This note replaces "Valuation of Late-Stage Companies and Buyouts" (UVA-F-1639).This note focuses on the valuation of late-stage companies with a particular emphasis on leveraged buyouts (LBOs). In contrast to venture capital, where firms are typically at an early stage of development, late-stage investments involve more-established businesses that have an ability to take on higher levels of debt to augment investor returns. The note provides a description of LBOs, an overview of the commonly used sources of financing and the metrics used to assess LBO capital structures, a discussion of the value drivers of buyouts, and a step-by-step example of an LBO analysis. This note takes the perspective of private equity (PE) investors and assumes some basic familiarity with the structure of PE investing. Their approach is compared to other discounted cash flow valuation methods based on the weighted-average cost of capital or adjusted present value. Excerpt UVA-F-1846 Aug. 23, 2018 Valuing Late-Stage Companies and Leveraged Buyouts This note focuses on the valuation of late-stage companies with a particular emphasis on leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Late-stage investments can arise in situations involving growth equity, turnarounds, mezzanine investments, and distressed debt. In contrast to venture capital, where firms are typically at an early stage of development, late-stage investments involve more-established businesses that have an ability to take on higher levels of leverage to augment investor returns. This note takes the perspective of a private equity (PE) investor and assumes some basic familiarity with the structure of PE investing. It provides a basic overview of the primary sources of financing, the metrics used to gauge LBO capital structures, and a step-by-step example of an LBO analysis. What is an LBO? An LBO is the purchase of a firm by an outside individual, another firm, or the incumbent management using large amounts of debt to finance the purchase. The target firm for an LBO can be a freestanding private or public company or a division of a company. Most often, LBOs are undertaken by PE firms that specialize in these transactions (e.g., Blackstone, Carlyle Group, and KKR). PE firms that specialize in LBOs are often referred to as sponsors, because they in effect sponsor or propose the deal. Unlike strategic buyers, who often have assets or expertise to combine with the target firm, sponsors are typically financial buyers whose expertise lies in arranging the financing and incentives for management to perform in a highly leveraged transaction (HLT). That said, sponsors must also have a keen eye to identify opportunities for business development and operating improvements. . . .
{"title":"Valuing Late-Stage Companies and Leveraged Buyouts","authors":"Susan J. Chaplinsky","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3238612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3238612","url":null,"abstract":"This note replaces \"Valuation of Late-Stage Companies and Buyouts\" (UVA-F-1639).This note focuses on the valuation of late-stage companies with a particular emphasis on leveraged buyouts (LBOs). In contrast to venture capital, where firms are typically at an early stage of development, late-stage investments involve more-established businesses that have an ability to take on higher levels of debt to augment investor returns. The note provides a description of LBOs, an overview of the commonly used sources of financing and the metrics used to assess LBO capital structures, a discussion of the value drivers of buyouts, and a step-by-step example of an LBO analysis. This note takes the perspective of private equity (PE) investors and assumes some basic familiarity with the structure of PE investing. Their approach is compared to other discounted cash flow valuation methods based on the weighted-average cost of capital or adjusted present value. Excerpt UVA-F-1846 Aug. 23, 2018 Valuing Late-Stage Companies and Leveraged Buyouts This note focuses on the valuation of late-stage companies with a particular emphasis on leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Late-stage investments can arise in situations involving growth equity, turnarounds, mezzanine investments, and distressed debt. In contrast to venture capital, where firms are typically at an early stage of development, late-stage investments involve more-established businesses that have an ability to take on higher levels of leverage to augment investor returns. This note takes the perspective of a private equity (PE) investor and assumes some basic familiarity with the structure of PE investing. It provides a basic overview of the primary sources of financing, the metrics used to gauge LBO capital structures, and a step-by-step example of an LBO analysis. What is an LBO? An LBO is the purchase of a firm by an outside individual, another firm, or the incumbent management using large amounts of debt to finance the purchase. The target firm for an LBO can be a freestanding private or public company or a division of a company. Most often, LBOs are undertaken by PE firms that specialize in these transactions (e.g., Blackstone, Carlyle Group, and KKR). PE firms that specialize in LBOs are often referred to as sponsors, because they in effect sponsor or propose the deal. Unlike strategic buyers, who often have assets or expertise to combine with the target firm, sponsors are typically financial buyers whose expertise lies in arranging the financing and incentives for management to perform in a highly leveraged transaction (HLT). That said, sponsors must also have a keen eye to identify opportunities for business development and operating improvements. . . .","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"61 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84023620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Aggregate bank-loan data reported by the FDIC show that bank lending to small businesses plummeted during 2009-2011 following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in Sep. 2008 and the onset of the financial crisis, and continued to decline during the post-crisis years 2012-2015. However, the number of banks also declined during both periods, making it difficult to determine if banks have continued, or loosened, the tight-credit policies of 2009-2011. The current study analyzes bank-level data on both the stock and flow of small-business lending collected by U.S. banking regulators to provide new univariate and multivariate evidence on whether bank lending to businesses - small and large - recovered after the financial crisis. The analysis reveals that bank lending to small businesses remained at depressed levels throughout the post-crisis years, while total-business lending saw somewhat of a recovery. Finally, the analysis documents that the declines in small-business lending were significantly greater at large banks than at small banks, and at banks in worse financial condition than at banks in better financial condition.
{"title":"How Did Bank Lending to Small Business in the United States Fare After the Financial Crisis?","authors":"Rebel A. Cole","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3077004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3077004","url":null,"abstract":"Aggregate bank-loan data reported by the FDIC show that bank lending to small businesses plummeted during 2009-2011 following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in Sep. 2008 and the onset of the financial crisis, and continued to decline during the post-crisis years 2012-2015. However, the number of banks also declined during both periods, making it difficult to determine if banks have continued, or loosened, the tight-credit policies of 2009-2011. The current study analyzes bank-level data on both the stock and flow of small-business lending collected by U.S. banking regulators to provide new univariate and multivariate evidence on whether bank lending to businesses - small and large - recovered after the financial crisis. The analysis reveals that bank lending to small businesses remained at depressed levels throughout the post-crisis years, while total-business lending saw somewhat of a recovery. Finally, the analysis documents that the declines in small-business lending were significantly greater at large banks than at small banks, and at banks in worse financial condition than at banks in better financial condition.","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81258373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The recent years of leasing industry have witnessed a steady pace of growth. More and more leasing players are entering the market and have product innovation largely driven by the need for such leasing products. At this date, the leasing market has several distinct leasing players creating a niche for themselves in the market. The paper tries to explain the types of leasing players based on the business activity in the leasing space.
{"title":"Emerging Types of Leasing Players in India","authors":"Nidhi Bothra","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3085983","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3085983","url":null,"abstract":"The recent years of leasing industry have witnessed a steady pace of growth. More and more leasing players are entering the market and have product innovation largely driven by the need for such leasing products. At this date, the leasing market has several distinct leasing players creating a niche for themselves in the market. The paper tries to explain the types of leasing players based on the business activity in the leasing space.","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"159 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76627766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-01DOI: 10.1016/J.JCE.2016.07.002
M. Grimm, R. Hartwig, J. Lay
{"title":"Does Forced Solidarity Hamper Investment in Small and Micro Enterprises?","authors":"M. Grimm, R. Hartwig, J. Lay","doi":"10.1016/J.JCE.2016.07.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JCE.2016.07.002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"2020 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72586092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Konstantinos I. Stouras, Sanjiv Erat, Kenneth C. Lichtendahl Jr.
Crowdsourcing platforms typically take a passive approach and let solvers self-select which (if any) of the concurrently running contests they wish to participate into. Thus, firms which set prizes and organize contests on these platforms are competing among themselves (for solver participation and effort). We model this competition among contests, and solve for the equilibrium solver participation and characterize the equilibrium among the firms. Next we compare the outcomes to a setting where the platform can “nudge” the solvers toward a particular contest (i.e., platforms can recommend a contest for a given solver, but cannot enforce participation). Our main results reveal that solvers' self-sorting into contests hurts the solvers, the firms and the platform. Thus, platform policies to nudge solver entry improve overall welfare.
{"title":"An Equilibrium Analysis of Competing Contests","authors":"Konstantinos I. Stouras, Sanjiv Erat, Kenneth C. Lichtendahl Jr.","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3485193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3485193","url":null,"abstract":"Crowdsourcing platforms typically take a passive approach and let solvers self-select which (if any) of the concurrently running contests they wish to participate into. Thus, firms which set prizes and organize contests on these platforms are competing among themselves (for solver participation and effort). We model this competition among contests, and solve for the equilibrium solver participation and characterize the equilibrium among the firms. Next we compare the outcomes to a setting where the platform can “nudge” the solvers toward a particular contest (i.e., platforms can recommend a contest for a given solver, but cannot enforce participation). Our main results reveal that solvers' self-sorting into contests hurts the solvers, the firms and the platform. Thus, platform policies to nudge solver entry improve overall welfare.","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88857448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Crowdfunding is a ubiquitous term that now means any of a number of things, including donative funding (such as gofundme.com), rewards-based crowdfunding (such as Indiegogo.com), and equity crowdfunding where investors receive an equity interest in the issuer. Donative and rewards-based crowdfunding have generally been held not to involve the offer or sale of a security subject to regulation under federal and Colorado securities laws. Equity-based crowdfunding, where the investor receives an equity interest in the crowdfunding issuer, does involve the application of federal and applicable state securities laws. Colorado's 2015 Crowdfunding Act (CCFA) has not proven to meet the goals of its legislative declaration to "allow[] small companies to access the capital they need to start or expand businesses." This paper contains a proposal for a simplified small crowdfunding offering where businesses can raise up to $300,000 to $500,000 without meeting the more complicated procedures and requirements of the CCFA.
{"title":"Crowdfunding in Colorado - One Person's Opinion","authors":"Herrick K. Lidstone","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3052254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3052254","url":null,"abstract":"Crowdfunding is a ubiquitous term that now means any of a number of things, including donative funding (such as gofundme.com), rewards-based crowdfunding (such as Indiegogo.com), and equity crowdfunding where investors receive an equity interest in the issuer. \u0000Donative and rewards-based crowdfunding have generally been held not to involve the offer or sale of a security subject to regulation under federal and Colorado securities laws. Equity-based crowdfunding, where the investor receives an equity interest in the crowdfunding issuer, does involve the application of federal and applicable state securities laws. \u0000Colorado's 2015 Crowdfunding Act (CCFA) has not proven to meet the goals of its legislative declaration to \"allow[] small companies to access the capital they need to start or expand businesses.\" This paper contains a proposal for a simplified small crowdfunding offering where businesses can raise up to $300,000 to $500,000 without meeting the more complicated procedures and requirements of the CCFA.","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88429470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Aravinda Garimella, Ming Fan, S. Kotha, Weijia You
In an increasingly competitive crowdfunding market, entrepreneurs are seeking out new ways to improve their likelihood of success. This is one of the reasons for the emergence of prefunding platforms, which help entrepreneurs to raise awareness of their forthcoming fund-raising projects. Using data from an online crowdfunding platform, we show that opting for prefunding prior to fund-raising significantly increases the likelihood of a campaign meeting its fund-raising goal. We also find that prefunding projects transition to the fund-raising stage with a higher number of backers, and a higher contribution size on the first day of funding when compared to non-prefunding projects. This strong head-start on the first day of solicitation then enhances a project’s ability to garner funds over the fund-raising window, thus increasing the likelihood of eventual success. Moreover, when entrepreneurs proactively update information about their projects and actively engage with followers during the prefunding period, their campaigns are more likely to launch with a higher number of backers and higher contribution size. Our study has important implications for both entrepreneurs and crowdfunding platforms.
{"title":"Launch on a High Note: How Prefunding Affects Crowdfunding Outcomes","authors":"Aravinda Garimella, Ming Fan, S. Kotha, Weijia You","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3049768","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3049768","url":null,"abstract":"In an increasingly competitive crowdfunding market, entrepreneurs are seeking out new ways to improve their likelihood of success. This is one of the reasons for the emergence of prefunding platforms, which help entrepreneurs to raise awareness of their forthcoming fund-raising projects. Using data from an online crowdfunding platform, we show that opting for prefunding prior to fund-raising significantly increases the likelihood of a campaign meeting its fund-raising goal. We also find that prefunding projects transition to the fund-raising stage with a higher number of backers, and a higher contribution size on the first day of funding when compared to non-prefunding projects. This strong head-start on the first day of solicitation then enhances a project’s ability to garner funds over the fund-raising window, thus increasing the likelihood of eventual success. Moreover, when entrepreneurs proactively update information about their projects and actively engage with followers during the prefunding period, their campaigns are more likely to launch with a higher number of backers and higher contribution size. Our study has important implications for both entrepreneurs and crowdfunding platforms.","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73894298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we investigate the optimal reward scheme design problem for online crowdfunding projects where project backers’ reward item selection is assumed to follow the multinomial logit choice model. Our model shows that project creator’s effective marginal profit from each reward item is the same at optimal backing prices, and the reward scheme design problem can be simplified to that of finding a fixed point of a single dimensional function. We also extend the basic model by considering crowdfunding participants’ behaviors such as backers’ altruistic motivation and heterogeneous beliefs in project’s success probability and project creator’s reward updating behavior. Finally, we conduct sensitivity analyses to examine the roles of key model parameters. This study provides theoretical and practical insights on reward design strategies for project creators in online crowdfunding market.
{"title":"Reward Scheme Design for Online Crowdfunding Projects","authors":"Shengsheng Xiao, Tongxin Zhou, Yong Tan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3048158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3048158","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we investigate the optimal reward scheme design problem for online crowdfunding projects where project backers’ reward item selection is assumed to follow the multinomial logit choice model. Our model shows that project creator’s effective marginal profit from each reward item is the same at optimal backing prices, and the reward scheme design problem can be simplified to that of finding a fixed point of a single dimensional function. We also extend the basic model by considering crowdfunding participants’ behaviors such as backers’ altruistic motivation and heterogeneous beliefs in project’s success probability and project creator’s reward updating behavior. Finally, we conduct sensitivity analyses to examine the roles of key model parameters. This study provides theoretical and practical insights on reward design strategies for project creators in online crowdfunding market.","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80056781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Wei-Kung Hsu, Yvonne Lean-Ee Lee, Nandu J. Nagarajan, B. Srinidhi
The extant literature on family-controlled firms in the U.S. presents a mixed picture on how family control affects opacity and value creation. In this study, we show that the mixed results arise from the differences among family firms with regard to the presence of founders and the extent of decision rights held by them. Specifically, we find that family firms in which founders are present and have significant decision rights (influence), are more transparent and have higher valuations, compared to similar non-family firms. In further analysis, we show that founders improve the operating efficiency of their firms and this partly explains the additional value creation in founder firms. We find all these effects to be stronger when founders have greater decision rights (influence). In contrast, non-founder family firms are more opaque than their non-family counterparts. Furthermore, we document cross-sectional variations in the impact of Founder-CEOs on opacity and value based on their tenure and horizon. For Founder-CEOs, firm opacity increases (decreases) and value decreases (increases) with founder tenure (founder horizon).
{"title":"Founder Control, Opacity and Value Creation in Family Firms","authors":"Wei-Kung Hsu, Yvonne Lean-Ee Lee, Nandu J. Nagarajan, B. Srinidhi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2801713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2801713","url":null,"abstract":"The extant literature on family-controlled firms in the U.S. presents a mixed picture on how family control affects opacity and value creation. In this study, we show that the mixed results arise from the differences among family firms with regard to the presence of founders and the extent of decision rights held by them. Specifically, we find that family firms in which founders are present and have significant decision rights (influence), are more transparent and have higher valuations, compared to similar non-family firms. In further analysis, we show that founders improve the operating efficiency of their firms and this partly explains the additional value creation in founder firms. We find all these effects to be stronger when founders have greater decision rights (influence). In contrast, non-founder family firms are more opaque than their non-family counterparts. Furthermore, we document cross-sectional variations in the impact of Founder-CEOs on opacity and value based on their tenure and horizon. For Founder-CEOs, firm opacity increases (decreases) and value decreases (increases) with founder tenure (founder horizon).","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88163167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Blockchain technology innovation is proliferating in the private investment fund industry. Using a hand-selected dataset of private investment fund advisers that utilize blockchain technology in various functions (N=120), this article shows that the private fund advisers who utilize blockchain technology are able to generate significant benefits for their clients. The data analysis suggests that blockchain technology plays a primary role in front office and investment functions, in the securing of crypto assets, but also in private investment fund managers’ attempts to satisfy the growth expectations of clients. The findings are consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting that the returns attainable through crypto investments have no short-term match in legacy systems. Although the use of blockchain technology in private investment fund strategies is still in its infancy, as it evolves and accelerates, the associated innovation benefits promise lasting change for the industry.
{"title":"Blockchain Innovation for Private Investment Funds","authors":"Wulf A. Kaal","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2998033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2998033","url":null,"abstract":"Blockchain technology innovation is proliferating in the private investment fund industry. Using a hand-selected dataset of private investment fund advisers that utilize blockchain technology in various functions (N=120), this article shows that the private fund advisers who utilize blockchain technology are able to generate significant benefits for their clients. The data analysis suggests that blockchain technology plays a primary role in front office and investment functions, in the securing of crypto assets, but also in private investment fund managers’ attempts to satisfy the growth expectations of clients. The findings are consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting that the returns attainable through crypto investments have no short-term match in legacy systems. Although the use of blockchain technology in private investment fund strategies is still in its infancy, as it evolves and accelerates, the associated innovation benefits promise lasting change for the industry.","PeriodicalId":11881,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Finance eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78024119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：