Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1017/s0892679423000072
Johanna C. Luttrell
because their actions are not even potentially morally justified. It is not that the Nazis, in planning and carrying out the Holocaust, fought a bad or wrong war. Rather, they did not fight a war against the Jews at all; they committed a genocide. This ethically meaningful distinction is lost if we accept Heuser’s very broad definition of war. This is a variation of the demarcation issue that is a long-standing difficulty in Western just war theory. As Heuser notes, such demarcation questions arise in part because of the fuzzy boundaries that are part and parcel of the long genealogies of thought and practice about war. Because she is primarily concerned with delineating and tracing the movement of those boundaries over time, I understand why she takes a more expansive view of war than many contemporary just war theorists; and it is still an open question as to who is correct regarding this issue. Ultimately, this book serves as both a comprehensive investigation into how cultural narratives surrounding war arose and changed over time in light of practices of war, and an in-depth study of war-related conceptual and normative topics. It will be extraordinarily helpful for readers looking to comprehend how people and groups in the West have thought, and continue to think, about war and how they arrived at those understandings. The deeply appropriate upshot of Heuser’s monumental work is an encouragement to think further and to reflect on how we might change our current cultural narratives and realities surrounding war now that we fully grasp their histories.
{"title":"Making Space for Justice: Social Movements, Collective Imagination, and Political Hope, Michele Moody-Adams (New York: Columbia University Press, 2022), 328 pp., cloth $120, paperback $28, eBook $27.99.","authors":"Johanna C. Luttrell","doi":"10.1017/s0892679423000072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0892679423000072","url":null,"abstract":"because their actions are not even potentially morally justified. It is not that the Nazis, in planning and carrying out the Holocaust, fought a bad or wrong war. Rather, they did not fight a war against the Jews at all; they committed a genocide. This ethically meaningful distinction is lost if we accept Heuser’s very broad definition of war. This is a variation of the demarcation issue that is a long-standing difficulty in Western just war theory. As Heuser notes, such demarcation questions arise in part because of the fuzzy boundaries that are part and parcel of the long genealogies of thought and practice about war. Because she is primarily concerned with delineating and tracing the movement of those boundaries over time, I understand why she takes a more expansive view of war than many contemporary just war theorists; and it is still an open question as to who is correct regarding this issue. Ultimately, this book serves as both a comprehensive investigation into how cultural narratives surrounding war arose and changed over time in light of practices of war, and an in-depth study of war-related conceptual and normative topics. It will be extraordinarily helpful for readers looking to comprehend how people and groups in the West have thought, and continue to think, about war and how they arrived at those understandings. The deeply appropriate upshot of Heuser’s monumental work is an encouragement to think further and to reflect on how we might change our current cultural narratives and realities surrounding war now that we fully grasp their histories.","PeriodicalId":11772,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & International Affairs","volume":"26 1","pages":"102 - 105"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75625808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0892679423000126
Living during the COVID- pandemic, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the global rise of far-right parties, and the escalating climate crisis, among myriad other issues, many people can relate to a sense of anxiety and nervousness on a transnational level. Building on these feelings, David Theo Goldberg explores topics ranging from racial identity to artificial intelligence in his recent book Dread: Facing Futureless Futures. Dread serves as the book’s throughline, and Goldberg defines it in relation to the topic and perspective at hand. For instance, when discussing racial anxieties, Goldberg explicates how dread for those who identify as white is the anxiety they feel at the sense of losing “long-sustaining racial power” (p. ). On the other hand, dread is also felt by those oppressed by that same longsustained racial power. These juxtapositions are what make the book captivating, as Goldberg plays between and through perspectives and power dynamics, with a nod to intersectionality. Those interested in critical theory or who may feel a sense of postmodern dread will find this aspect of the book particularly compelling. While Goldberg begins the book with a discussion on dread, he does not specifically pin down a definition, which allows him to explore the concept as it relates to each topic he addresses in the book. Overall, however, he states that dread can broadly be thought of as a “social logic in which the war on everything is inevitably prompting a proliferating civil war, an internalizing war within and among ourselves” (p. ). Dread goes further than anxiety, as dread operates and acts within our lives yet is external to our wishes, needs, and knowledge. The first topic on Goldberg’s docket is artificial intelligence and the dread that comes with the feeling of constant surveillance. He notes the role of facial recognition, tracking citizens’ locations, and social media surveillance, each of which contributes to a sense of dread. Goldberg then builds on this to redefine and rethink capitalism, specifically referring to contemporary capitalism as “tracking-capitalism.” Not only is there the dread that comes from technology replacing human labor, primarily in manufacturing, but there is also dread that comes from being tracked and from our behavior being sold, often without our understanding of the scope. He then addresses the dread that has come from the pandemic. COVID- has cultivated a widespread sense of dread in part,
{"title":"Dread: Facing Futureless Futures, David Theo Goldberg (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 2021), 244 pp., cloth $64.95, paperback $22.95, eBook $18.","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/S0892679423000126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679423000126","url":null,"abstract":"Living during the COVID- pandemic, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the global rise of far-right parties, and the escalating climate crisis, among myriad other issues, many people can relate to a sense of anxiety and nervousness on a transnational level. Building on these feelings, David Theo Goldberg explores topics ranging from racial identity to artificial intelligence in his recent book Dread: Facing Futureless Futures. Dread serves as the book’s throughline, and Goldberg defines it in relation to the topic and perspective at hand. For instance, when discussing racial anxieties, Goldberg explicates how dread for those who identify as white is the anxiety they feel at the sense of losing “long-sustaining racial power” (p. ). On the other hand, dread is also felt by those oppressed by that same longsustained racial power. These juxtapositions are what make the book captivating, as Goldberg plays between and through perspectives and power dynamics, with a nod to intersectionality. Those interested in critical theory or who may feel a sense of postmodern dread will find this aspect of the book particularly compelling. While Goldberg begins the book with a discussion on dread, he does not specifically pin down a definition, which allows him to explore the concept as it relates to each topic he addresses in the book. Overall, however, he states that dread can broadly be thought of as a “social logic in which the war on everything is inevitably prompting a proliferating civil war, an internalizing war within and among ourselves” (p. ). Dread goes further than anxiety, as dread operates and acts within our lives yet is external to our wishes, needs, and knowledge. The first topic on Goldberg’s docket is artificial intelligence and the dread that comes with the feeling of constant surveillance. He notes the role of facial recognition, tracking citizens’ locations, and social media surveillance, each of which contributes to a sense of dread. Goldberg then builds on this to redefine and rethink capitalism, specifically referring to contemporary capitalism as “tracking-capitalism.” Not only is there the dread that comes from technology replacing human labor, primarily in manufacturing, but there is also dread that comes from being tracked and from our behavior being sold, often without our understanding of the scope. He then addresses the dread that has come from the pandemic. COVID- has cultivated a widespread sense of dread in part,","PeriodicalId":11772,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & International Affairs","volume":"1 1","pages":"107 - 108"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78194846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0892679423000011
Sharon K. Weiner
Abstract Any threat to use nuclear weapons inherently carries the possibility of escalation to a level such that both parties in a conflict, and likely many others, would be destroyed. Yet nuclear weapons are also seen as necessary for securing the very things that would be destroyed if the weapons were ever used. The fix for this nuclear dilemma relies on the strategy of deterrence. Deterrence provides a rationale for why nuclear weapons are necessary, even though they may seem dangerous. But the practice of deterrence involves less intentionality and agency than is usually assumed. The success of deterrence relies partially on luck as well as unrealistic assumptions about human behavior. Rather than a strategic necessity, deterrence may be an institutionalized behavior, accepted because it has always been practiced rather than because it makes sense. Assessing the ethics of deterrence and nuclear weapons requires engaging with these issues.
{"title":"The Ethics of Choosing Deterrence","authors":"Sharon K. Weiner","doi":"10.1017/S0892679423000011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679423000011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Any threat to use nuclear weapons inherently carries the possibility of escalation to a level such that both parties in a conflict, and likely many others, would be destroyed. Yet nuclear weapons are also seen as necessary for securing the very things that would be destroyed if the weapons were ever used. The fix for this nuclear dilemma relies on the strategy of deterrence. Deterrence provides a rationale for why nuclear weapons are necessary, even though they may seem dangerous. But the practice of deterrence involves less intentionality and agency than is usually assumed. The success of deterrence relies partially on luck as well as unrealistic assumptions about human behavior. Rather than a strategic necessity, deterrence may be an institutionalized behavior, accepted because it has always been practiced rather than because it makes sense. Assessing the ethics of deterrence and nuclear weapons requires engaging with these issues.","PeriodicalId":11772,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & International Affairs","volume":"460 1","pages":"29 - 38"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77032271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1017/s0892679423000175
Cécile Fabre
Abstract A normative defense of espionage and counterintelligence activities in the service of foreign policy goals must show at least two things. First, it must show which foreign policy goals, if any, provide a justification for such activities. Second, it must provide an account of the means that intelligence agencies are morally permitted, indeed morally obliged, to use during those activities. I first discuss Ross Bellaby's probing critique of my defense of economic espionage. I then turn to the other four essays, which consider the ethics of the means by which espionage and counterintelligence activities are conducted.
{"title":"Reply to Critics","authors":"Cécile Fabre","doi":"10.1017/s0892679423000175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0892679423000175","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A normative defense of espionage and counterintelligence activities in the service of foreign policy goals must show at least two things. First, it must show which foreign policy goals, if any, provide a justification for such activities. Second, it must provide an account of the means that intelligence agencies are morally permitted, indeed morally obliged, to use during those activities. I first discuss Ross Bellaby's probing critique of my defense of economic espionage. I then turn to the other four essays, which consider the ethics of the means by which espionage and counterintelligence activities are conducted.","PeriodicalId":11772,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & International Affairs","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135001727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-23DOI: 10.1017/S0892679422000296
F. Bender
Abstract What is political about political refugeehood? Theorists have assumed that refugees are special because their specific predicament as those who are persecuted sets them aside from other “necessitous strangers.” Persecution is a special form of wrongful harm that marks the repudiation of a person's political membership and that cannot—contrary to certain other harms—be remedied where they are. It makes asylum necessary as a specific remedial institution. In this article, I argue that this is correct. Yet, the connection between political membership, its repudiation, and persecution is far from clear. Drawing on normative political thought and research on autocracies, repression, and migration studies, I show that it is political oppression that marks the repudiation of political membership and leads to various forms of repression that can equally not be remedied at home. A truly political account moves away from persecution and endorses political oppression as the normative pillar of refugeehood and asylum.
{"title":"What's Political about Political Refugeehood? A Normative Reappraisal","authors":"F. Bender","doi":"10.1017/S0892679422000296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679422000296","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What is political about political refugeehood? Theorists have assumed that refugees are special because their specific predicament as those who are persecuted sets them aside from other “necessitous strangers.” Persecution is a special form of wrongful harm that marks the repudiation of a person's political membership and that cannot—contrary to certain other harms—be remedied where they are. It makes asylum necessary as a specific remedial institution. In this article, I argue that this is correct. Yet, the connection between political membership, its repudiation, and persecution is far from clear. Drawing on normative political thought and research on autocracies, repression, and migration studies, I show that it is political oppression that marks the repudiation of political membership and leads to various forms of repression that can equally not be remedied at home. A truly political account moves away from persecution and endorses political oppression as the normative pillar of refugeehood and asylum.","PeriodicalId":11772,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & International Affairs","volume":"19 1","pages":"353 - 375"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74615943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-12DOI: 10.1017/S0892679422000144
E. Hilberg
Abstract The current debate over the global distribution of COVID-19 vaccines once again highlights the many shortcomings of the modern intellectual property (IP) system, especially when it comes to equitable access to medicines. This essay argues that the (unspoken) conceptual center of struggles over access to new pharmaceuticals rests in the IP system's colonial legacy, which perceives the world as uncharted territory that is ripe for discovery and ownership. This vision of the world as a blank canvas, or terra nullius, sets aside any other models of ownership and devalues other traditional modes of relating to territory and nature. Several examples show the long-lasting exclusionary effects of this hidden legacy of colonial conquest in the field of public health, ranging from the spiraling price of insulin to the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines to the negotiation of sharing mechanisms for virus samples. In all of these cases, the continuing marginalization of other interests by the IP system can lead to exploitation, without either the “sources” of materials, such as those from whom the samples were taken, or the recipients of the eventual product having any say in matters of price and access. This legacy of fundamental exclusion needs to be recognized and addressed in order to arrive at more equitable solutions to public health emergencies such as the current pandemic.
{"title":"The Terra Nullius of Intellectual Property","authors":"E. Hilberg","doi":"10.1017/S0892679422000144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679422000144","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The current debate over the global distribution of COVID-19 vaccines once again highlights the many shortcomings of the modern intellectual property (IP) system, especially when it comes to equitable access to medicines. This essay argues that the (unspoken) conceptual center of struggles over access to new pharmaceuticals rests in the IP system's colonial legacy, which perceives the world as uncharted territory that is ripe for discovery and ownership. This vision of the world as a blank canvas, or terra nullius, sets aside any other models of ownership and devalues other traditional modes of relating to territory and nature. Several examples show the long-lasting exclusionary effects of this hidden legacy of colonial conquest in the field of public health, ranging from the spiraling price of insulin to the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines to the negotiation of sharing mechanisms for virus samples. In all of these cases, the continuing marginalization of other interests by the IP system can lead to exploitation, without either the “sources” of materials, such as those from whom the samples were taken, or the recipients of the eventual product having any say in matters of price and access. This legacy of fundamental exclusion needs to be recognized and addressed in order to arrive at more equitable solutions to public health emergencies such as the current pandemic.","PeriodicalId":11772,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & International Affairs","volume":"19 1","pages":"125 - 134"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76903054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Self-Defense and the Killing of Noncombatants:","authors":"L. Alexander","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv24rgbr1.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv24rgbr1.8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11772,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & International Affairs","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84329064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Moral Standing of States:","authors":"M. Walzer","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv24rgbr1.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv24rgbr1.14","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11772,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & International Affairs","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90310667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-07DOI: 10.1017/S0892679421000666
Yuna Han
Abstract Should Germany be prosecuting crimes committed in Syria pursuant to universal jurisdiction (UJ)? This article revisits the normative questions raised by UJ—the principle that a state can prosecute serious international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed by foreigners outside of its territories—against the backdrop of increasing European UJ proceedings regarding Syrian conflict–related crimes, focusing on Germany as an illustrative example. While existing literature justifies UJ on the basis of universal prohibition of certain atrocities, this creates residual normative issues. Alternatively, this article applies the “two-tiered test” derived from the “dual foundation” thesis of the Eichmann judgment, in which the normative appropriateness of UJ is evaluated against both accounts of universal prohibition and the specific politics surrounding the prosecution. It contends that the large number of Syrian refugees in Germany means that Germany, in particular, should initiate Syrian conflict–related UJ proceedings to prevent continued harm and recognize the political agency of refugees. Ultimately, the article suggests UJ should normatively be thought of as a domestic, rather than international, political event.
{"title":"Should German Courts Prosecute Syrian International Crimes? Revisiting the “Dual Foundation” Thesis","authors":"Yuna Han","doi":"10.1017/S0892679421000666","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679421000666","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Should Germany be prosecuting crimes committed in Syria pursuant to universal jurisdiction (UJ)? This article revisits the normative questions raised by UJ—the principle that a state can prosecute serious international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed by foreigners outside of its territories—against the backdrop of increasing European UJ proceedings regarding Syrian conflict–related crimes, focusing on Germany as an illustrative example. While existing literature justifies UJ on the basis of universal prohibition of certain atrocities, this creates residual normative issues. Alternatively, this article applies the “two-tiered test” derived from the “dual foundation” thesis of the Eichmann judgment, in which the normative appropriateness of UJ is evaluated against both accounts of universal prohibition and the specific politics surrounding the prosecution. It contends that the large number of Syrian refugees in Germany means that Germany, in particular, should initiate Syrian conflict–related UJ proceedings to prevent continued harm and recognize the political agency of refugees. Ultimately, the article suggests UJ should normatively be thought of as a domestic, rather than international, political event.","PeriodicalId":11772,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & International Affairs","volume":"34 1","pages":"37 - 63"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84305890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-31DOI: 10.1017/S0892679421000654
Megan Price
Abstract During the final months of Sri Lanka's 2006–2009 civil war, Sri Lankan armed forces engaged in a disproportionate and indiscriminate shelling campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which culminated in the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians. Conventional wisdom suggests that Sri Lanka undermined international humanitarian law (IHL). Significantly, however, the Sri Lankan government did not directly challenge such law or attempt to justify its departure from it. Rather, it invented a new set of facts about its conduct to sidestep its legal obligations. Though indirect, this challenge was no less significant than had Sri Lanka explicitly rejected those obligations. Drawing on Clark et al.'s concept of denialism, this article details the nature of Sri Lanka's challenge to the standing of IHL. At the core of its denialist move, Sri Lanka maintained that while the LTTE was using civilians as human shields, government forces were adhering to a zero civilian casualty approach. With this claim, Sri Lanka absolved itself of any responsibility for the toll inflicted on civilians and sealed its conduct off from the ambit of IHL. This case illustrates how actors can considerably undermine the law using strategies of contestation far more subtle than direct confrontation.
{"title":"The End Days of the Fourth Eelam War: Sri Lanka's Denialist Challenge to the Laws of War","authors":"Megan Price","doi":"10.1017/S0892679421000654","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679421000654","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract During the final months of Sri Lanka's 2006–2009 civil war, Sri Lankan armed forces engaged in a disproportionate and indiscriminate shelling campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which culminated in the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians. Conventional wisdom suggests that Sri Lanka undermined international humanitarian law (IHL). Significantly, however, the Sri Lankan government did not directly challenge such law or attempt to justify its departure from it. Rather, it invented a new set of facts about its conduct to sidestep its legal obligations. Though indirect, this challenge was no less significant than had Sri Lanka explicitly rejected those obligations. Drawing on Clark et al.'s concept of denialism, this article details the nature of Sri Lanka's challenge to the standing of IHL. At the core of its denialist move, Sri Lanka maintained that while the LTTE was using civilians as human shields, government forces were adhering to a zero civilian casualty approach. With this claim, Sri Lanka absolved itself of any responsibility for the toll inflicted on civilians and sealed its conduct off from the ambit of IHL. This case illustrates how actors can considerably undermine the law using strategies of contestation far more subtle than direct confrontation.","PeriodicalId":11772,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & International Affairs","volume":"88 1","pages":"65 - 89"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81436370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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