Social Progress.) However, in the 1980s government agencies also became increasingly involved through direct lending to beneficiaries. The most salient of the earlier government programs was the KKK launched in 1981. It fell into some disrepute when it became overly politicized in the selection of beneficiaries and had a very low repayment rate. The Philippines has recently undertaken a major devolution of functions and resources to the local governments under the Local Government Code. However, the interests of the poor are expected to be better protected in future local-government implemented programs by the statutorily granted representation of NGO representatives on provincial and municipal governments (of unto 25 percent of the strength of their legislative bodies). Livelihood programs were revived under the Aquino administration as a major component of the antipoverty program and proliferated until as many as 154 programs, according to one count, were being run by nine line-agencies, some of them lending directly to borrowers. ","PeriodicalId":115960,"journal":{"name":"Financial Landscapes Reconstructed","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133605436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4324/9780429038891-18
J. H. Jones, F. Bouman, O. Hospes
{"title":"A Changing Financial Landscape in India: Macro-Level and Micro-Level Perspectives","authors":"J. H. Jones, F. Bouman, O. Hospes","doi":"10.4324/9780429038891-18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429038891-18","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":115960,"journal":{"name":"Financial Landscapes Reconstructed","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122837556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4324/9780429038891-12
R. Zander, F. Bouman, O. Hospes
A key problem in any comparative analysis of formal and informal finance is how to determine borrowers’ preference for specific savings and credit systems. Many policymakers -both supporters and opponents of cheap credit policies -assume that borrowers base their decisions on one particular loan component, that is, the interest rate. However, other costs of loan transactions might have a much more decisive impact on decisions of (potential) borrowers. The transaction cost analysis, attempting to identify all costs incurred by borrowers and lenders, has shown that interest rates are but one of a set of borrowers’ transaction costs. These costs usually include travelling costs to the credit institution, opportunity costs of labor for the time lost in lengthy application procedures, and expenses of updating or organizing legal documents used as collateral. For more than two decades, analysis of borrowers’ transaction costs has served as the analytical tool to investigate decisions of borrowers pro or contra informal and formal lenders. However, I feel that transaction costs cannot explain borrowers’ decisions comprehensively. These costs imply a ranking order by borrowers: the cheaper the credit source, the more likely they will try to get a loan from that source. Empirical evidence from my surveys in Sri Lanka suggests there is more at stake. This chapter introduces an alternative analytical framework based on these field surveys. The objective is to identify the existence and scale of entry barriers into formal and informal segments of financial markets.
{"title":"Barriers to Credit Access in Rural Sri Lanka","authors":"R. Zander, F. Bouman, O. Hospes","doi":"10.4324/9780429038891-12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429038891-12","url":null,"abstract":"A key problem in any comparative analysis of formal and informal finance is how to determine borrowers’ preference for specific savings and credit systems. Many policymakers -both supporters and opponents of cheap credit policies -assume that borrowers base their decisions on one particular loan component, that is, the interest rate. However, other costs of loan transactions might have a much more decisive impact on decisions of (potential) borrowers. The transaction cost analysis, attempting to identify all costs incurred by borrowers and lenders, has shown that interest rates are but one of a set of borrowers’ transaction costs. These costs usually include travelling costs to the credit institution, opportunity costs of labor for the time lost in lengthy application procedures, and expenses of updating or organizing legal documents used as collateral. For more than two decades, analysis of borrowers’ transaction costs has served as the analytical tool to investigate decisions of borrowers pro or contra informal and formal lenders. However, I feel that transaction costs cannot explain borrowers’ decisions comprehensively. These costs imply a ranking order by borrowers: the cheaper the credit source, the more likely they will try to get a loan from that source. Empirical evidence from my surveys in Sri Lanka suggests there is more at stake. This chapter introduces an alternative analytical framework based on these field surveys. The objective is to identify the existence and scale of entry barriers into formal and informal segments of financial markets.","PeriodicalId":115960,"journal":{"name":"Financial Landscapes Reconstructed","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114877983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Both these views suffered from tunnel vision. Those who criticized informal finance either were not aware of, or simply chose to ignore, the wide variety of financing arrangements which characterized it -preferring instead to think in terms of the harsh moneylender stereotype. They complained about "exorbitant" interest rates, but failed to consider the actual costs of lending—the high transactions costs inherent in small-scale loans, the costs of additional services sometimes provided by lenders (including risk-sharing, in some cases), and the often high probability of default. Most important of all, they paid little attention to the fact that the ubiquity of informal finance was strong evidence of its value to those who used it. The inappropriateness of this stereotype has since clearly been demonstrated by numerous studies of informal finance (see, for example, Adams and Fitchett 1992). At the same time, those calling for the expansion of resources allocated to formal finance either did so with the intention of having it displace informal finance (in line with this antipathetic attitude), or else virtually ignored the existence of the latter. The second approach may be seen as having been influenced by empirical and theoretical work which had been done on the relationship between financial development and economic growth1, which focused largely if not entirely on the expansion of formal financial institutions and transactions without looking at informal finance at all -as though financial institutions were being set up where previously there had been a vacuum. On the contrary, however, informal finance presumably has been a feature of economic transactions ever since production began to evolve from pure subsistence, and it remains an important aspect of even the most advanced economies. The historical growth of the well developed formal financial sector observed in the now more advanced countries was a response to the progressive emergence of opportunities for doing things which informal finance could not do as well, most frequently as a result of the steadily increasing scale of business enterprise in general. Often it was a by-product of the supply of services other than financial intermediation. For example, formal commercial banking can trace its origins to informal systems within which well-reputed individuals (usually traders or merchants) would accept cash deposits from others for safekeeping, and could issue handwritten notes allowing their own suppliers and acquaintances to obtain cash or goods on credit from third parties. When the demand for such services became large enough, it became profitable to establish distinct enterprises -namely banks -specifically for these purposes. Likewise, modern day stock exchanges evolved from very modest beginnings, in the form of informal meetings between the owners of shares in various enterprises who from time to time were desirous of changing the composition of their portfolios. Insurance compan
{"title":"A Changing Financial Landscape: The Evolution of Finance Policy in Indonesia","authors":"R. Mcleod, F. Bouman, O. Hospes","doi":"10.4324/9780429038891-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429038891-6","url":null,"abstract":"Both these views suffered from tunnel vision. Those who criticized informal finance either were not aware of, or simply chose to ignore, the wide variety of financing arrangements which characterized it -preferring instead to think in terms of the harsh moneylender stereotype. They complained about \"exorbitant\" interest rates, but failed to consider the actual costs of lending—the high transactions costs inherent in small-scale loans, the costs of additional services sometimes provided by lenders (including risk-sharing, in some cases), and the often high probability of default. Most important of all, they paid little attention to the fact that the ubiquity of informal finance was strong evidence of its value to those who used it. The inappropriateness of this stereotype has since clearly been demonstrated by numerous studies of informal finance (see, for example, Adams and Fitchett 1992). At the same time, those calling for the expansion of resources allocated to formal finance either did so with the intention of having it displace informal finance (in line with this antipathetic attitude), or else virtually ignored the existence of the latter. The second approach may be seen as having been influenced by empirical and theoretical work which had been done on the relationship between financial development and economic growth1, which focused largely if not entirely on the expansion of formal financial institutions and transactions without looking at informal finance at all -as though financial institutions were being set up where previously there had been a vacuum. On the contrary, however, informal finance presumably has been a feature of economic transactions ever since production began to evolve from pure subsistence, and it remains an important aspect of even the most advanced economies. The historical growth of the well developed formal financial sector observed in the now more advanced countries was a response to the progressive emergence of opportunities for doing things which informal finance could not do as well, most frequently as a result of the steadily increasing scale of business enterprise in general. Often it was a by-product of the supply of services other than financial intermediation. For example, formal commercial banking can trace its origins to informal systems within which well-reputed individuals (usually traders or merchants) would accept cash deposits from others for safekeeping, and could issue handwritten notes allowing their own suppliers and acquaintances to obtain cash or goods on credit from third parties. When the demand for such services became large enough, it became profitable to establish distinct enterprises -namely banks -specifically for these purposes. Likewise, modern day stock exchanges evolved from very modest beginnings, in the form of informal meetings between the owners of shares in various enterprises who from time to time were desirous of changing the composition of their portfolios. Insurance compan","PeriodicalId":115960,"journal":{"name":"Financial Landscapes Reconstructed","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133635404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the 1960s and 1970s national policymakers charged many rural banks with the provision of cheap credit to small farmers, small fishermen, or broadly speaking, rural households with small-scale enterprises. The performance of these institutions and the programs, projects and schemes they supported, however, remained below expectations. A new thinking about rural finance and its role in development, based on the concept of the Rural Financial Market (RFM), clearly demonstrated the shortcomings of the cheap credit policy. It enabled a more balanced understanding of the roles of rural banks, informal intermediaries and their (potential) clients in the supply of and demand for financial services (Adams 1983; Donald 1976; Von Pischke 1981). The new thinking also resulted in a growing recognition that governments should refrain from direct participation in banking and concentrate on policies that establish and maintain confidence in financial institutions. Such a new role of government in finance is a pre-condition for the provision of sustainable financial services by banks. Of course, this is not the only issue. Various studies have explored other factors that strongly affect the provision of rural banking services (Binswanger and Rozenzweig 1986; Schmidt and Kropp 1987; Von Pischke 1991). This paper focuses on the costs of financial intermediation and its relation to the scale of operation. The calculation and monitoring of costs is of central importance when rural banks2 pursue the socially desirable objective of providing financial services to new clients. Emphasis on reaching new clients without due attention to costs, and the control of costs in particular, leads invariably to operating losses which sooner or later result in a reduction or termination of services provided. From a long-term perspective, the objective to reach new clients should thus necessarily be linked with attention to costs, or in broader terms: with the objective to operate on a financially viable basis. Rural banks trying to achieve these two objectives simultaneously are faced with a host of questions regarding the demand for various types of financial services by their new clients, and their own organizational, operational and financial capabilities to meet this demand. Answering these questions requires analysis, followed by experiments to explore the feasibility of new organizational approaches and new methods of operation. The discussion of lending costs should therefore be part of evaluation of existing banking services and of planned experiments to widen to scope of services.
在20世纪60年代和70年代，国家政策制定者要求许多农村银行向小农户、小渔民，或者广义上讲，向拥有小型企业的农村家庭提供廉价信贷。然而，这些机构及其支持的计划、项目和计划的绩效仍低于预期。基于农村金融市场(RFM)的概念，对农村金融及其在发展中的作用进行了新的思考，清晰地揭示了廉价信贷政策的缺陷。它使人们能够更加平衡地理解农村银行、非正式中介机构及其(潜在)客户在金融服务供求方面的作用(Adams 1983;唐纳德1976;Von Pischke 1981)。这种新思维还使人们越来越认识到，政府应避免直接参与银行业，而应集中精力制定政策，建立和维持对金融机构的信心。政府在金融领域的这种新角色是银行提供可持续金融服务的先决条件。当然，这不是唯一的问题。各种研究探索了其他强烈影响农村银行服务提供的因素(Binswanger和Rozenzweig 1986;Schmidt and Kropp 1987;Von Pischke 1991)。本文主要研究金融中介成本及其与经营规模的关系。当农村银行追求向新客户提供金融服务这一社会期望的目标时，成本的计算和监控是至关重要的。强调获得新客户而不适当注意成本，特别是成本控制，必然导致经营亏损，迟早导致所提供服务的减少或终止。因此，从长期的角度来看，接触新客户的目标必须与对成本的注意联系起来，或者从更广泛的角度来说，与在财政上可行的基础上运作的目标联系起来。试图同时实现这两个目标的农村银行面临着新客户对各种金融服务的需求，以及他们自己的组织、运营和财务能力来满足这一需求的一系列问题。回答这些问题需要分析，然后通过实验来探索新的组织方式和新的操作方法的可行性。因此，对贷款成本的讨论应成为评价现有银行服务和扩大服务范围的计划试验的一部分。
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4324/9780429038891-13
M. Hendriks, F. Bouman, O. Hospes
Land reforms and the Green Revolution with its capital-intensive agricultural technology have increased the importance of informal lenders in many low-income countries, including traders of food products, input dealers, rich farmer-lenders, rice millers and store owners. As a result, informal financial intermediaries have received growing attention from researchers and policymakers, particularly in the Philippines (Agabin et al. 1989; Lamberte and Lim 1987; TBAC 1989). However, in spite of the growing number of (predominantly economic) studies, evaluations of the role of the new financiers still lack detailed, empirical data on their methods of working, their relationships with borrowers, and the different socio-economic and cultural contexts in which they operate. This chapter wants to contribute to a better understanding of these methods, relationships and contexts. For this purpose, I describe credit relations in the production and marketing of vegetables in the central Philippines, taking into account their diversity and contexts. My analysis provides insights into the interdependency of lenders and borrowers, the interweaving of trade and credit transactions, and the cultural and economic backgrounds of the combined strategy of spreading of risks and profit-seeking. It highlights personalized relations of exchange in vegetable marketing, called suki, and the flexible ways in which vegetable traders make use of these relations. Socio-economic factors, the normative environment, specific features of commodities and power conflicts affect opportunities and constraints in the vegetable market, and consequently, suki as a normative construct of individual traders and farmers, has different meanings. High risks are common to credit extension in the production and marketing of agricultural products in the Philippines. While neither the commercial banks nor the Philippines’ cooperative sector have proved wellequipped for lending to small farmers, the need for production capital has increased considerably due to the introduction of new HYV technology. With the failure of government programs and the withdrawal of landlords from the credit sphere, the informal finance circuit has extended and diversified since the mid 1970s. Traders and processors of farm produce, dealers in farm inputs, and rich farmers, offer production loans, together with a host of local middlemen in the credit chain from village to city and back, replacing patron-client relations with landlords (Sacay et al. 1985; TBAC 1981). Peasant agriculture faces further risks and uncertainty because of climatic factors, seasonality of production, changes in consumer preferences, and dependency in land use relations. Trade in agricultural products is similarly risky, and costs of transportation, storage, processing and information are high. Earlier studies show that informal lenders reduce risks and costs by operating in more than one market through interlinked deals (Floro 1987; Geron 1989).
土地改革和绿色革命及其资本密集型农业技术增加了许多低收入国家非正规贷款机构的重要性，包括食品贸易商、投入商、富裕农民贷款机构、碾米厂和商店老板。因此，非正式金融中介机构越来越受到研究人员和政策制定者的关注，特别是在菲律宾(Agabin et al. 1989;Lamberte and Lim 1987;1989年纪录)。然而，尽管有越来越多的研究(主要是经济方面的)，对新金融家作用的评估仍然缺乏关于他们的工作方法、他们与借款人的关系以及他们所处的不同社会经济和文化背景的详细经验数据。本章希望有助于更好地理解这些方法、关系和上下文。为此，我描述了菲律宾中部蔬菜生产和销售中的信贷关系，考虑到它们的多样性和背景。我的分析提供了对借贷双方相互依赖、贸易和信贷交易交织、以及风险扩散和逐利联合策略的文化和经济背景的见解。它突出了蔬菜营销中的个性化交换关系，称为suki，以及蔬菜贸易商利用这些关系的灵活方式。社会经济因素、规范环境、商品特性和权力冲突影响着蔬菜市场的机会和约束，因此，作为个体交易者和农民的规范性建构，suki具有不同的意义。在菲律宾，农产品生产和销售的信贷扩展普遍存在高风险。虽然商业银行和菲律宾的合作社部门都不具备向小农提供贷款的能力，但由于采用了新的HYV技术，对生产资本的需求大大增加。随着政府项目的失败和房东退出信贷领域，自20世纪70年代中期以来，非正式金融循环得到了扩展和多样化。农产品的贸易商和加工商、农业投入品的经销商和富有的农民提供生产贷款，连同从农村到城市再到城市的信贷链上的大量当地中间商，取代了与地主的主顾关系(Sacay et al. 1985;1981年纪录)。由于气候因素、生产的季节性、消费者偏好的变化以及土地利用关系的依赖性，农民农业面临着进一步的风险和不确定性。农产品贸易同样存在风险，运输、储存、加工和信息的成本很高。早期的研究表明，非正规贷款机构通过相互关联的交易在一个以上的市场上开展业务，从而降低风险和成本(Floro 1987;Geron 1989)。例如，一个人从事农业投入的销售，碾米，购买农产品，生产融资，所有这些都是同一个农民。关于印度的文献尤其广泛(Bharadway 1985;报告1983;布雷弗曼和斯蒂格利茨1982)。垂直整合似乎是一种盈利策略，也是一种从贫困农民那里榨取剩余的方式，因为一笔交易中的条件和不对称被转移到与同一个人进行的其他交易中。Floro(1987)是为数不多的分析菲律宾信贷和营销相互联系的人之一，他关注的是商人贷款人和富裕农民贷款人的策略和动机。她认为，这种相互联系不仅意味着通过替换抵押品来降低违约风险，而且还意味着控制粮食商品的市场渠道，并以牺牲小农的利益为代价获取利润。作为对生产信用的回报，贸易商以低于现行市场价格的价格对产品提出索赔。农业投入的加价和农产品的低价(有时也包括劳务)包含了隐性的利息形式，这与低收入国家其他形式的非正式借贷常见的高名义利率不同(Floro 1987;Geron 1989)。虽然这些关于市场相互联系的研究为交易者的借贷策略提供了有价值的见解，但它们留下了许多未解决的问题，例如社会经济背景对相互联系机制和长期和短期信贷关系的影响，不仅在交易者和农民之间，而且在市场链上的各种交易者之间。在菲律宾，这些关系以sukis的形式制度化，这是一种个性化的社会经济关系，通过这种关系，交易相互联系，提供信任和赞助的要素，这种联系是建立和执行的。
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4324/9780429038891-19
B. Harriss‐White, F. Bouman, O. Hospes
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