There is a rich literature in comparative politics discussing what makes democracies fragile and more likely to break down. The question has stimulated a substantial amount of research focusing on the fate of specific countries as well as on large cross-national comparisons over long periods of time. In the last decade several important works in political economy have advanced our understanding of some of the forces that systematically influence regime stability across countries. However, closer examination of the processes at work at the country-level indicates that some this literature’s claims are at odds with the historical evidence. In this paper, we revisit one historical event that has been repeatedly discussed by the literature on democratic breakdown: the rise and fall of Argentine democracy between 1916 and 1930. First, we demonstrate that socioeconomic factors do not furnish a convincing explanation for the 1930 coup. Next, we present an alternative explanation: we argue that the coup was the product of a polarizing political realignment that led to a legitimacy crisis. We examine our argument using estimates of Argentine legislators' latent preferences (ideal points) between 1916 and 1930. The roll call data analysis suggests that disputes over socioeconomic issues did not precipitate the breakdown of the regime. What mattered was the allocation of political power. These findings support the view that stable democracy requires that all major groups in society have a sufficiently large chance of being in power.
{"title":"Political Realignment and Democratic Breakdown in Argentina, 1916-1930","authors":"Eduardo Alemán, Sebastián Saiegh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1594412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1594412","url":null,"abstract":"There is a rich literature in comparative politics discussing what makes democracies fragile and more likely to break down. The question has stimulated a substantial amount of research focusing on the fate of specific countries as well as on large cross-national comparisons over long periods of time. In the last decade several important works in political economy have advanced our understanding of some of the forces that systematically influence regime stability across countries. However, closer examination of the processes at work at the country-level indicates that some this literature’s claims are at odds with the historical evidence. In this paper, we revisit one historical event that has been repeatedly discussed by the literature on democratic breakdown: the rise and fall of Argentine democracy between 1916 and 1930. First, we demonstrate that socioeconomic factors do not furnish a convincing explanation for the 1930 coup. Next, we present an alternative explanation: we argue that the coup was the product of a polarizing political realignment that led to a legitimacy crisis. We examine our argument using estimates of Argentine legislators' latent preferences (ideal points) between 1916 and 1930. The roll call data analysis suggests that disputes over socioeconomic issues did not precipitate the breakdown of the regime. What mattered was the allocation of political power. These findings support the view that stable democracy requires that all major groups in society have a sufficiently large chance of being in power.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133202913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There are compelling theoretical arguments as to why democracy should have a positive effect on environmental performance, yet the empirical findings are mixed. These mixed results are likely in part due to the fact that the mechanism linking democracy to the environment varies based on how the characteristics of specific environmental indicators relate back to the political process. I develop a theory that explains the relationship between democracy and the environment as a function of how visible the areas of environmental policy and performance are to the public. Using cross-sectional analysis and data from the Environmental Performance Index, I show that the provision of highly visible environmental public goods that affect human health is primarily a function of a country’s level of economic development, whereas the provision of less visible environmental public goods that affect ecosystem vitality is a function of both the levels of economic development and democracy. The finding that the effect of democracy differs across different areas of environmental policy suggests that the global spread of democracy will lead to environmental improvements in some, but not all areas.
{"title":"Democracy and the Environment: The Visibility Factor","authors":"Andrea Duwel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1582299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1582299","url":null,"abstract":"There are compelling theoretical arguments as to why democracy should have a positive effect on environmental performance, yet the empirical findings are mixed. These mixed results are likely in part due to the fact that the mechanism linking democracy to the environment varies based on how the characteristics of specific environmental indicators relate back to the political process. I develop a theory that explains the relationship between democracy and the environment as a function of how visible the areas of environmental policy and performance are to the public. Using cross-sectional analysis and data from the Environmental Performance Index, I show that the provision of highly visible environmental public goods that affect human health is primarily a function of a country’s level of economic development, whereas the provision of less visible environmental public goods that affect ecosystem vitality is a function of both the levels of economic development and democracy. The finding that the effect of democracy differs across different areas of environmental policy suggests that the global spread of democracy will lead to environmental improvements in some, but not all areas.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114068207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent development cooperation with Guinea-Bissau, focussing on good governance, state-building and conflict prevention, did not contribute to democratization nor to the stabilization of volatile political, military and economic structures. Both the portrayal of Guinea-Bissau as failed ‘narco state' as well as Western aid meant to stabilize this state are based on doubtful concepts. Certainly, the impact of drug trafficking could endanger democratization and state-building if continued unchecked. However, the most pressing need is not state-building, facilitated by external aid, yet poorly rooted in the social and political fabric of the country, but nation-building by national reconciliation, as a pre-condition for the creation of viable state institutions.
{"title":"Democratization Via Elections in an African 'Narco-State'? The Case of Guinea-Bissau","authors":"D. Kohnert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1553138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1553138","url":null,"abstract":"Recent development cooperation with Guinea-Bissau, focussing on good governance, state-building and conflict prevention, did not contribute to democratization nor to the stabilization of volatile political, military and economic structures. Both the portrayal of Guinea-Bissau as failed ‘narco state' as well as Western aid meant to stabilize this state are based on doubtful concepts. Certainly, the impact of drug trafficking could endanger democratization and state-building if continued unchecked. However, the most pressing need is not state-building, facilitated by external aid, yet poorly rooted in the social and political fabric of the country, but nation-building by national reconciliation, as a pre-condition for the creation of viable state institutions.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116310925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The EDSA ‘People Power’ of 1986 stands out in iconography and ideography of democratisation, both within and beyond the Philippines. Having paved the way for restoring democracy after over a decade of Marcos’s authoritarianism, conventional wisdom takes it as a critical turning point in Philippine political history. This is the idea that this paper seeks to re-assess by looking at the socio-political and discursive contexts within which it developed. Exploring two pathways to re-assessing EDSA ‘People Power’, it shows, firstly, that the extent to which the EDSA revolt may be considered as a critical conjuncture depends significantly on the assessment of, and meanings attached to, the Marcos years. In other words, that this event looms large as a critical turning point notwithstanding the ‘return to good old days’ in Philippine politics that it ushered, is a reflection of two parallel and mutually reinforcing developments: (1) the hegemony of global discourse on democratisation (2) and the strong anti-Marcos sentiments in the post-EDSA years that the segments of the elite, civil society and international players promote for their interests, both altruistic and self-serving. Secondly, this paper argues that EDSA cannot be assessed simply in terms of its immediate effects on formal economic and political structures. One has to look at democratisation process “from below”, which necessarily takes time and away from formal democratic institutions, to see the spaces it opened and the political energies it strengthened. A set of broader analytic lenses – ones that consider discursive resonances, that de-centre analysis from central state institutions, and that consider long-term changes in political culture – must be deployed in order to uncover the changes set in train by this event.
{"title":"A Historicised (Re)Assessment of EDSA ‘People Power’ (1986)","authors":"Rommel A. Curaming, Lisandro E. Claudio","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1716572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1716572","url":null,"abstract":"The EDSA ‘People Power’ of 1986 stands out in iconography and ideography of democratisation, both within and beyond the Philippines. Having paved the way for restoring democracy after over a decade of Marcos’s authoritarianism, conventional wisdom takes it as a critical turning point in Philippine political history. This is the idea that this paper seeks to re-assess by looking at the socio-political and discursive contexts within which it developed. Exploring two pathways to re-assessing EDSA ‘People Power’, it shows, firstly, that the extent to which the EDSA revolt may be considered as a critical conjuncture depends significantly on the assessment of, and meanings attached to, the Marcos years. In other words, that this event looms large as a critical turning point notwithstanding the ‘return to good old days’ in Philippine politics that it ushered, is a reflection of two parallel and mutually reinforcing developments: (1) the hegemony of global discourse on democratisation (2) and the strong anti-Marcos sentiments in the post-EDSA years that the segments of the elite, civil society and international players promote for their interests, both altruistic and self-serving. Secondly, this paper argues that EDSA cannot be assessed simply in terms of its immediate effects on formal economic and political structures. One has to look at democratisation process “from below”, which necessarily takes time and away from formal democratic institutions, to see the spaces it opened and the political energies it strengthened. A set of broader analytic lenses – ones that consider discursive resonances, that de-centre analysis from central state institutions, and that consider long-term changes in political culture – must be deployed in order to uncover the changes set in train by this event.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122326579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article divides as follows. Section I challenges the dominant approach to representation as an activity that largely rest on the shoulders of elected representatives to propose a relational understanding of democratic representation as resting on both active constituents and representatives. In this view, constituents’ activities are as legitimate and integral part of the practice of representation as elected representatives are. Section II analyses the two dimensions that are always present in the practice of democratic representation: a mirror and a creative one and how the latter relates to the issue of constituent and representative politics. Section III focuses on the debate about the democratic status and credentials of advocacy NGOs arguing that inherited notions of political accountability are inadequate as a conceptual tool to evaluate the role and contribution of advocacy organizations to the practice of democratic representation. The concluding sections argues for the need to redirect the debate from the issue of democratic credentials to the question of building bridging mechanisms to establish a more fluid communication between constituent and representatives that could result on a significant improvement of the degree of influence of the latter on decision-making structures.
{"title":"Constituents, Representatives and the Dual Politics of Democratic Representation","authors":"Enrique Peruzzotti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1653510","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1653510","url":null,"abstract":"The article divides as follows. Section I challenges the dominant approach to representation as an activity that largely rest on the shoulders of elected representatives to propose a relational understanding of democratic representation as resting on both active constituents and representatives. In this view, constituents’ activities are as legitimate and integral part of the practice of representation as elected representatives are. Section II analyses the two dimensions that are always present in the practice of democratic representation: a mirror and a creative one and how the latter relates to the issue of constituent and representative politics. Section III focuses on the debate about the democratic status and credentials of advocacy NGOs arguing that inherited notions of political accountability are inadequate as a conceptual tool to evaluate the role and contribution of advocacy organizations to the practice of democratic representation. The concluding sections argues for the need to redirect the debate from the issue of democratic credentials to the question of building bridging mechanisms to establish a more fluid communication between constituent and representatives that could result on a significant improvement of the degree of influence of the latter on decision-making structures.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"360 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116759497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A lot of changing in recent Indonesian political dynamics with eventual fact shows how political recruitment for legislative and executive chairs in national as well as regional levels in direct voting systems have brought the patterns of coalitions among political parties into interesting focus of observation. We evaluate the Regional Elections data held since June 2005 to September 2008 as election matrix. The matrix is then transformed into the ultrametric space yielding the hierarchical trees based on proximity on inter-party coalition. We represent the distance of coalitions among political parties based on the activity in regional elections and contrasting the findings with some nation-wide facts of the respective properties. The observations draws how Indonesian voters are failed to be segregated into any extreme political and ideological streams but the combinations among the existing and widely-recognized ones.
{"title":"Coalitions in Multiparty System: Empirical Reflection of the Indonesian Regional Elections","authors":"Ardian Maulana, Hokky Situngkir","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1400724","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1400724","url":null,"abstract":"A lot of changing in recent Indonesian political dynamics with eventual fact shows how political recruitment for legislative and executive chairs in national as well as regional levels in direct voting systems have brought the patterns of coalitions among political parties into interesting focus of observation. We evaluate the Regional Elections data held since June 2005 to September 2008 as election matrix. The matrix is then transformed into the ultrametric space yielding the hierarchical trees based on proximity on inter-party coalition. We represent the distance of coalitions among political parties based on the activity in regional elections and contrasting the findings with some nation-wide facts of the respective properties. The observations draws how Indonesian voters are failed to be segregated into any extreme political and ideological streams but the combinations among the existing and widely-recognized ones.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117347824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the effects of political competition on reform feasibility. In contrast to previous models, this paper shows that desirable reform may fail even in the absence of economic losers or informational asymmetries, as a result of democracy. Even if reforms were to generate economic gains for all agents, electoral gains remain a zero sum game. This model provides insight regarding the conditions under which critical elections take place as studied in the political science literature. If there is a majority party, minority parties are able to pursue low value (which do not lead to political shifts) and high value reforms (which cause a political realignment). Intermediate value reforms are harder to enact, as the electoral cost of reform is high for the dominant party. In contrast, in highly contested political environments, only high value reforms may successfully be enacted.
{"title":"The Effects of Political Competition on the Feasibility of Economic Reform","authors":"David Pinto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1357770","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1357770","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the effects of political competition on reform feasibility. In contrast to previous models, this paper shows that desirable reform may fail even in the absence of economic losers or informational asymmetries, as a result of democracy. Even if reforms were to generate economic gains for all agents, electoral gains remain a zero sum game. This model provides insight regarding the conditions under which critical elections take place as studied in the political science literature. If there is a majority party, minority parties are able to pursue low value (which do not lead to political shifts) and high value reforms (which cause a political realignment). Intermediate value reforms are harder to enact, as the electoral cost of reform is high for the dominant party. In contrast, in highly contested political environments, only high value reforms may successfully be enacted.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128961596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Endemic corruption is one the leading obstacles to political, economic and social development; corrupt acts not only undermine the rule of law but also hinder the effectiveness and sustainability of any reform programs. There is a recent trend, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, for governments to establish anti-corruption commissions - distinct, independent, national agencies charged with combating corruption. The multilateral development banks, aid agencies, and anti-corruption NGO's have all promoted the establishment of such bodies, claiming that they form an integral part of a country's National Integrity System ("NIS"). The recent UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) also makes specific provision for their establishment. However, anti-corruption commissions are costly to establish and to effectively run. Furthermore, they have often attracted criticism for being ineffective and politicized. The purpose of the paper is to undertake an institutional analysis of the value-added that independent anti-corruption bodies provide in an anti-corruption strategy, and identify the various models and factors that may make such bodies effective in the African state. This paper addresses the experiences of three established anti-corruption commissions in Africa, and assesses why they have proven to be successful or weak. These include:- Botswana's Directorate for Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC)- Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)- Kenya's Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC)The general arguments that frame the paper are that such bodies can play a critical role in the anti-corruption strategies of African states, provided they have certain structures and functions. Another objective of this paper is to inform those African states with newly established anti-corruption commissions or those that are in the process of establishing anti-corruption commissions, with some best practice guidelines.
{"title":"Anti-Corruption Commissions in the African State: Burying the Problem or Addressing the Issue?","authors":"Melissa Khemani","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1334286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1334286","url":null,"abstract":"Endemic corruption is one the leading obstacles to political, economic and social development; corrupt acts not only undermine the rule of law but also hinder the effectiveness and sustainability of any reform programs. There is a recent trend, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, for governments to establish anti-corruption commissions - distinct, independent, national agencies charged with combating corruption. The multilateral development banks, aid agencies, and anti-corruption NGO's have all promoted the establishment of such bodies, claiming that they form an integral part of a country's National Integrity System (\"NIS\"). The recent UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) also makes specific provision for their establishment. However, anti-corruption commissions are costly to establish and to effectively run. Furthermore, they have often attracted criticism for being ineffective and politicized. The purpose of the paper is to undertake an institutional analysis of the value-added that independent anti-corruption bodies provide in an anti-corruption strategy, and identify the various models and factors that may make such bodies effective in the African state. This paper addresses the experiences of three established anti-corruption commissions in Africa, and assesses why they have proven to be successful or weak. These include:- Botswana's Directorate for Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC)- Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)- Kenya's Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC)The general arguments that frame the paper are that such bodies can play a critical role in the anti-corruption strategies of African states, provided they have certain structures and functions. Another objective of this paper is to inform those African states with newly established anti-corruption commissions or those that are in the process of establishing anti-corruption commissions, with some best practice guidelines.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124994948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Decentralised, self-organised cross-border activities are increasingly shaping global policymaking. While state actors have lost ground, policy and economic networks have emerged as key actors, transforming international relations as well as national spheres. Academic discourse is following their activity, often focusing on "advocacy networks" and on the role of transnational actors within the transformation of the world economy and world polity. In contrast to these research activities, the approach proposed here extends the scope of inquiry to include the role of transnational networks in norm-building and norm-implementation. The networks under scrutiny here do not confine themselves to the articulation of particular interests, the resolution of particular conflicts, or compliance with legal norms. It is presumed here that a variety of networks which are fundamentally concerned with the creation of norms have emerged. The predominance of the nation-state, one of the main characteristics of modern democratic thinking, has eroded to the point where the fundamental nexus of voice (democratic participation) and entitlement (legal and social rights and duties) has been weakened or even broken. We presume that this decentration has fundamentally changed the option of voice as one of the most important responses by citizens to crisis and change. This comes to the fore with the emergence and effectiveness of transnational norm-building networks. The article develops a research programme, the outcome of which will shed light on this new resource for the development of a democratised world polity.
{"title":"Civilising Globalism: Transnational Norm-Building Networks - A Research Programme","authors":"Ulrich Mückenberger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1288049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1288049","url":null,"abstract":"Decentralised, self-organised cross-border activities are increasingly shaping global policymaking. While state actors have lost ground, policy and economic networks have emerged as key actors, transforming international relations as well as national spheres. Academic discourse is following their activity, often focusing on \"advocacy networks\" and on the role of transnational actors within the transformation of the world economy and world polity. In contrast to these research activities, the approach proposed here extends the scope of inquiry to include the role of transnational networks in norm-building and norm-implementation. The networks under scrutiny here do not confine themselves to the articulation of particular interests, the resolution of particular conflicts, or compliance with legal norms. It is presumed here that a variety of networks which are fundamentally concerned with the creation of norms have emerged. The predominance of the nation-state, one of the main characteristics of modern democratic thinking, has eroded to the point where the fundamental nexus of voice (democratic participation) and entitlement (legal and social rights and duties) has been weakened or even broken. We presume that this decentration has fundamentally changed the option of voice as one of the most important responses by citizens to crisis and change. This comes to the fore with the emergence and effectiveness of transnational norm-building networks. The article develops a research programme, the outcome of which will shed light on this new resource for the development of a democratised world polity.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126698415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The impact of economic development on democratization has long concerned social scientists, with prominent recent research focusing on the effects of economic inequality and factor specificity. Boix (2003) suggests that democratization is likelier when economic equality is high and factor-specificity is low. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that democratization is more likely when inequality is at middling levels. Both arguments assume that democratization is a function of autocratic elites' relative fear of the costs of redistribution at different levels of inequality. Drawing on contractarian political theory, we suggest that democratization is not about demands for redistribution from the elite; it is about demands for protection from the state. This alternative theoretical approach generates different predictions about the relationship between inequality and democratization, and suggests that land and income inequality impact democratization differently. Autocracies with unequal land distribution are less likely to democratize, while autocracies with substantial income inequality are more likely to democratize.
{"title":"Inequality and Democratization","authors":"Ben W. Ansell, David J. Samuels","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1144087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1144087","url":null,"abstract":"The impact of economic development on democratization has long concerned social scientists, with prominent recent research focusing on the effects of economic inequality and factor specificity. Boix (2003) suggests that democratization is likelier when economic equality is high and factor-specificity is low. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that democratization is more likely when inequality is at middling levels. Both arguments assume that democratization is a function of autocratic elites' relative fear of the costs of redistribution at different levels of inequality. Drawing on contractarian political theory, we suggest that democratization is not about demands for redistribution from the elite; it is about demands for protection from the state. This alternative theoretical approach generates different predictions about the relationship between inequality and democratization, and suggests that land and income inequality impact democratization differently. Autocracies with unequal land distribution are less likely to democratize, while autocracies with substantial income inequality are more likely to democratize.","PeriodicalId":126809,"journal":{"name":"Democratization: Building States & Democratic Processes eJournal","volume":"402 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124223606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}