Russian Abstract: Рассмотрены основные возможности реализации конституционных прав граждан посредством интернет-портала "Российская общественная инициатива".
English Abstract: It considers the main opportunities for the implementation of the constitutional rights of citizens through the Internet portal "Russian Public Initiative".
{"title":"Российская Общественная Инициатива как способ реализации конституционных прав граждан (Russian public initiative as a way to implement the constitutional rights of citizens)","authors":"Antonov Jaroslav Valerievich","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3293208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3293208","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> Рассмотрены основные возможности реализации конституционных прав граждан посредством интернет-портала \"Российская общественная инициатива\". <br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> It considers the main opportunities for the implementation of the constitutional rights of citizens through the Internet portal \"Russian Public Initiative\".","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125206805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"К Вопросу о Проектах Электронной Демократии в России (On the Issue of e-Democracy Projects in Russia)","authors":"Antonov Jaroslav Valerievich","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3293174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3293174","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> Рассмотрены проекты электронной демократии в России и некоторые особенности их реализации. <br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> It consider the projects of e-democracy in Russia and some features of their implementation.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131785653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Institutions are made up of the interplay of three components: (1) formal rules, (2) actual practices and (3) narratives. However, lawyers in post-socialist countries do not see law through institutionalist lenses, but often nurture a false and simplistic idea of the law: they consider it to be the sum of rules, disregarding often the actual practices of the rules’ addressees and narratives attached to the law (encompassing everything from the raison d’etre and goal of the institution, its symbolism, the public discourse surrounding it, and social attitudes towards the institution). This restricted view makes Hungarian lawyers blind and to a certain extent also defenceless against recent authoritarian tendencies. Institution-building has been a moderately successful feat in Hungary. To put it more pessimistically, it has partially failed since the end of socialism, in particular when it comes to actual practices and narratives. In the Hungarian context, consideration of the problems of institution-building suggests two general conclusions: on the one hand, the lack of unison among the individual elements (rules, practices, narratives) renders institutions less stable and consequently less capable of inducing compliance with the law; on the other, the institutions that have been established have failed to deliver prosperity to the political community. This paper describes the constitution-making of 2010/11 from the perspective of institution-building. This institutionalist view of the law yields two main specific findings: (1) Historical experience shows that besides honest determination, the radical institutional overhaul of a complete legal system can only be successful in the presence of external pressure, the effect of which has unfortunately decreased with Hungary’s accession to the EU. That is, institution-building should go hand-in-hand with effective international and EU obligations undertaken in more sober political moments to guarantee that the political community will not later enter into a self-destructive mode. (2) Taking elements beyond mere rules more consciously into account, such as actual practices and narratives in the realm of legislation, the application of the law and legal training would ideally result in the gradual reinforcement of substantive cultural elements. This, however, requires political action, more precisely the adjustment of formal rules. Since this is not in the interest of the incumbent decision-makers, overcoming the impasse seems unlikely for the time being.
{"title":"What is Wrong with the Hungarian Legal System and How to Fix it","authors":"A. Jakab","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3213378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3213378","url":null,"abstract":"Institutions are made up of the interplay of three components: (1) formal rules, (2) actual practices and (3) narratives. However, lawyers in post-socialist countries do not see law through institutionalist lenses, but often nurture a false and simplistic idea of the law: they consider it to be the sum of rules, disregarding often the actual practices of the rules’ addressees and narratives attached to the law (encompassing everything from the raison d’etre and goal of the institution, its symbolism, the public discourse surrounding it, and social attitudes towards the institution). This restricted view makes Hungarian lawyers blind and to a certain extent also defenceless against recent authoritarian tendencies. Institution-building has been a moderately successful feat in Hungary. To put it more pessimistically, it has partially failed since the end of socialism, in particular when it comes to actual practices and narratives. In the Hungarian context, consideration of the problems of institution-building suggests two general conclusions: on the one hand, the lack of unison among the individual elements (rules, practices, narratives) renders institutions less stable and consequently less capable of inducing compliance with the law; on the other, the institutions that have been established have failed to deliver prosperity to the political community. This paper describes the constitution-making of 2010/11 from the perspective of institution-building. This institutionalist view of the law yields two main specific findings: (1) Historical experience shows that besides honest determination, the radical institutional overhaul of a complete legal system can only be successful in the presence of external pressure, the effect of which has unfortunately decreased with Hungary’s accession to the EU. That is, institution-building should go hand-in-hand with effective international and EU obligations undertaken in more sober political moments to guarantee that the political community will not later enter into a self-destructive mode. (2) Taking elements beyond mere rules more consciously into account, such as actual practices and narratives in the realm of legislation, the application of the law and legal training would ideally result in the gradual reinforcement of substantive cultural elements. This, however, requires political action, more precisely the adjustment of formal rules. Since this is not in the interest of the incumbent decision-makers, overcoming the impasse seems unlikely for the time being.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125575200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
States of emergency do not only imply a significant change in the balance of powers between the three branches of government, they are also very frequently declared: between 1985 and 2014, at least 137 countries were subject to at least one such event. This contribution is the first to systematically inquire into the factors determining such declarations. We find that constitutions matter. Countries without constitutionalized emergency provisions declare states of emergency significantly more often than countries with such provisions. We further find that it is crucial to distinguish between states of emergency declared as a consequence of a natural disaster from those declared as a consequence of political turmoil. Distinguishing between the costs of declaring an emergency and its benefits, we find that the less costly it is to declare an emergency, the more emergencies will be called on the grounds of natural disasters but not on the grounds of political turmoil. This is, hence, more evidence that constitutions matter. Finally, emergencies based on political turmoil are more likely to be declared if an economic crisis is hitting the country.
{"title":"Why Do Governments Call a State of Emergency? – On the Determinants of Using Emergency Constitutions","authors":"C. Bjørnskov, S. Voigt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2988014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2988014","url":null,"abstract":"States of emergency do not only imply a significant change in the balance of powers between the three branches of government, they are also very frequently declared: between 1985 and 2014, at least 137 countries were subject to at least one such event. This contribution is the first to systematically inquire into the factors determining such declarations. We find that constitutions matter. Countries without constitutionalized emergency provisions declare states of emergency significantly more often than countries with such provisions. We further find that it is crucial to distinguish between states of emergency declared as a consequence of a natural disaster from those declared as a consequence of political turmoil. Distinguishing between the costs of declaring an emergency and its benefits, we find that the less costly it is to declare an emergency, the more emergencies will be called on the grounds of natural disasters but not on the grounds of political turmoil. This is, hence, more evidence that constitutions matter. Finally, emergencies based on political turmoil are more likely to be declared if an economic crisis is hitting the country.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115089540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Voter-registration laws have played a key role in eradicating electoral frauds, increasing electoral engagement among youth and minorities, and consolidating emerging democracies. Nevertheless, the conceptual study of voter enrollment has not been prolific despite its relevance to democratic legitimacy. This paper proposes a theoretical framework for the decision of voter registration, which recovers the classical insights that democracy is a public good, government actions are motivated by the public interest, and citizens act rationally in politics. The private and social solutions of the model entail three types of Nash equilibrium (null, partial, and full enrollment rate), where the real cost of voter enrollment and how valuable is democracy to people are crucial determinants. Policy analysis suggests that reducing or removing registration costs will not avoid a crisis of representation. Finally, the addition of ideological preferences and a pricing mechanism based on electoral engagement allows to discuss the potential costs of being unregistered to vote.
{"title":"Does Being (Un)Registered to Vote Make Any Difference? Re-Examining the Private and Social Costs of Voter Registration","authors":"Andrés A. Acuña-Duarte","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2965016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2965016","url":null,"abstract":"Voter-registration laws have played a key role in eradicating electoral frauds, increasing electoral engagement among youth and minorities, and consolidating emerging democracies. Nevertheless, the conceptual study of voter enrollment has not been prolific despite its relevance to democratic legitimacy. This paper proposes a theoretical framework for the decision of voter registration, which recovers the classical insights that democracy is a public good, government actions are motivated by the public interest, and citizens act rationally in politics. The private and social solutions of the model entail three types of Nash equilibrium (null, partial, and full enrollment rate), where the real cost of voter enrollment and how valuable is democracy to people are crucial determinants. Policy analysis suggests that reducing or removing registration costs will not avoid a crisis of representation. Finally, the addition of ideological preferences and a pricing mechanism based on electoral engagement allows to discuss the potential costs of being unregistered to vote.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132783435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anonymity is in trouble.Private incentives and initiatives during the past decade have resulted in the deployment of a variety of technologies and services each of which is unfriendly to anonymous communication. The paper discusses these private activities, then looks at three types of government regulation that also work to undermine anonymity: the general phenomenon of chokepoint regulation, and the more specific phenomena of online identification requirements and data retention (which can be understood as a special form of identification). The concluding section asks whether the fate of online anonymity in the next decade will be determined by human rights law and finds this unlikely. Instead, the trend is to make decisions either via the deployment of new technologies or by national and trans-national political choices. The paper therefore offers normative and pragmatic arguments why anonymity is worth preserving and concludes with questions that proponents of further limits on anonymous online speech should be expected to answer.
{"title":"Lessons Learned Too Well: Anonymity in a Time of Surveillance","authors":"A. Froomkin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1930017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1930017","url":null,"abstract":"Anonymity is in trouble.Private incentives and initiatives during the past decade have resulted in the deployment of a variety of technologies and services each of which is unfriendly to anonymous communication. The paper discusses these private activities, then looks at three types of government regulation that also work to undermine anonymity: the general phenomenon of chokepoint regulation, and the more specific phenomena of online identification requirements and data retention (which can be understood as a special form of identification). The concluding section asks whether the fate of online anonymity in the next decade will be determined by human rights law and finds this unlikely. Instead, the trend is to make decisions either via the deployment of new technologies or by national and trans-national political choices. The paper therefore offers normative and pragmatic arguments why anonymity is worth preserving and concludes with questions that proponents of further limits on anonymous online speech should be expected to answer.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"219 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115981440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Inequality is as old as civilization itself. In every society where people have managed to produce economic surplus, leisure classes have spring up to seize that surplus and institutionalize inequality. For millennia, aristocrats sporting one pretentious title or another absconded with their subjects’ earnings without so much as a by your leave. That all changed when American colonists tossed a shipload of British tea into Boston Harbor. The American Revolution destroyed King George III’s divine right to steal. Never again would a British monarch tax Americans either with or without representation.
{"title":"The Children of Ludlow: Their Struggle is Our Struggle","authors":"T. McGettigan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2834644","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2834644","url":null,"abstract":"Inequality is as old as civilization itself. In every society where people have managed to produce economic surplus, leisure classes have spring up to seize that surplus and institutionalize inequality. For millennia, aristocrats sporting one pretentious title or another absconded with their subjects’ earnings without so much as a by your leave. That all changed when American colonists tossed a shipload of British tea into Boston Harbor. The American Revolution destroyed King George III’s divine right to steal. Never again would a British monarch tax Americans either with or without representation.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132175407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Amidst the current economic crisis in Brazil, it is often forgotten that the structure of the Brazilian economy, and especially the strong role of the state as an economic actor, predates the Workers’ Party administrations (2003-present) and has been a fixture of the democratic regime. This paper describes the basic mechanics of state capitalism under democracy in Brazil, and the powerful tools that it offers to policymakers, as well as the equally important constraints that inhibit change. The paper advances two central arguments. The first is that state capitalism in Brazil is much broader than the state’s role in business alone. State capitalism is not merely, or even centrally, about the degree to which the state owns firms. Indeed, it is the very breadth of the state’s role across multiple dimensions of the economy that has helped to sustain state capitalism against challengers. The second argument is that the interlocking aspects of these dimensions help to explain their continuity overall, even under democracy: linkages and mutually supporting ties between macro level policies, between fiscally oblique instruments in micro policies, and between taxation, labor, pension and social policies.
{"title":"The Unchanging Core of Brazilian State Capitalism, 1985-2015","authors":"Matthew M. Taylor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2674332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2674332","url":null,"abstract":"Amidst the current economic crisis in Brazil, it is often forgotten that the structure of the Brazilian economy, and especially the strong role of the state as an economic actor, predates the Workers’ Party administrations (2003-present) and has been a fixture of the democratic regime. This paper describes the basic mechanics of state capitalism under democracy in Brazil, and the powerful tools that it offers to policymakers, as well as the equally important constraints that inhibit change. The paper advances two central arguments. The first is that state capitalism in Brazil is much broader than the state’s role in business alone. State capitalism is not merely, or even centrally, about the degree to which the state owns firms. Indeed, it is the very breadth of the state’s role across multiple dimensions of the economy that has helped to sustain state capitalism against challengers. The second argument is that the interlocking aspects of these dimensions help to explain their continuity overall, even under democracy: linkages and mutually supporting ties between macro level policies, between fiscally oblique instruments in micro policies, and between taxation, labor, pension and social policies.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"155 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121673767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explains how informal institutions have prevented the emergence of autonomous judges in Paraguay between 1954 and 2011. The central argument is that co‐optation, clientelism, and judicial corruption considered as informal institutions, rooted during the dictatorship, have impeded the appearance of an independent judicial branch in the democratic regime. To test this hypothesis, the article relies on historical narratives, surveys, and semistructured interviews. The conclusions suggest that in countries that have experienced the consolidation of informal institutions oriented toward maintaining the ties of subordination of judges to politicians, constitutional reforms and fragmentation of political power are necessary but not sufficient conditions for improving judicial independence.
{"title":"Informal Institutions and Judicial Independence in Paraguay, 1954–2011","authors":"Santiago Basabe-Serrano","doi":"10.1111/lapo.12038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12038","url":null,"abstract":"This article explains how informal institutions have prevented the emergence of autonomous judges in Paraguay between 1954 and 2011. The central argument is that co‐optation, clientelism, and judicial corruption considered as informal institutions, rooted during the dictatorship, have impeded the appearance of an independent judicial branch in the democratic regime. To test this hypothesis, the article relies on historical narratives, surveys, and semistructured interviews. The conclusions suggest that in countries that have experienced the consolidation of informal institutions oriented toward maintaining the ties of subordination of judges to politicians, constitutional reforms and fragmentation of political power are necessary but not sufficient conditions for improving judicial independence.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126112259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
From late 2010 through 2011, popular uprisings toppled authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. In each country, a key component of the new regime's "founding moment" was the selection of rules for the first democratically elected assembly. This paper asks how the design of electoral systems affected the outcomes of the founding elections. We are interested in whether the rules of competition were consequential in determining winners and losers, and to the quality and trajectory of democratization. Our conclusions are based on analysis of district level results from the list proportional representation component of each election and on first person interviews with actors in who participated in the design of electoral rules.
{"title":"Institutions as Causes and Effects: North African Electoral Systems During the Arab Spring","authors":"J. Carey, T. Masoud, A. Reynolds","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2821681","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2821681","url":null,"abstract":"From late 2010 through 2011, popular uprisings toppled authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. In each country, a key component of the new regime's \"founding moment\" was the selection of rules for the first democratically elected assembly. This paper asks how the design of electoral systems affected the outcomes of the founding elections. We are interested in whether the rules of competition were consequential in determining winners and losers, and to the quality and trajectory of democratization. Our conclusions are based on analysis of district level results from the list proportional representation component of each election and on first person interviews with actors in who participated in the design of electoral rules.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129168761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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