Research Summary: Departing from the extant literature, which assumes that firms pursue strong environmental performance as a differentiation strategy, we analyze the general relationship between firms’ competitive strategy and their response to heightened market competition. We find that, using a large sample of Chinese manufacturing firms between 2000 and 2005, intensified market competition has an overall negative impact on firms’ environmental performance. The negative impact is exacerbated in firms adopting a cost‐leadership strategy, but is attenuated in those adopting a differentiation strategy. The results emphasize the importance of including an examination of the particular competitive strategies chosen by firms in seeking to understand the impact of intensified market competition. Managerial Summary: Advocates of corporate social responsibility (CSR) have long argued for the differentiation role of CSR. However, managers may be misguided if the assumed benefits of differentiation critically depend on certain presumptions. In the Chinese context and focusing on the environmental dimension of CSR, our study finds a negative relationship between market competition and corporate environmental performance. It suggests that firms, to a large extent, cannot escape competition via environmental differentiation. Managers should therefore be cautious about the value of strategic investment in CSR as a viable competitive device.
{"title":"Does Market Competition Dampen Environmental Performance: Evidence from China","authors":"J. Duanmu, Maoliang Bu, R. Pittman","doi":"10.1002/SMJ.2948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/SMJ.2948","url":null,"abstract":"Research Summary: Departing from the extant literature, which assumes that firms pursue strong environmental performance as a differentiation strategy, we analyze the general relationship between firms’ competitive strategy and their response to heightened market competition. We find that, using a large sample of Chinese manufacturing firms between 2000 and 2005, intensified market competition has an overall negative impact on firms’ environmental performance. The negative impact is exacerbated in firms adopting a cost‐leadership strategy, but is attenuated in those adopting a differentiation strategy. The results emphasize the importance of including an examination of the particular competitive strategies chosen by firms in seeking to understand the impact of intensified market competition. Managerial Summary: Advocates of corporate social responsibility (CSR) have long argued for the differentiation role of CSR. However, managers may be misguided if the assumed benefits of differentiation critically depend on certain presumptions. In the Chinese context and focusing on the environmental dimension of CSR, our study finds a negative relationship between market competition and corporate environmental performance. It suggests that firms, to a large extent, cannot escape competition via environmental differentiation. Managers should therefore be cautious about the value of strategic investment in CSR as a viable competitive device.","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"72 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91389184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The results obtained establish that there is a positive correlation between firm valuation and Enterprise Resource Management implementation. However, the results are analyzed at a deeper level to see how ERM is dependent on firm size and some other factors. Resource management has always been a controversial topic. In the early days of financial research, the firm value cannot be influenced by capital structure in perfect capital markets.
{"title":"Enterprise Resource Management System and its Importance","authors":"Chenoy Ceil","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3520432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3520432","url":null,"abstract":"The results obtained establish that there is a positive correlation between firm valuation and Enterprise Resource Management implementation. However, the results are analyzed at a deeper level to see how ERM is dependent on firm size and some other factors. Resource management has always been a controversial topic. In the early days of financial research, the firm value cannot be influenced by capital structure in perfect capital markets.","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82603917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite the increasing use of social media among personalities such as politicians, athletes, and entertainment celebrities, little is known about the intensity of competition that these popular users engage in to draw the attention of other users, and how their competition affects the users' engagement with social networks. In this research we propose a model where social media users supply content in return for user attention. Using Twitter data on soccer players from the National Women's Soccer League (NWSL), we estimate a demand model where users decide how to allocate their attention among players, based on their content posted on social media and their performance on the soccer field. We consider the amount of tweets mentioning a player's account as a measure for the level of attention captured by the player. On the supply side, players decide the amount of social media content posted on the platform. We show that the attention substitution between players depends on their posting activity and soccer performance, but also on personal characteristics, such as physical attractiveness and team affiliation. Our analysis suggests that the competitive pressure to capture user attention is responsible for about one out of three tweets posted by players. This additional content benefits the social network, increasing by 7% the users' activity on the platform. We also quantify the effect on user activity of a revenue-sharing model in which the platform rewards players for posting tweets.
{"title":"Measuring Competition for Attention in Social Media: NWSL Players on Twitter","authors":"Federico M. Rossi, Gaia Rubera","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3203807","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3203807","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the increasing use of social media among personalities such as politicians, athletes, and entertainment celebrities, little is known about the intensity of competition that these popular users engage in to draw the attention of other users, and how their competition affects the users' engagement with social networks. In this research we propose a model where social media users supply content in return for user attention. Using Twitter data on soccer players from the National Women's Soccer League (NWSL), we estimate a demand model where users decide how to allocate their attention among players, based on their content posted on social media and their performance on the soccer field. We consider the amount of tweets mentioning a player's account as a measure for the level of attention captured by the player. On the supply side, players decide the amount of social media content posted on the platform. We show that the attention substitution between players depends on their posting activity and soccer performance, but also on personal characteristics, such as physical attractiveness and team affiliation. Our analysis suggests that the competitive pressure to capture user attention is responsible for about one out of three tweets posted by players. This additional content benefits the social network, increasing by 7% the users' activity on the platform. We also quantify the effect on user activity of a revenue-sharing model in which the platform rewards players for posting tweets.","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79399599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A lot of studies have examined only from the microeconomic point of view the usefulness of logistics to firm profitability either theoretically or empirically. In the present paper an effort will be made to examine the usefulness of logistics taking also into account the macroeconomic point of view. A panel data analysis will be applied covering the countries: Austria (2007-2014), Belgium (2007-2014), Cyprus (2007-2013), Denmark (2007-2014), Finland (2007-2014), France (2007-2014), Germany (2007-2014), Greece (2007-2013), Ireland (2007-2013), Italy (2007-2014), Netherlands (2007-2014), Norway (2007-2014), Portugal (2007-2014), Spain (2007-2014), Sweden (2007-2014) and UK (2007-2012).
{"title":"Logistics on Firm Profitability. A Macroeconomic Approach","authors":"M. Georgiou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3090183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3090183","url":null,"abstract":"A lot of studies have examined only from the microeconomic point of view the usefulness of logistics to firm profitability either theoretically or empirically. In the present paper an effort will be made to examine the usefulness of logistics taking also into account the macroeconomic point of view. A panel data analysis will be applied covering the countries: Austria (2007-2014), Belgium (2007-2014), Cyprus (2007-2013), Denmark (2007-2014), Finland (2007-2014), France (2007-2014), Germany (2007-2014), Greece (2007-2013), Ireland (2007-2013), Italy (2007-2014), Netherlands (2007-2014), Norway (2007-2014), Portugal (2007-2014), Spain (2007-2014), Sweden (2007-2014) and UK (2007-2012).","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89176721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The two games that are typically used to model markets with asymmetric information are the signalling game and the screening game. In the signalling game, an equilibrium may not be efficient because of the arbitrariness of off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. In the screening game, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium may fail to exist because of " cream-skimming " deviations. Perhaps surprisingly, I show how equilibrium generically exists and is efficient in a game that combines signalling and screening. The signalling part assures the existence of equilibrium, whereas the screening part prevents non-efficient allocations from being supported as equilibrium allocations .
{"title":"On Signalling and Screening in Markets with Asymmetric Information","authors":"Anastasios Dosis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2739792","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2739792","url":null,"abstract":"The two games that are typically used to model markets with asymmetric information are the signalling game and the screening game. In the signalling game, an equilibrium may not be efficient because of the arbitrariness of off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. In the screening game, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium may fail to exist because of \" cream-skimming \" deviations. Perhaps surprisingly, I show how equilibrium generically exists and is efficient in a game that combines signalling and screening. The signalling part assures the existence of equilibrium, whereas the screening part prevents non-efficient allocations from being supported as equilibrium allocations .","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89253459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study identification and estimation in first-price auctions with risk averse bidders and selective entry, building on a flexible entry and bidding framework we call the Affiliated Signal with Risk Aversion (AS-RA) model. This framework extends the AS model of Gentry and Li (2014) to accommodate arbitrary bidder risk aversion, thereby nesting a variety of standard models as special cases. It poses, however, a unique methodological challenge – existing results on identification with risk aversion fail in the presence of selection, while the selection-robust bounds of Gentry and Li (2014) fail in the presence of risk aversion. Motivated by this problem, we translate excludable variation in potential competition into identified sets for AS-RA primitives under various classes of restrictions on the model. We show that a single parametric restriction – on the copula governing selection into entry – is typically sufficient to restore point identification of all primitives. In contrast, a parametric form for utility yields point identification of the utility function but only partial identification of remaining primitives. Finally, we outline a simple semiparametric estimator combining Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility with a parametric signal-value copula. Simulation evidence suggests that this estimator performs very well even in small samples, underscoring the practical value of our identification results.
{"title":"Identification and Inference in First-Price Auctions with Risk-Averse Bidders and Selective Entry","authors":"Matthew Gentry, Tong Li, Jingfeng Lu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2587812","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2587812","url":null,"abstract":"We study identification and estimation in first-price auctions with risk averse bidders and selective entry, building on a flexible entry and bidding framework we call the Affiliated Signal with Risk Aversion (AS-RA) model. This framework extends the AS model of Gentry and Li (2014) to accommodate arbitrary bidder risk aversion, thereby nesting a variety of standard models as special cases. It poses, however, a unique methodological challenge – existing results on identification with risk aversion fail in the presence of selection, while the selection-robust bounds of Gentry and Li (2014) fail in the presence of risk aversion. Motivated by this problem, we translate excludable variation in potential competition into identified sets for AS-RA primitives under various classes of restrictions on the model. We show that a single parametric restriction – on the copula governing selection into entry – is typically sufficient to restore point identification of all primitives. In contrast, a parametric form for utility yields point identification of the utility function but only partial identification of remaining primitives. Finally, we outline a simple semiparametric estimator combining Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility with a parametric signal-value copula. Simulation evidence suggests that this estimator performs very well even in small samples, underscoring the practical value of our identification results.","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75183744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the determinants of sector-specific regulation imposed on broadband markets related both to efficiency objectives of regulators and to those of narrowly defined interest groups. We test hypotheses derived from the normative and positive theoretical literature employing recent panel data on 27 European Union member states taking into account endogeneity of the underlying regulation and market structure variables. Our empirical specification employs three different estimators based on instrumental variables in order to identify causal effects. We find evidence supporting both regulators pursuing normative objectives and inefficiencies related to regulatory path dependence, bureaucracy goals and an inadequate consideration of competition from mobile broadband networks. Our results call for adjustments in the institutional design of the decision making process under the current European Union regulatory framework.
{"title":"Path Dependencies versus Efficiencies in Regulation: Evidence from 'Old' and 'New' Broadband Markets in the EU","authors":"Wolfgang Briglauer, E. Camarda, I. Vogelsang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3050661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3050661","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the determinants of sector-specific regulation imposed on broadband markets related both to efficiency objectives of regulators and to those of narrowly defined interest groups. We test hypotheses derived from the normative and positive theoretical literature employing recent panel data on 27 European Union member states taking into account endogeneity of the underlying regulation and market structure variables. Our empirical specification employs three different estimators based on instrumental variables in order to identify causal effects. We find evidence supporting both regulators pursuing normative objectives and inefficiencies related to regulatory path dependence, bureaucracy goals and an inadequate consideration of competition from mobile broadband networks. Our results call for adjustments in the institutional design of the decision making process under the current European Union regulatory framework.","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81247755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the effect of competition on product quality when product quality is unobserved before purchase. Using a dataset that records the actual broadband internet speed consumers receive as well as the speed the provider claims is being delivered, I find that an additional broadband competitor raises the ratio of actual to claimed speeds for incumbents by between 23 and 32 percent within the first 6 months, but that this effect attenuates after 18 months. This increase is due to improvements in the actual speed, and not just reductions in the claimed speed. I recover the causal effect of competition on product misrepresentation by leveraging the launch of a broadband-capable satellite in mid-2012 and exploiting exogenous variation in the suitability for satellite internet across U.S. counties. I provide suggestive evidence that the reduction in firms’ strategic misrepresentation of their products led to reduced misallocation of consumers across internet plans.
{"title":"Competition and Product Misrepresentation","authors":"Daniel Goetz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3049334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3049334","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the effect of competition on product quality when product quality is unobserved before purchase. Using a dataset that records the actual broadband internet speed consumers receive as well as the speed the provider claims is being delivered, I find that an additional broadband competitor raises the ratio of actual to claimed speeds for incumbents by between 23 and 32 percent within the first 6 months, but that this effect attenuates after 18 months. This increase is due to improvements in the actual speed, and not just reductions in the claimed speed. I recover the causal effect of competition on product misrepresentation by leveraging the launch of a broadband-capable satellite in mid-2012 and exploiting exogenous variation in the suitability for satellite internet across U.S. counties. I provide suggestive evidence that the reduction in firms’ strategic misrepresentation of their products led to reduced misallocation of consumers across internet plans.","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78865400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bitcoin provides its users with transaction-processing services which are similar to those of traditional payment systems. This article models the novel economic structure implied by Bitcoin’s innovative decentralized design, which allows the payment system to be reliably operated by unrelated parties called miners. We find that this decentralized design protects users from monopoly pricing. Competition among service providers within the platform and free entry imply no entity can profitably affect the level of fees paid by users. Instead, a market for transaction-processing determines the fees users pay to gain priority and avoid transaction-processing delays. The article (i) derives closed-form formulas of the fees and waiting times and studies their properties, (ii) compares pricing under the Bitcoin Payment System to that under a traditional payment system operated by a profit-maximizing firm, and (iii) suggests protocol design modifications to enhance the platform’s efficiency. The Appendix describes and explains the main attributes of Bitcoin and the underlying blockchain technology.
{"title":"Monopoly without a Monopolist: An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System","authors":"Gur Huberman, Jacob D. Leshno, C. Moallemi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3025604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3025604","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Bitcoin provides its users with transaction-processing services which are similar to those of traditional payment systems. This article models the novel economic structure implied by Bitcoin’s innovative decentralized design, which allows the payment system to be reliably operated by unrelated parties called miners. We find that this decentralized design protects users from monopoly pricing. Competition among service providers within the platform and free entry imply no entity can profitably affect the level of fees paid by users. Instead, a market for transaction-processing determines the fees users pay to gain priority and avoid transaction-processing delays. The article (i) derives closed-form formulas of the fees and waiting times and studies their properties, (ii) compares pricing under the Bitcoin Payment System to that under a traditional payment system operated by a profit-maximizing firm, and (iii) suggests protocol design modifications to enhance the platform’s efficiency. The Appendix describes and explains the main attributes of Bitcoin and the underlying blockchain technology.","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77956676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Our paper investigates competition between ETFs that hold nearly identical baskets of securities. We provide strong evidence that incumbent-fund market quality is negatively affected when a new fund is added to an asset class. The degradation in liquidity is even more severe whenever both funds follow the same benchmark. Furthermore, increasing the number of ETFs in an asset class does not put downward pressure on expense ratios. Thus, decreasing market quality, enumerated by increasing bid-ask spreads and price impacts, is not offset by decreasing costs of fund ownership – resulting in a loss of surplus for investors and incumbent ETF providers.
{"title":"ETF Competition and Market Quality","authors":"Travis Box, Ryan L. Davis, Kathleen P. Fuller","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2721813","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2721813","url":null,"abstract":"Our paper investigates competition between ETFs that hold nearly identical baskets of securities. We provide strong evidence that incumbent-fund market quality is negatively affected when a new fund is added to an asset class. The degradation in liquidity is even more severe whenever both funds follow the same benchmark. Furthermore, increasing the number of ETFs in an asset class does not put downward pressure on expense ratios. Thus, decreasing market quality, enumerated by increasing bid-ask spreads and price impacts, is not offset by decreasing costs of fund ownership – resulting in a loss of surplus for investors and incumbent ETF providers.","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"90 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90682185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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