Address to the International Seminar on Accountability and Corruption Control, Mexico City, 21 October 2014. Over the last twenty years we have learned that transparency can be used to improve governmental accountability and performance in many ways. We have also become much better at understanding the political, bureaucratic and social factors that influence the adoption and successful implementation of transparency policies. But we have also witnessed the emergence of powerful trends -- such as economic globalization, the growth of terrorism, and a backlash against the democratic surge of the late twentieth century -- that have encouraged stronger resistance to transparency policies. And old approaches to transparency may not work well in a world in which governments and businesses are harvesting vast amounts of digitized information about citizens and customers. For all of these reasons, citizens need friends -- by which I mean organizations that are prepared to resist the rollback of transparency policies, and also explain precisely what governments and businesses are doing with the information they collect. But will there be a ready supply of organizations to play the role of trusted intermediary? This is the crucial question.
{"title":"Making Transparency Policies Work: The Critical Role of Trusted Intermediaries","authors":"A. Roberts","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2505674","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2505674","url":null,"abstract":"Address to the International Seminar on Accountability and Corruption Control, Mexico City, 21 October 2014. Over the last twenty years we have learned that transparency can be used to improve governmental accountability and performance in many ways. We have also become much better at understanding the political, bureaucratic and social factors that influence the adoption and successful implementation of transparency policies. But we have also witnessed the emergence of powerful trends -- such as economic globalization, the growth of terrorism, and a backlash against the democratic surge of the late twentieth century -- that have encouraged stronger resistance to transparency policies. And old approaches to transparency may not work well in a world in which governments and businesses are harvesting vast amounts of digitized information about citizens and customers. For all of these reasons, citizens need friends -- by which I mean organizations that are prepared to resist the rollback of transparency policies, and also explain precisely what governments and businesses are doing with the information they collect. But will there be a ready supply of organizations to play the role of trusted intermediary? This is the crucial question.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134059934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Establishing an effective legal framework for regulating elections is widely considered a priority for new democracies. Electoral regulation, though, can be profoundly political. Writing on democratization has given scant attention to the tension between the establishment of proper procedures and regulation itself becoming a means of contestation. I address this gap by examining the transformation of electoral regulation from authoritarianism to democracy in South Korea, a country widely considered a successful new democracy. I argue that South Korea’s national party leaders and other state actors have used regulation to fight potential rivals, and I offer an explanation for why they have been able to do so. My explanation begins with the premise that political struggles over electoral regulation in a new democracy depend on the ways regulatory institutions operated under authoritarianism and on the interests of powerful actors in reforming those institutions. I show how the democratic bargain of fairness between South Korea’s major parties served as the basis for cooperation among elites within those parties to adapt authoritarian-era regulatory institutions for the purpose of diminishing the electoral chances of other political actors. This study questions the conventional wisdom that a democratic transition necessarily wipes away elite manipulation of elections.
{"title":"Is Fairness Enough? The Politics of Regulating Elections in a New Democracy","authors":"Erik Mobrand","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2492486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2492486","url":null,"abstract":"Establishing an effective legal framework for regulating elections is widely considered a priority for new democracies. Electoral regulation, though, can be profoundly political. Writing on democratization has given scant attention to the tension between the establishment of proper procedures and regulation itself becoming a means of contestation. I address this gap by examining the transformation of electoral regulation from authoritarianism to democracy in South Korea, a country widely considered a successful new democracy. I argue that South Korea’s national party leaders and other state actors have used regulation to fight potential rivals, and I offer an explanation for why they have been able to do so. My explanation begins with the premise that political struggles over electoral regulation in a new democracy depend on the ways regulatory institutions operated under authoritarianism and on the interests of powerful actors in reforming those institutions. I show how the democratic bargain of fairness between South Korea’s major parties served as the basis for cooperation among elites within those parties to adapt authoritarian-era regulatory institutions for the purpose of diminishing the electoral chances of other political actors. This study questions the conventional wisdom that a democratic transition necessarily wipes away elite manipulation of elections.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130638047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This contribution outlines the special features of the Rule of Law crisis of the European Union which started in Hungary. It argues that the crisis of values is the first systemic challenge to the very essence of the process of European integration since the foundation of the project. The key features of the crisis are analyzed as well as the reasons that led to the crisis, focusing not only on the EU’s powerlessness to resolve it in terms of procedures and enforcement, but also on the justice void, which looms beyond the internal market, making EU’s substantive involvement – indispensable for the successful resolution of the crisis – overwhelmingly difficult. The main point is very simple: the crisis of values is something new and its importance should be realized in full, as it corrupts the core assumptions about the EU indispensable for Europe’s successful functioning.
{"title":"Europe's Crisis of Values","authors":"D. Kochenov","doi":"10.2436/20.8030.01.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2436/20.8030.01.23","url":null,"abstract":"This contribution outlines the special features of the Rule of Law crisis of the European Union which started in Hungary. It argues that the crisis of values is the first systemic challenge to the very essence of the process of European integration since the foundation of the project. The key features of the crisis are analyzed as well as the reasons that led to the crisis, focusing not only on the EU’s powerlessness to resolve it in terms of procedures and enforcement, but also on the justice void, which looms beyond the internal market, making EU’s substantive involvement – indispensable for the successful resolution of the crisis – overwhelmingly difficult. The main point is very simple: the crisis of values is something new and its importance should be realized in full, as it corrupts the core assumptions about the EU indispensable for Europe’s successful functioning.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130876074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
P. Schuler, Dimitar D. Gueorguiev, Francisco Cantú
Authoritarian elections have been linked to both regime longevity and implicated in regime change, raising the question as to whether or not such elections are beneficial. This paper distinguishes between the forces leading to long term decay and those hastening immediate breakdown, arguing that while elections can prevent decay they also provide a potential spark for breakdown. To test this theory, we use a regime-month measure of elections and regime failure. The results show that while multi-party elections are linked to regime longevity they also dramatically increase the risk of democratic transition immediately following an election. These findings are an important advance on our understanding of the impact of elections under authoritarianism. They provide an explanation for seemingly divergent findings that elections cause regime failure and generate regime stability. In short, elections seem destabilizing because they are proximal to a large number of democratic transitions. However, viewed over the long-term they seem healthy for regimes.
{"title":"Risk and Reward: The Differential Impact of Authoritarian Elections on Regime Decay and Breakdown","authors":"P. Schuler, Dimitar D. Gueorguiev, Francisco Cantú","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1718056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1718056","url":null,"abstract":"Authoritarian elections have been linked to both regime longevity and implicated in regime change, raising the question as to whether or not such elections are beneficial. This paper distinguishes between the forces leading to long term decay and those hastening immediate breakdown, arguing that while elections can prevent decay they also provide a potential spark for breakdown. To test this theory, we use a regime-month measure of elections and regime failure. The results show that while multi-party elections are linked to regime longevity they also dramatically increase the risk of democratic transition immediately following an election. These findings are an important advance on our understanding of the impact of elections under authoritarianism. They provide an explanation for seemingly divergent findings that elections cause regime failure and generate regime stability. In short, elections seem destabilizing because they are proximal to a large number of democratic transitions. However, viewed over the long-term they seem healthy for regimes.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131282308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This panel is an effort by the APPIN partners to revisit the legal environment, in four of the twelve participating countries, after a decade. The panel authors have experiences in working for the Asia Pacific Philanthropy Information Network (APPIN; 2000-06) that also looked at the legal and institutional aspects of philanthropy and third sector activities. This panel includes presentations from four (re)democratizing countries in Asia: Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines. All (political party) governments, in these countries, have been ‘reforming’ the regulatory system for the third sector organizations, in general. The question is: have these reforms been ‘regressive’ or ‘progressive’? The examples and discussions in this panel show that the laws have not been progressive, and conclude that more regulations are for not better outcomes; but for benefitting ‘us’, restricting ‘them’. Further, it seems that true associational revolution (with organizational democracy) will improve political and social conditions in these countries, not more laws or TSOs. The increase in the third sector capability need to be matched by membership organizations promoting competition of ideas and persons with horizontal self-regulatory mechanism. The third sector self-regulation, did not work because of the ‘us’ and ‘them’ divide in the past, but is important and must be introduced.
{"title":"The Third Sector Laws in (Re)Democratizing Asia: Regressive or Progressive?","authors":"S. Hasan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3138090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3138090","url":null,"abstract":"This panel is an effort by the APPIN partners to revisit the legal environment, in four of the twelve participating countries, after a decade. The panel authors have experiences in working for the Asia Pacific Philanthropy Information Network (APPIN; 2000-06) that also looked at the legal and institutional aspects of philanthropy and third sector activities. This panel includes presentations from four (re)democratizing countries in Asia: Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines. All (political party) governments, in these countries, have been ‘reforming’ the regulatory system for the third sector organizations, in general. The question is: have these reforms been ‘regressive’ or ‘progressive’? The examples and discussions in this panel show that the laws have not been progressive, and conclude that more regulations are for not better outcomes; but for benefitting ‘us’, restricting ‘them’. Further, it seems that true associational revolution (with organizational democracy) will improve political and social conditions in these countries, not more laws or TSOs. The increase in the third sector capability need to be matched by membership organizations promoting competition of ideas and persons with horizontal self-regulatory mechanism. The third sector self-regulation, did not work because of the ‘us’ and ‘them’ divide in the past, but is important and must be introduced.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133336412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Romanian constitution-making since 1989 has been of an uneven and recently evermore conflictive kind. In the 1990s, no significant changes to the 1991 Constitution were made, and the role of the Romanian Constitution could be said to be less visible in politics. Since the mid-2000s, in contrast, and after the 2003 amendment mostly triggered for reasons of EU accession, the Constitution has become a clear object of political salience and contention. Constitutional conflict is particularly outspoken since the presidential crisis of 2007, and has become outspoken again in the summer of 2012. This has triggered the 2013 attempt to revise the Constitution. Key problems in Romania remain a weakly diffused constitutional culture among both politicians and the wider public, a Constitutional Court that seems unable to play the role of guardian and constitutional educator, and the relative absence of a meaningful constitutional debate in the wider public sphere. The constitutional frame seems to fail in inducing in both political and civil society a civic and political orientation towards constitutional values and a robust public debate on the foundations of Romanian democracy. The 2013 turn to constitutional revision, might however include a turn into the right direction and constitute a 'constitutional moment'. The paper starts with a discussion of constitution-making since 1989. Second, I will briefly analyze the role of the Romanian Constitutional Court in the democratization process, and, third, discuss the recent crisis that directly involved the Court. Fourth, I will look into the current revision process and 'constitutional moment', and fifth, I will discuss the potentially reinvigorating effects of civic engagement in constitutional change.
{"title":"Constitution-Making in Romania: From Reiterative Crises to Constitutional Moment?","authors":"Paul Blokker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2290143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2290143","url":null,"abstract":"Romanian constitution-making since 1989 has been of an uneven and recently evermore conflictive kind. In the 1990s, no significant changes to the 1991 Constitution were made, and the role of the Romanian Constitution could be said to be less visible in politics. Since the mid-2000s, in contrast, and after the 2003 amendment mostly triggered for reasons of EU accession, the Constitution has become a clear object of political salience and contention. Constitutional conflict is particularly outspoken since the presidential crisis of 2007, and has become outspoken again in the summer of 2012. This has triggered the 2013 attempt to revise the Constitution. Key problems in Romania remain a weakly diffused constitutional culture among both politicians and the wider public, a Constitutional Court that seems unable to play the role of guardian and constitutional educator, and the relative absence of a meaningful constitutional debate in the wider public sphere. The constitutional frame seems to fail in inducing in both political and civil society a civic and political orientation towards constitutional values and a robust public debate on the foundations of Romanian democracy. The 2013 turn to constitutional revision, might however include a turn into the right direction and constitute a 'constitutional moment'. The paper starts with a discussion of constitution-making since 1989. Second, I will briefly analyze the role of the Romanian Constitutional Court in the democratization process, and, third, discuss the recent crisis that directly involved the Court. Fourth, I will look into the current revision process and 'constitutional moment', and fifth, I will discuss the potentially reinvigorating effects of civic engagement in constitutional change.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126290416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this essay is to suggest that, if six or more democratic states decide to share sovereignty in order to prevent war, the international organisation, which they establish to this effect, should be democratically governed too. According to the prevailing theory of international relations, however, it is impossible for this premise to be true. The Westphalian system of international relations holds that democracy and the rule of law can only come to fruition within the boundaries of a sovereign state, whereas the relations between states belong to the domain of diplomacy. The idea that a common democracy could be created besides and above the national democracies of the member states, is discarded as an anomaly. Notwithstanding these theoretical objections, the EU is developing from a common market to a common democracy. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty established the common citizenship of the Union and foresaw the creation of a common currency. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the principle of democracy as a core value of the EU per se, while the 2009 Lisbon Treaty stipulates that the functioning of the EU shall be founded on representative democracy. This essay argues that the European Union has outgrown the Westphalian system of international relations and aspires to establish itself as a common democracy.
{"title":"The Novelty of the EU: From Common Market to Common Democracy","authors":"J. Hoeksma","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2276683","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2276683","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this essay is to suggest that, if six or more democratic states decide to share sovereignty in order to prevent war, the international organisation, which they establish to this effect, should be democratically governed too. According to the prevailing theory of international relations, however, it is impossible for this premise to be true. The Westphalian system of international relations holds that democracy and the rule of law can only come to fruition within the boundaries of a sovereign state, whereas the relations between states belong to the domain of diplomacy. The idea that a common democracy could be created besides and above the national democracies of the member states, is discarded as an anomaly. Notwithstanding these theoretical objections, the EU is developing from a common market to a common democracy. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty established the common citizenship of the Union and foresaw the creation of a common currency. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the principle of democracy as a core value of the EU per se, while the 2009 Lisbon Treaty stipulates that the functioning of the EU shall be founded on representative democracy. This essay argues that the European Union has outgrown the Westphalian system of international relations and aspires to establish itself as a common democracy.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114509428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This concluding chapter summarizes the key findings, locates these findings within the existing literatures on law and development and related fields, develops policy recommendations for MIC governments and development agencies, and highlights areas for further research. The discussion is organized around the eight issue areas: (1) is “middle-income country” an analytically useful category? (2) is there a middle-income trap, are there various traps, or is it a myth? (3) what if anything do successful MICs share? (4) why have East Asian states been so successful, and does the recent success of Central and Eastern European states provide an alternative model? (5) what is the relationship between politics, or political-economy, and development in MICs? (6) how have MICs been influenced by and adapted to the new international economic order? (7) what approaches are available to MICs to address pressing socio-economic issues? and finally, (8) what lessons are there for policymakers and development agencies in promoting rule of law and good governance in MICs? I conclude with some recommendations for future research.
{"title":"Law and Development in Middle-Income Countries: Conclusion","authors":"R. Peerenboom","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2205163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2205163","url":null,"abstract":"This concluding chapter summarizes the key findings, locates these findings within the existing literatures on law and development and related fields, develops policy recommendations for MIC governments and development agencies, and highlights areas for further research. The discussion is organized around the eight issue areas: (1) is “middle-income country” an analytically useful category? (2) is there a middle-income trap, are there various traps, or is it a myth? (3) what if anything do successful MICs share? (4) why have East Asian states been so successful, and does the recent success of Central and Eastern European states provide an alternative model? (5) what is the relationship between politics, or political-economy, and development in MICs? (6) how have MICs been influenced by and adapted to the new international economic order? (7) what approaches are available to MICs to address pressing socio-economic issues? and finally, (8) what lessons are there for policymakers and development agencies in promoting rule of law and good governance in MICs? I conclude with some recommendations for future research.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129784950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In June 2012 the EU set up the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) with the aim of supporting prodemocracy actors and of doing so quickly, flexibly, unbureaucratically and audaciously. But wishful thinking and reality are still separated by a wide gap: first, integrating all relevant EU institutions and Member States in the decision-making structures of the EED might hinder flexible action. Second, what the EED is seeking to achieve, actor-centred democracy promotion in complex situations of radical change, is a highly risky venture. Third, it is unclear how the EED is to complement existing EU instruments with similar tasks and how the fragmentation of funding structures can be avoided. Against this background, the effectiveness of the EED is contested. To ensure that the Endowment has a positive impact, numerous key questions have yet to be answered, since the Statutes are very vague in many places. It is for the Board of Governors, which will probably meet in September 2012 for the first time, to decide what form the strategic and operational decision-making and allocation procedures should take. Only if the EED is able to take political action flexibly and the continuation of its activities in a target country in the long term is guaranteed by other EU institutions or Member States can it represent a genuine added value for European democracy promotion. For this the following aspects are of relevance: 1. Flexibility of procedures: If bureaucratic decision making processes are to be avoided, it would be advisable for the Board of Governors to exercise restraint in the EED’s operational activities and to confine itself to the EED’s strategic orientation. The future Executive Director will have a key role to play in this respect. 2. Support rather than control: The Member States should either be more generous with their voluntary contributions to the EED or not use their voting rights in the Board of Governors. The more financial room for manoeuvre and political backing the EED receives, the more flexibly it will actually be able to act. 3. Contextual sensitivity: Compared to the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIHDR) and the EU Civil Society Facility, the EED will be able to add value if it cooperates closely with experienced non-governmental democracy promoters in the target country and joins with them in identifying shortcomings in the assistance provided. 4. Long-term promotion: The EED’s establishment should not result in the allocation of resources to actorcentred measures at the expense of an institutionally aligned policy. They may have no effect at all or even counterproductive effects if they are not backed by a clear political strategy. From the outset, ways of ensuring long-term follow-up assistance, through EU instruments as the EIDHR, should therefore be sought. 5. Reform of the EIDHR: It is crucial to continue the planned reform of the EIDHR on which work has already begun. After all, its shortcomings will n
2012年6月，欧盟成立了欧洲民主基金会(European Endowment for Democracy, EED)，旨在支持亲民主的行动者，并迅速、灵活、不官僚、大胆地支持他们。但是，一厢情愿的想法和现实之间仍然存在巨大的差距:首先，将所有相关的欧盟机构和成员国纳入EED的决策结构可能会阻碍灵活的行动。其次，在激进变革的复杂局势中，EED寻求实现以行动者为中心的民主促进，这是一项高风险的尝试。第三，目前尚不清楚EED如何以类似的任务补充现有的欧盟工具，以及如何避免资金结构的分散。在此背景下，人们对EED的有效性提出了质疑。为了确保捐赠基金产生积极的影响，许多关键问题尚未得到回答，因为章程在许多地方非常模糊。将由理事会决定战略和业务决策及分配程序应采取何种形式，理事会可能将于2012年9月举行首次会议。只有经济发展委员会能够灵活地采取政治行动，并且它在一个目标国家的长期活动得到其他欧盟机构或成员国的保证，它才能成为促进欧洲民主的真正附加价值。为此，以下几个方面是相关的:程序的灵活性:如果要避免官僚决策过程，建议理事会对EED的业务活动进行约束，并将其自身限制在EED的战略方向上。未来的执行主任将在这方面发挥关键作用。2. 支持而非控制:成员国要么更慷慨地向发展基金提供自愿捐款，要么不使用其在理事会中的投票权。EED获得的财政回旋空间和政治支持越多，它的实际行动就越灵活。3.背景敏感性:与欧洲民主和人权工具(EIHDR)和欧盟公民社会基金相比，如果EED与目标国家经验丰富的非政府民主促进者密切合作，并与他们一起确定所提供援助的不足之处，它将能够增加价值。4. 长期促进:环境评估署的设立不应导致资源分配到以行为者为中心的措施上，而牺牲了与制度一致的政策。如果没有明确的政治战略支持，它们可能根本没有效果，甚至适得其反。因此，从一开始，就应该寻求通过欧洲联盟的文书，如《欧洲卫生条例》，确保长期后续援助的方法。5. 《国际卫生报告》的改革:至关重要的是继续按计划进行《国际卫生报告》的改革，这项工作已经开始。毕竟，它的缺点不会仅仅通过建立一个新的机构而消除。
{"title":"The European Endowment for Democracy between Wishful Thinking and Reality: Flexible and Unbureaucratic?","authors":"Julia Leininger, Solveig Richter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2480126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2480126","url":null,"abstract":"In June 2012 the EU set up the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) with the aim of supporting prodemocracy actors and of doing so quickly, flexibly, unbureaucratically and audaciously. But wishful thinking and reality are still separated by a wide gap: first, integrating all relevant EU institutions and Member States in the decision-making structures of the EED might hinder flexible action. Second, what the EED is seeking to achieve, actor-centred democracy promotion in complex situations of radical change, is a highly risky venture. Third, it is unclear how the EED is to complement existing EU instruments with similar tasks and how the fragmentation of funding structures can be avoided. Against this background, the effectiveness of the EED is contested. To ensure that the Endowment has a positive impact, numerous key questions have yet to be answered, since the Statutes are very vague in many places. It is for the Board of Governors, which will probably meet in September 2012 for the first time, to decide what form the strategic and operational decision-making and allocation procedures should take. Only if the EED is able to take political action flexibly and the continuation of its activities in a target country in the long term is guaranteed by other EU institutions or Member States can it represent a genuine added value for European democracy promotion. For this the following aspects are of relevance: 1. Flexibility of procedures: If bureaucratic decision making processes are to be avoided, it would be advisable for the Board of Governors to exercise restraint in the EED’s operational activities and to confine itself to the EED’s strategic orientation. The future Executive Director will have a key role to play in this respect. 2. Support rather than control: The Member States should either be more generous with their voluntary contributions to the EED or not use their voting rights in the Board of Governors. The more financial room for manoeuvre and political backing the EED receives, the more flexibly it will actually be able to act. 3. Contextual sensitivity: Compared to the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIHDR) and the EU Civil Society Facility, the EED will be able to add value if it cooperates closely with experienced non-governmental democracy promoters in the target country and joins with them in identifying shortcomings in the assistance provided. 4. Long-term promotion: The EED’s establishment should not result in the allocation of resources to actorcentred measures at the expense of an institutionally aligned policy. They may have no effect at all or even counterproductive effects if they are not backed by a clear political strategy. From the outset, ways of ensuring long-term follow-up assistance, through EU instruments as the EIDHR, should therefore be sought. 5. Reform of the EIDHR: It is crucial to continue the planned reform of the EIDHR on which work has already begun. After all, its shortcomings will n","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"185 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116135841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the past 26 years, Uganda has carried out a series of economic and governance reforms. Throughout the 1990s, Uganda implemented the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and world Bank aimed at transforming the economy and encouraging economic development. The economic reforms were part of a wider reconstruction programme aimed at reviving the economy after decades of economic and political mismanagement. The reforms involved liberalising the economy to stimulate the private sector and make it the engine of economic growth. These economic reforms were implemented alongside extensive governance reforms aimed at strengthening state institutions, establishing accountability through anti-corruption institutions, promoting democracy and good governance through electoral reforms among others. Despite the timing of the economic and governance reforms, they were not linked or synchronised and each aspect was pursued independently of the wider reforms. In some instance like the creation of the URA and the tax reforms, there was a deliberate effort to shield the URA from the “political” institutions themselves. The argument in this paper is that this “blunted” and constrained the impact and success of the reforms both economic and political.
{"title":"Tax Reform in Uganda: Missed Opportunities and Prospects for State-Building","authors":"Dorothy Kwagala-Igaga","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2609357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2609357","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past 26 years, Uganda has carried out a series of economic and governance reforms. Throughout the 1990s, Uganda implemented the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and world Bank aimed at transforming the economy and encouraging economic development. The economic reforms were part of a wider reconstruction programme aimed at reviving the economy after decades of economic and political mismanagement. The reforms involved liberalising the economy to stimulate the private sector and make it the engine of economic growth. These economic reforms were implemented alongside extensive governance reforms aimed at strengthening state institutions, establishing accountability through anti-corruption institutions, promoting democracy and good governance through electoral reforms among others. Despite the timing of the economic and governance reforms, they were not linked or synchronised and each aspect was pursued independently of the wider reforms. In some instance like the creation of the URA and the tax reforms, there was a deliberate effort to shield the URA from the “political” institutions themselves. The argument in this paper is that this “blunted” and constrained the impact and success of the reforms both economic and political.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124408053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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