Pub Date : 2023-06-28DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1423
José Giromini
El propósito de este trabajo es exponer una estrategia explicativa que está en el núcleo de A Spirit of Trust de Robert Brandom. Esta estrategia consiste, de acuerdo con nuestra lectura, en tratar la oposición epistemológica entre apariencias y realidad —y otras oposiciones conceptuales emparentadas— como una distinción interna, normativa e histórica. Mostraremos cómo Brandom hace funcionar esta estrategia apelando al procedimiento de la rememoración, que permite, al ubicar diferentes representaciones en una secuencia de desarrollo histórico, entender la distinción entre apariencias y realidad como la distinción entre cómo nos representamos qué son las cosas y cómo deberíamos representárnoslas.
{"title":"Justificación, normatividad e historia: sobre la idea de rememoración en A Spirit of Trust","authors":"José Giromini","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1423","url":null,"abstract":"El propósito de este trabajo es exponer una estrategia explicativa que está en el núcleo de A Spirit of Trust de Robert Brandom. Esta estrategia consiste, de acuerdo con nuestra lectura, en tratar la oposición epistemológica entre apariencias y realidad —y otras oposiciones conceptuales emparentadas— como una distinción interna, normativa e histórica. Mostraremos cómo Brandom hace funcionar esta estrategia apelando al procedimiento de la rememoración, que permite, al ubicar diferentes representaciones en una secuencia de desarrollo histórico, entender la distinción entre apariencias y realidad como la distinción entre cómo nos representamos qué son las cosas y cómo deberíamos representárnoslas.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"256 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115389089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-28DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1430
Gustavo Ortiz Millán
Benjamin J.B. Lipscomb, The Women Are up to Something. How Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch Revolutionized Ethics, Oxford University Press, New York, 2022, 326pp., ISBN 978–0–19–754107–4.
本杰明·j·b·利普斯科姆，《女人有所图谋》。伊丽莎白·安斯科姆、菲利帕·富特、玛丽·米奇利和艾里斯·默多克如何彻底改变了伦理学，牛津大学出版社，纽约，2022年，326页。， isbn 978-0-19-754107-4。
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Pub Date : 2023-06-28DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1424
Guillermo Nigro Puente
La discusión sobre pureza del método suele enfatizar el estudio de demostraciones particulares de la práctica matemática. Una crítica a esta posición cuestiona el valor de la pureza al afirmar que el “progreso matemático” depende esencialmente del empleo de métodos impuros. Este artículo muestra que una perspectiva más holística, centrada en cómo las demandas de pureza pueden operar en la construcción de teorías autónomas, permite identificar un contexto donde la pureza del método adquiere valor en la práctica matemática. En particular, se muestra la relevancia de tales demandas en el caso de las teorías algebraicas de números de Kronecker y Dedekind.
{"title":"Pureza del método y construcción de teorías: el caso de Kronecker y Dedekind en teoría algebraica de números","authors":"Guillermo Nigro Puente","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1424","url":null,"abstract":"La discusión sobre pureza del método suele enfatizar el estudio de demostraciones particulares de la práctica matemática. Una crítica a esta posición cuestiona el valor de la pureza al afirmar que el “progreso matemático” depende esencialmente del empleo de métodos impuros. Este artículo muestra que una perspectiva más holística, centrada en cómo las demandas de pureza pueden operar en la construcción de teorías autónomas, permite identificar un contexto donde la pureza del método adquiere valor en la práctica matemática. En particular, se muestra la relevancia de tales demandas en el caso de las teorías algebraicas de números de Kronecker y Dedekind.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128513904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-28DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1422
Miguel Álvarez Lisboa
In this essay I propose two theories of truth and show how they deal with semantic paradoxes. Their most salient feature is that they are based on a gametheoretic understanding of logic and meaning. “Truth”, therefore, is understood dialogically, as agreement between parts. I compare this proposal with a similar one already existing in the literature —Dutilh Novaes and French 2018—, and highlight the advantages of mine. The theories of truth I present are non-trivial, substructural (in a sense to be clarified) and capture strong intuitions about truth. Some philosophical recommendations in favor of our understanding of Dialogics are delivered along the way.
在这篇文章中，我提出了两种真理理论，并展示了它们是如何处理语义悖论的。它们最显著的特点是基于对逻辑和意义的博弈论理解。“真理”，因此，被理解为对话，作为部分之间的协议。我将此提案与文献中已经存在的类似提案(dutilh Novaes and French 2018)进行了比较，并强调了我的优势。我所提出的真理理论是非平凡的、次结构的(在某种意义上有待澄清)，并抓住了关于真理的强烈直觉。在此过程中，我们提出了一些有利于我们理解对话的哲学建议。
{"title":"Outline of a Dialogical Theory of Truth","authors":"Miguel Álvarez Lisboa","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1422","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay I propose two theories of truth and show how they deal with semantic paradoxes. Their most salient feature is that they are based on a gametheoretic understanding of logic and meaning. “Truth”, therefore, is understood dialogically, as agreement between parts. I compare this proposal with a similar one already existing in the literature —Dutilh Novaes and French 2018—, and highlight the advantages of mine. The theories of truth I present are non-trivial, substructural (in a sense to be clarified) and capture strong intuitions about truth. Some philosophical recommendations in favor of our understanding of Dialogics are delivered along the way.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123994542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fernando Broncano, Racionalidad, acción y opacidad. Sujetos vulnerables en tierras libres","authors":"Nora Stigol","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1429","url":null,"abstract":"Fernando Broncano, Racionalidad, acción y opacidad. Sujetos vulnerables en tierras libres, EUDEBA/SADAF, 2017, 198pp., ISBN 978–950–23–2805–8.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123155734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-12DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1406
Olive Marshall
Extensive Magnitudes: Metaphysics, Representation and Epistemology
广义量:形而上学、表象与认识论
{"title":"Extensive Magnitudes: Metaphysics, Representation and Epistemology","authors":"Olive Marshall","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1406","url":null,"abstract":"Extensive Magnitudes: Metaphysics, Representation and Epistemology","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"433 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125762519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-12DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1407
Geoffrey Lee
In recent work, Christopher Peacocke has argued for a kind of realism (or anti-reductionism) about magnitudes such as temperature and spatial distance. Peacocke’s argument is that magnitudes are an ineliminable commitment of scientific and everyday explanations (including high-level explanations), and that they are the natural candidates for semantic values of our ordinary magnitude talk, and for contents of our mental states. I critique these arguments, in particular focusing on whether the realist has a satisfactory account of how high-level magnitude facts are grounded in lower-level facts. I argue that a less realist (i.e., more reductionist approach) is preferable, or at least viable. I also aim to substantially clarify what is at stake in the debate.
{"title":"Against Magnitude Realism","authors":"Geoffrey Lee","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1407","url":null,"abstract":"In recent work, Christopher Peacocke has argued for a kind of realism (or anti-reductionism) about magnitudes such as temperature and spatial distance. Peacocke’s argument is that magnitudes are an ineliminable commitment of scientific and everyday explanations (including high-level explanations), and that they are the natural candidates for semantic values of our ordinary magnitude talk, and for contents of our mental states. I critique these arguments, in particular focusing on whether the realist has a satisfactory account of how high-level magnitude facts are grounded in lower-level facts. I argue that a less realist (i.e., more reductionist approach) is preferable, or at least viable. I also aim to substantially clarify what is at stake in the debate.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"477 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128864280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-12DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1411
Corey J. Maley
Analog representations come in different types. One distinction is between those representations that have parts that are themselves representations and those that do not (i.e., those for which the Parts Principle is true and those for which it is not). I offer a unified account of analog representation, showing what all types have in common. This account clarifies when the Parts Principle applies and when it does not, thereby illuminating why the Parts Principle is less interesting than one might have thought. Understanding analog representation instead requires understanding the kinds of magnitudes used in a particular representation, and the kinds of variation possible within a representational scheme.
{"title":"Icons, Magnitudes, and Their Parts","authors":"Corey J. Maley","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1411","url":null,"abstract":"Analog representations come in different types. One distinction is between those representations that have parts that are themselves representations and those that do not (i.e., those for which the Parts Principle is true and those for which it is not). I offer a unified account of analog representation, showing what all types have in common. This account clarifies when the Parts Principle applies and when it does not, thereby illuminating why the Parts Principle is less interesting than one might have thought. Understanding analog representation instead requires understanding the kinds of magnitudes used in a particular representation, and the kinds of variation possible within a representational scheme.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"19 44","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132747555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-12DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1408
Zee R. Perry
I present an argument against the view that the additivity of mass (i.e., the property according to which a composite object’s mass is the “sum” of its parts’) is metaphysically independent of dynamical laws governing massive bodies. In particular, taking additivity to be independent of dynamics commits you to widespread unexplained correlations between the mass properties of composites and the dynamic behavior of massive bodies. The second half of the paper extends this explanatory worry, showing that the very same considerations apply to aspects of mass’s quantitative structure. This gives rise to a new and powerful objection to certain influential theories about the fundamental structure of physical quantities —most notably the magnitude realism of Peacocke (2019) and the second-order absolutist accounts defended by Mundy (1987) and Eddon (2013b).
{"title":"Explanatory Problems for Mass Additivity and Dynamics","authors":"Zee R. Perry","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1408","url":null,"abstract":"I present an argument against the view that the additivity of mass (i.e., the property according to which a composite object’s mass is the “sum” of its parts’) is metaphysically independent of dynamical laws governing massive bodies. In particular, taking additivity to be independent of dynamics commits you to widespread unexplained correlations between the mass properties of composites and the dynamic behavior of massive bodies. The second half of the paper extends this explanatory worry, showing that the very same considerations apply to aspects of mass’s quantitative structure. This gives rise to a new and powerful objection to certain influential theories about the fundamental structure of physical quantities —most notably the magnitude realism of Peacocke (2019) and the second-order absolutist accounts defended by Mundy (1987) and Eddon (2013b).","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121438773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-12DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1410
Jacob Beck
Building on Christopher Peacocke’s account of analog perceptual content and my own account of analog perceptual vehicles, I defend three claims: that the perception of magnitudes often has analog contents; that the perception of magnitudes often has analog vehicles; and that the first claim is true in virtue of the second —that is, the analog vehicles help to ground the analog contents.
{"title":"Contents and Vehicles in Analog Perception","authors":"Jacob Beck","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1410","url":null,"abstract":"Building on Christopher Peacocke’s account of analog perceptual content and my own account of analog perceptual vehicles, I defend three claims: that the perception of magnitudes often has analog contents; that the perception of magnitudes often has analog vehicles; and that the first claim is true in virtue of the second —that is, the analog vehicles help to ground the analog contents.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126941615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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