The literature identifies four modes of balancing exploration/exploitation activities within a single firm. We develop a framework for examining alliances noting that whether an alliance represents exploration or exploitation for a partner depends on the activity relative to that partner’s past activities. Balancing these activities across firms in distinct domains can achieve the benefits of multiple modes while avoiding some pitfalls. We find that alliances in which one partner explores while the other exploits outperform, on average, those alliances in which partners conduct symmetric activities. Also, alliances with both partners exploiting outperform those when both partners explore. Bridging the longstanding exploration/exploitation literature to the platform literature, we also develop and test hypotheses about the relationships among alliance performance, platform characteristics and partnership characteristics.
{"title":"Balance Across Firms: Exploration and Exploitation in Alliances Between Platform Participants","authors":"Kenan Guler, Doug Miller","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3413876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3413876","url":null,"abstract":"The literature identifies four modes of balancing exploration/exploitation activities within a single firm. We develop a framework for examining alliances noting that whether an alliance represents exploration or exploitation for a partner depends on the activity relative to that partner’s past activities. Balancing these activities across firms in distinct domains can achieve the benefits of multiple modes while avoiding some pitfalls. We find that alliances in which one partner explores while the other exploits outperform, on average, those alliances in which partners conduct symmetric activities. Also, alliances with both partners exploiting outperform those when both partners explore. Bridging the longstanding exploration/exploitation literature to the platform literature, we also develop and test hypotheses about the relationships among alliance performance, platform characteristics and partnership characteristics.","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"65 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88143249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the relationship between markups, firm concentration and inequality using a model of entrepreneurial dynamics in an environment with incomplete markets and borrowing constraints. A key ingredient of the model is that markups are endogenous so that the markup a producer charges depends on the amount of competition it faces. We ask two questions. First, what fraction of the rise in income and wealth inequality is due to changes in the U.S. tax code and decline in anti-trust enforcement that led to a rise in the level and dispersion of markups? Second, what are the consequences of policies aimed at curtailing the market power of firms and reducing the level of markups? We answer these questions by studying micro-level data on income and wealth, entrepreneurial activity and product market concentration through the lens of our model.
{"title":"Markups and Inequality","authors":"Corina Boar, Virgiliu Midrigin","doi":"10.3386/W25952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W25952","url":null,"abstract":"We study the relationship between markups, firm concentration and inequality using a model of entrepreneurial dynamics in an environment with incomplete markets and borrowing constraints. A key ingredient of the model is that markups are endogenous so that the markup a producer charges depends on the amount of competition it faces. We ask two questions. First, what fraction of the rise in income and wealth inequality is due to changes in the U.S. tax code and decline in anti-trust enforcement that led to a rise in the level and dispersion of markups? Second, what are the consequences of policies aimed at curtailing the market power of firms and reducing the level of markups? We answer these questions by studying micro-level data on income and wealth, entrepreneurial activity and product market concentration through the lens of our model.","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"1 4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79470376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
James F. Albertus, Andrew Bird, S. Karolyi, T. Ruchti
We exploit Regulation SHO as a natural experiment to investigate the effects of short selling threats on intrafirm capital allocation. Using detailed data on the foreign operations of multinationals, we find that the marginal effect on aggregate investment masks a significant effect on intrafirm reallocation. Managers reallocate investment and R&D expenditures across borders toward productive subsidiaries and R&D centers, respectively. Treated firms shifted 30% more capital toward foreign subsidiaries with strong recent performance. These results provide new evidence on the scope and potential benefits of governance by short sellers and demonstrate the importance of cross-border spillovers of capital markets regulation.
{"title":"External Governance and Internal Resource Allocation","authors":"James F. Albertus, Andrew Bird, S. Karolyi, T. Ruchti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2923404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2923404","url":null,"abstract":"We exploit Regulation SHO as a natural experiment to investigate the effects of short selling threats on intrafirm capital allocation. Using detailed data on the foreign operations of multinationals, we find that the marginal effect on aggregate investment masks a significant effect on intrafirm reallocation. Managers reallocate investment and R&D expenditures across borders toward productive subsidiaries and R&D centers, respectively. Treated firms shifted 30% more capital toward foreign subsidiaries with strong recent performance. These results provide new evidence on the scope and potential benefits of governance by short sellers and demonstrate the importance of cross-border spillovers of capital markets regulation.","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"272 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73405584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We show that the news is a rich source of data on distressed firm links that drive firm-level and aggregate risks. The news tends to report about links in which a less popular firm is distressed and may contaminate a more popular firm. This constitutes a contagion channel that yields predictable returns and downgrades. Shocks to the degree of news-implied firm connectivity predict increases in aggregate volatilities, credit spreads, and default rates, and declines in output. To obtain our results, we propose a machine learning methodology that takes text data as input and outputs a data-implied firm network.
{"title":"The Network of Firms Implied by the News","authors":"G. Schwenkler, Hannan Zheng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3320859","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3320859","url":null,"abstract":"We show that the news is a rich source of data on distressed firm links that drive firm-level and aggregate risks. The news tends to report about links in which a less popular firm is distressed and may contaminate a more popular firm. This constitutes a contagion channel that yields predictable returns and downgrades. Shocks to the degree of news-implied firm connectivity predict increases in aggregate volatilities, credit spreads, and default rates, and declines in output. To obtain our results, we propose a machine learning methodology that takes text data as input and outputs a data-implied firm network.","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85234536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Home Market Effect (HME) provides a mechanism for trade driven by demand: locations with a comparatively large consumer base for an industry specializes in production of that industry. The theory originates with Krugman in the 1980s, yet, despite the many iterations since, sharp theoretical predictions are only given in two-location models. As the world has more than two locations, empirical operationalization requires, therefore, assumptions outside of the model. By making only a single additional assumption relative to the canon --- the matrix of interregional iceberg trade costs is positive semi-definite --- I prove that the HME continues to hold in many location models on average. Furthermore, the empiricist needs to make little amendment: the HME hypothesis test valid in many-locations is almost identical to that already being implemented using the two-location hypothesis.
{"title":"Disproportionate Gains: A Home Market Effect in an Almost Arbitrary Geography","authors":"Jordan J. Norris","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3328253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3328253","url":null,"abstract":"The Home Market Effect (HME) provides a mechanism for trade driven by demand: locations with a comparatively large consumer base for an industry specializes in production of that industry. The theory originates with Krugman in the 1980s, yet, despite the many iterations since, sharp theoretical predictions are only given in two-location models. As the world has more than two locations, empirical operationalization requires, therefore, assumptions outside of the model. By making only a single additional assumption relative to the canon --- the matrix of interregional iceberg trade costs is positive semi-definite --- I prove that the HME continues to hold in many location models on average. Furthermore, the empiricist needs to make little amendment: the HME hypothesis test valid in many-locations is almost identical to that already being implemented using the two-location hypothesis.<br>","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"73 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85754372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using airlines as a backdrop, we study optimal overbooking policies with endogenous customer demand, when customers internalize their expected cost of being bumped. We first consider the traditional setting in which compensation for bumped passengers is fixed and booking limits are the airline's only form of control. We provide sufficient conditions under which demand endogeneity leads to lower overbooking limits in this case. We then consider the broader problem of joint control of ticket price, bumping compensation, and booking limit. We show that price and bumping compensation can act as substitutes, which reduces the general problem to a more tractable one-dimensional search for optimal overbooking compensation and effectively allows the value of flying to be decoupled from the cost of being bumped. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case of auction-based compensation schemes and demonstrate that these generally outperform fixed compensation schemes. Numerical experiments that gauge magnitudes suggest that fixed-compensation policies that account for demand endogeneity can significantly outperform those that do not and that auction-based policies bring smaller but still significant additional gains.
{"title":"Overbooking with Endogenous Demand","authors":"Rowena Gan, Noah Gans, Gerry Tsoukalas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3321409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3321409","url":null,"abstract":"Using airlines as a backdrop, we study optimal overbooking policies with endogenous customer demand, when customers internalize their expected cost of being bumped. We first consider the traditional setting in which compensation for bumped passengers is fixed and booking limits are the airline's only form of control. We provide sufficient conditions under which demand endogeneity leads to lower overbooking limits in this case. We then consider the broader problem of joint control of ticket price, bumping compensation, and booking limit. We show that price and bumping compensation can act as substitutes, which reduces the general problem to a more tractable one-dimensional search for optimal overbooking compensation and effectively allows the value of flying to be decoupled from the cost of being bumped. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case of auction-based compensation schemes and demonstrate that these generally outperform fixed compensation schemes. Numerical experiments that gauge magnitudes suggest that fixed-compensation policies that account for demand endogeneity can significantly outperform those that do not and that auction-based policies bring smaller but still significant additional gains.","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"284 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74394049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies how innovating firms’ timing decisions on implementing new ideas affect macroeconomic fluctuations with the presence of two sources of competition: imperfect substitutability across products and imitations within products. In order to take advantage of a higher aggregate demand, firms may strategically choose to implement innovative ideas simultaneously with other firms. As a result, implementation cycles emerge endogenously in equilibrium. Using U.S. IPO and Venture-backed companies data, I first provide some empirical evidence on the existence of implementation cycles with an average frequency of 3.7 years. Second, a stylized model shows that smaller substitutability across products and longer imitation processes can contribute to a longer and lower frequent implementation cycle; it, however, has a larger impact on driving the fluctuations of macro variables. Third, when firms can only observe noisy private sunspot signals on others’ implementation decisions, the equilibrium can feature no, short, and long cycles depending on the realization of the sunspots.
{"title":"Competition and Implementation Cycles","authors":"Sai Ma","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3279837","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3279837","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how innovating firms’ timing decisions on implementing new ideas affect macroeconomic fluctuations with the presence of two sources of competition: imperfect substitutability across products and imitations within products. In order to take advantage of a higher aggregate demand, firms may strategically choose to implement innovative ideas simultaneously with other firms. As a result, implementation cycles emerge endogenously in equilibrium. Using U.S. IPO and Venture-backed companies data, I first provide some empirical evidence on the existence of implementation cycles with an average frequency of 3.7 years. Second, a stylized model shows that smaller substitutability across products and longer imitation processes can contribute to a longer and lower frequent implementation cycle; it, however, has a larger impact on driving the fluctuations of macro variables. Third, when firms can only observe noisy private sunspot signals on others’ implementation decisions, the equilibrium can feature no, short, and long cycles depending on the realization of the sunspots.","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"78 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90497922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since 2008, Innovation, Science and Economic Development (ISED) and the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) have retained Wall Communications Inc. (Wall) or NGL Nordicity Group Ltd. (Nordicity) to conduct a price comparison of communication services in Canada and select foreign jurisdictions (“the Study”). Wall and Nordicity use nearly identical study methodologies, and every year both consultancies claim that Canadian prices are among the highest in the industrialized world. The purpose of the present report is first to examine the accuracy, or lack thereof, of the Wall/Nordicity Study and second to conduct an economically sound price comparison for the same countries.
This report reaches two overarching conclusions: (1) The Study’s finding of high prices in Canada relative to other countries is false because it is the result of a poorly designed study and incorrect data interpretation; and (2) a properly designed and executed study methodology reveals that the existing prices for communications services in Canada are cheaper than the prices that foreign providers would charge in Canada for the same service plans.
The Wall/Nordicity Study compares the prices of communications services in Canada and other countries that are closest to artificial demand profiles established by the consultancy performing the Study, not actual service plans. This approach results in an apples-to-oranges comparison because none of the plans the Study compares are identical. Often the plans being compared are fundamentally different in terms of the services they offer (e.g., number of voice minutes included, data allowance, roaming), network quality (e.g., upload and download speeds), and the geography in which the services are provisioned (e.g., a network in Japan has a different cost structure than a network in Canada). The comparisons in the Study prove nothing about price levels in Canada because they only reflect how close or far certain providers’ plans are relative to the artificial demand profiles established by the consultancy performing the Study.
Correcting for the significant shortcomings of the Wall/Nordicity Study, this report introduces a proper price comparison of communications services in Canada and ISED’s select foreign jurisdictions. This analysis reveals that: (1) Canadian providers do not charge high prices relative to the benchmark countries; and (2) approximately 80% of the Canadian mobile wireless telephony, mobile broadband Internet, and fixed broadband Internet plans studied have prices below international benchmarks, which means that Canadian consumers are paying relatively lower prices given the specific market offerings, networks, and country conditions.
自2008年起，创新、科学及经济发展局(ISED)及加拿大广播电视及电讯委员会(CRTC)委任Wall Communications Inc. (Wall)或NGL Nordicity Group Ltd. (Nordicity)对加拿大及部分外国司法管辖区的通讯服务进行价格比较(“研究”)。Wall和Nordicity使用几乎相同的研究方法，每年这两家咨询公司都声称加拿大的物价是工业化国家中最高的。本报告的目的首先是审查Wall/ nordic研究报告是否准确，其次是对同一国家进行经济上合理的价格比较。该报告得出了两个主要结论:(1)该研究关于加拿大相对于其他国家的高价格的发现是错误的，因为这是设计不良的研究和错误的数据解释的结果;(2)适当设计和执行的研究方法表明，加拿大现有的通信服务价格比外国供应商在加拿大为相同的服务计划收取的价格便宜。Wall/Nordicity研究比较了加拿大和其他国家的通信服务价格，这些国家最接近进行研究的咨询公司所建立的人工需求概况，而不是实际的服务计划。这种方法的结果是苹果和橙子的比较，因为研究所比较的计划都不相同。通常被比较的计划在它们提供的服务(例如，包含的语音分钟数，数据津贴，漫游)，网络质量(例如，上传和下载速度)以及提供服务的地理位置(例如，日本的网络与加拿大的网络具有不同的成本结构)方面存在根本差异。研究中的比较并不能证明加拿大的价格水平，因为它们只反映了某些供应商的计划相对于执行研究的咨询公司所建立的人为需求概况有多接近或远。为了纠正Wall/ nordic研究的重大缺陷，本报告对加拿大和ise选定的外国司法管辖区的通信服务进行了适当的价格比较。这一分析表明:(1)相对于基准国家，加拿大供应商收取的价格并不高;(2)大约80%的加拿大移动无线电话、移动宽带互联网和固定宽带互联网计划的价格低于国际基准，这意味着考虑到特定的市场产品、网络和国家条件，加拿大消费者支付的价格相对较低。
{"title":"An Accurate Price Comparison of Communications Services in Canada and Select Foreign Jurisdictions","authors":"Christian M. Dippon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3309214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3309214","url":null,"abstract":"Since 2008, Innovation, Science and Economic Development (ISED) and the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) have retained Wall Communications Inc. (Wall) or NGL Nordicity Group Ltd. (Nordicity) to conduct a price comparison of communication services in Canada and select foreign jurisdictions (“the Study”). Wall and Nordicity use nearly identical study methodologies, and every year both consultancies claim that Canadian prices are among the highest in the industrialized world. The purpose of the present report is first to examine the accuracy, or lack thereof, of the Wall/Nordicity Study and second to conduct an economically sound price comparison for the same countries.<br><br>This report reaches two overarching conclusions: (1) The Study’s finding of high prices in Canada relative to other countries is false because it is the result of a poorly designed study and incorrect data interpretation; and (2) a properly designed and executed study methodology reveals that the existing prices for communications services in Canada are cheaper than the prices that foreign providers would charge in Canada for the same service plans.<br><br>The Wall/Nordicity Study compares the prices of communications services in Canada and other countries that are closest to artificial demand profiles established by the consultancy performing the Study, not actual service plans. This approach results in an apples-to-oranges comparison because none of the plans the Study compares are identical. Often the plans being compared are fundamentally different in terms of the services they offer (e.g., number of voice minutes included, data allowance, roaming), network quality (e.g., upload and download speeds), and the geography in which the services are provisioned (e.g., a network in Japan has a different cost structure than a network in Canada). The comparisons in the Study prove nothing about price levels in Canada because they only reflect how close or far certain providers’ plans are relative to the artificial demand profiles established by the consultancy performing the Study. <br><br>Correcting for the significant shortcomings of the Wall/Nordicity Study, this report introduces a proper price comparison of communications services in Canada and ISED’s select foreign jurisdictions. This analysis reveals that: (1) Canadian providers do not charge high prices relative to the benchmark countries; and (2) approximately 80% of the Canadian mobile wireless telephony, mobile broadband Internet, and fixed broadband Internet plans studied have prices below international benchmarks, which means that Canadian consumers are paying relatively lower prices given the specific market offerings, networks, and country conditions.<br><br>","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82080627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is a long debate whether TV advertising time should be restricted (as in the EU and UK nowadays) or be left unregulated (as in the US since 1982). This paper exploits a novel dataset of per hour data on 12 major TV broadcasters in France to investigate the efficiency of regulation using an empirical two-sided market model. I first estimate the demand function of TV viewers and advertisers, in order to account for the two-sidedness of the market in the supply decision of TV stations. I then identify the shadow prices of regulation based on the observed regulatory constraints. Finally, I conduct counterfactual simulations to calibrate the regulation’s impact on viewers and advertisers. The results suggest that deregulating the market would increase the market advertising level by 4%, reduce the number of views per advert by 2%, and increase the average advertising cost per view by 0.5%. Accordingly, deregulation could increase the TV broadcasters’ net advertising revenue by 7%, but reduce the surplus of advertisers, and possibly damage the surplus of TV viewers if the broadcasters do not commit to improving the program quality.
{"title":"Regulating Advertising Quantity: Is This Policy Efficient?","authors":"Jiekai Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2847856","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2847856","url":null,"abstract":"There is a long debate whether TV advertising time should be restricted (as in the EU and UK nowadays) or be left unregulated (as in the US since 1982). This paper exploits a novel dataset of per hour data on 12 major TV broadcasters in France to investigate the efficiency of regulation using an empirical two-sided market model. I first estimate the demand function of TV viewers and advertisers, in order to account for the two-sidedness of the market in the supply decision of TV stations. I then identify the shadow prices of regulation based on the observed regulatory constraints. Finally, I conduct counterfactual simulations to calibrate the regulation’s impact on viewers and advertisers. The results suggest that deregulating the market would increase the market advertising level by 4%, reduce the number of views per advert by 2%, and increase the average advertising cost per view by 0.5%. Accordingly, deregulation could increase the TV broadcasters’ net advertising revenue by 7%, but reduce the surplus of advertisers, and possibly damage the surplus of TV viewers if the broadcasters do not commit to improving the program quality.","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84763904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Every firm has a business model, which is the collection of strategic decisions that determine how the firm generates a sustainable enterprise through the creation of enough value (its supply model...
{"title":"A Research Framework for Business Models: What Is Common Among Fast Fashion, E-Tailing, and Ride Sharing?","authors":"Gérard P. Cachon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3250441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3250441","url":null,"abstract":"Every firm has a business model, which is the collection of strategic decisions that determine how the firm generates a sustainable enterprise through the creation of enough value (its supply model...","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"79 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80356254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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