This paper studies voters' preferences on municipal borders in a setting with cohabiting linguistic communities. It takes advantage of unique data from referendum results in the Canadian province of Quebec in 2004, which allows a direct investigation of voter preferences. I find that differences in income and language affect the likelihood of secession. Notably, I also find that these effects are interdependent, suggesting that the support for a local secession is affected to some degree by out-group aversion. Finally, I find that voters are willing to pay additional taxes to live in their jurisdiction of choice.
{"title":"'Love Thy Neighbour'? The Effect of Income and Language Differences on Votes for Municipal Secessions","authors":"Simon Lapointe","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3163501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3163501","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies voters' preferences on municipal borders in a setting with cohabiting linguistic communities. It takes advantage of unique data from referendum results in the Canadian province of Quebec in 2004, which allows a direct investigation of voter preferences. I find that differences in income and language affect the likelihood of secession. Notably, I also find that these effects are interdependent, suggesting that the support for a local secession is affected to some degree by out-group aversion. Finally, I find that voters are willing to pay additional taxes to live in their jurisdiction of choice.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121914753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper accounts for the effects of the master lever (ML), aka the straight-ticket voting option, on elected US senators from 1960 till 2012. The ML, still present in some states, allows voters to select a specific party for all elections listed on a ballot, as opposed to filling out each office individually. Introducing it leads to an increase in the number of partisan votes, and thus changes the groups of voters targeted by parties and shifts the positions of senatorial candidates. Theoretically, we examine this change in tradeoffs by building a model of pre-election competition. Empirically, we use a triple-difference estimator to account for selection into treatment and find that, controlling for party trends, the ML has led to a right-wing shift of senatorial positions; an effect that is larger for the Republican party. We use the theory to explain how the political climate, as observed in the data, has implied the specific result.
{"title":"One Strike and You're Out: The Effects of the Master Lever on Senators' Positions","authors":"O. Gorelkina, I. Grypari","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2889686","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2889686","url":null,"abstract":"This paper accounts for the effects of the master lever (ML), aka the straight-ticket voting option, on elected US senators from 1960 till 2012. The ML, still present in some states, allows voters to select a specific party for all elections listed on a ballot, as opposed to filling out each office individually. Introducing it leads to an increase in the number of partisan votes, and thus changes the groups of voters targeted by parties and shifts the positions of senatorial candidates. Theoretically, we examine this change in tradeoffs by building a model of pre-election competition. Empirically, we use a triple-difference estimator to account for selection into treatment and find that, controlling for party trends, the ML has led to a right-wing shift of senatorial positions; an effect that is larger for the Republican party. We use the theory to explain how the political climate, as observed in the data, has implied the specific result.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123483249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Some argue that a “good” economy, measured as productivity-enhancing, free market policies, is better than a “just” economy for promoting social harmony. Growth is needed to increase a middle class, but growth may also increase income disparity, creating political instability. We examine this conundrum by estimating the effects of income inequality among individuals (vertical) and political inequality among groups (horizontal) on a measure of political repression. Our results show consistently that economic freedom lowers political repression, an effect that is robust to several tests of causality, including instrumental variables techniques. Comparatively, the effects of both forms of inequality are poor predictors of political repression, their effects are substantively small and not robust to specification and estimating techniques. It seems that people might be less sensitive to inequality when they feel that processes are fair and that they expect their turn to arrive even if they see others moving ahead, the so-called “tunnel effect” identified by Albert Hirschman. Our results do not support the view that economic freedom and free market capitalism drive the dissent-repression nexus as many critical theories expect. In fact, the opposite is true.
{"title":"Do We Need a Just Economy, or Just a Good One? Inequalities, Economic Freedom and Political Repression, 1975-2015","authors":"Indra de Soysa, K. Vadlamannati","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3138747","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3138747","url":null,"abstract":"Some argue that a “good” economy, measured as productivity-enhancing, free market policies, is better than a “just” economy for promoting social harmony. Growth is needed to increase a middle class, but growth may also increase income disparity, creating political instability. We examine this conundrum by estimating the effects of income inequality among individuals (vertical) and political inequality among groups (horizontal) on a measure of political repression. Our results show consistently that economic freedom lowers political repression, an effect that is robust to several tests of causality, including instrumental variables techniques. Comparatively, the effects of both forms of inequality are poor predictors of political repression, their effects are substantively small and not robust to specification and estimating techniques. It seems that people might be less sensitive to inequality when they feel that processes are fair and that they expect their turn to arrive even if they see others moving ahead, the so-called “tunnel effect” identified by Albert Hirschman. Our results do not support the view that economic freedom and free market capitalism drive the dissent-repression nexus as many critical theories expect. In fact, the opposite is true.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126600131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I project the near-term future of work to ask whether job losses induced by artificial intelligence will increase the appeal of populist politics. The paper first explains how computers and machine learning automate workplace tasks. Automated tasks help to both create and eliminate jobs and I show why job elimination centres in blue-collar and clerical work—impacts similar to those of manufactured imports and offshored services. I sketch the near-term evolution of three technologies aimed at blue-collar and clerical occupations: autonomous long-distance trucks, automated customer service responses, and industrial robotics. I estimate that in the next 5–7 years, the jobs lost to each of these technologies will be modest but visible. I then outline the structure of populist politics. Populist surges are rare but a populist candidate who pits ‘the people’ (truck drivers, call centre operators, factory operatives) against ‘the elite’ (software developers, etc.) will be mining many of the US regional and education fault lines that were part of the 2016 presidential election.
{"title":"Computers and Populism: Artificial Intelligence, Jobs and Politics in the Near Term","authors":"F. Levy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3091867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3091867","url":null,"abstract":"I project the near-term future of work to ask whether job losses induced by artificial intelligence will increase the appeal of populist politics. The paper first explains how computers and machine learning automate workplace tasks. Automated tasks help to both create and eliminate jobs and I show why job elimination centres in blue-collar and clerical work—impacts similar to those of manufactured imports and offshored services. I sketch the near-term evolution of three technologies aimed at blue-collar and clerical occupations: autonomous long-distance trucks, automated customer service responses, and industrial robotics. I estimate that in the next 5–7 years, the jobs lost to each of these technologies will be modest but visible. I then outline the structure of populist politics. Populist surges are rare but a populist candidate who pits ‘the people’ (truck drivers, call centre operators, factory operatives) against ‘the elite’ (software developers, etc.) will be mining many of the US regional and education fault lines that were part of the 2016 presidential election.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125053436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What explains the shift from the moderate to high inflation rates of the Golden Age of post-war capitalism to the low inflation regime of monetarism in the 1970s and 1980s? Conventional views emphasise the rise of monetarism as a new economic paradigm that convinced policy makers to delegate monetary policy to conservative and independent central banks – a view that comes in many variants, from constructivist to orthodox economics. In contrast to these arguments, we introduce electoral and party politics into the debate. This paper models and examines the shifts in the inflationary preferences of the median voter and their translation into party politics and economic policies. As the median voter accumulates nominal assets against a background of de facto and de jure increasing job security and rising wages, her preferences on macro-economic policies shift from concerns about employment-friendly to inflation-averse policies. Social democratic parties, who are pivotal players in this regard because of their ‘natural’ preference for high employment over low inflation, are thus forced to adopt antiinflation policies as well to remain electorally viable. We show that the employment situation of the average worker improved in every respect during the 1960s and 1970s, that most of the population became inflation averse during the 1970s and 1980s, and that social democratic parties were forced to adopt more economically orthodox party manifestos. We then analyse the shift to a low inflation regime in a series of country case studies.
{"title":"The Politics of Disinflation","authors":"Bob Hancké, Tim Vlandas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3086569","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3086569","url":null,"abstract":"What explains the shift from the moderate to high inflation rates of the Golden Age of post-war capitalism to the low inflation regime of monetarism in the 1970s and 1980s? Conventional views emphasise the rise of monetarism as a new economic paradigm that convinced policy makers to delegate monetary policy to conservative and independent central banks – a view that comes in many variants, from constructivist to orthodox economics. In contrast to these arguments, we introduce electoral and party politics into the debate. This paper models and examines the shifts in the inflationary preferences of the median voter and their translation into party politics and economic policies. As the median voter accumulates nominal assets against a background of de facto and de jure increasing job security and rising wages, her preferences on macro-economic policies shift from concerns about employment-friendly to inflation-averse policies. Social democratic parties, who are pivotal players in this regard because of their ‘natural’ preference for high employment over low inflation, are thus forced to adopt antiinflation policies as well to remain electorally viable. We show that the employment situation of the average worker improved in every respect during the 1960s and 1970s, that most of the population became inflation averse during the 1970s and 1980s, and that social democratic parties were forced to adopt more economically orthodox party manifestos. We then analyse the shift to a low inflation regime in a series of country case studies.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116586874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is a common practice that the National People’s Congress releases law drafts to the society to solicit opinions. Such practice is called open door legislation. Based on cases and interviews, this paper examines whether and how the national legislature takes lawmaking advices from the general public. It finds that the transparency and openness in PRC national lawmaking is selective or strategic. On one hand, in the field of economic affairs and social welfares, the Party state listens to the general public, on the other hand, in more political related issues, the public participation hardly make a real impact.
{"title":"Selective Openness: An Evaluation on Open-Door Legislation in China","authors":"Ying Sun, Xiang Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3117376","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3117376","url":null,"abstract":"It is a common practice that the National People’s Congress releases law drafts to the society to solicit opinions. Such practice is called open door legislation. Based on cases and interviews, this paper examines whether and how the national legislature takes lawmaking advices from the general public. It finds that the transparency and openness in PRC national lawmaking is selective or strategic. On one hand, in the field of economic affairs and social welfares, the Party state listens to the general public, on the other hand, in more political related issues, the public participation hardly make a real impact.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114406488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Measures of U.S. government policy approval, such as U.S. Presidential or Congressional ratings, are strongly related to persistent fluctuations in the dollar exchange rates. Contemporaneous correlations between approval ratings and the dollar value reach 50% against the advanced economy currencies, in real and nominal terms, in levels and multi-year changes. High approval ratings further forecast a decline in the dollar risk premium, a persistent increase in economic growth, and a reduction in future economic volatility several years in the future. We provide an illustrative economic model to interpret our empirical evidence. In the model, policy valuations are forward-looking and reflect net contributions of policy to economic growth. Policy valuations (approvals) increase at times of high policy-related growth and low policy-related uncertainty, which are the times of a strong dollar and low dollar risk premium.
{"title":"Government Policy Approval and Exchange Rates","authors":"Yang Liu, Ivan Shaliastovich","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3090851","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3090851","url":null,"abstract":"Measures of U.S. government policy approval, such as U.S. Presidential or Congressional ratings, are strongly related to persistent fluctuations in the dollar exchange rates. Contemporaneous correlations between approval ratings and the dollar value reach 50% against the advanced economy currencies, in real and nominal terms, in levels and multi-year changes. High approval ratings further forecast a decline in the dollar risk premium, a persistent increase in economic growth, and a reduction in future economic volatility several years in the future. We provide an illustrative economic model to interpret our empirical evidence. In the model, policy valuations are forward-looking and reflect net contributions of policy to economic growth. Policy valuations (approvals) increase at times of high policy-related growth and low policy-related uncertainty, which are the times of a strong dollar and low dollar risk premium.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"72 S103","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120836593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-09-10DOI: 10.17323/2072-8166.2017.2.154.173
Artur Mochalov
Russian Abstract: Для многих современных государств характерна этнотерриториальная фрагментация. Отдельные местности или регионы внутри страны могут быть территориями концентрированного проживания этнических групп, являющихся национальными меньшинствами в масштабе страны в целом. В статье рассматривается вопрос, каким образом этнотерриториальная структура населения может отражаться в конституционном регулировании территориального устройства государства. На основе сравнительно-правовой методологии проводится анализ этнического фактора в конституционно-правовом регулировании территориального устройства стран БРИКС. Цель исследования — показать, что данные страны независимо от их географического положения, конституционного строя или исторического прошлого учитывают этнотерриториальную фрагментацию населения в своем территориальном устройстве, но делают это разными способами и с использованием различных конституционно-правовых форм. В работе дается объяснение выявленным различиям. По мнению автора, государственная территория в данном случае выступает инструментом управления этническом многообразием. Конституция страны может наделять регионы, населенные этническими меньшинствами, особым правовым статусом и закреплять за ними права самоуправления (территориальная аккомодация этнических групп). И наоборот: внутренние границы могут быть проведены таким образом, чтобы ни одно из этнических меньшинств не получало численного доминирования в том или ином регионе. В свою очередь самоуправление на «этнических» территориях также может реализовываться в рамках различных конституционно-правовых форм, основными среди которых являются федерализм, территориальная автономия, а также создание специализированных территорий, пользующихся конституционной защитой. На примере стран БРИКС иллюстрируются различные подходы и способы их реализации. Автор приходит к выводу, что выбор способа территориальной аккомодации этнических групп обусловлен главным образом степенью политических притязаний таких групп в отношении территорий их концентрированного проживания. В то же время наделение «этнических» регионов особым статусом не всегда приводит к углублению этнополитических расколов, а напротив, может способствовать интеграции общества. English Abstract: A large number of modern states are characterized by ethnic-territorial fractionalization. It means that separate regions of a state might be territories of concentration of ethnic groups which constitute a significant part or a local majority of population within these territories but have a position of national minorities within the state as a whole. The article discusses the ways in which the ethnic structure of population is reflected in constitutional-law regulation of territorial structure of a state. The comparative law analysis of the ‘ethnic’ factor in the constitutional rulings concerning territorial structure is represented in the article. The author has studied constitutions of the BRICS countries (Brazil
{"title":"Территориальное Устройство Государства Как Способ Управления Этническим Многообразием (Конституционно-Правовое Регулирование в Странах Брикс) (Territorial Structure of State As a Tool of Ethnic Diversity Management (Constitutional Law Regulation in the BRICS Countries))","authors":"Artur Mochalov","doi":"10.17323/2072-8166.2017.2.154.173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/2072-8166.2017.2.154.173","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> Для многих современных государств характерна этнотерриториальная фрагментация. Отдельные местности или регионы внутри страны могут быть территориями концентрированного проживания этнических групп, являющихся национальными меньшинствами в масштабе страны в целом. В статье рассматривается вопрос, каким образом этнотерриториальная структура населения может отражаться в конституционном регулировании территориального устройства государства. На основе сравнительно-правовой методологии проводится анализ этнического фактора в конституционно-правовом регулировании территориального устройства стран БРИКС. Цель исследования — показать, что данные страны независимо от их географического положения, конституционного строя или исторического прошлого учитывают этнотерриториальную фрагментацию населения в своем территориальном устройстве, но делают это разными способами и с использованием различных конституционно-правовых форм. В работе дается объяснение выявленным различиям. По мнению автора, государственная территория в данном случае выступает инструментом управления этническом многообразием. Конституция страны может наделять регионы, населенные этническими меньшинствами, особым правовым статусом и закреплять за ними права самоуправления (территориальная аккомодация этнических групп). И наоборот: внутренние границы могут быть проведены таким образом, чтобы ни одно из этнических меньшинств не получало численного доминирования в том или ином регионе. В свою очередь самоуправление на «этнических» территориях также может реализовываться в рамках различных конституционно-правовых форм, основными среди которых являются федерализм, территориальная автономия, а также создание специализированных территорий, пользующихся конституционной защитой. На примере стран БРИКС иллюстрируются различные подходы и способы их реализации. Автор приходит к выводу, что выбор способа территориальной аккомодации этнических групп обусловлен главным образом степенью политических притязаний таких групп в отношении территорий их концентрированного проживания. В то же время наделение «этнических» регионов особым статусом не всегда приводит к углублению этнополитических расколов, а напротив, может способствовать интеграции общества. <b>English Abstract:</b> A large number of modern states are characterized by ethnic-territorial fractionalization. It means that separate regions of a state might be territories of concentration of ethnic groups which constitute a significant part or a local majority of population within these territories but have a position of national minorities within the state as a whole. The article discusses the ways in which the ethnic structure of population is reflected in constitutional-law regulation of territorial structure of a state. The comparative law analysis of the ‘ethnic’ factor in the constitutional rulings concerning territorial structure is represented in the article. The author has studied constitutions of the BRICS countries (Brazil","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127302477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we examine whether refugee flows are associated with an increase in electoral support for populist-right parties. The empirical evidence on this so far remains mixed. We argue that refugee inflows alone are an inaccurate predictor of the success of populist-right parties. Rather, refugee inflows can lead to a rise in electoral support for populist-right parties where traditional welfare states are expansive —the so called ‘welfare chauvinism’ argument, wherein natives already dependent on high levels of social welfare are likely to see refugees as interlopers who free-ride on welfare and thereby threaten the welfare of locals. Using panel data on 27 OECD countries during 1990–2014 period (25 years), we find no evidence to suggest that refugee inflows per se increase electoral support for populist-right parties. However, a positive effect of refugee inflows on electoral support for populist-right parties is conditional upon a higher degree of social welfare and unemployment benefit spending, which supports the propositions of 'welfare chauvinism.' Moreover, support for populist-right parties increase when the degree of labor market regulations and welfare spending is high. Our results are robust to alternative data, sample and estimation techniques.
{"title":"Welfare Chauvinism? Refugee Flows and Electoral Support for Populist-Right Parties in Industrial Democracies","authors":"K. Vadlamannati, G. Kelly","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3034518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3034518","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we examine whether refugee flows are associated with an increase in electoral support for populist-right parties. The empirical evidence on this so far remains mixed. We argue that refugee inflows alone are an inaccurate predictor of the success of populist-right parties. Rather, refugee inflows can lead to a rise in electoral support for populist-right parties where traditional welfare states are expansive —the so called ‘welfare chauvinism’ argument, wherein natives already dependent on high levels of social welfare are likely to see refugees as interlopers who free-ride on welfare and thereby threaten the welfare of locals. Using panel data on 27 OECD countries during 1990–2014 period (25 years), we find no evidence to suggest that refugee inflows per se increase electoral support for populist-right parties. However, a positive effect of refugee inflows on electoral support for populist-right parties is conditional upon a higher degree of social welfare and unemployment benefit spending, which supports the propositions of 'welfare chauvinism.' Moreover, support for populist-right parties increase when the degree of labor market regulations and welfare spending is high. Our results are robust to alternative data, sample and estimation techniques.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134496354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Psychologists have long documented that we over-attribute people's actions to innate characteristics, rather than to luck or circumstances. Similarly, economists have found that both politicians and businessmen are rewarded for luck. In this paper, we introduce this "Fundamental Attribution Error" into two benchmark political economy models. In both models, voter irrationality can improve politicians' behavior, because voters attribute good behavior to fixed attributes that merit reelection. This upside of irrationality is countered by suboptimal leader selection, including electing leaders who emphasize objectives that are beyond their control. The error has particularly adverse consequences for institutional choice, where it generates too little demand for a free press, too much demand for dictatorship, and responding to endemic corruption by electing new supposedly honest leaders, instead of investing in institutional reform.
{"title":"Fundamental Errors in the Voting Booth","authors":"E. Glaeser, G. Ponzetto","doi":"10.3386/w23683","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w23683","url":null,"abstract":"Psychologists have long documented that we over-attribute people's actions to innate characteristics, rather than to luck or circumstances. Similarly, economists have found that both politicians and businessmen are rewarded for luck. In this paper, we introduce this \"Fundamental Attribution Error\" into two benchmark political economy models. In both models, voter irrationality can improve politicians' behavior, because voters attribute good behavior to fixed attributes that merit reelection. This upside of irrationality is countered by suboptimal leader selection, including electing leaders who emphasize objectives that are beyond their control. The error has particularly adverse consequences for institutional choice, where it generates too little demand for a free press, too much demand for dictatorship, and responding to endemic corruption by electing new supposedly honest leaders, instead of investing in institutional reform.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"174 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123473645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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