This paper investigates the determinants of political polarization, a phenomenon of increasing relevance in Western democracies. How much of polarization is driven by divergence in the ideologies of politicians? How much is instead the result of changes in the capacity of parties to control their members? We use detailed internal information on party discipline in the context of the U.S. Congress—whip count data for 1977–1986—to identify and structurally estimate an economic model of legislative activity in which agenda selection, party discipline, and member votes are endogenous. The model delivers estimates of the ideological preferences of politicians, the extent of party control, and allows us to assess the effects of polarization through agenda setting (i.e., which alternatives to a status quo are strategically pursued). We find that parties account for approximately 40% of the political polarization in legislative voting over this time period, a critical inflection point in U.S. polarization. We also show that, absent party control, historically significant economic policies would have not passed or lost substantial support. Counterfactual exercises establish that party control is highly relevant for the probability of success of a given bill and that polarization in ideological preferences is more consequential for policy selection, resulting in different bills being pursued.
{"title":"Unbundling Polarization","authors":"N. Canen, Chad Kendall, Francesco Trebbi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3253592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3253592","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the determinants of political polarization, a phenomenon of increasing relevance in Western democracies. How much of polarization is driven by divergence in the ideologies of politicians? How much is instead the result of changes in the capacity of parties to control their members? We use detailed internal information on party discipline in the context of the U.S. Congress—whip count data for 1977–1986—to identify and structurally estimate an economic model of legislative activity in which agenda selection, party discipline, and member votes are endogenous. The model delivers estimates of the ideological preferences of politicians, the extent of party control, and allows us to assess the effects of polarization through agenda setting (i.e., which alternatives to a status quo are strategically pursued). We find that parties account for approximately 40% of the political polarization in legislative voting over this time period, a critical inflection point in U.S. polarization. We also show that, absent party control, historically significant economic policies would have not passed or lost substantial support. Counterfactual exercises establish that party control is highly relevant for the probability of success of a given bill and that polarization in ideological preferences is more consequential for policy selection, resulting in different bills being pursued.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121503897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the United States, the legitimacy of presidents who do not obtain a majority of the popular vote is often questioned. Debates on electoral legitimacy tend to revolve around the relative importance of the Electoral College and the popular vote. We develop a theory of electoral legitimacy judgments when legitimacy depends on these two factors. Under natural restrictions on these judgments, the legitimacy of some candidates can be unambiguously compared. In particular, we show that D. Trump’s election was more legitimate than G.W. Bush’s 2000 election. We also show that Trump’s election remains one of the most contentious in history.
{"title":"Trump Trumps Bush: Electoral Legitimacy in U.S. Presidential Elections","authors":"Rafael Treibich, Martin Van der Linden","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3058183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3058183","url":null,"abstract":"In the United States, the legitimacy of presidents who do not obtain a majority of the popular vote is often questioned. Debates on electoral legitimacy tend to revolve around the relative importance of the Electoral College and the popular vote. We develop a theory of electoral legitimacy judgments when legitimacy depends on these two factors. Under natural restrictions on these judgments, the legitimacy of some candidates can be unambiguously compared. In particular, we show that D. Trump’s election was more legitimate than G.W. Bush’s 2000 election. We also show that Trump’s election remains one of the most contentious in history.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"445 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132819668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J. Gerring, A. Hicken, Daniela Weitzel, L. Cojocaru
The study of electoral contestation generally focuses on districts or regions rather than polities. We present a new dataset that measures electoral contestation through historical records of elections in sovereign and semi-sovereign polities throughout the world from 1789 to the present. We also offer a new index of contestation intended to capture multiple dimensions of this complex concept. Our second objective is to explain variation across polities and through time in electoral contestation. We argue that the degree of contestation in a polity is affected by demography, with larger polities fostering greater electoral contestation. This hypothesis is tested with a series of cross-national regression tests that employ a variety of specifications and estimators – crosssectional, fixed-effect, and instrumental variable. We find a robust association between population and contestation extending throughout the modern era.
{"title":"Electoral Contestation: A Comprehensive Polity-Level Analysis","authors":"J. Gerring, A. Hicken, Daniela Weitzel, L. Cojocaru","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3230670","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3230670","url":null,"abstract":"The study of electoral contestation generally focuses on districts or regions rather than polities. We present a new dataset that measures electoral contestation through historical records of elections in sovereign and semi-sovereign polities throughout the world from 1789 to the present. We also offer a new index of contestation intended to capture multiple dimensions of this complex concept. Our second objective is to explain variation across polities and through time in electoral contestation. We argue that the degree of contestation in a polity is affected by demography, with larger polities fostering greater electoral contestation. This hypothesis is tested with a series of cross-national regression tests that employ a variety of specifications and estimators – crosssectional, fixed-effect, and instrumental variable. We find a robust association between population and contestation extending throughout the modern era.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126400963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority to dominate minorities. For this purpose we propose a novel quantitative criterion for voting rules: the quali ed mutual majority criterion (q; k)-MM. For a xed total number of m candidates, a voting rule satis es (q; k)-MM if whenever some k candidates receive top k ranks in an arbitrary order from a majority that consists of more than q 2 (0; 1) of voters, the voting rule selects one of these k candidates. The standard majority criterion is equivalent to (1=2; 1)-MM. The standard mutual majority criterion (MM) is equivalent to (1=2; k)-MM, where k is arbitrary. We nd the bounds on the size of the majority q for several important voting rules, including the plurality rule, the plurality with runo rule, Black's rule, Condorcet least reversal rule, Dodgson's rule, Simpson's rule, Young's rule and monotonic scoring rules; for most of these rules we show that the bound is tight.
{"title":"Measuring Majority Tyranny: Axiomatic Approach","authors":"Aleksei Y. Kondratev, Alexander S. Nesterov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3208580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3208580","url":null,"abstract":"We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority to dominate minorities. For this purpose we propose a novel quantitative criterion for voting rules: the quali ed mutual majority criterion (q; k)-MM. For a xed total number of m candidates, a voting rule satis es (q; k)-MM if whenever some k candidates receive top k ranks in an arbitrary order from a majority that consists of more than q 2 (0; 1) of voters, the voting rule selects one of these k candidates. The standard majority criterion is equivalent to (1=2; 1)-MM. The standard mutual majority criterion (MM) is equivalent to (1=2; k)-MM, where k is arbitrary. We nd the bounds on the size of the majority q for several important voting rules, including the plurality rule, the plurality with runo rule, Black's rule, Condorcet least reversal rule, Dodgson's rule, Simpson's rule, Young's rule and monotonic scoring rules; for most of these rules we show that the bound is tight.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"275 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115945729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Prosecutors and Politics Project has compiled a database that identifies who contributed to prosecutor elections and the amount of their donations. Campaign contribution information is often publicly available, but the format of that information varies from state to state, the information is often scattered across multiple sources and the information is sometimes incomplete. The Project has compile this fragmented data into a single nationwide database that will allow sustained study about who contributes to prosecutor campaigns and the amount of contributions. This report summarizes and analyzes some of the data from the database. The report will be updated as more data is added to the database and analyzed. This report was last updated on August 8, 2018.
{"title":"The Prosecutors and Politics Project: Study of Campaign Contributions in Prosecutorial Elections","authors":"Carissa Byrne Hessick","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3202875","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3202875","url":null,"abstract":"The Prosecutors and Politics Project has compiled a database that identifies who contributed to prosecutor elections and the amount of their donations. Campaign contribution information is often publicly available, but the format of that information varies from state to state, the information is often scattered across multiple sources and the information is sometimes incomplete. The Project has compile this fragmented data into a single nationwide database that will allow sustained study about who contributes to prosecutor campaigns and the amount of contributions. This report summarizes and analyzes some of the data from the database. The report will be updated as more data is added to the database and analyzed. This report was last updated on August 8, 2018.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131576007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Buchanan (1987) identifies Politics as Exchange as one of the key pillars of research program. Viewing politics through the lens of exchange focuses attention on what sorts of political bargains individuals and organized groups find both to their advantage and feasible. Politics as Exchange locates differences between policies in the different rules that condition and result from these bargains. This essay contrasts the Politics as Exchange approach with the recent literature on state capacity, which typically embodies a view that we dub Politics as Administration. While these two points of view are not mutually exclusive, we argue that Politics as Exchange may be more effective in explaining important changes in political economic systems. We illustrate the relationship between the two by examining the evolution of the Byzantine Empire during and after the reign of Basil II.
{"title":"Politics as Exchange in the Byzantine Empire","authors":"Adam Martin, James Ruhland","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3202524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3202524","url":null,"abstract":"Buchanan (1987) identifies Politics as Exchange as one of the key pillars of research program. Viewing politics through the lens of exchange focuses attention on what sorts of political bargains individuals and organized groups find both to their advantage and feasible. Politics as Exchange locates differences between policies in the different rules that condition and result from these bargains. This essay contrasts the Politics as Exchange approach with the recent literature on state capacity, which typically embodies a view that we dub Politics as Administration. While these two points of view are not mutually exclusive, we argue that Politics as Exchange may be more effective in explaining important changes in political economic systems. We illustrate the relationship between the two by examining the evolution of the Byzantine Empire during and after the reign of Basil II.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123519163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Seven successive democratic elections conducted in Ghana between 1992 and 2016 has resulted in peaceful alternation of power between two major political parties; namely the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) in what Huntington refers to as the turn over test. Whiles this remains a major step in consolidating multiparty democracy and a model for Africa, Boafo-Arthur has argued that, “elections in most African countries remains very difficult to predict due to several social factors like high levels of illiteracy, ethnic proclivities, religious attachment and personalities” (Boafo-Arthur, 2006:1). Looking at the electoral politics of Ghana since 1992, it would be observed that, different factors has accounted to the electoral dynamics as well as electoral victories and defeats. Some political pundits have attributed these dynamics to issues of ethnic bloc voting, Political power capture by the two dominant political parties among other myriads factors. This research paper investigates electoral dynamics of Ghana since 1992, the major determinants of elections, some interesting established electoral traditions in Ghana and its implications on future elections.
{"title":"Electoral Politics in Ghana’s 4th Republic (1992-2016) and its Implications on Future Elections","authors":"Baffour Agyeman Prempeh Boakye","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3202431","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3202431","url":null,"abstract":"Seven successive democratic elections conducted in Ghana between 1992 and 2016 has resulted in peaceful alternation of power between two major political parties; namely the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) in what Huntington refers to as the turn over test. Whiles this remains a major step in consolidating multiparty democracy and a model for Africa, Boafo-Arthur has argued that, “elections in most African countries remains very difficult to predict due to several social factors like high levels of illiteracy, ethnic proclivities, religious attachment and personalities” (Boafo-Arthur, 2006:1). Looking at the electoral politics of Ghana since 1992, it would be observed that, different factors has accounted to the electoral dynamics as well as electoral victories and defeats. Some political pundits have attributed these dynamics to issues of ethnic bloc voting, Political power capture by the two dominant political parties among other myriads factors. This research paper investigates electoral dynamics of Ghana since 1992, the major determinants of elections, some interesting established electoral traditions in Ghana and its implications on future elections.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126049129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This research develops a model of optimal political expenditures that is integrated with a theory of voters maximizing their personal utility at the ballot box and that shows how money inevitably controls government leaders. The paper also demonstrates theoretically why many businesses do not make such investments despite returns on the expended political capital tending to be abnormally high. Recent worldwide events reported in the press are utilized to illustrate the general applicability of the model to the many varying ways wealthy agents control government, as well as indicate how the model variables can be estimated from actual polling results.
{"title":"A Model of Optimizing Political Expenditures to Buy Government Power","authors":"A. Murphy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3195280","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3195280","url":null,"abstract":"This research develops a model of optimal political expenditures that is integrated with a theory of voters maximizing their personal utility at the ballot box and that shows how money inevitably controls government leaders. The paper also demonstrates theoretically why many businesses do not make such investments despite returns on the expended political capital tending to be abnormally high. Recent worldwide events reported in the press are utilized to illustrate the general applicability of the model to the many varying ways wealthy agents control government, as well as indicate how the model variables can be estimated from actual polling results.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129605794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The scholarly literature provides little evidence that the line‐item veto is used effectively by governors in the U.S. states to reduce budget totals or shrink the size of government. By examining the actions of five governors in four states, this study reveals that item vetoes have been used explicitly in several cases to maintain higher levels of taxation and spending. It concludes that under the right conditions at key moments in time the line item veto can be used by governors to have a decisive impact on state budget outcomes.
{"title":"Maintaining Higher Taxes and Spending More with the Line‐Item Veto: Uncommon Events that Sting","authors":"J. Douglas","doi":"10.1111/pbaf.12176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12176","url":null,"abstract":"The scholarly literature provides little evidence that the line‐item veto is used effectively by governors in the U.S. states to reduce budget totals or shrink the size of government. By examining the actions of five governors in four states, this study reveals that item vetoes have been used explicitly in several cases to maintain higher levels of taxation and spending. It concludes that under the right conditions at key moments in time the line item veto can be used by governors to have a decisive impact on state budget outcomes.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130219821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kyle L. Marquardt, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Yi-ting Wang
Many datasets use experts to code latent quantities of interest. However, scholars have not explored either the factors affecting expert reliability or the degree to which these factors influence estimates of latent concepts. Here we systematically analyze potential correlates of expert reliability using six randomly selected variables from a cross-national panel dataset, V-Dem v8. The V-Dem project includes a diverse group of over 3,000 experts and uses an IRT model to incorporate variation in both expert reliability and scale perception into its data aggregation process. In the process, the IRT model produces an estimate of expert reliability, which affects the relative contribution of an expert to the model. We examine a variety of factors that could correlate with reliability, and find little evidence of theoretically-untenable bias due to expert characteristics. On the other hand, there is evidence that attentive and condent experts who have a basic contextual knowledge of the concept of democracy are more reliable.
{"title":"What Makes Experts Reliable?","authors":"Kyle L. Marquardt, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Yi-ting Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3190946","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3190946","url":null,"abstract":"Many datasets use experts to code latent quantities of interest. However, scholars have not explored either the factors affecting expert reliability or the degree to which these factors influence estimates of latent concepts. Here we systematically analyze potential correlates of expert reliability using six randomly selected variables from a cross-national panel dataset, V-Dem v8. The V-Dem project includes a diverse group of over 3,000 experts and uses an IRT model to incorporate variation in both expert reliability and scale perception into its data aggregation process. In the process, the IRT model produces an estimate of expert reliability, which affects the relative contribution of an expert to the model. We examine a variety of factors that could correlate with reliability, and find little evidence of theoretically-untenable bias due to expert characteristics. On the other hand, there is evidence that attentive and condent experts who have a basic contextual knowledge of the concept of democracy are more reliable.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130584351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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