Pub Date : 2020-09-30DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2020.1172
R. Mena
Empty Names and Negative Existentials
空名字与否定存在
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Pub Date : 2020-09-30DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2020.1173
Imogen Dickie
This paper uses cases involving empty singular terms (on the one hand, cases of what I call “accidental aboutness-failure”; on the other, cases involving proper names occurring in fictions) to argue for a claim about the goal of ordinary belief-forming activity, and shows how this claim generates new foundations for the theory of reference.
{"title":"A Lemma from Nowhere","authors":"Imogen Dickie","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2020.1173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2020.1173","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses cases involving empty singular terms (on the one hand, cases of what I call “accidental aboutness-failure”; on the other, cases involving proper names occurring in fictions) to argue for a claim about the goal of ordinary belief-forming activity, and shows how this claim generates new foundations for the theory of reference.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114250999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-30DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2020.1175
S. Yablo
Holmes exists is false. How can this be, when there is no one for the sentence to misdescribe? Part of the answer is that a sentence’s topic depends on context. The king of France is bald, normally unevaluable, is false qua description of the bald people. Likewise Holmes exists is false qua description of the things that exist; it misdescribes those things as having Holmes among them. This does not explain, though, how Holmes does not exist differs in cognitive content from, say, Vulcan does not exist. Our answer builds on an observation of Kripke’s: even if Holmes exists, he is not in this room, for we were all born too late.
{"title":"Nonexistence and Aboutness: The Bandersnatches of Dubuque","authors":"S. Yablo","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2020.1175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2020.1175","url":null,"abstract":"Holmes exists is false. How can this be, when there is no one for the sentence to misdescribe? Part of the answer is that a sentence’s topic depends on context. The king of France is bald, normally unevaluable, is false qua description of the bald people. Likewise Holmes exists is false qua description of the things that exist; it misdescribes those things as having Holmes among them. This does not explain, though, how Holmes does not exist differs in cognitive content from, say, Vulcan does not exist. Our answer builds on an observation of Kripke’s: even if Holmes exists, he is not in this room, for we were all born too late.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114681203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-30DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2020.1177
Julio De Rizzo
A natural proposal for the grounds of negative existential truths, such as that Vulcan does not exist, states that these truths are grounded in the totality truth affirming the existence of every existent thing together with the truth that they are all. In this paper I will put forward three objections to straightforward formulations of this idea, and argue that a change in the usual grammar of grounding claims, allowing for pluralities of sentences to express not only grounds, but also groundees, is effective in making the account immune to the objections raised.
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Pub Date : 2020-09-30DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2020.1176
L. Clapp
To solve the referential sub-problem of negative existentials one must explain why we interpret uses of, e.g., ‘Sherlock Holmes doesn’t exist’ as saying something coherent and intuitively true, even though the speaker purports to refer to something. Pragmatic Meinongism solves this problem by allowing ‘does not exist’ to be pragmatically modulated to express an inclusive sense under which it can be satisfied by something. I establish three points in defense of pragmatic Meinongism: (i) it is superior to Russell-inspired solutions; (ii) it is supported by independent evidence of pragmatic modulation; and (iii) it requires no dubious ontological commitments.
{"title":"Sometimes Some Things Don’t (Really) Exist: Pragmatic Meinongism and the Referential Sub-Problem of Negative Existentials","authors":"L. Clapp","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2020.1176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2020.1176","url":null,"abstract":"To solve the referential sub-problem of negative existentials one must explain why we interpret uses of, e.g., ‘Sherlock Holmes doesn’t exist’ as saying something coherent and intuitively true, even though the speaker purports to refer to something. Pragmatic Meinongism solves this problem by allowing ‘does not exist’ to be pragmatically modulated to express an inclusive sense under which it can be satisfied by something. I establish three points in defense of pragmatic Meinongism: (i) it is superior to Russell-inspired solutions; (ii) it is supported by independent evidence of pragmatic modulation; and (iii) it requires no dubious ontological commitments.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124567024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-28DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.1148
Melisa Vivanco
José Ferreirós y Abel Lasalle Casanave (coordinadores), El árbol de los números: cognición, lógica y práctica matemática, Editorial Universidad de Sevilla, Sevilla, 2015, 256 pp.
jose ferreiro和Abel Lasalle Casanave(协调员)，《数字树:认知、逻辑和数学实践》，塞维利亚大学出版社，塞维利亚，2015,256页。
{"title":"Números naturales: distintas metodologías que convergen en el análisis de su naturaleza y de cómo los entendemos","authors":"Melisa Vivanco","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.1148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.1148","url":null,"abstract":"José Ferreirós y Abel Lasalle Casanave (coordinadores), El árbol de los números: cognición, lógica y práctica matemática, Editorial Universidad de Sevilla, Sevilla, 2015, 256 pp.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132533291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-28DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.1149
L. Mojica
Thomas Fuchs, Ecology of the Brain, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, 336 pp.
Thomas Fuchs，《大脑生态学》，牛津大学出版社，牛津，2018年，336页。
{"title":"Mentes en cuerpos de afecto: nota crítica sobre Ecology of the Brain, de Thomas Fuchs","authors":"L. Mojica","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.1149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.1149","url":null,"abstract":"Thomas Fuchs, Ecology of the Brain, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, 336 pp.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"291 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115928556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-01DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.07
Manuel J. García-Pérez, Tamires Dal Magro
En nuestro artículo, analizaremos las diferencias y similitudes que pode- mos encontrar en el uso de diagramas entre dos prácticas matemáticas de la antigüedad. Mostraremos que no existe un solo uso posible de éstos, sino que tienen que considerarse como herramientas de razonamiento creadas y manipuladas de acuerdo con los propósitos de cada tradición. Argumentaremos que las diferencias en los procedimientos y organizaciones del conocimiento que ambas tradiciones presentan no implican ningún tipo de valoración acerca de su mayor o menor “matematicidad”, ya que ambas tradiciones llegaron a resultados matemáticos suficientemente generales y precisos, hecho que es característico de investigaciones matemáticas a un nivel teórico.
{"title":"UN ANÁLISIS COMPARATIVO DEL USO DE DIAGRAMAS EN DOS PRÁCTICAS MATEMÁTICAS DE LA ANTIGÜEDAD","authors":"Manuel J. García-Pérez, Tamires Dal Magro","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.07","url":null,"abstract":"En nuestro artículo, analizaremos las diferencias y similitudes que pode- mos encontrar en el uso de diagramas entre dos prácticas matemáticas de la antigüedad. Mostraremos que no existe un solo uso posible de éstos, sino que tienen que considerarse como herramientas de razonamiento creadas y manipuladas de acuerdo con los propósitos de cada tradición. Argumentaremos que las diferencias en los procedimientos y organizaciones del conocimiento que ambas tradiciones presentan no implican ningún tipo de valoración acerca de su mayor o menor “matematicidad”, ya que ambas tradiciones llegaron a resultados matemáticos suficientemente generales y precisos, hecho que es característico de investigaciones matemáticas a un nivel teórico.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125883335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-01DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.09
Hubert Marraud
Wellman introdujo el razonamiento conductivo en 1971 para distinguirlo del razonamiento deductivo y del razonamiento inductivo. Para la mayoría de los comentaristas lo que define al razonamiento conductivo es la ponderación de los pros y los contras. Sostengo, sin embargo, que la ponderación está asociada con determinadas estructuras argumentativas, mientras que “conductivo” se refiere a la relación entre las premisas y la conclusión de un argumento. Propongo por ello una definición recursiva de argumento conductivo, conforme a la cual los argumentos conductivos son argumentos basados en clasificaciones verbales que involucran conceptos multi-criterio o composiciones de tales argumentos.
{"title":"SOBRE LA DEFINICIÓN DE LOS ARGUMENTOS CONDUCTIVOS","authors":"Hubert Marraud","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.09","url":null,"abstract":"Wellman introdujo el razonamiento conductivo en 1971 para distinguirlo del razonamiento deductivo y del razonamiento inductivo. Para la mayoría de los comentaristas lo que define al razonamiento conductivo es la ponderación de los pros y los contras. Sostengo, sin embargo, que la ponderación está asociada con determinadas estructuras argumentativas, mientras que “conductivo” se refiere a la relación entre las premisas y la conclusión de un argumento. Propongo por ello una definición recursiva de argumento conductivo, conforme a la cual los argumentos conductivos son argumentos basados en clasificaciones verbales que involucran conceptos multi-criterio o composiciones de tales argumentos.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124401296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-01DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.08
M. P. Otero
I present and defend a theory about intuitions and the justification they provide. The theory relies on a familiar notion: having direct prima facie justification merely on the basis of understanding concepts. But, under the assumption that not all intuitively true propositions are so directly justified, I advance and develop an original thesis about the rest of cases in which someone has an intuition: when a subject has the intuition that P, she/he makes a (tipycally implicit) estimate about the comparative simplicity of possible extensions of certain parts of her/his system of beliefs.
{"title":"INTUITIONS, SIMPLICITY AND EXTRAPOLATION FROM CONCEPTS","authors":"M. P. Otero","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.08","url":null,"abstract":"I present and defend a theory about intuitions and the justification they provide. The theory relies on a familiar notion: having direct prima facie justification merely on the basis of understanding concepts. But, under the assumption that not all intuitively true propositions are so directly justified, I advance and develop an original thesis about the rest of cases in which someone has an intuition: when a subject has the intuition that P, she/he makes a (tipycally implicit) estimate about the comparative simplicity of possible extensions of certain parts of her/his system of beliefs.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127704408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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