This is the Introduction to a four-volume collection of articles on Law and Development, due to be published by Routledge in 2012 (Critical Concepts in Law Series). It is divided into two sections. The first section describes and compares the two main approaches to the study of Law and Development: the first approach developed by US legal academics in the late 1960s and early 1970s; the second approach, initially promoted by the World Bank in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and later adopted by most multilateral and bilateral donors agencies. The second section offers an overview of the main themes covered in the collection, which includes articles on a range of topics, such as economic growth, governance, institutions, political development, gender, human rights, judicial reform, customary law, rule of law, democracy and access to justice.
{"title":"Law and Development Lives On","authors":"Julio Faundez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1950125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1950125","url":null,"abstract":"This is the Introduction to a four-volume collection of articles on Law and Development, due to be published by Routledge in 2012 (Critical Concepts in Law Series). It is divided into two sections. The first section describes and compares the two main approaches to the study of Law and Development: the first approach developed by US legal academics in the late 1960s and early 1970s; the second approach, initially promoted by the World Bank in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and later adopted by most multilateral and bilateral donors agencies. The second section offers an overview of the main themes covered in the collection, which includes articles on a range of topics, such as economic growth, governance, institutions, political development, gender, human rights, judicial reform, customary law, rule of law, democracy and access to justice.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116972429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For centuries it has been believed that the extension of the franchise in unequal societies would lead to relatively high levels of redistribution. According to international rankings, how- ever, among the fourteen most unequal countries in the world, nine have been democratic for at least the past fourteen years. A prerequisite for the adoption of redistributive policies is that there be elected representatives who are either committed to or who have an incentive to advocate for such policies. The prospects of such an outcome depend not only on candidates personal policy preferences and motivations, but also how they are perceived by voters. One important feature shared by highly unequal democracies is that they tend to be relatively young, with many new parties and candidates in the political scene. This means elections occur under a high degree of uncertainty about critical information voters need to chose their delegates. Thus, in this paper I develop a model of elections as a game of incomplete information to explore how uncertainty, candidates’ motivation (policy vs. office), and beliefs about their ideological inclinations affect what policy interests are likely to be represented in the political process. I explore the model’s assumptions and outcomes empirically using individual level data for each presidential election in Brazil since democratization.
{"title":"Inequality, Uncertainty, and Redistribution","authors":"Fabiana Machado","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1978004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1978004","url":null,"abstract":"For centuries it has been believed that the extension of the franchise in unequal societies would lead to relatively high levels of redistribution. According to international rankings, how- ever, among the fourteen most unequal countries in the world, nine have been democratic for at least the past fourteen years. A prerequisite for the adoption of redistributive policies is that there be elected representatives who are either committed to or who have an incentive to advocate for such policies. The prospects of such an outcome depend not only on candidates personal policy preferences and motivations, but also how they are perceived by voters. One important feature shared by highly unequal democracies is that they tend to be relatively young, with many new parties and candidates in the political scene. This means elections occur under a high degree of uncertainty about critical information voters need to chose their delegates. Thus, in this paper I develop a model of elections as a game of incomplete information to explore how uncertainty, candidates’ motivation (policy vs. office), and beliefs about their ideological inclinations affect what policy interests are likely to be represented in the political process. I explore the model’s assumptions and outcomes empirically using individual level data for each presidential election in Brazil since democratization.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129079758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It has become almost universal practice for countries to adopt formal constitutions. Little is known empirically, however, about the evolution of this practice on a global scale. Are constitutions unique and defining statements of national aspiration and identity? Or are they standardized documents that vary only at the margins, in predictable and patterned ways? Are constitutions becoming increasingly similar or dissimilar to one another over time, or is there no discernible overall pattern to their development? Until very recently, scholars have lacked even basic empirical data on the content of the world’s constitutions, much less an understanding of whether there are global patterns to that content.This Article offers the first empirical account of the global evolution of rights constitutionalism. Our analysis of an original data set that spans the rights-related content of all national constitutions over the last six decades confirms the existence of several global constitutional trends. These include the phenomenon of rights creep, wherein constitutions tend to contain an increasing number of rights over time, and the growth of generic rights constitutionalism, wherein an increasing proportion of the world’s constitutions shares an increasing number of rights in common. Perhaps our most striking discovery is that 90% of all variation in the rights-related content of the world’s constitutions can be explained as a function of just two variables. Both of these variables are underlying traits of a constitution that can be measured quantitatively. The first variable is the comprehensiveness of a constitution, which refers simply to the tendency of a constitution to contain a greater or lesser number of rights provisions. The second variable is the ideological character of the constitution. We find empirically that the world’s constitutions can be arrayed along a single ideological dimension. At one end of the spectrum, some constitutions can be characterized as relatively libertarian, in the sense that they epitomize a common law constitutional tradition of negative liberty and, more specifically, judicial protection from detention or bodily harm at the hands of the state. At the other end of the spectrum, by contrast, some constitutions are more statist in character: they both presuppose and enshrine a far-reaching role for the state in a variety of domains by imbuing the state with a broad range of both powers and responsibilities. For every constitution in the world, we calculate a numerical score that measures its position on this ideological spectrum. These scores yield an ideological ranking of the world’s constitutions – the first of its kind.Using these scores, we are able to map the ideological evolution of global constitutionalism. We show that the world’s constitutions are increasingly dividing themselves into two distinct families – one libertarian in character, the other statist. Within each family, constitutions are becoming incre
{"title":"The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism","authors":"David S. Law, Mila Versteeg","doi":"10.15779/Z38913R","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38913R","url":null,"abstract":"It has become almost universal practice for countries to adopt formal constitutions. Little is known empirically, however, about the evolution of this practice on a global scale. Are constitutions unique and defining statements of national aspiration and identity? Or are they standardized documents that vary only at the margins, in predictable and patterned ways? Are constitutions becoming increasingly similar or dissimilar to one another over time, or is there no discernible overall pattern to their development? Until very recently, scholars have lacked even basic empirical data on the content of the world’s constitutions, much less an understanding of whether there are global patterns to that content.This Article offers the first empirical account of the global evolution of rights constitutionalism. Our analysis of an original data set that spans the rights-related content of all national constitutions over the last six decades confirms the existence of several global constitutional trends. These include the phenomenon of rights creep, wherein constitutions tend to contain an increasing number of rights over time, and the growth of generic rights constitutionalism, wherein an increasing proportion of the world’s constitutions shares an increasing number of rights in common. Perhaps our most striking discovery is that 90% of all variation in the rights-related content of the world’s constitutions can be explained as a function of just two variables. Both of these variables are underlying traits of a constitution that can be measured quantitatively. The first variable is the comprehensiveness of a constitution, which refers simply to the tendency of a constitution to contain a greater or lesser number of rights provisions. The second variable is the ideological character of the constitution. We find empirically that the world’s constitutions can be arrayed along a single ideological dimension. At one end of the spectrum, some constitutions can be characterized as relatively libertarian, in the sense that they epitomize a common law constitutional tradition of negative liberty and, more specifically, judicial protection from detention or bodily harm at the hands of the state. At the other end of the spectrum, by contrast, some constitutions are more statist in character: they both presuppose and enshrine a far-reaching role for the state in a variety of domains by imbuing the state with a broad range of both powers and responsibilities. For every constitution in the world, we calculate a numerical score that measures its position on this ideological spectrum. These scores yield an ideological ranking of the world’s constitutions – the first of its kind.Using these scores, we are able to map the ideological evolution of global constitutionalism. We show that the world’s constitutions are increasingly dividing themselves into two distinct families – one libertarian in character, the other statist. Within each family, constitutions are becoming incre","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132724979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper uses data from the AidData project to analyze the association between foreign aid and the likelihood of democratization in aid recipients. Previous studies have argued that aid can entrench dictatorships, making a transition less likely. I find evidence that the relationship between aid and democratization depends on characteristics of the aid donor. During the period from 1992 to 2007, aid from democratic donors is often found to be associated with an increase in the likelihood of a democratic transition. This is consistent with a scenario in which aid promotes democratization and/or a situation in which democratic donors reward countries that take steps in a democratic direction. In either case, it suggests that democratic donors use scarce aid resources to encourage democracy. During the same period, aid from authoritarian donors exhibits a negative relationship with democratization. This suggests that the source of funding matters, with donor preferences regarding democracy helping to determine the link between aid and democratization.
{"title":"Foreign Aid and Regime Change: A Role for Donor Intent","authors":"S. Bermeo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1780357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1780357","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses data from the AidData project to analyze the association between foreign aid and the likelihood of democratization in aid recipients. Previous studies have argued that aid can entrench dictatorships, making a transition less likely. I find evidence that the relationship between aid and democratization depends on characteristics of the aid donor. During the period from 1992 to 2007, aid from democratic donors is often found to be associated with an increase in the likelihood of a democratic transition. This is consistent with a scenario in which aid promotes democratization and/or a situation in which democratic donors reward countries that take steps in a democratic direction. In either case, it suggests that democratic donors use scarce aid resources to encourage democracy. During the same period, aid from authoritarian donors exhibits a negative relationship with democratization. This suggests that the source of funding matters, with donor preferences regarding democracy helping to determine the link between aid and democratization.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129891246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A government-proclaimed desire to promote technological innovation and boost economic growth in Russia implies the need for the state to take an active role in the economy and to provide the right stimuli and guarantees for investors. Since under its current political regime the Russian state lacks trust and credibility, and since the actions of the state to promote innovative economic development as well as its likelihood of succeeding depend on its type and characteristics, such an economic agenda would demand democratization. For entrepreneurs and investors, in its current form the Russian state is inefficient, riddled with corruption, lacking in accountability, and unpredictable. Most importantly, it cannot credibly commit to respect property rights and sustain the rules with which they are associated. Democratic reforms, ideally, could modernize the Russian state and make it simultaneously strong, limited, accountable, conducive to good governance and, thus, an effective agent of economic modernization. Yet the same Russian leadership that proclaims the vital importance of economic and technological innovation is reluctant to engage in political modernization, attempting instead to improve the existing model of governance by administrative methods.
{"title":"Benefits and Risks of Political Modernization in Russia","authors":"I. Busygina, M. Filippov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1736483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1736483","url":null,"abstract":"A government-proclaimed desire to promote technological innovation and boost economic growth in Russia implies the need for the state to take an active role in the economy and to provide the right stimuli and guarantees for investors. Since under its current political regime the Russian state lacks trust and credibility, and since the actions of the state to promote innovative economic development as well as its likelihood of succeeding depend on its type and characteristics, such an economic agenda would demand democratization. For entrepreneurs and investors, in its current form the Russian state is inefficient, riddled with corruption, lacking in accountability, and unpredictable. Most importantly, it cannot credibly commit to respect property rights and sustain the rules with which they are associated. Democratic reforms, ideally, could modernize the Russian state and make it simultaneously strong, limited, accountable, conducive to good governance and, thus, an effective agent of economic modernization. Yet the same Russian leadership that proclaims the vital importance of economic and technological innovation is reluctant to engage in political modernization, attempting instead to improve the existing model of governance by administrative methods.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131398744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Compared to the average lower-middle income country, China has done relatively well on most social and economic indicators. Chinese courts however have generally played a limited, and rather ineffectual, role in implementing economic and social rights (ESR). The UN Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has strongly urged China to make greater use of the courts in implementing ESR. This article considers what the role of the courts could and should be in implementing ESR in China. Part I surveys recent global developments giving greater bite to economic and social rights, as well as some of the main controversies, debates, and approaches to promoting, protecting and fulfilling ESR, with particular attention to the role of the courts. Part II provides a general introduction to the social, legal, political and economic context in China, and contrasts the situation in China with South Africa, one of the global leaders in judicial implementation of ESR. The overall environment in China is if not hostile, at least not promising, for a robust role for the courts in protecting ESR. Nevertheless, there is still some room for the courts to play a positive role in implementing ESR. Part III provides policy recommendations regarding the way forward. Part IV concludes.
{"title":"Economic and Social Rights: The Role of Courts in China","authors":"R. Peerenboom","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1693613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1693613","url":null,"abstract":"Compared to the average lower-middle income country, China has done relatively well on most social and economic indicators. Chinese courts however have generally played a limited, and rather ineffectual, role in implementing economic and social rights (ESR). The UN Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has strongly urged China to make greater use of the courts in implementing ESR. This article considers what the role of the courts could and should be in implementing ESR in China. Part I surveys recent global developments giving greater bite to economic and social rights, as well as some of the main controversies, debates, and approaches to promoting, protecting and fulfilling ESR, with particular attention to the role of the courts. Part II provides a general introduction to the social, legal, political and economic context in China, and contrasts the situation in China with South Africa, one of the global leaders in judicial implementation of ESR. The overall environment in China is if not hostile, at least not promising, for a robust role for the courts in protecting ESR. Nevertheless, there is still some room for the courts to play a positive role in implementing ESR. Part III provides policy recommendations regarding the way forward. Part IV concludes.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132664971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
International legal standing has traditionally been established by victory in a trial by ordeal: a region initially integral to an existing state successfully establishes itself as an independent sovereign unit only where its secession movement creates, usually by decisive victory in an armed struggle, facts on the ground that appear irreversible; an insurgent faction successfully establishes itself as a government where it overthrows an existing constitutional structure and secures, even if at bayonet-point, widespread popular acquiescence. Insofar as it is perceived as little more than an imprimatur for 'might makes right' at the local level, this 'effective control doctrine' is manifestly offensive to a rule-of-law sensibility. Notwithstanding the international order's disposition to defer to the outcome of internal conflicts, alternative solutions are available where a state manifestly fails to embody the self-determination of the entirety of the territorial population, or where a government manifestly fails to represent the political community that the state encompasses. These alternative solutions, however, far from generating new generally applicable doctrines, tend ineluctably to have an ad hoc character.
{"title":"Secessions, Coups and the International Rule of Law: Assessing the Decline of the Effective Control Doctrine","authors":"Brad R. Roth","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1736718","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1736718","url":null,"abstract":"International legal standing has traditionally been established by victory in a trial by ordeal: a region initially integral to an existing state successfully establishes itself as an independent sovereign unit only where its secession movement creates, usually by decisive victory in an armed struggle, facts on the ground that appear irreversible; an insurgent faction successfully establishes itself as a government where it overthrows an existing constitutional structure and secures, even if at bayonet-point, widespread popular acquiescence. Insofar as it is perceived as little more than an imprimatur for 'might makes right' at the local level, this 'effective control doctrine' is manifestly offensive to a rule-of-law sensibility. Notwithstanding the international order's disposition to defer to the outcome of internal conflicts, alternative solutions are available where a state manifestly fails to embody the self-determination of the entirety of the territorial population, or where a government manifestly fails to represent the political community that the state encompasses. These alternative solutions, however, far from generating new generally applicable doctrines, tend ineluctably to have an ad hoc character.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126288018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Self-determination in politics has become the ideal everybody accepts. This paper argues that such contentment undermines the very idea of democracy. Democracy should be open to criticism and change. Two possible developments are considered: (a) More political power should be given to the citizens. Direct democracy is the appropriate form of democracy for the 21st century. (b) Many innovations are possible in democracy. The focus is on the potential role of random mechanisms to secure that the population is more fully represented in the political process both with respect to the persons in politics and the decisions taken.
{"title":"Democracy and Innovation","authors":"B. Frey","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1709311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1709311","url":null,"abstract":"Self-determination in politics has become the ideal everybody accepts. This paper argues that such contentment undermines the very idea of democracy. Democracy should be open to criticism and change. Two possible developments are considered: (a) More political power should be given to the citizens. Direct democracy is the appropriate form of democracy for the 21st century. (b) Many innovations are possible in democracy. The focus is on the potential role of random mechanisms to secure that the population is more fully represented in the political process both with respect to the persons in politics and the decisions taken.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120999102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, global society has been characterized by a transition from international law, based on treaties among states, to cosmopolitan law, which endows individuals with rights in a way that challenges established forms of sovereignty. Most debates on the challenges posed by cosmopolitanism have presupposed a stable institutional framework in which the principles of sovereignty and democracy coincide, thus obscuring the role played by the state. In this paper, I analyze these challenges from the point of view of weak, transitional democracies in which sovereignty remains in tension with the demands of both democracy and human rights. I then attempt to reformulate Seyla Benhabib’s notion of the “democratic paradox”, based on the tension between universal rights and sovereign self-determination, and focus on the democratic decision made by transitional regimes of whether or not to prosecute past human rights abuses. I argue that the most promising way to mitigate such tensions, as Benhabib suggests for consolidated regimes, is the principle she develops of “democratic iteration,” which is a deliberative, open-ended process, even if, in transitional regimes, it cannot ultimately guarantee either the respect for human rights nor democratic stability. No outcome can be determined in advance.In consolidated democracies, the state has to confront the undemocratic demands of rights that do not have their basis in the state. In transitional democracies, it also has to confront the undemocratic demands of those that do. In consolidated regimes, these demands might lead to discussions about the redefinition of sovereignty; in transitional regimes, these demands might bring about their demise. Deliberation and iteration shed light on the limits to sovereign democracy posed by cosmopolitan norms. Transitional democracies, which cannot take for granted a stable framework, shed light on the limits of deliberation and iteration, that is, the limits of cosmopolitanism itself.
{"title":"Struggling for Democracy and Human Rights – Cosmopolitanism in Transitional Democracies","authors":"Lucas Entel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1671063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1671063","url":null,"abstract":"Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, global society has been characterized by a transition from international law, based on treaties among states, to cosmopolitan law, which endows individuals with rights in a way that challenges established forms of sovereignty. Most debates on the challenges posed by cosmopolitanism have presupposed a stable institutional framework in which the principles of sovereignty and democracy coincide, thus obscuring the role played by the state. In this paper, I analyze these challenges from the point of view of weak, transitional democracies in which sovereignty remains in tension with the demands of both democracy and human rights. I then attempt to reformulate Seyla Benhabib’s notion of the “democratic paradox”, based on the tension between universal rights and sovereign self-determination, and focus on the democratic decision made by transitional regimes of whether or not to prosecute past human rights abuses. I argue that the most promising way to mitigate such tensions, as Benhabib suggests for consolidated regimes, is the principle she develops of “democratic iteration,” which is a deliberative, open-ended process, even if, in transitional regimes, it cannot ultimately guarantee either the respect for human rights nor democratic stability. No outcome can be determined in advance.In consolidated democracies, the state has to confront the undemocratic demands of rights that do not have their basis in the state. In transitional democracies, it also has to confront the undemocratic demands of those that do. In consolidated regimes, these demands might lead to discussions about the redefinition of sovereignty; in transitional regimes, these demands might bring about their demise. Deliberation and iteration shed light on the limits to sovereign democracy posed by cosmopolitan norms. Transitional democracies, which cannot take for granted a stable framework, shed light on the limits of deliberation and iteration, that is, the limits of cosmopolitanism itself.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125501314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As countries throughout the world democratize and decentralize, citizen participation in public life should increase. In this paper, I suggest that democratic participation in local government is enhanced when citizens can reply affirmatively to at least three questions about their ability to hold local officials accountable for their actions: Can citizens use the vote effectively to reward and punish the general or specific performance of local public officials and/or the parties they represent? Can citizens generate response to their collective needs from local governments? Can citizens be ensured of fair and equitable treatment from public agencies at local levels? The findings of a study of 30 randomly selected municipalities in Mexico indicate that, over the course of a decade and a half, voters were able to enforce alternation in power and the circulation of elites, but not necessarily to transmit unambiguous messages to public officials or parties about performance concerns. More definitively, citizens were able to build successfully on prior political experiences to extract benefits from local governments. At the same time, the ability to demand good performance of local government as a right of citizenship lagged behind other forms of accountability.
{"title":"Sanctions, Benefits, and Rights: Three Faces of Accountability","authors":"M. Grindle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1724737","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1724737","url":null,"abstract":"As countries throughout the world democratize and decentralize, citizen participation in public life should increase. In this paper, I suggest that democratic participation in local government is enhanced when citizens can reply affirmatively to at least three questions about their ability to hold local officials accountable for their actions: Can citizens use the vote effectively to reward and punish the general or specific performance of local public officials and/or the parties they represent? Can citizens generate response to their collective needs from local governments? Can citizens be ensured of fair and equitable treatment from public agencies at local levels? The findings of a study of 30 randomly selected municipalities in Mexico indicate that, over the course of a decade and a half, voters were able to enforce alternation in power and the circulation of elites, but not necessarily to transmit unambiguous messages to public officials or parties about performance concerns. More definitively, citizens were able to build successfully on prior political experiences to extract benefits from local governments. At the same time, the ability to demand good performance of local government as a right of citizenship lagged behind other forms of accountability.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127887292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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