Lars Erik Kleiven, Emil Johan Verlo Ifwarsson, L. Sendstad
Globalization drives the need to properly understand policy uncertainty and how it affects both the economy in general and business conditions. To systematically investigate the effect of policy uncertainty on small, open economies, we develop a policy uncertainty index based on newspaper content for each of the three Scandinavian countries; Norway, Denmark and Sweden. We show how these indices capture important historical events, both local events such as referendums and certain general elections, but also global events such as financial crises. Our narrative validation provides evidence that the three indices are good measures of policy uncertainty. Further, we compare historical policy uncertainty in the Scandinavian countries to a similar index for the US, before analysing the effect of both local and US policy uncertainty on the Scandinavian economies. Our findings indicate that increased policy uncertainty both at home and in the US leads to economic contraction, a significant decline in stock markets and a long-lasting reduction in the Scandinavian countries’ Purchasing Managers’ Index. These results can be highly relevant for anyone seeking to predict economic indicators in Scandinavia, or other small, open economies. Similarly, our findings can help to better understand how companies react to changes in policy uncertainty.
{"title":"Policy Uncertainty in the Scandinavian Countries","authors":"Lars Erik Kleiven, Emil Johan Verlo Ifwarsson, L. Sendstad","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3515202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3515202","url":null,"abstract":"Globalization drives the need to properly understand policy uncertainty and how it affects both the economy in general and business conditions. To systematically investigate the effect of policy uncertainty on small, open economies, we develop a policy uncertainty index based on newspaper content for each of the three Scandinavian countries; Norway, Denmark and Sweden. We show how these indices capture important historical events, both local events such as referendums and certain general elections, but also global events such as financial crises. Our narrative validation provides evidence that the three indices are good measures of policy uncertainty. Further, we compare historical policy uncertainty in the Scandinavian countries to a similar index for the US, before analysing the effect of both local and US policy uncertainty on the Scandinavian economies. Our findings indicate that increased policy uncertainty both at home and in the US leads to economic contraction, a significant decline in stock markets and a long-lasting reduction in the Scandinavian countries’ Purchasing Managers’ Index. These results can be highly relevant for anyone seeking to predict economic indicators in Scandinavia, or other small, open economies. Similarly, our findings can help to better understand how companies react to changes in policy uncertainty.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133989878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I exploit a large natural experiment in Australia that saw the House of Representatives expand from 125 districts to 148 districts. This required substantial changes to electoral boundaries, which, for the first time, were determined by a body that was not subject to ministerial discretion. As a result of these changes to electoral boundaries, many postal areas moved from being in relative safe districts to relatively marginal districts. I examine the effect of these exogenous changes to the marginality of postal areas on median and mean incomes in subsequent years. I find no consistent relationship between changes in marginality and incomes in subsequent years. As such, there is no evidence that politicians systematically allocate income-affecting discretionary resources to marginal districts to increase their representation in Parliament, or to safe districts to ‘reward the base’.
{"title":"Marginal Benefits? Electoral Geography and Economic Outcomes","authors":"Chris Wokker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3498694","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3498694","url":null,"abstract":"I exploit a large natural experiment in Australia that saw the House of Representatives expand from 125 districts to 148 districts. This required substantial changes to electoral boundaries, which, for the first time, were determined by a body that was not subject to ministerial discretion. As a result of these changes to electoral boundaries, many postal areas moved from being in relative safe districts to relatively marginal districts. I examine the effect of these exogenous changes to the marginality of postal areas on median and mean incomes in subsequent years. I find no consistent relationship between changes in marginality and incomes in subsequent years. As such, there is no evidence that politicians systematically allocate income-affecting discretionary resources to marginal districts to increase their representation in Parliament, or to safe districts to ‘reward the base’.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"125 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123482034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I develop a model of party formation in which politicians share their political rents with party leaders in exchange for accessing parties' club goods. Bigger parties provide greater club goods but tax politicians’ rents more upon entry. Therefore, politicians with more assets prefer smaller parties. I estimate my model for Turkey with a dataset of all listed politicians between 1995 and 2014. I find that the right-wing parties accumulate club goods more easily than they produce rents, which leads to ever stronger party control. Counterfactual exercises provide a novel explanation for the differences in party-size distributions across political systems.
{"title":"Choosing Your Pond: A Structural Model of Political Power Sharing","authors":"Selcen Çakır","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3467761","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3467761","url":null,"abstract":"I develop a model of party formation in which politicians share their political rents with party leaders in exchange for accessing parties' club goods. Bigger parties provide greater club goods but tax politicians’ rents more upon entry. Therefore, politicians with more assets prefer smaller parties. I estimate my model for Turkey with a dataset of all listed politicians between 1995 and 2014. I find that the right-wing parties accumulate club goods more easily than they produce rents, which leads to ever stronger party control. Counterfactual exercises provide a novel explanation for the differences in party-size distributions across political systems. <br>","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131404601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Japanese Abstract: 議会における政党のシャープレイ・シュービック投票力指数（SSPI）を、その党へ投票した国民の人数で割った値を、一人当たりシャープレイ・シュービック投票力指数（SSPIPP）と定義する。その党に投票した人にとってSSPIPPは、自分が持つ政治への影響力の大きさとみなせる。今回の理論において、SSPIPPを最大化する政党の最適規模を算出し、可決により多くの賛成票を要求する議会ほどこの最適規模のサイズが低下することを証明する。また、この分析に基づき、可決にsupermajorityの賛成を必要とする国は小党分立状態が固定化しやすいことが示唆される。
English Abstract: I define Shapley-Shubik Power Index per Person (SSPIPP) as the ratio of a political party's Shapley-Shubik Power Index in a parliament to the number of people who voted for the party. SSPIPP can be regarded as the political power each of them has. I calculate the optimal size of a political party that maximizes SSPIPP, and it shows that the more approval votes a parliament requires to pass bills, the smaller the optimal party size becomes. It also shows that in countries that require supermajority approval vote to pass bills, party system fragmentation tends to become permanent.
如何abstract:将议会中政党的夏普夏普投票能力指数(SSPI)除以投票给该党的国民人数，得到的值被定义为人均夏普夏普投票能力指数(SSPIPP)。对投了那个党的人来说，SSPIPP是对自己政治的巨大影响力。在这个理论中，我们计算了政党的最优规模以使SSPIPP最大化，证明了要求更多赞成票通过的议会的最优规模的大小越小。根据这一分析，需要supermajority的赞成才能通过的国家更容易形成小党分立的局面。english abstract:I define shaply - shubik Power Index per Person (SSPIPP) as the ratio of a political party'sshaply - shubik Power Index in a parliament to the number of people who voted for the party. SSPIPPcan be regarded as the political power each of them has. I calculate the optimal size of a politicalparty that maximizes SSPIPP，and it shows that the more approval votes a parliament requires to pass bills，the smaller the optimal party size becomes. It also shows that in countries that requiresupermajority approval vote to pass bills, party system fragmentation tends to become permanent。
{"title":"シャープレイ・シュービック投票力指数に基づく政党の最適規模 (The Optimal Size of a Political Party Based on the Shapley-Shubik Power Index)","authors":"Yuuki Maruyama","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3466332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3466332","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Japanese Abstract:</b> 議会における政党のシャープレイ・シュービック投票力指数（SSPI）を、その党へ投票した国民の人数で割った値を、一人当たりシャープレイ・シュービック投票力指数（SSPIPP）と定義する。その党に投票した人にとってSSPIPPは、自分が持つ政治への影響力の大きさとみなせる。今回の理論において、SSPIPPを最大化する政党の最適規模を算出し、可決により多くの賛成票を要求する議会ほどこの最適規模のサイズが低下することを証明する。また、この分析に基づき、可決にsupermajorityの賛成を必要とする国は小党分立状態が固定化しやすいことが示唆される。<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> I define Shapley-Shubik Power Index per Person (SSPIPP) as the ratio of a political party's Shapley-Shubik Power Index in a parliament to the number of people who voted for the party. SSPIPP can be regarded as the political power each of them has. I calculate the optimal size of a political party that maximizes SSPIPP, and it shows that the more approval votes a parliament requires to pass bills, the smaller the optimal party size becomes. It also shows that in countries that require supermajority approval vote to pass bills, party system fragmentation tends to become permanent.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126340669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Voters would be better off if they removed politicians offering low-quality government by pursuing populist policies and re-elected those who improved government quality with sustainable policies. In many political contexts, including those with free and fair elections, voters do the opposite. Low social trust can account for this paradox: voters must act collectively to shape political incentives, but low trust among voters is an obstacle to collective action. If every voter believes that fellow voters will accept particularistic benefits from poorly performing governments that keep them from voting against those governments, no voter has an incentive to select politicians who promise high-quality government. By the same logic, low social trust prevents voters from sanctioning politicians who renege on their promises. Frequent reneging on campaign promises, in turn, leads voters to hold low political trust. Low quality government, and in particular populism, emerge as optimal electoral strategies of political candidates in this environment. We analyze new survey data from 5,800 respondents in seven Latin American countries that provides support for a novel argument about populism and the quality of government: voters who express low trust are significantly more likely to prefer populist policies that reflect a low quality of government.
{"title":"Social Trust and Electoral Populism: Explaining the Quality of Government","authors":"Philip Keefer, Carlos Scartascini, Razvan Vlaicu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3460914","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3460914","url":null,"abstract":"Voters would be better off if they removed politicians offering low-quality government by pursuing populist policies and re-elected those who improved government quality with sustainable policies. In many political contexts, including those with free and fair elections, voters do the opposite. Low social trust can account for this paradox: voters must act collectively to shape political incentives, but low trust among voters is an obstacle to collective action. If every voter believes that fellow voters will accept particularistic benefits from poorly performing governments that keep them from voting against those governments, no voter has an incentive to select politicians who promise high-quality government. By the same logic, low social trust prevents voters from sanctioning politicians who renege on their promises. Frequent reneging on campaign promises, in turn, leads voters to hold low political trust. Low quality government, and in particular populism, emerge as optimal electoral strategies of political candidates in this environment. We analyze new survey data from 5,800 respondents in seven Latin American countries that provides support for a novel argument about populism and the quality of government: voters who express low trust are significantly more likely to prefer populist policies that reflect a low quality of government.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"490 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115300794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Are ordinary citizens or political party leaders better positioned to select candidates? While the American primary system lets citizens choose, most democracies rely instead on party officials to appoint or nominate candidates. The consequences of these distinct design choices are unclear: while officials are often better informed about candidate qualifications, they may value traits, like party loyalty or willingness to pay for the nomination, at odds with identifying the best performer. We partnered with both major political parties in Sierra Leone to experimentally vary how much say voters have in selecting Parliamentary candidates. Estimates suggest that more democratic procedures increase the likelihood that parties select voters’ most preferred candidates and favor candidates with stronger records of public goods provision. (JEL D72, H41, O17)
{"title":"An Experiment in Candidate Selection","authors":"K. Casey, A. B. Kamara, N. Meriggi","doi":"10.3386/w26160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26160","url":null,"abstract":"Are ordinary citizens or political party leaders better positioned to select candidates? While the American primary system lets citizens choose, most democracies rely instead on party officials to appoint or nominate candidates. The consequences of these distinct design choices are unclear: while officials are often better informed about candidate qualifications, they may value traits, like party loyalty or willingness to pay for the nomination, at odds with identifying the best performer. We partnered with both major political parties in Sierra Leone to experimentally vary how much say voters have in selecting Parliamentary candidates. Estimates suggest that more democratic procedures increase the likelihood that parties select voters’ most preferred candidates and favor candidates with stronger records of public goods provision. (JEL D72, H41, O17)","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128865462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We consider the implementation problem with at least three agents. We study double implementability of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibria and undominated Nash equilibria. We prove that “DZ-invariance,” “weak no-veto-power,” and “unanimity” together are sufficient for double implementability. If there is at least one partially honest agent in the sense of Dutta and Sen (2012) , then weak no-veto-power and unanimity together are sufficient for double implementability. If there are at least two partially honest agents, then unanimity is sufficient for double implementability. In addition, we show that if there is at least one partially honest agent and unanimity is satisfied, then “LY-condition” is necessary and sufficient for double implementability. From these results, we obtain several positive corollaries.
{"title":"Double Implementation without No-Veto-Power","authors":"Makoto Hagiwara","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3423931","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3423931","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We consider the implementation problem with at least three agents. We study double implementability of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibria and undominated Nash equilibria. We prove that “DZ-invariance,” “weak no-veto-power,” and “unanimity” together are sufficient for double implementability. If there is at least one partially honest agent in the sense of Dutta and Sen (2012) , then weak no-veto-power and unanimity together are sufficient for double implementability. If there are at least two partially honest agents, then unanimity is sufficient for double implementability. In addition, we show that if there is at least one partially honest agent and unanimity is satisfied, then “LY-condition” is necessary and sufficient for double implementability. From these results, we obtain several positive corollaries.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134415748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the effects of economic distress on support for radical right parties. Using Swedish election data, I show that layoff notices among low-skilled native-born workers account for 31 percent of the increased vote share for the Swedish radical right party the Sweden Democrats. The effect of layoff notices on support for the Sweden Democrats is larger in areas with a high share of low-skilled immigrants, and in areas with a low share of high-skilled immigrants. These findings are in line with theories suggesting that voters attribute their impaired economic status to immigration, due to labor market concerns. In addition, I use individual-level survey data to show that self-reported unemployment risk is positively associated with voting for the Sweden Democrats among low-skilled respondents while the opposite is true for high-skilled respondents, echoing the aggregate-level findings.
{"title":"Economic Distress and Support for Radical Right Parties - Evidence from Sweden","authors":"Sirus H. Dehdari","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3160480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3160480","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the effects of economic distress on support for radical right parties. Using Swedish election data, I show that layoff notices among low-skilled native-born workers account for 31 percent of the increased vote share for the Swedish radical right party the Sweden Democrats. The effect of layoff notices on support for the Sweden Democrats is larger in areas with a high share of low-skilled immigrants, and in areas with a low share of high-skilled immigrants. These findings are in line with theories suggesting that voters attribute their impaired economic status to immigration, due to labor market concerns. In addition, I use individual-level survey data to show that self-reported unemployment risk is positively associated with voting for the Sweden Democrats among low-skilled respondents while the opposite is true for high-skilled respondents, echoing the aggregate-level findings.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134523623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze how proxy advisors, which sell voting recommendations to shareholders, affect corporate decision‐making. If the quality of the advisor's information is low, there is overreliance on its recommendations and insufficient private information production. In contrast, if the advisor's information is precise, it may be underused because the advisor rations its recommendations to maximize profits. Overall, the advisor's presence leads to more informative voting only if its information is sufficiently precise. We evaluate several proposals on regulating proxy advisors and show that some suggested policies, such as reducing proxy advisors' market power or decreasing litigation pressure, can have negative effects.
{"title":"Proxy Advisory Firms: The Economics of Selling Information to Voters","authors":"A. Malenko, Nadya Malenko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2757597","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2757597","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze how proxy advisors, which sell voting recommendations to shareholders, affect corporate decision‐making. If the quality of the advisor's information is low, there is overreliance on its recommendations and insufficient private information production. In contrast, if the advisor's information is precise, it may be underused because the advisor rations its recommendations to maximize profits. Overall, the advisor's presence leads to more informative voting only if its information is sufficiently precise. We evaluate several proposals on regulating proxy advisors and show that some suggested policies, such as reducing proxy advisors' market power or decreasing litigation pressure, can have negative effects.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129890523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economic analysis is essential to the understanding of the rise and fall of populism. The conceptual and analytical framework of economics to the study of populism is still in its infancy, but great advances have been made in recent years. This paper reviews some key contributions behind this progress. When analyzing populism, economists face two methodological hurdles: lack of consensus and clarity about its definition and reconciling the populist vote with voter rationality. The former has plagued sociologists and political scientists for decades. As to the latter, it raises a conundrum: if populist policies are detrimental to economic growth, as most economists agree, the vote for a populist candidate suggests some irrationality or inefficiency in the political markets. But accepting that individuals are irrational when making political decisions, would imply that they are irrational when making economic decisions unless, of course, there is something fundamentally different about political markets. The works reviewed in this paper propose alternative approaches to address these issues. The most promising line of research in the economic analysis of populism incorporates and expands concepts developed by academics in other social sciences such as political theory, sociology, history and social psychology.
{"title":"The Economic Analysis of Populism. A Selective Review of the Literature","authors":"Emilio Ocampo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3421752","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3421752","url":null,"abstract":"Economic analysis is essential to the understanding of the rise and fall of populism. The conceptual and analytical framework of economics to the study of populism is still in its infancy, but great advances have been made in recent years. This paper reviews some key contributions behind this progress. When analyzing populism, economists face two methodological hurdles: lack of consensus and clarity about its definition and reconciling the populist vote with voter rationality. The former has plagued sociologists and political scientists for decades. As to the latter, it raises a conundrum: if populist policies are detrimental to economic growth, as most economists agree, the vote for a populist candidate suggests some irrationality or inefficiency in the political markets. But accepting that individuals are irrational when making political decisions, would imply that they are irrational when making economic decisions unless, of course, there is something fundamentally different about political markets. The works reviewed in this paper propose alternative approaches to address these issues. The most promising line of research in the economic analysis of populism incorporates and expands concepts developed by academics in other social sciences such as political theory, sociology, history and social psychology.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130789875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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