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Do Auditors Respond to Clients’ Climate Change-related External Risks? Evidence from Audit Fees 审计师是否应对客户的气候变化相关外部风险?来自审计费用的证据
IF 3.3 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2022-11-15 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2141811
Sven Hartlieb, B. Eierle
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引用次数: 3
Family Ownership and Impression Management: An Integrated Approach 家族所有权与印象管理:一种综合方法
IF 3.3 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2022-11-14 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2141287
Saverio Bozzolan, Claudia Imperatore, Marco Mattei

ABSTRACT

According to agency theory, impression management is lower in family-owned firms because of reduced agency I conflicts. However, when family owners are present, agency I conflicts are superseded by agency II conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders, leading to a positive association between impression management and family ownership. Moreover, family owners have distinct goals related to the preservation of socioemotional wealth (SEW) that may influence agency conflicts. We formalize these countervailing forces by developing an integrated theoretical framework that considers both agency I and agency II conflicts and how they interact with SEW-related motives. We hypothesize that the coexistence of agency I and agency II conflicts in family-owned firms leads to a U-shaped association between family ownership and impression management. We also expect that this U-shaped association is flatter when family influence on the board is stronger and SEW motives shape more corporate choices. We test our predictions by analyzing the letters to shareholders of 77 Italian-listed firms from 2008 to 2015. The results confirm our expectations and hold when we use instrumental variable estimation, alternative proxies to capture SEW motives, and impression management measures.

摘要根据代理理论,家族企业的印象管理水平较低是因为代理冲突较少。然而,当家族所有者在场时,代理I冲突被控股股东和小股东之间的代理II冲突所取代,从而导致印象管理与家族所有权之间的正相关。此外,家族所有者在保存社会情感财富(SEW)方面有不同的目标,这可能会影响代理冲突。我们通过开发一个综合的理论框架来形式化这些抵消力量,该框架考虑了代理I和代理II的冲突以及它们如何与sew相关动机相互作用。我们假设家族企业中代理一和代理二冲突的共存导致家族所有权与印象管理之间呈u型关系。我们还预计,当家族对董事会的影响更大,SEW动机影响更多的公司选择时,这种u形关联更平坦。我们通过分析2008年至2015年77家意大利上市公司致股东的信件来检验我们的预测。当我们使用工具变量估计、替代代理来捕捉SEW动机和印象管理措施时,结果证实了我们的期望。
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引用次数: 0
Accruals Quality, Shocks to Macro-uncertainty, and Investor Response to Earnings News 应计质量,对宏观不确定性的冲击,以及投资者对收益新闻的反应
IF 3.3 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2022-11-14 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2141288
Carlo D’Augusta, A. Prencipe
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引用次数: 0
The Effect of Geographic Diversity on Managerial Earnings Forecasts 地域多样性对管理层盈余预测的影响
IF 3.3 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2022-11-04 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2139738
B. Godigbe, Jared N. Jennings, Hojun Seo, Lloyd Tanlu
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引用次数: 0
Product Recalls and Audit Production 产品召回和审核生产
IF 3.3 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2022-10-20 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2130953
Kevin H. Kim, Jonathan Nash, Jongha Park
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引用次数: 0
Does Disaster Risk Relate to Banks’ Loan Loss Provisions? 灾害风险与银行贷款损失拨备有关吗?
IF 3.3 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2022-10-14 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2120513
Lorenzo Dal Maso, K. Kanagaretnam, Gerald J. Lobo, Francesco Mazzi
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引用次数: 4
Optimal Revision Rules of Cost-Based Transfer Prices in a Multi-Period Production Setting 多周期生产环境下基于成本的转移价格最优修正规则
IF 3.3 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2022-09-28 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2125420
M. Brunner, Peter Schäfer
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引用次数: 0
When Investors Can Talk to Firms, Is It a Meaningful Conversation? Evidence from Investor Postings on Interactive Platforms 当投资者可以与公司对话时,这是一次有意义的对话吗?来自投资者在互动平台上发帖的证据
IF 3.3 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2022-09-28 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2118147
Shijun Guo, Xin Yu, Robert Faff
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引用次数: 4
Cost Stickiness and Stock Price Delay 成本粘性与股价延迟
IF 3.3 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2022-09-28 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2121739
Nishant Agarwal

ABSTRACT

This study examines the effect of cost stickiness on stock price delay. Using a sample of U.S. firms in the period of 1984–2019, I find that the stickiness of Selling, General, and Administrative (SG&A) costs is positively associated with stock price delay. This finding is consistent with the notion that cost stickiness reduces the quality of information available to investors and causes stock price delay (the direct channel). Using a mediation test, I document that cost stickiness reduces the analyst following of the firm, thus increasing stock price delay (the indirect channel). Cross-sectional analyses reveal that the effect of cost stickiness on stock price delay is prominent in firms characterized ex-ante by a relatively poor information environment. Meanwhile, the effect is weak for firms with managers who use less uncertain and more positive words in Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) disclosures within 10-K filings. This study contributes to the growing literature on cost behavior by documenting the adverse consequences of managers’ cost decisions on the capital market and the role of the information environment in mitigating these negative implications.

摘要本研究探讨成本黏性对股价延迟的影响。使用1984-2019年期间的美国公司样本,我发现销售、一般和行政(SG& a)成本的粘性与股价延迟呈正相关。这一发现与成本粘性降低投资者可获得的信息质量并导致股价延迟(直接渠道)的概念是一致的。通过中介检验,我证明了成本粘性降低了分析师对公司的追随,从而增加了股价延迟(间接渠道)。横断面分析表明,成本粘性对股票价格延迟的影响在事前信息环境相对较差的公司中表现突出。与此同时,对于那些在10-K文件中的管理讨论和分析(MD&A)披露中使用较少不确定性和更多积极词汇的经理人的公司,这种影响较弱。本研究通过记录管理者成本决策对资本市场的不利影响以及信息环境在减轻这些负面影响方面的作用,为成本行为的文献增长做出了贡献。
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引用次数: 0
When do Governments ‘Go Dark'? Evidence on Governments’ Disclosure Choices in Periods of Uncertainty 政府什么时候“黑暗”?不确定时期政府信息披露选择的实证研究
IF 3.3 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2022-09-14 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2118146
C. Columbano, Marco Trombetta
ABSTRACT We examine the effect of uncertainty shocks on the level of fiscal guidance – the guidance issued by governments on the expected evolution of the fiscal and economic outlook. Because uncertainty makes governments’ expectations less precise but potentially more valuable to users, we hypothesize that a disclosure dilemma leads governments to balance a higher demand for guidance with a higher probability of issuing inaccurate forecasts. Using natural disasters to randomize uncertainty shocks in our sample, we find that on average, governments issue less guidance in periods of uncertainty. The effect is driven by a reduction in the number of forecasts on the future evolution of balance sheet items, but only when governments have low refinancing needs and face a relatively quiet bond market. Instead, governments that maintain a stable level of guidance in periods of uncertainty appear to cater to coercive isomorphic pressures stemming from creditors. We further document that the relative ‘transparency’ of governments in periods of uncertainty is negatively related to indicators of fiscal reporting quality. Collectively, the evidence indicates that in the public sector, uncertainty leads to a trade-off between disclosure quantity and quality.
摘要本文研究了不确定性冲击对财政指导水平的影响。财政指导是政府对财政和经济前景的预期演变所发布的指导。由于不确定性使政府的预期不那么精确,但对用户来说可能更有价值,我们假设披露困境导致政府在更高的指导需求和更高的发布不准确预测的可能性之间取得平衡。在我们的样本中使用自然灾害随机化不确定性冲击,我们发现平均而言,政府在不确定时期发布的指导较少。这种影响是由对资产负债表项目未来演变的预测数量减少所驱动的,但只有在政府的再融资需求较低、债券市场相对平静的情况下才会出现这种情况。相反,在不确定时期保持稳定指导水平的政府,似乎是在迎合来自债权人的强制性同构压力。我们进一步证明,政府在不确定时期的相对“透明度”与财政报告质量指标呈负相关。总的来说,证据表明,在公共部门,不确定性导致披露数量和质量之间的权衡。
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引用次数: 0
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European Accounting Review
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